Chapter I
Introduction
New Pragmatic Nationalists in Europe: experienced Flemish and Scottish Nationalists in times of economic crisis
New Pragmatic Nationalists in Europe: experienced regional nationalists in times of economic crisis
In the 90´s, Europe used to be depicted as the most privileged political arena for regional nationalist political parties (Lynch 1996; De Winter and Tursan 1998; De Winter 2001; Jolly 2007) to access for “more” political power. This idealistic vision of Europe was deeply rooted in the right of
“nation-regions” (Loughlin 1996; Keating and Loughlin 1997); “minority nationalisms” (Keating 1996:
18) or stateless nations (Keating 1995:2) to govern more autonomously (Loughlin 2000:10).
According to Michael Keating (1996: 18), regional nationalisms can be defined as groups within the nation who advance national claims in competition with the existing definition of the nation.
Moreover, minority nationalism, or separatist nationalism, involves the denial of exclusive claims on the part of the state nationalism and the assertion of national rights of self-determination for groups within it. Therefore, it is not surprising why regional nationalists across Western Europe were among the most ardent defenders of the “Europe of the Regions”, almost overwhelmed with the extra- political space granted by the Maastricht Treaty, at the Council of Ministers (Article 146 of the Maastricht Treaty). Additionally, with the institutionalization of the Committee of the Regions, the subsidiarity principle became bounded to the European polity project and today it is undeniable that Europe has provided one of the stimuli for a bottom-up “regionalism”(Keating 1997; Down 2002:
172). In a clear contrast with top-down regionalism, “bottom-up” regionalism was intended to highlight regional political demands that were conflicting with the dominance of national forms of nationalism (Keating 1996:18; Suszycki & Karolewski 2007: 12).
Indeed, for many of these regional nationalist political actors, Europe represented a renewed political hope, especially for those who were going through devolutionary processes, as it was the case of the SNP in Scotland in the United Kingdom or of the Convergència i Unió (CiU) in Catalonia and even of the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) in the Basque Country in Spain. In a slightly different manner, in Flanders, Europe has always been taken for granted (Deschouwer and Van Assche 2005) but for the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA), previous Volksunie as well as for the Vlaams Belang, previous Vlaams Blok, Europe has always been perceived as a compensation for a common lack of Belgitude to make sense of a certain policy distinctiveness towards political and cultural recognition,
constitutional settlements or nationalist credo, Europe seemed to dissolve sovereignty (Keating and Mc. Garry 2001: 19) enabling regional nationalists to prosper in a context where cultural or political recognition could eventually be reached.
However, in spite of a general European flurry, the institutional access to political power was clearly nuanced, as distinctive constitutional resources were dictating differential institutional channels of access to policy decisions. In that sense, whereas formal channels of regional interest representation were taken for granted by those regional nationalists standing within federal political systems; informal channels of regional interest representation were highly valued by regional nationalists standing in decentralized or devolutionary constitutional settlements who were opening quasi-embassies to conduct their own para-diplomatic activities (Duchacek 1986; Michelmann and Soldatos 1990; Aldecoa and Keating 1999; Paquin 2002 and 2004; Lecours 2007; Criekemans 2010;
Bursens and Deforche 2010). Nevertheless, for this “party family”(De Winter and Cachafeiro 2002), irrespectively of nuanced perceptions of Europe as well as nuanced constitutional settlements, the European venue was used “to bypass” (Keating and Hooghe 1996; Jeffery 2000) national governments in a more privileged access to political power.
As a consequence of this illusive perception of Europe, Europe was rationally inspired (Peters 2005: 51) as it used to be perceived as an aggregation of formal-legal structures that could be used as a means to prescribe, proscribe and permit a certain behavior in exchange of a personal utility. In that sense, regional nationalists were policy “maximizers” who acted in isolation using their own limited political resources to maximize their political gains by pursuing distinctive forms of political autonomy. Unfortunately, as soon as regional nationalists realized that Europe could not deliver political independence, the European institutional opportunity structure (Marks and McAdam 1996) was about to shrink as much as to dictate the end of the naïve hype of the “Europe of the Regions”
(Elias 2008a; Hepburn 2008b). In fact, whilst regional actors had been granted new access points to European decision-making processes, these were either not available to them - because the access was reserved to parties in regional governments - or the scope of influence that could be exercised was very limited due to the limits of a sovereign logic prevailing in Europe. Moreover, the establishment of the European Free Alliance-Democratic Party of the Peoples of Europe (EFA-DPPE) at the European Parliament in 1981 (Lynch and Winter 2008) and its participation in the Greens-EFA political group since 1999 soon proved to be “flawed” (Nagel 2004: 59) as much as the Committee of the Regions became a political disappointment due to its political weakness, lack of resources and excessive diversity in terms of authority within it (Elias 2008a; Hepburn 2008b).
Whereas regional nationalists from federal states such as Belgium were deprived of their competences on the international fora due to a policy praxis, which was not fully recognizing the internal division of policy competences; regional nationalists from devolutionary unitary or decentralized states such as the United Kingdom or Spain were confined to the limits of their national
constitutional settlements, because they had never been contemplated with international powers. In both cases, irrespectively of nuanced constitutional designs, all regional nationalists were confined to a de facto or a de jure minority position in Europe, due to the limits of an overwhelming sovereign logic prevailing in Europe. By the end of the 90’s, it became clear that in Europe, the access to political power was dictated and controlled by national governments, irrespectively of nuanced constitutional settlements. Furthermore, it became also obvious that the European strategy required a regional and national resonance as the access to political power could only be achieved through people’s consent as much as further concessions of political autonomy could only be granted via national governments.
However, in the 21st century, as soon as a new European policy cycle started to emerge and the economic crisis started to cripple, experienced regional nationalists realized that they could use the benefits of regional economic resources in face of the European economic targets to justify further concessions of policy competences in Europe and at the regional level of governance. In addition, they have also realized that they could use the European argument to deliver policies, especially in times in economic crisis, which would allow them to induce regional citizens into their political plan so they could finally reach the legal threshold to endorse a new state reform.
Therefore, more than an external shield in a difficult pathway towards political or cultural recognition, in the 21st century, experienced regional nationalists in government have learned to re- scale Europe (Jessop 2004; Keating 2009c) in order to cope with the policy demands of a new European economic order and to perform a renewed nationalist political strategy which has finally gained a regional and a national resonance. For these experienced regional nationalists, optimistic regionalism is certainly not back on track but Europe has definitely opened a new policy window which will allow them to legitimize their nationalist aspirations, no longer in Europe, but through Europe. Additionally, it will allow them to be perceived as trustworthy political actors who hold the policy solution for the economic recovery of their territorial community, especially in times of economic crisis.
As we look into numbers, what we see is a sudden rise of nationalist impetus in regions where regional nationalists are governing, even in a minority position. For instance, in Flanders, Bart de Wever, from the N-VA, came into power in 2004 but he has conquered 13,6% of the votes in 2009 and has reached more than 30% of the votes at the federal elections of June 2010. In Scotland, Alex Salmond from the SNP came into power for the first time in 2007 with 32,9% of the votes and a minority government but he has won a majority government in 2011 with 45,4% of the votes. More recently, in November 2012, in Catalonia, Artur Mas from the CiU has kept its position in government and has formed a coalition government with the nationalist Oriol Junqueras, from the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC). Very seemingly, in the Basque Country, the PNV has returned to political power and Inigo Urkullu has formed a coalition government with the nationalists of the EH Bildu (EHB). In addition, as we look into policy programs and party manifestos,
what we see is a deep concern in meeting the European Economic targets, especially after the advent of the European 2020 Strategy, using European policy guidelines as powerful leavers of economic recovery, but more importantly, as legitimate arguments to justify their nationalist plan for the region. In a complementary manner, people in the street seem to be responding positively to the nationalist call, as in Catalonia as well as in Scotland, opinions pools reveal a clear support for independence. In Catalonia, if in 1996, only 33,6% were in favor of independence; in September 2012, the number raised to 50,9% (CEO 2012). In Scotland, what is most noticeable from a look back at the data is that, despite peaks and troughs where support exceeded 40% - in 2011 - or fell below 20%, backing for independence has remained fairly constant, at least since the mid 1980’s with a sudden rise after the 2011 Holyrood elections (IPSOS Mori 2012a). Even if in January 2012, only 37%
of the Scots were supporting independence of Scotland (ibidem); a vast majority, 71% of the Scots, are backing the concept of “Devolution Max”, which means that a clear majority of Scottish people are in favor of devolving substantial new powers and tax raising responsibilities to the Scottish Government.
However, it is not only the sudden rise of a nationalist feeling in times of economic crisis, which has caught our attention. Indeed, more unexpectedly, it is by wandering in Brussels, near Rue de Loi, that we have discovered the first Flemish regional office in Europe and the question was:
“why?”. If regional offices (Hooghe 1995; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Jeffery 1997a and 2000) have always been considered a common practice for all categories of regional authorities (Moore 2008) – especially, for nationalist political parties (Lecours 2007: 119) – to represent regional interests in Europe, and if Flanders has always ignored it: why now? who is behind it? and for what? When we found out that the N-VA was behind it, our curiosity grew substantially. On the other hand, in Scotland, as soon as the SNP came into power in 2007, they seemed to be witnessing a great dose of optimism, using strong labels such as “It’s time to move forward” (SNP party Manifesto 2007 and 2011) or “We have got what it takes” (SNP European party manifesto 2009). Once more, in a clear contrast with their common practice of the 90’s, they seemed to be privileging an intra-state strategy instead of an extra-state strategy as well as to be returning to Scotland Europa, following Scottish Labour’s footsteps. Based upon these intriguing evidences, new questions were raised: why have they returned to the center? Why are they using Scotland Europa? Where does this confidence come from?
To put it simply, new empirical evidences got us into research. Later on, we have confirmed our choices as the N-VA and the SNP represented the only two nationalist political parties who were and stayed in government during the period of research – between 2004 and 2012 -, and which, consequently, were capable of showing positive evidences of a new “usage” of Europe. The purpose of this research is to demonstrate that regional nationalists in government have moved from a
“rational” to a “cognitive” usage of Europe to fulfill renewed political preferences across multiple
layers of governance. It is based upon the paradigmatic cases of the N-VA in Flanders since 2004 and of the SNP in Scotland since 2007 that we will argue that, in a clear contrast with pragmatic nationalists of the 90’s, who hoped to legitimize their nationalist aspirations in Europe by the means of a rational “usage” of the European institutions; experienced regional nationalists have become new pragmatic nationalists as they have learned to legitimize their nationalist aspirations through Europe by the means of a cognitive “usage” of the European institutions. We will then conclude that for this new generation of pragmatic nationalists, the European strategy has finally gained a regional and national resonance though Europe has remained a post-sovereign order where the construction of a pluralist and multilevel Europe has postponed the immediate search of political independence.
An advocacy coalition framework as the policy solution for a renewed nationalist political plan
Now that we have identified renewed political preferences in face of a new policy context, the remaining question concerns “the means” through which they have performed these goals. If regional nationalists have identified a new policy window – new perception - to legitimize their nationalists’ aspirations – renewed preferences -; the lack of policy expertise – limited capabilities - will force them into a cognitive “usage” of Europe. In fact, since they were rationally bounded (Simon 1954) in the sense that they were lacking the policy expertise to accomplish these policy goals, they have learned to rely on a policy narrative (Shabahan et al 2011; Jones and Beth 2010;
Radaelli 2010) embedded in a territorial economic argument to make sense of an advocacy coalition framework (Smith and Sabatier 1993), using informal channels as new meaningful policy arenas (Scott 1995a; 1995b) to clarify the best policy options to be implemented in Europe and at the regional ground.
As we look into literature, an advocacy coalition framework (ACF) stands for the North American version of a policy network developed by Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith (1993;
1999). In a clear contrast with the British tradition of policy network (Rhodes 1992; 1997), the North American tradition of policy network is conceived as a specific form of governance which focuses more on the structure and process through which joint policy-making is organized on governance.
Beyond the governance role, which makes it distinctive from traditional public private partnerships, an advocacy coalition framework is defined as a “belief system” in the sense that it carries a normative belief for its participants. In a complementary manner, it represents a useful tool of analysis when technical information assumes a predominant role in policy-making (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993: 16; Sabatier 199: 117).
An advocacy coalition framework includes all actors located within the policy network subsystem that are involved in the formulation and implementation of a policy. It is characterized by predominantly informal interactions between public and private actors with the distinctive, but interdependent interests, who strive to solve problems of collective action on a central non- hierarchical level. Unlike exchange and strategic interaction which are based on the maximization of self-interest through cots benefit calculations and which are pone to produce bargaining dilemmas, negotiation within an advocacy coalition framework is based on communication and trust and aims at achieving joint outcomes which has a proper “value” for the actors involved.
Within the limits of our research, an advocacy coalition framework will allow us to understand the dynamics of policy-making in a multi-level context by granting a special role to “consensual perceptions” and “policy beliefs”. In other words, the ability to map “identity” and “policy belief” on the same canvas (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993: 16) will provide us with the analytical solution to our empirical puzzle as far as experienced regional nationalists have learned to use the reference to European economic targets to convince regional partners in government as well as regional
stakeholders that the completion of the European economic strategy would allow them to protect the economic interests of their territorial community, both in Europe and at the regional level of governance. If in Europe, it would allow regional governments to use regional economic assets in face of the European economic targets to protect regional economic interests against an overwhelming national presence at the Council of Ministers; at the regional ground, it would allow regional authorities to identify key policy areas where to invest in order to promote the economic recovery of their territorial community. Therefore, by the means of a meaningful policy narrative, regional political actors in government and regional economic actors would come together to clarify the best policy options to be implemented in both layers of governance to protect the economic interests of their territorial community. Political and economic actors would act as regional compatriots as far as they would agree to cooperate for the benefits of their territorial community.
In other words, experienced regional nationalists have become skilled policy entrepreneurs who have learned to rely on a territorial economic argument to make sense of an advocacy coalition framework, using informal channels of regional interest intermediation as renewed strategic arenas to clarify and to articulate a regional policy strategy to be implemented in both layers of governance.
Therefore, more than a “rational” structure for regional nationalists to comply with an individualistic political plan, informal channels of regional interest intermediation have gained a “cognitive”
dimension as far as they are conceived as being consistent with the economic interests of their territorial community (Stone Sweet at al 2001: 12; Fligstein 1997 a and b; Scott 1995a and b).
However, whenever perceived from a nationalist’s perspective, the purpose goes way beyond a patriotic economic sentiment as they expect to use this sui generis policy solution to access the
“policy expertise” in order to find the most perfect “match” between regional economic resources and the European economic targets to fulfill their nationalist intents. In other words, the purpose is to use the benefits of an informal channel to organize policy communities around cross-sectorial interests – defined as territorial policy communities (Keating at al 2008) – in order to clarify which economic arguments they can put forward to perform their renewed political plan. In spite of a renewed political strategy, the ability to translate their policy options in both layers of governance will rely on three major factors: first, on their relative position in power; second, on clear policy goals;
third, on the policy alignment that can be reached between their policy priorities and regional economic stakeholders’ policy priorities.
Therefore, in a clear contrast with the 90’s, the European venue is no longer dictated by the access to “more” political power but by the access to the “informational resource” which will allow them to comply with their renewed political plan across multiple layers of governance. Furthermore, informal channels of regional interest intermediation are no longer conceived as “an instrument of government” but rather as an “instrument of governance” (Salamon 2002) which will allow them to clarify the best policy solutions to be implemented in Europe and at the regional level of governance.
Evolutionary trends in regional mobilization in Europe: from “rational” to “cognitive” Europe
If the word “usage” can be defined as the act of using something to achieve a particular goal (Jacquot and Wolf 2003: 5), by insisting on the term, we wish to cover evolutionary “rationalities”
employed by regional nationalist political parties on their “usage” of the European institutions to fulfill their political preferences. In order to do so, we will apply an actor centered institutionalist approach (Mayntz and Sharp 1997) as it will allow us to understand how evolving “perceptions” of the European rule of the game and renewed political “preferences” in face of limited “capabilities” have forced regional nationalists into a new rationality of “usage” of Europe.
The purpose of this research is to demonstrate that experienced regional nationalists have moved from a “rational” to a “cognitive” usage of European institutions to fulfill renewed political preferences across multiple layers of governance. Whereas in the 90’s, regional nationalists used to privilege a rational “usage” of formal or informal channels of regional interest intermediation to make sense of policy distinctiveness to legitimize their nationalist cause in Europe; in the 21st century, experienced regional nationalists in government have learned to rely on a cognitive “usage” of informal channels of regional interest intermediation to make sense of policy distinctiveness to legitimize their nationalist cause through Europe. In that sense, we will demonstrate that, irrespectively of nuanced constitutional settlements, all experienced regional nationalists in government have returned to the center, using informal channels as renewed strategic and cognitive arenas to articulate a nationalist policy strategy in both layers of governance.
Whereas political scientists (Keating 2008) are still caught between the most adequate theoretical explanations to cope with emerging policy systems in Europe; it seems that political practitioners have leapt over this disconnection using a territorial economic argument to perform their nationalist plan. For this new category of political actors, the ability to use a policy narrative embedded in a territorial economic argument (Shabahan et al 2011; Jones and Beth 2010) has allowed them to establish an advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier 1993), using informal channels of regional interest intermediation as “cognitive” structures to fulfill renewed political preferences across multiple layers of governance. In that sense, we could argue that experienced regional nationalists have become “policy satisficers”(Simon 1954) who have learned to forgo immediate satisfaction in Europe to collect major gains of political power across multiple layers of governance.
Additionally, informal channels of regional interest intermediation in Europe have become indispensable policy arenas to comply with their renewed political plan in Europe and at the regional ground.
According to Michael Keating (2009c: 39), the emergence of these new policy systems has contributed to the revival of minority nationalisms in Europe as much as it has definitely postponed the urgency of immediate political independence. If in the late 80’s and early 90’s, many nationalist’s movements have moved back to moderate autonomist positions, seeing in the emerging European
space as a new framework for autonomy that does not require them to assume the burdens of statehood; in the 21st century, the emergence of these new policy systems has confirmed this moderate positioning, though the most rewarding one. Rather we are returning to a diversified and complex order more typical of Europe’s longer experience, much more in line with the pre-modern order where we find the simultaneity and interaction of fragmenting and integrating dynamics which have given rise to new spheres of authority (Rosenau 1997:28). In this conception, there is no up and down, no lower or higher; rather a wide range of public-private actors who collaborate and compete in shifting coalitions (Marks and Hooghe 2004: 21).
Finally, by the end of this research, we will argue that the European venue can be considered by all categories of regional nationalist political actors in government, from any constitutional settlement, who wish to legitimize their nationalist cause, that is, to justify further concessions of policy competences both in Europe and at the regional ground by the means of an European reference. We will then conclude that in the 21st century, and against traditional dogmas of the 90’s, the “usage” of Europe is cognitively twisted, economically driven and collectively performed. It embraces all experienced regional nationalist political parties in government, irrespectively of the nature of their constitutional settlement or nationalist credo, as long as they possess the ability to anchor a political strategy embedded in a “identity” without sticking to strict politics of nationalism.
Conclusion
Research on regional mobilization in Europe (Hooghe 1995; Jeffery 1997a and 1997b; Jeffery 2000) has reached its peak in the early 90’s; it has lost its main salience in the late 90’s but today it is regaining the attention of many scholars who believe that regional research agenda is far from being completely scrutinized. Over a period of twenty-five years, we have witnessed the waxing and the waning of the idea of the “Europe of the Regions” (Keating 2008a: 629; Mazey and Mitchell 1993;
Mazey 1995; Loughlin 1996) which has brought, first, hope; then, disillusion to both political and theoretical practitioners in Europe. Today, we are not witnessing the return of an optimistic regionalism in Europe, but we are witnessing the ability of experienced regional nationalists to overcome the European disillusion with a great dose of realism, bearing in mind the contribution of a new policy context initiated with the Lisbon Strategy.
The main purpose of this research is to trace the evolution of regional mobilization in Europe in order to demonstrate that the “usage” of Europe (Jacquot and Woll 2003) has evolved from a rational to a cognitive “usage” for regional nationalists to perform strategic gains of political power across multiple layers of governance. Our goal is to clarify under which personal, political and constitutional circumstances regional nationalists have decided to move from a “rational” to a “cognitive” usage of the European institutions to pursue strategic gains of political power across multiple layers of governance. In addition, if a theory can be defined as a systematic explanation of empirical data, usually presented as reliable knowledge (Heywood 2000: 20) and if a paradigm can be depicted as an intellectual framework comprising interrelated values and assumptions which sustains a general explanation for a particular phenomenon (ibidem: 21), then this renewed theory of “usage” of Europe will lay the basis of a new paradigm of “usage” of Europe that can be applied to all categories of regional nationalist political parties in Europe.
Our research will be case-orientated (Della Porta and Keating 2008) as we will be exploring diversity by the means of a thick description of paradigmatic case studies. We will be focusing on positive cases, that is, on cases where evolutionary trends of regional mobilization are present and consequently relevant to confirm our hypothesis. Moreover, since it is our purpose to demonstrate that it is possible to lay the basis of a new theory of regional mobilization that could be applied to all regional nationalist political actors in government, we have chosen our case studies based upon four major criterion: first, we have chosen two nationalist political parties who have responded positively to this new European policy window; second, who were and stayed in government between 2007 and 2012; third, two nationalist political parties with distinctive forms of regional nationalism, that is, one civic and the other one ethnic; and fourth, two nationalist political parties from two distinctive political systems that can be defined as being “extreme categories” as far as the dispersion of political power between regional and national of governance is concerned. In that sense, we will choose the
Flemish civic nationalist political party, the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (the N-VA), from Belgian federal state and the ethnic1 Scottish National Party (the SNP), from British devolutionary unitary state.
The colorful depiction of empirical facts will be supported by 25 in depth-interviews, 12 of which have been conducted in Flanders and 13 in Scotland between January and September 2010.
Last but not least, the time frame of this research will be determined by moments of accession to political power by the N-VA and the SNP and it will end by the time of this writing. It will start in June 2004 for the N-VA in Flanders and in May 2007 for the SNP in Scotland and it will end in December 2012. Both analyses will include major European institutional changes introduced by the European treaties as well as all major aspects of federalization and devolutionary processes occurred in Flanders and in Scotland, respectively. Based upon these two case studies, we will demonstrate that whereas the N-VA has become more conscious of the cognitive contribution of Europe as they have learned to rely on a policy narrative embedded in a territorial economic argument to engage regional partners in government as well regional economic actors into an advocacy coalition framework to fulfill renewed nationalist goals; the SNP has gained in political maturity as they have learned to adapt a policy praxis inherited from Scottish Labour to make sense of an advocacy coalition framework to fulfill renewed nationalist goals.
We will then conclude, that, whereas the N-VA has barely took advantage of a newly born Flemish territorial community due to the late inception of a Flemish office in July 2005; unclear policy goals and a minority position in government; the SNP has benefited from a fully-fledged territorial community since they have inherited the benefits of a public-private partnership already set in place by Scottish Labour in Europe which has eased their way towards a nationalist governance in both layers of governance. By the end of the day, it seems that in the 21st century, regional mobilization in Europe has become an open and fair political game, which is no longer, dictated by the level of political competences in a pre-established category of national states orders.
In Chapter II, we will first justify and explain our theoretical framework. In Chapter III, we will explain our methodological choices. In Chapter IV and chapter V, we will move towards empirical evidences of Flemish and Scottish experiences before we highlight analytical differences and empirical specificities by the means of a sharp comparison in Chapter VI. Finally, we will finish this report with a short conclusion in Chapter VII where final assumptions will be highlighted and further venues of research will be further explored.
1 The SNP will be mentioned as an ethnic nationalist political party for its deep connection with ethnic Scottish references and the usage of the term “nation” to qualify Scotland. However, as we shall see, the SNP is in fact an independentist political party that has moved from an ethnic to a civic sense of nationalism to accommodate
