Chapter VII
Conclusion: New Pragmatic Nationalists in Europe: a new legacy for all nationalist political parties in Europe?
New Pragmatic Nationalists in Europe: experienced regional nationalists in times of economic crisis In this research, we have tried to demonstrate that, in the 21st century, the “usage” of Europe by regional nationalists has evolved as it has become cognitively twisted, economically driven and collectively performed. Our purpose was to demonstrate that for a certain category of regional nationalists - for new pragmatic nationalists - the European venue has gained a regional resonance as much it has brought real gains of political power to be collected at the national level of governance. In that sense, the purpose of this research was to clarify under which constitutional, personal and political conditions ethnic or civic regional nationalists could consider a successful, though realistic European venue to fulfill nationalist purposes at the regional ground.
Departing from the major contribution of Eve Hepburn (2007a) who has acknowledged a rational “usage” of Europe by all categories of political parties; we have decided to recapture this notion of “usage” of Europe, although we have kept it within the limits of a nationalist approach.
Additionally, based upon the first definition of “pragmatic nationalists” initially used by Michael Keating and Liebset Hooghe (1996) to identify a certain category of regional nationalists who used to consider the European venue to legitimize their nationalist aspirations by the means of a rational
“usage” of Europe, we have built our own definition. In that sense, we have argued that experienced regional nationalists in government have become new pragmatic nationalists as they have learned to rely on a cognitive ”usage” of Europe to justify further concessions of policy competences that are still legally shared in both layers of governance in order to induce regional citizens into their political plan and reach the legal threshold to endorse a new state reform. Finally, we have concluded that, this new generation of pragmatic nationalists have evolved as they have learned to adapt their strategy to a new policy cycle to legitimize their nationalist’s aspirations, no longer in Europe, but through Europe.
If the term “usage” can be defined as the act of using something to achieve certain goals (Jacquot & Woll 2003: 3), by using the term “usage”, we wished to identify changing rationalities of
“usage” employed by regional nationalists on a strategic interaction with the European Institutions to achieve renewed political preferences. Moreover, by the means of a qualitative and a comparative research, we have chosen two paradigmatic cases, which revealed evidences of a new rationality of
“usage” of the European institutions. Our purpose was to focus on positive cases, that is, on cases
where evolutionary trends of regional mobilization were present and consequently relevant to confirm our hypothesis. Additionally, since we wished to demonstrate that the “usage” of Europe can be applied to all categories of nationalist political parties, irrespectively of their nationalist credo or constitutional settlement, we have chosen an ethnic and a civic nationalist political party, on the one hand, as well as two regional authorities from two distinctive constitutional orders, a federal order and an unitary devolutionary state, on the other. Finally, we have chosen two regional nationalist political parties who were and have stayed in power during our period of research (2007-2012). As far as our theoretical grounding is concerned, we have applied an actor centered institutionalist approach (Mayntz and Sharp 1997) as it has allowed us to sustain how changing “perceptions” and
“preferences” within the limits of “bounded capabilities” have lead experienced regional nationalists into a new rationality of “usage” of the European Institutions.
In this research, we have demonstrated that the N-VA in Flanders, since 2004, and the SNP in Scotland, since 2007, have become new pragmatic nationalists as they have learned to rely on a territorial economic argument, bearing in mind the positive contribution of a new European policy cycle, especially in times of economic crisis to comply with their renewed political plan. Moreover, we have also argued that, in a clear contrast with the 90’’s, where formal or informal channels were rationally used by all categories of regional nationalists to legitimize their nationalist projects in Europe; in the 21st century, experienced ethnic or civic nationalists in government have learned to rely on a policy narrative (Shabahan et al 2011; Jones and Beth 201; Dardanelli 2010) embedded in a territorial economic argument to make sense of an advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), using informal channels as new “policy arenas” (Scot 1995a) to clarify the best policy options to be implemented in Europe and at the regional ground.
As we look into literature, an advocacy coalition framework stands for the North American conception of policy network, which, in a clear contrast with British tradition on policy network, is conceived as a tool of governance where public private partnership are set into place to solve collective policy problems. Moreover, an ACF constitutes a useful tool of analysis whenever mechanisms of policy change need to be investigated as much as when technical information assumes a predominant role in joint policy-making (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993: 16; Sabatier 199: 117). Last but not least, an ACF is conceived as a “belief system”, and it could be defined as a set of actors from both public and private institutions, at various levels of government, who share critical aspects of a “belief system” which is responsible for aggregating individuals into manageable institutional rules and actors – into policy coalitions - to achieve common policy goals. Within this sub-system, which include political and social actors linked together by a territorial identity bound, it is assumed that actors can be aggregated into a number of advocacy coalitions who share a set of
“policy belief” - also defined as “policy core belief” (ibidem) - and which, based upon these policy believes, act consequently in concert. The purpose of each coalition is to translate their belief into public policies or programs. Whenever applied in our research, we can consider that regional
nationalists have learned to make sense of an ACF to supply their need of “policy expertise” to translate their own policy choices in Europe and at the regional ground in order to comply with their renewed political plan.
The emergence of an advocacy coalition framework in Europe could also be linked to the literature on new regionalism (Balme 1996; Keating 1998b; Keating, Cairney and Hepburn 2008:1) and on spatial re-scaling (Brenner 2004; Bartolini 2005) which have also identified the inception of new policy systems of collective action, previously bounded by coterminous state boundaries. In the same light of thought, other commentators have identified an emergent, upward re-scaling of the traditional form of sovereign state from the national to the supra-national level, which would culminate, sooner or later in a new form of supranational statehood (Jessop 2004: 53). Consequently, it is within this general context of upward re-scaling that regional nationalists have chosen Europe as a new place of strategic governance where the development of a multi-level government could be seen as a transitional effect towards a supranational European state (Keating 2009c: 39; Jessop 2004:54). Therefore, the setting up of an advocacy coalition framework can be understood in the light of the emergence of economic governance that has become definitely multi-layered and polycentric (Hooghe and Marks 2004: 25).
However, for regional nationalists, “governance rescaling” can only be considered in the light of a new policy solution to clarify policy options, which would allow them to comply with a renewed political plan across layers of governance. In fact, for these experienced regional nationalists, Informal channels of regional interest intermediation have simply gained a new “policy role”, as they are providing the most suitable place of encounter to make sense of joint policy-making in a situation where policy expertise has become highly decisive for regional nationalists to comply with their renewed political plan. With this renewed political strategy, optimist regionalism is not back on track but Europe has opened a new policy window that has favored those who have learned to use a seductive territorial argument to comply with long-term political goals to be collected, finally, at the national ground.
The N-VA and the “usage” of Europe in the 21st century
The N-VA is a center-right Flemish democratic nationalist party that came into existence in 2001, mostly out of protest against a controversial state reform, the Lambermont state reform (Noppe and Wauters 2002). The N-VA is a civic nationalist political party which has a clear consciousness of Flemish cultural and linguistic distinctiveness but these elements are just part of a broadly defined civic identity. Now that the linguistic battle has been fully achieved in the sixties (Howell 2003:150), the Flemish sentiment is emotionally diluted, almost rational and highly pragmatic. In June 2004, the N-VA came back to power by the hands of a Flemish cartel sealed with the Flemish Christian Democrats (CD&V) but they had to face a minority position in government with one ministerial position only with Geert Bourgeois as Flemish Minister of Administrative Affairs, Foreign Policy, Media and Tourism. The N-VA has a short political existence, but they are experienced politicians. Even if they do not like to stand under the spotlights due to previous bad political experiences in federal governments of the past, the N-VA knows the meanders of political power.
They still believe in an independent Flanders even if they argue that confederalism should be the best political solution for Belgium. For the time being, their main focus stresses the reinforcement of Flemish institutions within this process of “evaporation of Belgium” (La Libre 2010206). In other words, the N-VA aims at a gradual institutional reform that Bart de Wever has labeled “political Darwinism”.
For the N-VA, the political imbroglios of Brussels, on the one hand, and the clear division of competences between the federal and the regional levels, on the other hand, are now their main concerns.
As far as Europe is concerned, as the most predominant inheritor of the Volksunie (Wauters 2005; Van Haute and Pilet 2006), the N-VA has always been very supportive of the European integration process and has retained many of the ideas that the Volksunie defended for Europe. Their approach to Europe has always been institutionally and economically marked as they used to perceive the European institutions as a platform to advocate a more radical vision of Europe where regions ought to be endowed with sufficient powers at the European level to protect and promote regional interests (Laible 2001: 235). In that sense, the Volksunie looked at Europe as a political opportunity structure where they could legitimize the federalist plan they advocated for Belgium (Lynch 2001).
Moreover, while Belgium would continue to exist with Flanders as a powerful region, the Volksunie supported a “Europe of the Regions and the Peoples”, though the notion of “people” was rather imprecise and vague. Finally, the Volksunie has also participated actively at the European Parliament, within the European Free Alliance-Democratic Party of the Peoples of Europe (EFA-DPPE) (Laible 2008: 129; Lynch and De Winter 2008:583). For these regional nationalists, Europe was rationally used as they expected to legitimize their cause by the means of a formal and individualistic presence in Europe.
206 In article from La Libre Belgique published on the 09/06/ 2010, “Le Drapeau Européen à la sauce N-VA”.
However, by the end of the 90’s, the N-VA became more critical of Europe as well as more irascible over Belgian dysfunctional political system. Today, the N-VA still portrays itself as the most pro-European political party in Flanders (N-VA European Manifesto 2009) but today the political practice has become more assertive and meticulous. While back in the 90’s, it was possible to imagine a “Europe of the regions” where Flanders could play a distinctive role alongside Belgium within the European Institutions; in the 21st century, the N-VA has lost its faith in Europe and has evolved towards concerns of regional economic governance to overcome the “Belgian obstacle”. For the N- VA, the best political strategy has remained “Europe with the Regions” but Europe is now raised as the best substitute for a dysfunctional Belgian sovereign state, which prevents Flanders from being responsible for its policies. In fact, even if Flanders is a powerful deelstaat within Belgian federal state, which includes a formal representation to the European Union since 1993 (Delpérée 1994; Theo Jans and Stouthuysen 2007), political consensus is very difficult to achieve which means that in practice, substantial economic competences are exclusively retained at the federal level. Moreover, a cooperative relationship has been defined by the means of a complex institutional framework (Leton 2001) but the system is not fluid or transparent. All Flemish political parties seem to agree on that assertion but the “usage” of Europe has been very limited and the extreme right nationalist party, Vlaams Belang, is very skeptical of Europe. In Flanders, Europe has become a national dogma but it has always been taken for granted (Deschouwer and Van Assche 2005). Flemish MEP’s have always worked on behalf of their personal agendas and Flemish economic stakeholders have always been excluded from the European project.
However, in 2004, the European reality was about to change as the N-VA realized that they could the benefits of a new European policy cycle to legitimize their nationalist cause no longer in Europe but through Europe. In other words, they realized that they could use the added value of regional economic resources in face of the European economic strategy to argue for further concessions of policy competences that are still legally shared in both layers of governance. In addition, the ability to use the reference of European economic targets as powerful guidelines to discipline Flemish governance would allow them to induce regional citizens into their political plan so they could reach the legal threshold to endorse a new state reform. Moreover, since the renewed political strategy could not be performed without the intervention of Flemish economic and social partners, the N-VA has proved to move successfully through Belgian political troubled waters using a territorial economic argument to make sense of an advocacy coalition framework, using the first regional office – Vleva - to clarify the best policy choices to comply with the European targets as well as with their strategy.
Therefore, by the means of a policy narrative embedded in a territorial economic argument, the N-VA has managed to convince Flemish political actors in government, namely the most charismatic Flemish political party the CD&V, that an advocacy coalition framework would be the best policy solution to clarify the best policy solutions to protect the economic interests of Flanders, both
in Europe and at the regional level of governance, especially in times of economic crisis. Vleva is a public-private partnership, which aims to represent the economic interests of Flemish social fabrics – les forces vives de la société – as well as to link divergent political actors and scattered economic Flemish stakeholders. Vleva has contributed to a new form of Flemish governance, where scattered Flemish political and economic actors, across layers of governance, have finally been dully articulated for concerns of economic efficiency. The result is a functional interdependence of public and private actors in policy-making, as the Flemish government would become increasingly dependent upon the co-operation and joint resource mobilization of policy actors in Europe. For the first time since the beginning of the European adventure, the European strategy was cognitively inspired, economically driven and collectively performed. However, as part of the Flemish government and beyond a simplistic patriotic sentiment, the N-VA expected to use Vleva to be able to play the European card to argue for the clarification of policy competences in Europe as well as to argue for the homogenous devolution of major policy competences that are still legally shared such as research, energy, environment and fiscal competences in Flanders. But since Velva is newly born institution with unclear policy goals and the N-VA is a minority political party in government, the N-VA has decided to use the European economic Strategy as the immediate solution to perform the economic recovery of Flanders.
Their political purpose is to be perceived as trustworthy political actors to the eyes of regional citizens in order to expand their small trench of political power at the regional and federal levels of governance while policy targets are being further clarified. In that sense, in 2004, the European theme has been fully reestablished with the slogan: “Nodig in Vlaanderen. Nuttig in Europa” [needed in Flanders, useful in Europe]. At the European elections of June 2009, the title of their manifesto207 speaks for itself: “Sterker Vlaanderen, sterker Europa, minder crisis” [more Flanders, stronger Europe and lesser crisis]. With this renewed political strategy, political legitimacy has been expanded at the regional elections of June 2009, with 13,15% of the votes. Geert Bourgeois has become the vice- president of Flanders as well as he has become the visible face of the third version of the Flemish economic program called ViA, Flanders in Action. Additionally, at the federal elections of June 2010, political legitimacy has been confirmed with 30% of the votes and a new state reform has been launched through nationalist impetus though without nationalist support. For the time being, the year 2014 is their political milestones as they expect to win the presidency of Flanders as well as to conquer a better position at the Federal government to endorse a new state reform. For the N-VA, the political battle is not over yet, since Vleva has not delivered its full potential. Irrespectively of the electoral results, what it is certain is that political pressure is expected to rise in Belgium, as the N-VA hopes to be capable of using the European argument to force federal partners into a confederalist solution for Belgium and for Flanders.
207 In http://www.n-va.be/verkiezingen/programma/europees1.asp retrieved in June 2009.
The SNP and the “usage” of Europe in the 21st century
The SNP is a regional nationalist political party that came into existence in 1934. The SNP has always strived for the political independence of Scotland, though it has always been the victim of its own political inexperience and turbulent political pathway. The SNP can be defined as a party that supports independence rather than a party of the left, right or center (Lynch 2002). This particular feature makes it distinctive from many of its European contemporaries (De Winter and Tursan 1998) as well as it makes it ideologically different. The key point about the SNP is that can be defined as an
“independence party”, which places the party in a grey zone between ethnic and civic nationalism. To that respect, we could argue that the nationalism of the SNP reflects Gellner’s view fairly clearly, aided by Scottish history and Scotland “sense of itself” (Lynch 2002: 3).
The geographical territory of Scotland has been recognized since the wars of independence of the fourteenth century. Scotland does not have areas of territory contested with other ethnic groups or nations. The Scottish nation is well defined irrespectively of where Scottish people stand within national constitutional issue. In fact, Scotland possesses a global national brand208 (Scottish Government 2009), which makes everyone Scottish irrespectively of personal opinions regarding Scottish constitutional debate. Scotland has a consistent territory, strong national institutions and a long sense of its own history. Institutions such as the Church of Scotland, a separate legal system and a distinctive education system have all assisted in giving Scotland a sense of itself as a separate entity from the rest of the UK (Kellas 1989). Whilst history, culture and tradition may be important to Scottish nationalism in the broadest sense – in terms of providing the raw materials of a nation –such factors are nor especially important to the program of the SNP. The SNP is not driven by history, language, culture or tradition in the sense of seeking to restore Scotland’s past glories or concern with the folkloric past. Rather, the SNP is a modern nationalism and a modernizing phenomenon in Scottish politics, which has always been used to suit their changing political goals both in Scotland and in Europe. A belief in the efficiency of Scottish self-government and a desire for the economic improvement of Scotland has been the twin drives motivating people to join the SNP rather than cultural issues (Lynch 2002:4).
In Europe, the SNP has always acted as an opportunistic actor who has always used Europe to its own political convenience to manage a difficult relationship with the center. As we look into history, the SNP has evolved from a critical European political party in the 70’s towards a pro- European political party in the 90’s who believed that it could use Europe as an external shied to spread its political message of impendence in Europe (Keating and Hooghe 2001: 272; Dardanelli
208 The 2009 Nation Brand Hexagon shows that Scotland continues to have a strong and fairly balanced image rating as a top twenty country on five of six dimensions which are Tourism, governance, people, culture, immigration and export. Export is still one area of reputation where those surveyed do not distinctively recognize Scotland’s reputation. This report has been carried out but the Scottish Government in 2009. In “The Anholt GFK – Roper’s nation brand Index: summary report for Scotland 2009”, 2010, Europe and International Affairs, Scottish Government. This report is available on Scottish Government Social research website in www.scotland.gov.uk/socialresearch. Report was consulted and downloaded in April 2010.
2005: 87). As an opposition party in the 90’s, the SNP was highly supportive of Scotland Europa – a platform for Scottish interest established in 1992 by the Scottish Labor (Keating and Hooghe 2006:276) even before devolution - but the SNP has always been very critical of Scottish Labor’s support to the UK line to secure Scottish interests in Europe. In that sense, it has always privileged a formal position at the European Parliament, within the EFA group, to make sense of policy distinctiveness in order to spread its political message of political independence. The relationship with the center has always been highly confrontational and individualistic. In other words, the “usage” of the European institutions was rationally inspired as formal presence at the European Parliament was used as a means to prescribe, proscribe and permit a certain behavior in exchange of a personal utility.
However, by the end of the 90’s, the SNP fell into European disillusion as they stopped hoping for the political recognition of Scotland in Europe and realized that a real position in government was absolutely required to have some influence over the system. Therefore, in spite of the European impetus in the 70’s and 90’s to anchor their political message of “independence in Europe”, the SNP is fully aware that Scottish legal sovereignty remains in Westminster, as well as Scotland remains part of the asymmetrical devolutionary unitary British political state (McGarvey and Cairney 2008:11).
Moreover, the Scotland Act of 1998 have set out a clear list of reserved powers which UK State institutions in Westminster and Whitehall retain, with the rest falling under the jurisdiction of the Scottish Parliament and Government. If devolution ceded responsibility for major EU policy areas such as agriculture, fisheries and the environment to the Scottish Parliament, European matters remained a matter reserved to Westminster as stated by Schedule 5 of the Scotland Act (Lynch 2001:
157).
In the 21st century, Europe has remained an essential element of the independence package to move Scotland forward209 (SNP Manifesto 2007) but political maturity has brought temperance to passionate political ambitions as much as the added value of Scottish natural resources in face of a new European policy cycle has opened new perspectives to legitimize their nationalist cause through Europe. For these experienced regional nationalists, the political purpose is to use the European argument to justify further concessions of policy competences that are still legally shared in both layers of governance as well to induce Scottish citizens into their political plan so they could reach the legal threshold to endorse a new state reform. Even if for Scottish stakeholders the policy process has only slightly changes, as it has became more policy targeted, what the SNP expects to achieve politically with it has. In other words, the SNP has decided to follow Scottish Labour’s footsteps using an obvious sense of Scottishness, that is, a territorial economic appeal, to perform a renewed political plan.
209 “Moving Scotland Forward” is the label used by Alex Salmond to deploy its ambitious and optimistic political strategy since he came back to power in May 2007. It can be consulted in http://www.scotlandforward.net/ retrieved in May 2012.
Therefore, since they came into office, the SNP has immediately returned to Scotland Europa, using the benefits of a public private partnership to guide Scottish stakeholders into the policy demands of an advocacy coalition framework, using Scotland Europa as a renewed strategic arena to articulate a nationalist policy strategy to be implemented both in Europe and in Scotland.
Additionally, for the SNP, working in partnership with Scottish stakeholders has become a key element of the European strategy to get Scotland into more de facto competences in Europe, namely in energy as well as to legitimize their policy options to make Scotland a leading economic region in Europe. For the SNP, the European strategy has become cognitively twisted, economically driven and collectively performed. Additionally, an ACF has become an instrument of governance in a multi-level context, as much as Scotland Europa has gained a new “policy” role.
“Continuity” is the best word to qualify the political attitude of the SNP in Europe. Apart from a selective discursive approach to Europe to enhance Scotland’s political profile, in substance, the SNP has replicated Scottish Labor’s strategy by adding a regional resonance to it. In Europe, it has immediately tried to push the boundaries of British constitutional settlement by getting Scotland into energy whereas in Scotland the SNP has privileged strong Scottish economic sectors such as energy and research sectors, using Europe as the perfect back-up scene to demonstrate that Scotland possesses the natural resources to perform better economically, especially in times of economic crisis, if it could be fully responsible for its policies. In that sense, by the means of an European argument, they have pushed for truly Scottish policies both in Europe and at the regional ground, covering traditional and new policy areas, in order to justify further concessions of policy competences in both layers of competences.
With this renewed political strategy, a majority government has been achieved in May 2011 and in 2012 a new referendum on political independence has already been scheduled for autumn 2014. Moreover, in January 2012, a consultation paper on the referendum has been launched and in October 2012, an agreement between the Scottish Government and the UK government - the Edinburgh Agreement - has been signed. With this agreement, Holyrood has been granted the powers to hold a single-question independence referendum by the end of 2014. It has also been agreed that the Scottish Parliament would be responsible to decide on the wording of the question. Even though the referendum will be confined to one question on political independence and Alex Salmond would have rather opted for full economic independence, that is, for an enhanced form of devolution or devolution max. Moreover, despite recent increases of support for independence, in January 2012 (Ipsos MORI 2012a), only a third of Scots – 37% - were supporting full independence against a vast majority – 71% - supporting Devolution Max. For the time being, the year 2014 is their next political milestone but until then the SNP will have to keep on proving that Scotland “has all it needs” to flourish and that they are trustworthy political actors who deserve to lead the destiny of a modern country that has come to terms with Europe.
Conclusion: New Pragmatic Nationalists in Europe: a new legacy for all nationalist political parties in Europe?
Now that we have concluded our journey of intellectual search, we believe that we have answered the questions we asked ourselves at the beginning of our research. Intriguing facts have been solved and reasoning disorder has found its way back to normality. Therefore, by the means of an actor centered institutionalist approach, we have laid the basis of a new theory of “usage” of Europe. Moreover, if a “paradigm” can be defined as an intellectual framework comprising interrelated values and assumptions which sustain a general explanation for a particular phenomenon, then we strongly believe that this renewed theory of “usage” of Europe has also laid the basis of a new paradigm of “usage” of Europe that could be addressed by all categories of regional nationalist political parties in power for four main reasons.
First, because the European venue can only be considered by regional nationalists in government, even in a minority position; second, because the European logic prevailing in Europe has leveled the benefits of “privileged” constitutional orders, that is, regional authorities with international competences; third, the political strategy is economically driven and patriotically sustained and fourth, since this strategy aims at justifying further concessions of policy competences that are legally shared and since all constitutional orders have constitutional “flaws” as they have evolved from unitary states, then it model of “usage” of Europe can be applied to all categories of political systems. In other words, this renewed political strategy is simultaneously efficient and effective: it is efficient as it relies on a patriotic economic behavior, which has the power to instill policy cooperation beyond the limits of ideology and it is effective as it has the power to collect real gains of political autonomy at the national ground. Based upon these arguments, we strongly believe that all categories of nationalist political parties could benefit from this strategy, irrespectively of their national constitutional settlement or nationalist credo, as long as they possess the ability to anchor a political strategy embedded in “identity” without sticking to strict politics of nationalism.
In that sense, this intellectual reasoning could be exported to other relevant case studies and it could be used as a guiding map to explain the political success of the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) and of the Convergéncia i Unió (CiU) on last regional elections of October 2012. On the opposite side, it could also help us to understand the political failure of the Bloco Nacionalista Galego (BNG) in Galicia on last elections of November 2012 and of the political failure Plaid Cymru (PC) in Wales on the elections of 2011. In fact, even if these regional nationalist political parties have remained overtly pro-European, only the PNV and the CiU have been able to “fit” long-term constitutional goals with Europe. Moreover, when it comes to the BNG and Plaid Cymru, it seems that they have been
“bypassed” by major opposition political parties, namely the Partido Popular Galego (PPdG) and the Welsh Labour, who have caught the European spirit to boost regional economy (2012 PPdG Party Manifesto and 2011 Welsh Labour Party Manifesto). Therefore, as we look into party manifestos;
whereas in the case of the PNV (Party Manifesto 2012) and of the CiU (Party Manifesto 2012), the reference to the European 2020 strategy is very present and obvious; in the cases of the BNG (Party Manifesto 2012), and of the Plaid Cymru (Party Manifesto 2012), the European reference is absent.
To conclude, we could argue that regional mobilization in Europe has definitely changed and that only those who will be able to overcome the European disillusion with pragmatism will be well succeeded on their European venue.
For the time being, the year 2014 has become the magical number for regional nationalists to achieve greater electoral success across Europe. In fact, the N-VA will run the European, the regional and federal elections in 2014; the SNP will run the referendum in 2014; and the Catalan nationalists in coalition expect to run a referendum on the political independence of Catalonia in 2014. “Urgency”
seems to be the last key word to be retained since they all want to reap the benefits of the psychological impact of the economic crisis before it disappears.
