ENHANCED NUCLEAR SECURITY REGIME

The nuclear renaissance has increased the importance of nuclear security, because the consequences of a major nuclear security incident would likely be catastrophic and global. The threat of terrorism and other malevolent acts involving the use of nuclear and other radioactive materials has led the international community to think about the enhancement of a strengthened nuclear security regime.

A comprehensive nuclear security regime comprises an effective ability to prevent and detect and respond to theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances or their associated facilities.

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Prevention requires the assignment of nuclear security responsibilities at all levels; a strong legislative and regulatory framework; the identification and assessment of threats; licensing and authorization; inspections and verifications;

stringent export control measures; and correctly designed and sustainable physical protection systems and measures.

Detection measures are required to be implemented for the discovery and assessment of an attempted or actual intrusion that could have the objective of unauthorized removal or sabotage of nuclear and other radioactive material.

Detection can be achieved by visual observation, video surveillance, electronic sensors, material accountability records, seals and other tamper indicating devices. Installing effective monitoring systems at facility entry/exit points and international borders is advantageous.

Response requires the capability to assess the validity and potential consequences of the nuclear security event, to locate, identify and categorize the material, to recover and secure/neutralize the event and device, and to prosecute or extradite those involved.

There are a number of multifaceted legally binding and non-binding instruments that call for the establishment of an international framework for an effective nuclear security regime. These instruments include United Nations Security Council resolutions 1373 (28 September 2001) and 1540 (28 April 2004), the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (and facilities), the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005) and non-binding IAEA documents such as INFCIRC/225, the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

It is necessary for States to adhere to and implement these instruments/standards in harmony to ensure effective nuclear security in a sustainable manner worldwide.

3. TSOs IN NUCLEAR SECURITY

TSOs are one of the important prerequisites for establishing and maintaining a sustainable nuclear security regime in a State. A comprehensive nuclear security regime requires specific expertise and trained human resources to provide guidance and solutions. For this purpose, it is necessary to know the available resources having expertise in areas such as the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, nuclear material accounting and control, detection and response, etc. Furthermore, expertise and experience are required in

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development is needed to improve the systems and their effectiveness. TSOs are developed to support the national organizations for specific guidance, training and expert opinions, etc., for their related functions.

A TSO may have a neutral outlook or an official umbrella; it may be a separate body or part of a regulatory body. In either of these capacities, TSOs are gaining increased importance for providing the technical and scientific basis for decisions and activities regarding nuclear safety and security. Therefore, the role and quality of the technical and scientific expertise provided by TSOs in the nuclear industry and regulatory systems are of fundamental importance. A TSO may be national, regional or international.

3.1. National TSO

At the national level, a TSO may be established either as part of a governmental body or in partnership with the public or private sector. The governmental body may be a research institute, a regulatory body or a totally separate organization.

TSO as a part of the regulatory body or an existing governmental body

Within the regulatory body, there may be a dedicated team of experts to analyse problems and render an opinion on issues related to nuclear security, physical protection, accounting and control, etc. A national TSO should have the capability, capacity and tools to assess and analyse problems and to suggest solutions based on technical logic. The TSO staff should include very experienced persons from the industry, the regulatory body, and implementing and operating organizations (maybe working as consultants), etc.; mid-career workers at the managerial level; and people in the early stages of their careers.

The experienced persons can suggest different solutions based on their multidisciplinary experience, while the mid-career workers can discuss the different options to select the best one, and the beginners can help in the collection of data and literature while growing into their jobs. All this requires interdependence, harmonization and mutual cooperation among the team members. Considering this, managers have to choose the right people to make up these teams.

TSO as a separate organization

A team of experts/consultants from various technical organizations such as the regulatory body, operating organizations, policy makers, manufacturers, etc., having experience in specific fields and readily available to provide assistance,

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guidance and training can join together to set up a TSO. Such TSOs can work simultaneously for the regulators, operators, manufacturers and policy makers, etc. These groups of people may be organized and sponsored by governments or NGOs, or may be volunteers.

National TSOs can work as a focal point for different national organizations to support their efforts, for example, by: suggesting methods that customs and other law enforcement agencies can use to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials; providing analysis and evaluation of physical protection proposals to regulators; assessing and detecting radiation doses for relevant stakeholders; and preparing first responders for response actions.

3.2. Regional TSOs

Those countries having modest nuclear or radiation activities may share resources and expertise, and establish regional TSOs. Small national TSOs of those States with specific capacities/capabilities can be integrated to create a complete network encompassing all areas of nuclear security. Such arrangements will help Member States to share resources and expenses and to benefit from each other in most of the desired areas for the provision of necessary guidance/assistance. International organizations such as the IAEA can help Member States to establish regional TSOs.

3.3. Virtual TSOs

Virtual TSOs with a dedicated team of experts may be formed without a central location and may provide assistance, guidance and training on issues related to nuclear security through the Internet or through other electronic means of communication. They may analyse a problem without meeting face to face and suggest a solution virtually.

Virtual TSOs/teams can help organizations/countries to reach the best talent/systems without geographical restrictions.

4. TSOs FOR ‘NEW BUILD’ AND EXPANDING COUNTRIES

The establishment of nuclear security TSOs is important for ‘new build’

countries as well as for countries expanding exiting programmes.

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Prerequisites for ’new build’ countries

It is a prerequisite for ‘new build’ countries to establish a regulatory body to regulate and supervise the activities related to nuclear safety, nuclear security and safeguards. In the current scenario, a country without a regulatory infrastructure would not be able to acquire even a radiation source for medical purposes. The regulatory body should be provided with adequate authority, competence, and the financial and human resources to fulfil its national responsibilities. The functions and decisions of the regulatory body should be supported by a national TSO.

The inspection, enforcement and analysis activities of the regulatory body should be supported by the TSO for the provision of expert opinion in related matters such as legislation and provision of regulatory advice on nuclear security issues, evaluation of physical protection plans for nuclear materials and facilities, material accounting and control reports/submissions, radiation detection techniques and dose rates, radiation spectrum analysis, import/export and non-proliferation issues, incident response and recovery methods, etc. (Fig. 1).

It is important to note that security considerations and physical protection requirements must be considered from the site evaluation stage to decommissioning of the facility.

TSOs for countries expanding their programmes

Those States expanding their nuclear power programmes also have to consider further actions. For example, by virtue of already possessing a

FIG. 1. Regulatory pyramid.

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regulatory authority, these States need to conduct gap analysis to find any weaknesses in nuclear safety, nuclear security and nuclear safeguards. This gap analysis will help them to suggest solutions to address these gaps. The regulatory body of the country should have the capabilities: to oversee nuclear security issues; to develop coordination with the relevant organizations in the country for threat analysis, and for information gathering and dissemination; to help recovery and response efforts in the case of theft, loss or sabotage of nuclear material or sabotage to nuclear facilities, etc.; and to develop a nuclear security culture for sustainability and maintenance of the nuclear security regime.

Guidance is available in the form of IAEA nuclear security documents and international legally binding and non-binding instruments.