D activities and the productive sectors of theeconomy, poses serious

difficulties for strengthening S & T capability. It is believed that proper coordination of activities and linkages would ensure the implementation of S& T policies and plans at the execution level, and proper application of R&D results at the production level.

45. By and large, coordination and linkages are either weak, inadequate on non-existent. As

a

result, there are many instances

in

Africa whereR&Dinstitutions have not yet had anyvisible impact on their potential users, i.e., the relevant sectors that would have used the results of the research activities. Unhealthy competition between the policy-making body and ministries, frequent changes in institutional arrangements with the accompanying changes in personnel hamper proper coordinationand linkages as well ascontinuity ofpoliciesand policy instruments. Needless to say, this results in wastage of scarce resources.

46.

The

above general constraints preclude the contribution that S

& T policies can make in socio-economic development. Therefore, there is a need to analyze the problems and consciously design policies that could remove these constraints. If these measures are neglected or if policies that might intensify the impact of the constraints are instituted, the contribution of S & T policies to development is bound to remain ineffective.

47. The second category of specific policy constraints refers to a number of economic nolicies which most African countries have adopted for many years. In manyAfrican countries, the public sector plays adominant role in socio-economic development. In viewofthe limited capability of the private sector, such a tendency is understan-dable, especially at the beginning of the development process. The development of physical and social infrastructure has naturally fallen within the domain of the public sector in Africa. Its role in the productive sectors of the economy has

also

been significant, in an

attempt to fill the gap of unsatisfied domestic

demand.

However, its grip over the economy bas remained very tight, without showing any signs of encouragement to the private sectorto enable it participatein economic activities. In particular, this has been the case in those African countries, like Ethiopia (till 1991), that espouse extreme socialism patterned after the ex-USSR system. Such a tendency bas prompted these countriestoadopt non-market oriented or non-competi-tiveeconomic policies. Other African countries that

have

adopted free-market economic'policieshave also failedin implemc:nting them.

48. The performance of the public sector in Africa has been disappointing, with some exceptions. In the foreseeable future, the public sector will continue to playa leading role in

infrastructura1

(physical and social) development, because the current stage of development in Africa cannot possibly attract participation of the private sector. Also, the same is true for some key industrial and miningactivitieswhich fall beyond the capability of indigenous private entrepreneurs, and which require special attention to develop.

However, African governments

need

to encourage the private sectorto participate activelyinservices, small

and

medium-scale manufacturing industries, farming(rainfedandirrigatedagricultureof different scales), through appropriate economic policies and S &T policies.

49. The public sector in Africa is characterised by poor manage-ment, low salary scales accompanied by low motivation, and problem of accountability, giving rise to inefficiency. The economic policies adopted by African governments not onlyignored the private sector, but also preventedit from participatingin economic activities through nationalisation process. Under

such

conditions, no matter how meticulously S & T policiesmight have been .designed they cannot possibly contribute to national development.

Ethiopia,

during 1974-1991, provides an "outstanding example of the crippling effect that wrong economic policies can bring about.

50. Ethiopia, with a total area of 1.22 million sqJan. and a population of over 50 million (including Eritrea), has potentially rich agricultural, mining and energy resources. Despite these favourable resources, however, the country has remained one of the least developed countries in the world. In particular, since the Dergue regime in 1974 took control and declared socialism in Ethiopia, the

economy has beendeteriorating,

Nationalisation of large..

and

medium-scale industrial and farming enterprises, and bringing virtually all export and import activities together

with

the trade distribution channels of the country under direct government control, left almost the whole economy in the hands of the .public sector. In the process, even some small private retail businesses and travel agents were put out of operation by either nationalising their assets or revoking their trading licences. As can be expected, in the absence of free entry to the market

and

competition, the economic policies of the

country were

grossly distorted. Under the circumstances, thanks to the poor performance of the public sector in Ethiopia, asinall African countries, coupled with the deep-rooted structural deficiencies as well as the disastrous years of the 19808 for

Africa,

the Ethiopian economy completely

collapsed.

51. In Ethiopia, agriculture is the largest and at the same time the weakest sector of production. The sluggish growth in overall produc-tion has largely been due to the virtual stagnation of output in the agricultural sector which has significantly influenced the levels of activity in the. other sectors. Mainly due to the severe drought of 1984/1985, agricultural GDP declined by about 10 percent in 1984, and by about 16 percent in 1985. Because of this significant fall, GDP declined by about 4 and 7 percent in 1984 and 1985 respectively. In

1989, again GOP declined

by 2.1 per cent and per capita income by about5percent. It is to be noted

that

in some years, particularly

after

years of sharp

decline, there were

some spurts of growth resulting from favourable weather conditions.

52. In addition to recurring droughts and absence of peace in the country, the other major causes for poor agricultural production were the disappointing performance of the inefficient huge state farms,

backward production technology used

by Ethiopian peasants, low

level of development of rural infrastructures, inadequate supplies of

modem agricultural inputs, environmental degradation, weak or backward^# organisation and

system

of production, and inadequate production incentives. .All

these hinge

on inappropriate economic policies.

53. The state farms were incurring huge losses. To start with, the farm projects were not' properly studied and the sites were in many instances chosenby

political leaders in

defiance

of adviceproffered

by well meaning Ethiopian professionals.

Many

farm managers were appointed for their politicalinclinationrather than for their professional competence. As a result, wrong technologies were appliedduring the operation of

the state farms, leading

to

high

production

costs far below

sales value. Despite this, high priority was given to the development of state farms in terms of budgetary

appropriation

and the provision of agricultural inputs. In this respect, Ethiopian peasants, each of whom hold on average from 2 to 2.5 hectares, were not only negJected, but also discouraged from cultivating theirlands

properly.

54. The peasants did not

have

access to credit and modem agricultural inputs (e.g. fertilizers, improved seeds, implements, etc.), unless they were organised in

highly

politicized producer and service

cooperatives that were supported

by government.

In

addition, the

peasants were required

to

contribute their produce and young men

for the war efforts perpetuated bythe regime. Also, producer prices

were,

highly inadequate and

discriminatory,

favouring state farms and producer cooperatives. As a result, the poor peasants becamehelpless and unproductive. Many

peasant

coffee growers were highly dis-couraged by the low prices

offered

by government who would

subsequently sell the producein the

domestic and international

markets

via the many public corporations set up for thepurpose. Due to price disincentives,many coffee peasantseithershifted from coffee cultiva-tion to the growingof maize and othermore.payingcereals, or resorted

to

more lucrative illicit markets to sell their coffee. Obviously~ this gave riseto low coffee production, low government revenue and severe foreign exchange shortage. It is to be noted, at this juncture, that in Ethiopia coffee accounts on average for some 60 percent of total foreign exchange earnings. It is, therefore, not difficult to

see the

adverse effects that such wrong economic policies can bring about to

an

already impoverished economy.

55. Inadequate supply of modern agricultural inputs in Ethiopia, regardJess of priority consideration between the state farms and peasants, can also be attributed to weak agricultural research in the country. Someofthe researchproducts, particularlyseeds,do not. have wide adaptability and in some agro-ecologies their superiority over 'traditional' varieties is minimal,ifat all. The weakness ofagricultural extension service is another problem. Inadequacies in logistical support and the heavy involvement of extension agents in non-extension activities have substantially decreased extension/effectiveness.

Additional problems in the adoption of modern agricultural technology include, as intimated earlier on, unfavourable input-output price relations, and limited availability and untimely delivery of inputs.

56. In industry, the situation is equallybad. The agricultural sector has been incapable of providing the manufacturing sector with adequate and cheap raw materials. As in the case of agriculture, the diminutive industrial private sector has been discriminated against in the supply of inputs. Also, with the exception of very few public sector enterprises,

all other industrial

sector establishments

were

ill-managed,

poorly

organised and over-staffed.

57. The manufacturing industry in Ethiopia is little :developed, accounting for about 11 per cent of GDP, 0.3 percentemployment of ,total active population, and 11 percent of total export earnings. About half

of

the total manufacturing contribution to GDP,

and

nearly 50 percent of total industrial employment originates from handicrafts

and

small-scale industries. Almost all manufacturing industries in Ethiopia

were

originally

set up

bythe

state or

by private

entrepreneurs, mostly

foreigners or foreigners as majority shareholders. During

the

Dergue regime, all major industries were nationalised.

58. Most of the industries (about 8(010) in Ethiopia produce consumer goods such as textiles, leather goods, food and beverages.

Chemical and metallurgical industries, which are the basis for -heavy industry, are stillin their embryonic stage. These sub-sectors do not produce fertilizers, chemicals, and

machinery and

equipment which

are

highly. demandedby the agricultural sector. There are, however, few metal fabrication workshops, a small scrap

iron

smelter, four cement .plants,

and -a

vehicle

and

tractor

assembly

plants.

59. Nearly all components of these industrial plants are imported, with the exception of the non-metal bulk building materials. In ^terms of value, about 93 percent of all indus~a1 spare parts is imported.

Almostall equipment, facilities and tools in most of these industriesare aged, and production suffers from frequent interruptions due to breakdown. The proportion of imported raw materials for industriesin Ethiopia is close ^to

50

percent of total value of

material

inputs. To

reduce

dependency, recently

some measures

have

been

taken

by

setting up a spare parts

manufacturing

plant, an

engineering

design and tools

centre, and a

pilot foundry. Their impact remains to be seen in the

future.

60. Factories recently established inthecountry have been capital-intensive, with about Birr

70,000

^per worker (at 2.07 Birr

=

1 US$).

Some of the projects were not

properly

studied and the issue of technology transfer was not adequately tackled in the absence of S

&

T

policy. As a result, the industrial sector has continued to

be highly

dependent on imports, and has

weak

forward and backward linkages

with

agriculture, the dominant sector.

61. The other sectors

of

the Ethiopian economy

have

also

not

been receiving

the attention they deserve. In the face of

budgetary

con-:

straints, these sectors usually receive residual budget, i.e., after budget

has

been appropriated for

defence,

security, agriculture and industry.

What remains after these allocations is usually small and

inadequate

for

Dans le document The influence of economic and development policies on science and technology in Africa (Page 128-135)