PHD thesis in Political Science
New Pragmatic Nationalists in Europe:
Experienced Flemish and Scottish Nationalists in times of economic crisis
(2004-2012)
Sandrina Ferreira Antunes
PhD Advisor:
François Foret
Members of the Jury:
Jean-Benoit Pilet (Université Libre de Bruxelles) John Loughlin (University of Cambridge) Justine Lacroix (Université Libre de Bruxelles) Peter Bursens (University of Antwerp)
Brussels
To my parents,
To those who have always been there for me.
First, I would like to thank my PHD advisor, François Foret, who has always supported me, even when I was still looking for answers that I couldn’t articulate properly. He has certainly dealt with my excessive enthusiasm with kindness, patience and respect. I can only be grateful for his honest remarks and for the working conditions he has provided me at the ULB. Second, I would like to thank all the political actors that I have interviewed for the quality of their answers and for the long hours they have invested in me. Moreover, I would like to thank all the scientific boards and individual feedbacks that I have received throughout the way. More particularly, I would like to thank Caitriona Carter (University of Edinburgh) for opening me the doors of the Europa Institute at the University of Edinburgh. I would like also to thank Christopher Weible (University of Colorado Denver) who has helped me with the many nuances of an Advocacy Coalition Framework analysis. Finally, I would like to thank the Portuguese Ministry of Research (FCT) and the ULB for the financial support they have provided me with as they have made my journeys in Brussels and in Edinburgh possible. Last but not least, and in a more personal tone, I would like to thank my parents who have taught me the language of perseverance as well as my family, friends and colleagues – in Portugal and in Brussels - who have always supported me in good times and, especially, in bad times.
“Most of the time it is said that we are in Brussels and that we don’t need to have an institution in Brussels but Europe ignores us because Europe works on a national logic. Therefore, if Brussels does not come to us, we need to come to them. (…) In Belgium, we have had a big fight for our language, but now we want more autonomy for our people, we want to have more responsibility upon our policies. This is the basis of our nationalism.”
Frieda Brepoels, N-VA MEP at the European Parliament Brussels, February 2010
“Europe is seen as a kind of a saving element of this lack of Belgitude but Europe is also seen as a compensation for this lack of governance within Belgium. (…) We are pretty aware that Europe is important as a stabilizing factor, economically, financially and politically speaking (…). What we try to do is to overcome the Belgian obstacle and we try to use the European institutions also as a tool to discipline our own administration and our own way of governing our region.”
Flemish Representation to the European Union, Brussels, January 2010
Scotland
“When the SNP came into power, they started to look for new opportunities, particularly in energy.
The SNP realized that they could use Europe to advance their own policy objectives about creating investment in Scotland and renewable energy. Alex Salmond saw that in 2005, 2006.
The SNP perceived that they could use Europe to advance their policy objectives and that Europe could become a powerful against the UK government.”
SNP Scottish Energy Political Adviser Scotland, April 2010
“Scotland is regarded as a nation regardless of where you stand on the issue of Scottish constitutional future. Scotland doesn’t come to Europe for cultural recognition: Europe is about influence, it is about getting access to channels and to political decisions (...) I think the SNP is more strategic, and I suspect they will continue that practice. Especially, if they feel that this strategy has more benefits for Scotland, so I think they will look for continuity. This has nothing to do with the politics of nationalism: it has to do with “what works” and with what delivers outcomes. This has to do with effectiveness”.
Nicola McEwen, University of Edinburgh, Scotland, April 2010
In the 90´s, Europe used to be depicted as the most privileged political arena for regional nationalist political parties to access for “more” political power. In that sense, whereas formal channels of regional interest representation were taken for granted by those standing within federal political systems; informal channels of regional interest representation were highly valued by regional nationalists standing in decentralized or devolutionary constitutional settlements. In spite of nuanced institutional preferences, Europe was rationally inspired (Ostrom 2005) as it used to be perceived as an aggregation of formal-legal structures that could be used as a means to prescribe, proscribe and permit a certain behavior in exchange of a personal utility. Moreover, regional nationalists were policy “maximizers” who acted in isolation, away from the center, using their own limited political resources to maximize their policy gains by pursuing distinctive forms of political autonomy. However, by the end of the 90’s, both categories of regional nationalists plunged into European disillusion due to the limits of a sovereign logic prevailing in Europe.
However, in the 21st century, as soon as a new European policy cycle started to emerge and the economic crisis started to cripple, experienced regional nationalists realized that they could use the benefits of regional economic resources in face of the European Economic strategy to justify further concessions of policy competences that are still shared, either in theory or in practice, as well as to argue for new ones. The political plan would consist of using the reference of the European Economic targets to deliver policies, which would allow them to legitimize their nationalist aspirations, in both layers of governance, as well as to induce regional citizens into their political plan so they can finally reach the legal threshold to endorse a new state reform. Moreover, since they were rationally bounded, in the sense that they were lacking the policy expertise to perform these goals, they have learned to rely on a policy narrative (Shabahan et al 2011; Jones and Beth 2010; Radaelli 2010) embedded in a territorial economic argument to make sense of an advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), using informal channels of regional interest intermediation as “cognitive” structures (Scot 1995a) to articulate a policy strategy to be implemented in Europe and at the regional level of governance.
Therefore, and irrespectively of nuanced constitutional settlements, all experienced regional nationalists have returned to the center, using informal channels as an instrument of governance (Salamon 2002) to clarify the best policy options to be implemented in both layers of governance.
In other words, regional nationalists have become “policy satisficers” (Simon 1954) who have learned to forgo immediate satisfaction in Europe to collect major gains of political power across multiple layers of governance. If the term “usage” can be defined as the act of using something to achieve certain political goals (Jacquot and Wolf 2003), in this research, we will apply the concept of “usage” to demonstrate that experienced regional nationalists in government have moved from a rational to a cognitive “usage” of the European institutions to perform renewed political preferences across multiple layers of governance.
Departing from an actor centered institutionalist approach (Mayntz and Sharp 1997), we will demonstrate that the N-VA in Flanders, since 2004, and the SNP in Scotland, since 2007, have become new pragmatic nationalists. In that sense, we will argue that, in a clear contrast with pragmatic nationalists of the 90’s who expected to legitimize their nationalist aspirations in Europe by the means of a rational “usage” of the European institutions; experienced regional nationalists have become new pragmatic nationalists as they have learned to rely on a cognitive “usage” of the European institutions to legitimize their nationalist aspirations, no longer in Europe, but through Europe.
We will then conclude that in the 21st century, and against traditional dogmas of the 90’s, the “usage” of Europe by regional nationalists is cognitively twisted, economically driven and collectively performed. It embraces all experienced regional nationalist political parties in government, irrespectively of their constitutional settlement or nationalist credo, as long as they possess the ability to anchor a political strategy embedded in “identity” without sticking to strict politics of nationalism.
INDEX
Abstract ... v
I - Introduction: New Pragmatic Nationalists in Europe: experienced Flemish and Scottish Nationalists in times of economic crisis ... 1
II – New Pragmatic Nationalists and the “usage “of Europe ... 12
2.1. Regional nationalists and the “usage” of Europe: a definition ... 12
2.2. An actor centered institutionalist approach ... 15
2.2.1. Regional nationalists and the “usage” of Europe in the 90’s ... 17
2.2.2. Regional nationalists and the “usage” of Europe in the 21st century ... 22
2.2.3. Conclusion: from rational to cognitive “usage” of Europe ... 29
2.3. New Pragmatic Nationalists and the “usage” of Europe: type, elements, logics and ends ... 31
2.3.1. The type of “usage”... 31
2.4.1.1. A cognitive “usage” for strategic ends ... 31
2.3.2. The elements of “usage” ... 32
2.3.2.1. Immaterial ... 32
i. A policy narrative embedded in territorial economic argument ... 32
2.4.2.2. Material ... 32
i. Informal channel of regional interest representation ... 32
2.3.3. The logics of “usage” ... 33
2.3.3.1. At the European level ... 33
i. Influencing logic ... 33
2.3.3.2. At the regional level ... 33
i. Legitimizing logic ... 33
2.3.3.3. At the National level ... 34
i. Positioning logic ... 34
2.3.4. The ends of “usage” ... 35
2.3.4.1. At the European level ... 35
i. Political influence ... 35
2.3.4.2. At the Regional level ... 35
i. Political legitimacy ... 35
2.3.4.3. At the national level ... 35
i. Political autonomy ... 36
2.3.5. Conclusion: a renewed nationalist political strategy in a multi-level system of governance ... 37
III - Methodology: Epistemology, Methods and Techniques ... 39
3.1. Methodology: epistemology, methods and techniques ... 39
3.1.1. Epistemology: an interpretative research ... 39
3.1.2. Methods: a qualitative and a comparative research ... 40
3.1.3. Techniques: in-depth interviews and a thematic analysis ... 40
3.1.3.1. Collecting data: between the “narrative” and the “responsive interviewing” model ... 40
IV - The N-VA and the “usage” of Europe ... 47
4.1. The N-VA, from Flanders to Europe ... 47
4.1.1. The N-VA in Flanders until 2004 ... 52
4.1.1.1. Who is the N-VA? ... 52
4.1.1.2. The N-VA and the political puzzle ... 56
4.1.1.3. The N-VA and the cultural puzzle ... 63
4.1.1.4. Conclusion: a civic political party with a minority position in government ... 69
4.1.2. The N-VA in Europe until 2004 ... 70
4.1.2.1. The N-VA and the political puzzle ... 70
4.1.2.2. The N-VA and the cultural puzzle ... 74
4.1.2.3. Conclusion: a pro-European political party with a new political plan ... 76
4.1.3. Conclusion: from Flanders to Europe: caught between ideological discrepancies and a minority position in government ... 77
4.2. Flemish resources in Europe in 2004 ... 78
4.2.1. A powerful deelstaad but uncoordinated Belgian federal state ... 78
4.2.2. Obvious Europeans but scattered Flemish actors ... 82
4.2.3. Conclusion: a powerful deelstaad but insensitive Flemish compatriots ... 86
4.3. The N-VA and the “usage” of Europe in the 21st century ... 86
4.3.1. Vleva, the first Flemish office in Europe ... 90
4.3.1.1. Getting Flanders into the European policy cycle ... 93
4.3.1.2. Conclusion: defining a policy strategy for Flanders ... 96
4.3.2. The N-VA in Flanders since 2004 ... 97
4.3.2.1. 2004-2009: a coalition government and a collective policy plan... 97
4.3.2.2. Since 2009: a new position in power and a “nationalist” policy plan ... 99
4.3.2.3. Conclusion: disciplining Flemish governance through European mimicry ... 103
4.3.3. The N-VA in Belgium: 2010 federal elections and the sixth state reform ... 104
4.3.4. Conclusion: The N-VA and the “usage” of Europe: the political payoffs ... 108
V -The SNP and the “usage” of Europe ... 110
5.1. The SNP, from Scotland to Europe ... 111
5.1.1. The SNP in Scotland until 2007 ... 115
5.1.2.1. Who is the SNP? ... 115
5.1.2.2. The SNP and the political puzzle ... 123
5.1.2.3. The SNP and the cultural puzzle ... 129
5.1.1.4. Conclusion: an independentist political party with a minority government ... 135
5.1.2. The SNP in Europe until 2007 ... 136
5.1.2.1. The SNP and the political puzzle ... 136
5.1.2.2. The SNP and the cultural puzzle ... 142
5.1.3. Conclusion: from Scotland to Europe: caught between ideological discrepancies
and a minority government ... 144
5.2. Scottish resources in Europe in 2007 ... 146
5.2.1. A minority nation within British devolutionary unitary State ... 146
5.2.2. Moderate Europeans but well-coordinated Scots ... 149
5.2.3. Conclusion: a minority nation but sensitive Scottish compatriots ... 152
5.3. The SNP and the “usage” of Europe in the 21st century ... 152
5.3.1. Back to old Scotland Europa ... 156
5.3.1.1. Getting Scotland into the new European policy cycle ... 158
5.3.1.2. Conclusion: defining a policy strategy for Europe and for Scotland ... 159
5.3.2. The SNP in Europe since 2007: getting Scotland into more de facto competences ... 160
5.3.3. The SNP in Scotland since 2007 ... 161
5.3.3.1. 2007-2011: a minority government and a new policy plan ... 161
5.3.3.2. Since 2011: a majority government and a nationalist policy plan ... 166
5.3.3.3. Conclusion: making Scotland a leading economic region ... 168
5.3.4. The SNP in the United Kingdom: 2014 and a new referendum ... 170
5.3.5. Conclusion: The SNP and the “usage” of Europe: the political payoffs ... 172
VI – Flemish and Scottish New Pragmatic Nationalists in Europe: similarities and differences ... 175
VII – Conclusion: New Pragmatic Nationalists in Europe: a new legacy for all nationalist political parties in Europe? ... 180
References ... 191
i. Books ... 191
ii. Reviews ... 213
iii. Official documents ... 223
iv. Newspapers ... 227
Appendix 1: Interviews of case study one: Flanders ... 229
Appendix 2: Interviews of case study two: Scotland ... 307
Table 1: The “usage” of Europe in the 90’s ... 17
Table 2: Channels of regional mobilization in Europe in the 90’s ... 19
Table 3: The “usage” of Europe in the 21st century ... 23
Table 4: An advocacy coalition framework (ACF) ... 27
Table 5: Channels of regional mobilization in Europe in the 21st century ... 28
Table 6: Voting Intention in Flanders between 2009-2011 (in percentage) ... 48
Table 7: Volksunie’s factions and nationalism (in percentage) ... 54
Table 8: 2004 Flemish Regional Elections (in percentage and seats) ... 55
Table 9: The Moreno question in Wallonia 1995-2004 (in percentage) ... 65
Table 10: The Moreno question in Flanders 1995-2004 (in percentage) ... 66
Table 11: 2009 Flemish Regional Elections (in percentage and seats) ... 100
Table 12: 2010 Belgian General Elections for the Chamber (in percentage) ... 104
Table 13: 2010 Belgian General Elections for the Senate (in percentage) ... 105
Table 14: Scottish Elections 1999-2011 (percentage of Constituency votes) ... 112
Table 15: General election results in Scotland 1945-2005 (number of seats and percentage of votes) 120 Table 16: The Moreno question in Scotland 1974-2012 (in percentage) ... 130
Table 17: How the world sees Scotland 2010 (in percentage) ... 130
Table 18: 1979-2004 European Elections in Scotland (in percentage) ... 138
Table 19: Scottish GDP index 1998-2011 ... 153
Table 20: Scottish opinion on Government’s highest priority 2004-2007, 2009-2010 (in percentage) . 162 Table 21: Who/what people credit/blame for perceived improvements/falls in Scotland’s economy (in percentage) ... 163
Table 22: Trust in the UK and Scottish Government to act in Scotland’s interest (in percentage) ... 165
Table 23: Support for independence in Scotland 1978-2012 (in percentage) ... 171
Table 24: the N-VA and the SNP in comparison ... 179
PICTURES Picture 1: Flemish map printed at the Flemish House in New York ... 60
Picture 2: The Logo of Vleva ... 94
Picture 3: Bart de Wever on the aftermath of 2010 Federal Elections ... 110
ABBREVIATIONS
ACF - Advocacy Coalition Framework
BNG - Bloque Nacionalista Galego CD&V - Flemish Christian Democrats CiU - Convergéncia i Unió
CoR - Committee of the Regions
EEC - European Economic Communities
EEP - European Group of the European People’s Party EFA - European Free Alliance
EFA-DPPE - European Free-Alliance-Democratic Party of the People of Europe EHB - Euskal Herria Bildu
EP - European Parliament
ERC - Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya
EU - European Union
JMC - Joint Ministerial Committee MLG - Multi-level governance N-VA - Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie Open Vld - Flemish Liberal Democrats
REGLEG - Conference of European Regions with Legislative Power
PC - Plaid Cymru
PNV - Partido Nacionalista Vasco PPdeG - Partido Popular Galego PPP - Public Private Partnership PVDA - Flemish Labor Party
SHRA - Scottish Home Rule Association SNL - Scots National League
SME - Small and Medium Enterprises
SNP - Scottish National Party Sp.a - Flemish Socialists
UK - United Kingdom
UKRep - Permanent Representation in Brussels
UNIZO - Flemish Organization of self-employed and SME’s VOKA - Flemish Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
VU - Volksunie
