On distinguishing between (T1) and (T2)

Walton’s “direct principles”

I understand that what I call simple principles correspond to what Walton calls

“direct principles of generation” as opposed to (T3) which are “indirect principles of generation”.

By Walton’s standard, directly generated fictional propositions are those which do not depend on any other fictional propositions. Indirectly generated fictional propositions are those which depend on other fictional propositions. To get back to Gregory and Eric: “This stump is a bear” is directly generated, since it is derivable from real world information and a (T2) principle like (11). By contrast, “There is a bear in front of Gregory” is indirectly generated, since it is derivable from the two fictional propositions that “There is a bear there” and “Gregory is there”.

This being said, one must refrain from identifying the directly generated fictional propositions with the explicit fictional propositions and the indirectly generated propositions with the implicit fictional propositions. As Walton readily observes:

Any inclination to suppose that the propositions whose fictionality a literary work generates directly are simply the ones its words express, given the language in which it is written, dissipates quickly. Many of these propositions are not fictional at all, most obviously in the case of works with “unreliable” narrators (such as Ford’sGood Soldier), and when they are fictional their fictionality is often implied rather than primary. It is

4Imagine a mad surgeon whose purpose in life is to make chimeras. He would surely try to make stump-bears.

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fictional that someone (the narrator) utters the words of the text, in many cases, and, if the narrator is “reliable,” this implies the fictionality of what the words express. Is it always fictional at least that someone utters the words in question: Does this constitute the core of primary fictional truths? No. Sometimes it is fictional merely that someone thinks those words without uttering them, or that they express his fantasies or dreams or desires. Sometimes, perhaps, there is no narrator and it is simply what is expressed by the text (taken perhaps in one or another nonliteral manner) whose fictionality is generated directly. It is not uncommon for readers to be very uncertain which of these alternatives obtains.⁵

So there are some reasons to group (T1) and (T2) into a kind. Although Walton does not distinguish between the two, I think Everett has indeed good reasons to distinguish them.

(T2) is prop-relative

The above example illustrates the difference between principles of type (T1) and (T2). Roughly, one sees that (T2) principles are coordinating some real informa-tion channels with a ficinforma-tional interpretainforma-tion of this informainforma-tion. This is the formal rendering of the intuitive “count as” or the “is” of identity holding between props and their fictional counterparts as in expressions like: dolls “count as” babies, or mud globs are cakes. More precisely, it creates a mapping between the individu-als of ordinary discourse and those of the fictional discourse. Consequently, talking about these stumps corresponds to fictionally talking about bears, although there is no actual bear.

Principles of type (T2) should thus be understood as modeling the function props have in a pretence. Props’ function is precisely to “count as” such and such within the scope of the pretence. One can see how props ground a kind of “objectivity” within the scope of a pretence by coordinating real propositions with fictional propositions in Everett’s framework.

Consequently, (T2) makes it the case that, in principle, many things that are true of the real-world prop will be duplicated in the pretence with the relevant fixes. If the stump is huge, it will prompt the imagining that fictionally the corresponding bear is huge. But not everything that is true will be thus duplicated. If it is true that the stump is a dead organism, it will not prompt the imagining that fictionally the corresponding bear is a dead organism. The line between what is so imported and left over is taken care of by (T3) principles, which we will discuss later.

5[Walton1990], p. 170.

In practice, principles of type (T2) are either conventional as in the case of dolls, or they are deployed only in the context of a specific pretence as in the case of Gregory and Eric playing with stumps. What is so remarkable is that we are very good at taking up on non-conventional (T2) on the spot and even those which contravene conventional (T2). For instance, it is very easy to establish a (T2) principle to the effect that dolls are fictionally evil creatures and not babies.

By contrast, (T1) principles are stipulated. They generate fictional propositions by fiat, without any corresponding object in the real world. Everett’s example is:

[^fP igs can f ly]^f

As such (T1) are much less “natural” that (T2) principles: the above example illus-trates this forcefully. The labels followlogical complexityand not conceptual priority.

It may very well be that the acquisition of (T1) principles is more difficult and comes later in development than (T2) principles as the level of abstraction suggests. But the labels are justified when we look at the complexity of the formulae.

Existentially conservative and creative pretences

I think Everett’s distinction between (T1) and (T2) is even more substantial. It is, I propose, the formal rendering of a distinction made by Evans between existentially conservative and existentially creative pretences.

Conservative pretences are pretences which quantify over the same entities than ordinary discourse, whereas creative pretences quantify over some other entities, not in the domain of ordinary discourse. Evans gives interesting examples of very basic creative pretences. One is the following. Take a practicing boxer who is, within the scope of his pretence, fighting an opponent. He would deal and dodge blows to and from the imaginary opponent. Let us call our practicing boxer Bob. It seems that the natural way to formalise such that (with F standing for “fighting against” and B for “being a boxer”):

[^f∃x(Bx∧F(Bob, x))]^f

i.e. it is fictionally the case that Bob is fighting with a boxer. But nothing cor-responds to this boxer in the real world: there is nobody opposite Bob in the real world.

The practicing boxer’s pretence is, in that respect, very different from Gregory and Eric’s one. (T1) principles are essential to the formalisation of existentially cre-ative pretences whereas (T2) principles cannot formalise them. Hence the importance of the distinction between (T1) and (T2).

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One way of putting it is that existentially creative pretences free themselves from real features of props. In the practicing boxer pretence,there is no prop which stands for the imagined boxer opposite Bob. These pretences are arguably “less rich”

that ones using props, for many things are left underspecified if not stipulated. For instance, one might say that the height of Bob’s opponent can be inferred indirectly by Bob’s punches: if [^f he punches his opponent in the face]^f then one can infer the height of his opponent, using a principle of type (T3). Same for his exact position.

But as for, say, the skin-colour of Bob’s opponent, it is arguably impossible to infer it. The only way to settle the matter would be to devise a (T1) principle to that effect.

This underspecification is a matter of degree though, for many things are also underspecified when there is a full-fledged prop. This phenomenon of indeterminacy in existentially creative pretences is at the core of the second part of this dissertation.

Existentially creative pretences and language

As for linguistic fictions, there are two cases which force existentially creative pre-tences. The first is when the φ in a (T1) principle is an existential formula. The second is when the φ in a (T1) principle contains a singular term which does not purport to refer to any real world individual. Indeed, as Evans eloquently puts it:

The kind of pretence which is involved in the conniving use of empty singular terms isexistentially creative; the pretence is not that something which there is is other than it is, but that there is something which in fact there isn’t.⁶

Conversely, an existentially conservative pretence is one in which the following schema is valid:⁷

[^f∃xφx]^f → ∃x[^fφx]^f

This tells us how we should interpret principles of (T1). They are a formal tool to track down one’s ontological commitments in arbitrarily complex pretences.

Here is an illustration of such tracking. Suppose, for instance, that one reads Leibniz’sMonadology without believing it at all but as a fiction. One will, roughly,

6[Evans1982], p. 358.

7Note that this formally corresponds to the Barcan formula in modal logic: ♦∃xAx→ ∃x♦Ax, which has generated a lot of metaphysical debates about so-called “actualism” and technical devel-opments in variable domain modal logics. See [Williamson2013] (§2) for a discussion of actualism and [Priest2008a(§15) for a discussion of variable domain logics.] This might be another interesting bridged between the modal account and the functional account.

have to imagine that for every real human being, there is a soul which is intimately related to it, and each one reflects the whole of the universe, etc. The principle of generation formalizing the first sentence will thus be (with H “being human”, S

“being a soul”, andR “being intimately related to”):

∀x(Hx→[^f∃y(Sy∧R(x, y))]^f)

This principle of generation is complex. Its overall structure is of (T2). However, one can easily derive from it that:

[^f∃ySy]

which is a (T1) principle. Such derivations of (T1) from complex (T2) principles are a formal tracking of one’s ontological commitments within complex pretences.

This last remark gives good reasons for holding that (T2) principles are con-ceptually primary and “more natural” than (T1) principles which are concon-ceptually derived, as suggested above. However, it also shows that they are a necessary feature of the general framework for one must be able to distinguish and model both the existentially conservative and the existentially creative pretences in pretence seman-tics.