EASI model

Van Kleef (2009, 2010) proposed a model (Figure 3.5) that unifies several findings in the role of emotions at the interpersonal level. The EASI model builds on research regarding emotion in a social functional perspective. Contrary to Rimé (2009), this author focuses on both explicit and implicit expressions of emotions. He also high-lights the fact that emotional expression serves affiliation as well as social distancing

(Fischer, Manstead, et al., 2016). It highlights that verbal and non-verbal expressions of emotions convey social information to observers, which in turn affect their be-havior. In other words, people observe the emotional expressions of others and are influenced by them. This process takes place consciously but also unconsciously.

FIGURE3.5: EASI model. Retrieved from Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead (2010)

According to the model, two core processes are mobilized when people come across emotional expressions. Firstly, emotional expression triggersinferential processes.

Individuals use emotional expressions as cues allowing them to infer social infor-mation. This social information can naturally concern the subjective feeling of the emoter but not only. Emotional expressions also help the observer to understand the status of the interpersonal interaction more deeply. These inferences may relate to the relational orientation (e.g., openness), attitudes (e.g., motivational disposition), and behavioral intentions. Consequently, the observer regulates their behavior ac-cordingly. For example, anger expression leads to infer that the observer has done something wrong and may elicit apologizing behavior. Conversely, an expression of happiness is a signal that things are going well for the emoter, which may make pos-sible cooperative behaviors. On a reciprocal basis, expressing emotions is also a way to elicit a desired behavior from the observer. For example, in negotiation settings, expressing anger involves more concessions from the other party than expressing happiness (Van Kleef, 2009). Secondly, emotional expressions elicitaffective reac-tionsin observers. First, emotional expressions involveemotional contagion, i.e.,

“the tendency to unintentionally and automatically “catch” other people’s emotions through their facial expression, vocalizations, posture or bodily movements” (Van Kleef et al., 2010, p. 54). For example, negotiators than express anger tend to elicit anger from their counterparts (Van Kleef, 2009). According to Van Kleef et al. (2010), emotional contagion can pervade the observer’s judgment through different types of affect infusion. Individuals would tend to use a “how I feel about it” heuristic to

infer the general tone of the interpersonal situation. For example, if positive feelings arise from the other’s emotional expression, the observer is likely to assume that the situation is safe and exploration is possible (see Broaden-and-Build theory, Fredrick-son, 2013). Futhermore, emotion experienced through emotional contagion can also last and shape the observer’s personal mindset through the creation of mood (mood management). People observing and feeling negative mood in return are likely to exhibit behaviors that relieve this feeling (e.g., helping others), whereas people who see and experience positive mood are willing to avoid strenuous activities that could spoil this interpersonal feeling (Van Kleef et al., 2010). Second, apart from emotion contagion, affective reactions generated in the observer may also affect thebuilding of impressionsregarding the emoter (e.g., personal liking). For example, employees form a more favorable impression of a happy leader than a stingy one (Van Kleef, 2009). Inferential processes and affective reactions can converge, oppose or influence each other. First, these two modes can converge each other when emotional expres-sion leads the observer to make inferences (e.g., she is confused) and elicit feelings (e.g., I feel empathy) that both provoke the same kind of behavior (e.g., give help).

Second, they can oppose each other when emotional expression lead the observer to feel a similar emotion that the emoter (e.g., I am angry because she looks angry to me) but make inferences (e.g., she is angry because she feels overwhelmed) that could provoke opposite behavior (e.g., support or fight). Finally, these two modes can influence each other when inferential processes themselves generate affective re-actions (e.g., I think she is angry because she is disappointed by me, I feel shameful) (Van Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef et al., 2010).

The authors also assume that the motivation to process emotional expression pre-dicts the resulting social decisions. Therefore, strategic inferences are more predic-tive of social decisions in competipredic-tive situations because observers would be more eager to analyze the meaning of their counterparts’ emotional expressions. In ad-dition, affective reactions such as emotional contagion are less present in this case.

In contrast, affective reactions are more predictive of social decisions when the sit-uation is perceived as cooperative because this motivation is reduced. Therefore, the perceived competitive or collaborative tone of the situation appears to be an essential determinant influencing the observer’s reaction to emotional expressions.

Depending on the type of situation (cooperative vs. competitive) and the type of emotional expression, different actions tendencies appear more or less prevalent (Ta-ble 3.4) (Van Kleef et al., 2010). Moving towardrefers to cooperative actions such as negotiate, make cooperative decisions, promote equity. Moving away implies non-cooperative behaviors such as interaction avoidance, emotional suppression, passivity.Moving againstincludes confrontation behaviors such as refusal to make concessions, refusal to coordinate, threatening postures.

Finally, as emotion is seen as information, the model assumes that the effects of emo-tional expressions are proporemo-tional to the thoroughness of the observer’s processing.

TABLE3.4: Social signals of emotions in cooperative versus competitive settings. Retrieved from Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead (2010)

According to the authors, this processing depends mainly on the individual’s epis-temic motivation, i.e., “his or her willingness to expend effort to achieve a rich and accurate understanding of the world, including interdependent others” (Van Kleef et al., 2010, p. 62). Cognitive styles influence epistemic motivation, which is more frequent in individuals exhibiting higher need to engage and enjoy “brainy” activi-ties, lower need for definite conclusions and structure and openness to experience.

In addition, a host of situational constraints can also influence epistemic motiva-tion such as cognitive load, noise, time pressure, fatigue, social power differences are posited to alter how much the observer processes emotion information. For ex-ample, people who feel in power over someone are less motivated to understand others’ emotional suffering. Competitive situations are also more likely to enhance epistemic motivation than cooperative ones (Van Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef et al., 2010).