ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA Conference of African Planners

CJNITED NATIONS

ECONOMIC J^PS^ * / °™

AND «88a( {-^ &Sx967

SOCIAL COUNCIL ^^^" l ^-i: ^lish

ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA Conference of African Planners

Second session

Addis A"ba"ba, 4~15 December 1967

DEVELOPMENT PLAIOOTG IN AFRICA

M67-869

E/CN.14/CAP/9

TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter

Page.

I* Main features of African Development Plans 1

1. Introduction -,

2. Kinds of Development Plans c

3. Plan Objectives and Targets g

4« Plan Methodology -,£

5- Planning Organizations 23

II. Commodity Production 2r

1. Planned Growth of Agriculture 26

2. Industrial Development 33

Manpower and Financial Resources 44

1• Manpower **

2. Financial Resources c2

Plan versus Achievement 52

1. Progress Review Procedures 52

2. Overall Growth and Capital Formation 64

3. The Foreign Sector 5g

4. Domestic Capital Accumulation 72

.■5. pr°ject Preparation and Administration 73

6. Conclusion 78

9

E/OT.14/0&P/9

LIST OP TABLES

1. .Synoptic Table of African Development Plans and Programmes Page3 2. Major indicators of African Development Plans 10 3. World Grain Trade by major geographic regions 28 4. Planned Growth in Agriculture and Industrial Production

of selected African Countries: Annual Growth Rates 30 5- Share of Agriculture in Gross Domestic Production and

Gross Fixed Capital Formation and ICORS in Agriculture in

Selected African Countries 34

6* Planned Investment and Growth Rates in output of Manufa

cturing, Mining, Electricity, Water, and Gas in Current

Plans of selected African Countries (Percentages) 36

7» Industrial Origin of Gross Domestic Product in Africa and

its Sub-regions 37

8, Educational enrolment in Africa by levels, I96O-64 47

9« Summary of high-level Manpower Requirements and Supplies

in some East African Countries 49

10, Planned annual growth rate of consumption and distribution of Planned Capital Formation by sources of finance, in

selected African Countries , ; . 54

11, Projected Rates of Growth of Imports, Exports and Capital

Formation in the Development Plans of countries in Africa 56

12. Capital Formation-and Incremental Capital/Output Rates

(ICOR) - 60

13. GDP annual growth rates in selected African countries 65 14* Gross Fixed Capital Formation in selected African countries 67 15. Public and publicly guaranteed external debt, including

undisburseds selected African countries 71

E/CN.14/CAP/9

CHAPTER I .

MAIN FEATURES OF AFRICAN" .DEVELOPMENT PLAITS

!• Introduction

1. In Africa development planning has q lickly become an accepted method of ordering the economic and social lives of the new nations*.

The planning idea is not entirely new to these countries,—' though it had certainly gained in popularity during the period of struggle for political emancipation. Popular political parties had "been compelled to draw attention to the numerous economic and social disabilities imposed Tqy foreign rule, and even when they had published no reform programmes, had nevertheless left the people in a state of joyful, but impatient expectancy regarding the advent of independence. With . so much to do, and so little by way of financial and skilled manpower resources, it was only natural that the newly elected popular govern ments should resort to some system of setting up priorities and general planning of resource use.

2, As the Tanzania Plan puts it, a development plan is a necessary sequel to the end of tlie fight for political emancipation, and ranks equal with political independence itselfi

l/ Uganda traces its development planning history from 1920 with the

appointment in that year of a, Uganda Development Commission to examine steps for promoting the "commercial and industrial development of the Protectorate" <> See Uganda*s Second Five-Year Development Plan, 1966-

1971 (p« 174)c All countries that were formerly under British and

French rule were also given some experience of rudimentary economic planning by the metropolitan powers through such schemes as the

Colonial Development and ¥elfare Acts (1940, 1945) and development

financing by FIDES (Fonds d'investissement pour le developpement

economique et social des territoires d'outre-mer) and CCFOM (Caisse

'centrale de la France d'outre-mer)♦ The Portuguese Government drew

up a development plan for Angola as early as 1946, but in Mozambique planning was introduced much later - 1953=

E/CN.14/OAP/9

Page 2

"Our people wanted independence for two reasons? to establish their human dignity and self-respect5 and to get an opportunity to create their own future. Independence asserted our dignity and established our opportunity. The opportunity has now to be used, and our national pride had to be given the basis of a healthy, educated and prosperous people. The Five-Year Development Plan

outlines the way forward towards these objectives," l/

3, The popularity of planning was also enhanced by the policies of the United Nations to whose membership all the new countries promptly sought accession. Not only did the United Nations, by its very

Charter, inspire faith in economic and social development in all its members. Around the beginning of the 196Ofs when the development movement was gathering momentum,—'2/ the United Nations declared the decade of the sixties as the Development Decade, and called upon all its members to aim at the attainment by the developing countries of a minimum annual growth rate in national income of 5 Ve? cent by the end of that decade. What is more, it urged the adoption of development planning for ensuring an orderly progress towards this goal,

4, Moreover, the former metropolitan countries, which had not been over-enthusiastic towards development planning, had begun to reconsider their attitude in the post-war period, and to encourage the new African

countries (who still maintained economic and cultural ties with them)

to frame their requests for aid on the basis on some well-ordered pro gramme or development plan. For their part, the Western countries

have seen themselves compelled by the pressures of post-war reconstruction to move further along the road of planning. These pressures have been reinforced by the following fundamental changes in economic thought

and policies?—'

l/ Address by the Presidentc Tanganyika Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1 July 1964 - 30 June 1969 9 Vol. I, p. vii, 2/ From Synoptic Table 1, it could be seen that of the 39 independent

African countries, five gained independence in the middle and late 1950's and 24 in the early 1960!s.

3/ ECE, Economic Planning in Europe, Part II, Geneva, 19^5» Also ECE

"Economic Significance of the Public Sector", Economic Surveys of Europe in 1959, Part III.

K/Cl\T.14/CAP/9

Page 3 table i

Synoptic table of African development plans and programmes

%-Country ^{Year of} indepen dence

Transitional plans

Current

plans Perspective Plans under plans preparation

« North Africa Morocco Tunisia Libya Sudan UAR Algeria East Africa

Ethiopia Somalia Kenya Uganda / Tanzania—' Madagascar Zambia Malawi Burundi Rwanda Rhodesia Botswana Lesotho tfest Africa

Mauritania Senegal Mali

Ivory Coast Dahomey Guinea Niger

Upper Volta Togo

• Ghana Nigeria 0 Sierra Leone

Gambia Liberia

1956

1956

1956 1951

1922 1962

.I960

1963

1962 1961 I960

1964 1964

1962 1962

_

1966 1966

I960 I960 I960 i960 I960 1958i960 I960 I960

1957

I960 1961

1965 1947

1962-64

196O-65b/

1963-6/P

1958-62

1961/62-1963/'6 4

1960-62 1962-65196$

1966-69

1960-62 196I-64

1962-63

1962-65

1960-63 1961-63 1963-67

1957-58

1959-64

196O-64

1962-64

1963-68

1961/62-1970/71

I960-'

1959-*

1963-67 1963-67

1966-70 1966-71

1964-69

1966-70

1965-69

1965-68

1963-66 1965-69

1961-65

1964-70

1965-74

1963-67

1966-70 /

1963/64-1969/70^

1962-68

1962/63-1971/72 1964-67

1965-67 1962-71 1965-68

1960-70o/ 1965-70

1957-6

1966-81 1965-80

1964-71

1960-70 1960-80

1963-75 1965-84

1965-69

1965-69

Page 4

'TABLE 1 (Cont'd)

Country

Central Africa Cameroon

Congo (Kinshasa) Congo (Brazza.)

Gabon

CAR Chad

Other Africa South Africa

Year of indepen dence

I960 I960 I960 I960 I960 I960

1910

Sources? National Plans

Transitional plans

1961-64./

1963-65^

1960-62 .1964-65

...

Current plans

1961-65 1965-69.

1964-68 1966-70

1964-65

1966-70

1964-69

Perspective plans

1960-80

...

Plans under * ... preparation

-

a/ Plans abandoned.

b/ Capital Expenditure Programme. H- 0/ Tanganyika only3 also throughout the text,

(1) The adoption of a global view of the economy induced by the

strides made in macro-economic theory and econometrics and their application to national accounting techniques3 input- output analysis and projection and forecasting techniques|

(2) The recognition of the active role of the State in economic

matters which as a corollary implied that the price mechanism as an allocational instrument was inappropriate to ensure a sustained and high level of economic activity and act as a guide for long-term investment decisions|

(3) The concern with long-term objectives involving structural

changes which involved an extension of the time-horizon.

Indeed, economic policies and short-term economic and social planning became components in a longer perspective plan,

which subject to constant adjustments could extend in principle as far ahead as the effects of the envisaged structural changes 5

E/CN.14/CAP/9

Page 5

(4) Widening participation in the shaping of medium- and long-term

economic policies which involved enhanced democratic participa tion in the planning process, and as a weapon for mobilizing and

•eliciting popular appeal, and the active involvement of economic agents and collective organizations in the decision-making process,

5« These four major tendencies have naturally "been discernible in

varying degrees in the African region.

2. Kinds of development plans

6, To date, something like three-quarters of the independent African

countries have issued development plans in one form or another, the

character and scope varying from country to country. Such diversity also reflects the varying economic and social levels of the countries, the strength of their administrative machinery, the wealth of statistical data, natural and human resource endowment, geographic size and location

(land-locked or coastal) and demographic levels. Almost without excep

tion, however, all these plans represent a distinct improvement on their colonial predecessors, which were often little more than lists of public sector projects.

7« Table 1 indicates that the serious planning experience of a new country in the region often begins with the formulation of a transitional plan or "plan inte"rimaire". In the words of Botswana, the country with the latest published transitional plan, such a plan

"is transitional in two senses. Firstly, it bridges the period of constitutional transition from internal self-rule to full indepen dence. Secondly, it covers the period of change from the rudimentary planning represented by the colonial public expenditure programme to full resources planning which the Government intends to introduce," l/

8, Central African Republic's "plan interimaire" of I96O-62 also

underlines the temporary and preparatory nature of such plans. It contains no global targets or quantitative indicators, rather it ■

l/ Republic of Botswana Transitional Plan for Social and Economic

Developmente Government Printer, Gaberones, Botswana, 1966,

E/CN.14/CAP/9

Page 6

concerns itself with some partial actions in a few sectors, namely general agriculture, livestock, forestry services, education and health. For the rest? it addresses itself to the strengthening of

the technical and statistical "base for planning "by organizing surveys

in four crucial areas. The country organized an exhaustive popula

tion census, coupled with demographic sample surveys and enquiries on

employment and manpower problems, an agricultural survey, a social survey and a budgetary inquiryo In these ways, it laid a good founda

tion for the subsequent plans. -■••■■-■ -

9. Though somewhat further advanced in some of these respects, Chad found itself as late as 1964 having to issue a "plan interimaire"

while awaiting the complete findings of its demographic enquiry and conclusions of the regional development study of Ouaddi, both to be submitted in 19&5*

10. These transitional or short-term plans vary in duration from two

years (e.g. Algeria, Ivory Coast, Chad) to four (e.g. Dahomey). These

are usually public expenditure programmes, prepared in most c^ses by the countries without much external technical help. Then follow the medium-term plans of five to eight years' duration (Table l), which are somewhat more sophisticated technically. Some of these are still lists

of major capital expenditure projects, but in varying degrees, many

attempt to take an inventory of resources (natural, human and financial),

relate investment to expected output in the various sectors, present a balance of payments budget, and propose institutional and administrative reforms of executing the plan. Some, including Uganda, UAR, Tunisia, have even ventured beyond this stage to the application of econometric models. Others add linear programming, input-output tables and simu

lation techniques.

11. As a rule, the medium-term plans are prepared either solely or largely by expatriate economists who are admittedly more skilled in the manipulation of the sparse statistical and technical data available.

However, their lack of familiarity with local conditions and aspirations,

Pa^e 7

accompanied sometimes by the inadequate consultation with.the policy

makers and administrators, makes the plan documents unrealistic*-^

What is more, these experts often depart from the scene shortly after the \plan .has "been adopted "by the country's parliament, leaving "behind still poor statistical services5 and inadequately trained local counter parts to interpret and implement the plan. Needless to say that, in the circumstances, the people are insufficiently involved in the planning process § accordingly their enthusiasm is not likely to be kindled later

"by exhortations demanding their whole-hearted participation in efforts to attain development targets.

12. Finding themselves unable to present a full programme of recon struction in the medium-term plan, some countries resort to perspective plans as a means of announcing to the general public the rest of the benefits promised during the liberation campaign. It is also in this document that projects with long gestation periods, such as power dams, irrigation and flood control schemes, harbours, and long-term policy measures such as education and land reform can be presented meaningfully, and structural changes generally mapped out. The duration of sue;

plans is ten to twenty years5 only Dahomey.and Cameroon have published

plans for a twenty-year period (Table l), though others, including

Ethiopia*~J have a perspective plan framework worked out.2/

1/ In the vase of Nigeria, "For all practical purposes the federal

plan was drawn up by a limited number of expatriate economists, working virtually in a vacuum so far as detailed direction or consultation with political leaders went 5 and with only peripheral advisory contact with Nigerian civil servants and planners. The social and political preferences of the plan, as was inevitable given this method of preparation, represent what the planners preferred or I'elt Nigerians ought to prefer, rather than any

expressed Nigerian preferences", R.H. Green, "Four African Develop ment Plans", Journal of Modern African Studies9 Vol. 3, No, 2,

p. 254.

2/ Ethiopia's perspective plan is for a period of twenty-five years,

broken down into five-year plans,

E/CN.14/CAP/9

Page 8

3. Plan objective and targets

13. Considering the similarity of the economic and social problems confronting all African countries, it wae only to be expected that their development plans would proclaim fairly similar objectives. It is refreshing also to see a clear perception of these objectives in the plans, though these are sometimes only implied in the sectoral programmes, and not always explicitly stated as policy aims. For instance, to appreciate to the full the policy mainsprings behind the Uganda Plan, one would need to go beyond the three main goals mentioned

in the Plan, namely (a) increased production and wealth, (b) diversifi

cation of production, (c) social and economic justice.-^ At the other

extreme in detail lies the Somali Plan, which has fourteen items under the heading, Social and Economic Objectives, dealing with such a wide variety of subjects as agriculture, industry, education, health, trans port, communications and power, administration, the Government budget,

balance of payments, employment and surveys .-^

2/

14. All the plans recognize the paramount importance of raising living standards of the masses. The quickest route to this goal is by making structural changes in the economies of the African countries, primarily by diminishing the proportion of ta.e gross domestic product that ori ginates in agriculture, or of primary industries as a group. Thus, while the important role of agriculture in economic expansion is

accepted, its share is planned to decline during some current plan periods as followss. Tunisia, 35-5 per cent to 28.4 per cent between 1962 and 1971°, Tanzania, 57-5 per cent in 1960/62 to 37.3 per cent in 19805 Madagascar, 50.6 per cent in i960 to 37-7 per cent in 1973°, and the UAR, from 31 per cent to 24 per cent during I96O-65.

15... Correspondingly, industry's share is to rise throughout? in the outstanding case of the Ivory Coast, industry's share is to more than

1/ Uganda's Second Five-Year Plan, 1966-1971? P«

2/ First Five-Year Plan (1963-1967)? Somali Republic, p, 9.

E/CN.14/CAP/9

Page 9

double from 12.4 per cent in i960 to 25.8 per cent in 1970| excluding mining, Tanzania is also to raise industry1s share from 13 per cent

(1960/62) to 26,7 per cent in I98O..

16, ■Overall growth of the gross domestic product itself rather than

income redistribution is to be the surest way of bringing about rapid improvements in living standards for the majority of the people (Table 2).

The implications of such growth rates for capital formation are serious, but if the rates are achieved, national incomes are to double as follows8

UAR 10 years

Uganda 15 years

Tanzania 15 years

Upper Volta 17 years

Cameroon 20 years

Chad 30 years

Per capita GDP gains could also be seen (Table 2) to be considerable.

Some plans also contain estimates of the implications of such increases in economic well-being for life expectancys this is to rise from 35 or 40 years to 50 in 1930 for Tanzania*

17. One of the main characteristics of many African plans is that their anticipated rates of growth for the major economic sectors are invariably higher than those of the pre-independence era as well as the immediate post-independence plans. Taking their cue from the United Nations Development Decade? few countries have planned for growth rates of less than 5 per cent,

18, These targets have appeared in the light of experience to be rather

high, particularly as the agricultural sector has lagged more severely than most of the plans anticipated* Thus, almost without exception, whether

the growth rates of this sector are as low as those for Mauritania (2 per

cent), Ethiopia (2.3 per cent) or as high as that of Mali (9 per cent),

the rigidities in this sector have prevented target fulfilment. As agriculture represents a rather large component in GDPs in the African region, poor performance o;T this sector has meant depressed overall growth rates.

E/CFU4/CAP/9

Page 10

TABLE 2

Major indicators of African development plans

Country

Morocco Tunisia Libya Sudan UAH Ethiopia Somalia Kenya Uganda Madagascar Tanzania Zambia Mauritania Senegal Mali Niger

Upper Volta Dahomey Togo

Ghana Nigeria Sierra Leone Gambia

Cameroon

Congo (B.)

Gebon

Plan period

1965-67

1965-68 1963-68

1961/62-70/71

1960-65

1963-67 1963-67

1966-70 1966-71 1964-68

1964-69

1966-70 1963-66 1965-69 1961-65

1961-63 1963-67

1966-70

1963/64-69/70

1962-68

1962/63-71/72 1964-67

1961-65 1964-68 1966-70

Planned growth

annual rates

GDP per capita

■ 3.7 6.5

■> ...

7.05.1

4.3

. •.

5.2 6.1

6.7 5.5

11.0 9.2 6.0 8.0 5.0

••0

5.6 4.05.5

• •.

7.3

...

Sourcess National Development Plans

0.7^ 4.4^

... /

2,3.2/ .

2.7

...

2.1 4.3 3.0 4.6

...

7.9 3.7 5.5

2.3

• * •

3.7

2.9 1.5

• • •

3.5^ 5.1

*. •

3.

Planned shares of formation in Initial

year

13.2 22.1

13.5

9.4

10.5

...

11.6

17-7d/ _12.4^

13.5

20.0 60.0 14.6

...

...

. * •

15.9

19.5

...

...

...

...

26.0

...

capital GDP

End

year

21.0 20.4 11.2 14.3 14.2

...

19.1 1

21.4^7

19. &

25.6 12.2 16.5 10.8

...

...

•..

13.523.4

• • •

■...

...

17.1

...

N.B. Human investment is not included.

a/ Computed.

b/ For the ten-year period,

c/ As per cent of GDP (Monetary Sector).

d/ I960. • e/ 1973.

f/ 1960-1980.

e/cn,14/cap/9

Page 11

19. The industry rates are much higher, ranging from 8.5 per cent for UAR, through 10 per cent for Libya, 11.2 per cent for Ethiopia, I4.6 per cent for Tanzania to 17 per cent and 19 per cent for Zambia and Mali respec tively. These high rates are due to the rather small base from which further progress in this sector is to be made and the widely accepted capacity and responsibility of industry for promoting economic growth.

20. It is generally anticipated that with economic growth taking place

in a planned manner and at a fast rate, employment opportunities will naturally increase\ but deliberate employment policies have been adopted

in such countries as Ghana, Morocco, Sudan, Nigeria, Upper Volta,

Somalia, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda and Zambia to ensure the provisions of the existing educational systems.

21. While recognizing the limits that under-developed economic conditions

can impose on egalitarian schemes for individuals, most of the plans

announce an intention to reduce income inequalities through the adoption of such measures as absorption of more persons in monetary sector occu-' pations, sometimes accompanied by land reform (e.g. Kenya, UAR, Tanzania), progressive, taxation, and the fixing of minimum wages (e.g. Uganda and,

UAR), and an expanded network of social services. However, as the Kenya

Plan points outs

"in a low-income country equitable distribution of income must be

tackled within a framework of growth. In Kenya, in particular, even if the whole of the national income were distributed equally among all the people, the poorest would only be slightly better off while those in higher income brackets could only be retained in their jobs through compulsion* The policy of equitable distribu tion must therefore be consistent with, among other things,

measures to promote growth." l/

Kenya therefore sets the pattern in this field, associating moderate

redistributional measures with a widening of the monetary sector,

more efficient production, wider employment opportunities, aided by

education and training on a larger scale. Africanization is designed

1/ Development Plan, Republic of Kenya, 1966-1970.

E/CN.14/CAP/9

Page 12

to reduce income inequalities "between the races? agriculture, industry, commerce and construction are all to witness increasing African parti cipation in most of the African countries,

22. On the crucial question of population growth, which is of consider able significance to per capita incomes, many of the plans express apprehensions about the large dependency burden that declining infant mortality rates impose of their economies, though few grapple with the fundamental issue of family planning. These few include the UAR, Kenya and Tunisia? in the latter case a decline in the population growth rate from 2.2 per cent in i960 to 1.7 per cent in 1971 is foreseen.

22>» Egalitarianism among individuals is but one aspect of a policy of socialism, which has been interpreted to include the reduction of in equalities between geographical regions of the same country, a widening of the public sector accompanied by a careful delimitation of the

spheres of the economy in which private enterprise may be permitted to operate,, as well as the terms on which it may participate in the task of economic development,

24. As regards regional equalization, it may be pointed out that the urge to achieve it is a natural outcome of the attainment of nationhood by all the African countries* To give only a few examples, Sudan, Kenya and Tanzania refer to the removal of barriers which deter popula tions in the depressed regions from participating in the monetary sector^ Gabon and Cameroon intend to open up peripheral areasf Gambia and Madagascar will integrate urban and rural communities more effec tively § and Somalia is to provide for the settlement of nomads. All these imply extended transport and communications networks, and some times the transfer of people from areas affected by population pressure, and the consolidation of settlements in areas with sparse population.

25* And lest it be thought that this policy is to be pushed to reckless extremes everywhere, the Zambia Plan warnss

"No attempt has been made to provide equal levels of investment for all provinces. It is realized that there is a certain con tradiction between the concept of regional balance and that of

E/CN.14/CAP/9

Page 13

investment in growth sectors of the economy. The aim of regional investment programmes has been to increase the productivity of such regions having regard to their absorptive capacity and the

total resource balance," l/

26. Interpreted in terms of public versus private ownership, the content of socialism in the plans contains some apparent contradictions; besides, there is not much uniformity in its connotation from country to country,—'2/

As seen through their development plans, the policies of the African Governments regarding ownership of enterprise fall into two main cate gories. There is the group, made up of such countries as Guinea, Mali,

the UAR and (until recently) Ghana ,^ that believes in a widening public

sector that may ultimately overshadow the private sector. At the op posite pole are such others as Liberia, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Gabon and Nigeria who are among the strongest advocates of a large private sector, Not even the first group advocates the liquidation of private ownership, however. Even the UAR, which has made perhaps the farthest inroads into private enterprise, has declared?

"The planning adopted in our Arab Republic does not make economic development the responsibility of the Government alones co

operation, collaboration and integrated efforts between the various groups and the private and public sectors are among the

fundamental principles on which this Plan is founded," 4/

The Ghana Plan, while declaring that?

"The community through its Government must play a major role in the economy ... Accordingly, the need for the most rapid growth of the public and co-operative sector in productive enterprise must be kept in the forefront of Government policy",

l/ First National Development Plan, 1966-1970, Republic of Zambia, p. 9»

2/ The term "socialism" has been given various connotations such as

African socialism (African Socialism and its Application to Planning

in Kenya), "democratic and co-operative socialism" (UAR, General

Frame of the Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development,

July I960 - June 1965)« "neo-destourian socialism" (Tunisia* Plan quinquennal, 1964-1968).

3/ Up to the political events of 24 February 1966, followed quickly by

the abandonment of the Seven-Year Development Plan, 1963/64-1969/70,

4/ General Plan Frame, UAR, p. viii.

E/CF..14/CAP/9

Page 14

also asserts, with equHl.-.-oou^iction, ,:

"Under, the mixed economy system conditions must be preserved in which "both public and private investment can fulfil their assigned

tasks * The plans for national economic development will assign tasks which must Tdd fulfilled by each sector if the momentum of progress towards V/.e uri;ipato objective of a prosperous Ghana-is - to be maintained, Any suggestion that vigorous State and private

sectors within the same economy are incompatible is unacceptable.

Ghana's policies will be so designed as to obtain the maximum contribution from each sector towards the overall growth of the

economy o'! 1/

27c -■ On the other hand, there are strong indications of a desire on the part of the Governments in the second group to enter more and.more into commodity production. Thus, while the Somali Plan acknowledges that Government participation in industry has not been generally effi cient if it assumes the form of Government operation of the. enterprises . themselves, it ne-verthelc^ ormounoes the Somali Government's intention

to establish an Industrial Development Corporation to spearhead the industrialization drive as private enterprise has not been readily forthcoming in cerlain fields, notably industry and agriculture. And Kenya, which has often espoused the.merits of private enterprise, has

felt itself compelled for similar reasons to introduce government

ownership' and operation in the key sectors of the economy. As the Plan

declares, .,.

"If, however, private enterprise is hesitant or slow in taking up these (development%i opportunities, the Government will initiate the more important ^rejects on its own account. The development of sugar■•-factories, tiie culp and paper mill,, ana off-shore

fisheries are examples of opportunities identified and being promoted by the Government,," 2/

To carry out these and other projects, the Plan lists among the State enterprises to be expanded or established a National Trading-Corpora- tion, a National Construction Company, an Agricultural Development Corporation and an Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation.

!/ Ghana Seyen^ejjrJDejg^l^^aenlJPlan, 1963/64-1969/70, p... 2,

2/ Development Plan, Republic of Kenya, o&r-J^l* ? P- 58.

Page 15

28, - What appears to "be contradioitions in the policies relating to the

role of'government thus stem from the pragmatic approach that African Governments adopt towards the issues in the very vital question of development. Not even the strongest advocates of private enterprise can ignore the inherent cautiousness of foreign private enterprise, its strong profit motive, the weaknesses of indigenous entrepreneurs, and the over-riding arguments that could "be adduced in support of State ownership in certain strategic sectors of the economy. On the other hand, capital scarcity and deficiencies of African managerial capacity, as well as marketing difficulties put a "bridle on the enthusiasm of governments which seek to own and manage most of t^eir economic affairs.

In the event, a vast array of privileges and immunities have been designed "by African Governments with a view to attracting foreign

enterprise, while some lurking suspicion of its effect on the countries*

economies is still in evidence,

29. The main reason for this seemingly ambivalent attitude is the

degree of economic and political power that has sometimes been wielded by foreign business interests. It cannot be easily forgotten that some of

the most disturbing political upheavals of the African continent since the

days of early contact with European economies have been traced in one way or another to commercial interests in Africa, Their ownership of important enterprises in such crucial sectors as plantation agriculture, timber

extraction, mining, transport and communications could only be seen by African Governments as a perpetuation of policies and practices pre

judicial, to African interests and aspirations,-^

30, Besides, the development effort requires for its most successful

implementation the ability of planning authorities to control and direct the performance of the various sectors of an economy. Such mechanisms

l/ A recent illustration is the case of the copper prices in Congo (Kinshasa),

where it is reported that Union Mini&re du Haut Katanga "unilaterally

decided to. reduce the price of Congolese copper after having raised it

unilaterally in May 1965". The news item goes on to say that such action

had "only one objective ... that of preventing the Kinshasa Government

from exercising its rights over the sale of Congolese products and of

boycotting the Congolese economy in all eventualities". Quoted in

African Research Bulletin, 15 July - 14 August 1966, p. 56O, C.

E/CH.14/CAP/9

Page 16

of control so far devised tend to work rather slowly or generally inef fectually where the private sector is concerned, public ownership is often urged as a means of more efficient planning and plan implementation.

31. It will, on the whole, be difficult to predict the relative sizes of the public sectors when the current national plans have run their course. The major determinants, namely availability of capital, indigenous managerial capacity and political factors influencing government economic policies are too unpredictable to permit reliable

forecasts.

32. Other considerations to which most of the plans give attention are health, the improvement of technical and statistical data, administrative improvement, strengthening of their balance of payments positions and

sounder national budgets.

33. Pan-Africanism and economic co-operation are unfortunately not given sufficient recognition, and even those plans that emphasize them

(e.g. Ghana, Mali, Kenya) do not press the point beyond an assertion

of the merits of such arrangements, and a declaration to strive to

bring them into being.

4. Plan methodology

34. Almost all African transitional and first development plans con tain a plea regarding the poor state of technical and statistical data, shortage of economists, engineers and other grades of planning personnel, administrative inadequacies, and Governments' inability to control the behaviour of certain key sectors. All these hamper the planning effort

considerably,

35. Perhaps the most serious obstacle to sound planning is the dearth of data regarding the behaviour of the main sectors of the economy.

This problem has been tackled more bravely in Somalia than in many other countries of the African region. The Plan admits thats

"The methodology of planning for the Somali Republic does not

follow the usual pattern based on the &ross national product

(GNP) approach, for the simple reason that information about

E/CU.14/CAP/9

Page 17

GNP is not available. Certain other necessary data is either not available at all, or, if available, is unreliable and incomplete.

This is true .of ..population, birth and death rates, age distribution,

immigration and emigration, labour force, employment and unemploy

ment, wages and salaries, areas under different crops, agricultural pro

duction, yields of different crops, agricultural holdings, livestock products, livestock trade, forestry, fisheries, small-scale and handi

craft indv.:, tries, "building cobstruction, electricity, wholesale and re

tail trado, pi-ice indices, road transport, education, health, personal

income and housing*"1/

36. And whereas many a conventional planner would undoubtedly be dismayed at this dearth of data, the Somali Plan boldly makes a beginning towards a transformation of the economy without waiting for statistical elegance.

The Plan reflects a conviction that, even in these circumstances, it is possible to plan. The approach adopted wass

"...to find out the most urgent needs of the country and to identify

the factors which were of strategic importance for development.

The Plan concentrates on meeting these immediate needs and creat

ing favourable conditions for future development without being too

fastidious about-GNP." 2/

37. Such an approach has indeed a number of useful lessons for planners

in Africa, who often complain about the lack of data. The Plan follows essentially a simple-.development strategy. Instead of emphasizing the lack of data, it concentrates on a handful of projects - expansion of irrigation for crops and fodder§ increased output of sugar, cotton, wheat and other cereals^ oil seeds, textiles, meat packing, fish pro cessing, dairy products and a few other industries, certain improvements

in economic and social services (transport, education, health, admini strative services, etc.). The strategy may be described thuss formulate

a number of concrete projects, estimate their cost and their contribu tion to development of that given sector, and enter into firm agreements with foreign governments and enterprises to carry these out. And one could hardly doubt that, if these projects materialize, they are bound to have a major impact on the important sectors of the economy.

l/ First Five-Year Plan, Somali Republic, op.cit.9 pp. 25, 26.

2/ First Five-Year Plan, Somali Republic, opt.cit.5 pp. 25, 26.

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38, The Plan nevertheless contains proposals for making up the short comings in statistical information, and lists surveys, investigations and research in such a wide range of fields as cartography, transport and manpower, and agriculture, including "banana cultivation, fisheries, and livestock.

39* It is to "be expected that the mere exercise of planning, by being handicapped by lack of data, itself points up the kinds of data to be collected to ensure better planning at each successive round. And such progressive improvement is being attempted by all African countries,

40. A large number of the African plans followed the Somali approach for some sectors, if not all. In Ethiopia, for instance, in the absence of population census,

"the present population estimates are based on the 1949 population count, two sample surveys, and estimates made for the First Five- Year Plan. Due to lack of vital statistics, the rate of growth of the population also had to be estimated by assuming that the improvement in public health will gradually reduce mortality, while some growth of fertility might be expected* According to

the stated assumptions, the growth of population of the whole of

Ethiopia has been forecast (up to 1974)•" l/

41. The estimates of population, often arrived at in the foregoing manner, are then used as a basis for estimating a large share of the

GDP. As Zambia explains,

"Resource data is notably inadequate in the agricultural sector where figures for total acreages, production and yields of major

food crops are not available except for the marketable surplus.

It has thus been necessary to derive production targets from estimates of the active rural population and levels of consump tion. Figures for individual cash incomes were estimated in

the same manner." 2/

It is to be noted that the consumption estimates are themselves based on nutritional levels, which have been measured for only a few African countries.

l/ Second Five-Year Development Plan, 1963-1967> Imperial Ethiopian

Government, p. 58.

2/ First National Development Plan, 1966-1970, Republic of Zambia Plan,

P. 9.

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42• Although targets have been set for various commodities, few are the plans which have made detailed studies of the necessary inputs and

technical coefficients that would be required to materialize these

targets.

43. Estimation for agricultural output has run along conventional lines for most countries. Output targets have been set by estimating future demand in the context of increasing agricultural resources and inputs.

Projections for consumption and exports have also been made. Nutri tional norms such as those set up in Ghana and Madagascar have also been used in setting targets. However, fewer attempts have been made to evaluate the demand effect of price changes or the substitution effect of lower quality by higher quality foods as urbanization and incomes

rise.

44. One of the major deterrents in estimating output targets springs

from the supply side. Raising farm output, as is now generally recognized, is not exclusively predicated on technical inputs, but hinges equally on the institutional forms, the modes of incentives and agrarian social

relations.

45. The interdependence between the overall plan frame and the agri cultural sectoral plan targets is provided primarily through projed- tions and analyses of anticipated levels, patterns of demand and supply of specific agricultural commodities. The projections made by FAO with regard to output, trade and demand trends provide a framework for the . formulation of foreign trade targets for agricultural commodities.

Several current plans have ventured to project final demand of major products based on income growth and its impact on food consumption. . One of the great handicaps to effective demand projection, however, is the .paucity of data* Given the large subsistence component in food consumption the conceptual value of average per capita incomes and income elasticities is severely circumscribed.

46. Projections of agricultural output and supply are far cruder than

demand projections, due to the complex set of factors that affect levels

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of output. One such agricultural planning technique is the "response coefficient" which is an estimate of the average production response for a given input such as DDT, fertilizers, pesticides, improved seed, irrigation etc. Since, however, it is allied inputs which propor tionately increase output, the limitations of this technique are recognized. Increasingly, there is the need for comprehensive produc tion functions, linear programming and input-output relationships.

Input-output analysis has very limited applications in the African

region, due to the large share of agricultural output (apart from

exports) which is absorbed "by household consumption. Further the subsistence sector, by definition, uses few inputs from other sectors.

47. The Zambia method represents an advance over the one used by Somalia and Ethiopia and is likely to be adopted by countries that are relatively better supplied with statistical information. After the resource data had been collected, ministries and provincial authorities were invited to submit "imaginative maximum programmes set out on

project data sheets giving details of necessary inputs". Next, on the basis of assumptions regarding export volumes and prices.* rate of

investment, foreign exchange, growth in the monetary output of agri culture, and employment, projections for the national accounts were prepared for 1970, the terminal year of the plan. Note was then taken of the implications of government policy statements, which were used to revise ministerial and provincial estimates. The programmes of the first year of the plan were then embodied in a development budget, which was approved before the other years' plans were considered.

However, as the policy issues had been already decided, what was left was to draw up the plan for the remaining three years within the

framework of the projected national accounts for 1970. Through annual budgets the plan would be kept under review throughout its lifetime.

Page 21

48. Though the published Uganda Plan does not contain an input-output

table like Zambia's,-^ it is more sophisticated in some other respects,

A mathematical model of the Uganda economy (based on unpublished input- output tables) was used for deriving provisional targets for each of

ten sectors of the economy for 1971* This model shows the implications of development in one sector for other sectors, and is thus a useful means of testing the general feasibility and internal consistency of a set of plan targets. The targets were originally arrived at after

"preliminary studies of the structure of the economy and its long-term potential for growth".

49- The sectoral plans were then prepared by twelve working parties each representing major economic and social interests and each operating within broad terms of reference comprising development objectives in the respective sectors and available resources. Each working party then proceeded to elaborate general methods and in some cases the specific projects required to achieve the targets. After consideration by the Planning Commission, a panel of international experts was convened to advise on the overall objectives and sector proposals. Necessary modifications were introduced by the Planning Commission and Cabinet, and the Central Planning Bureau and ministries then worked out the details and costings of the major projects, leaving the other projects to be prepared in similar manner in the course of the plan,

50. Three countries in the North African sub-region (the UAR, Morocco,

Tunisia) have had perhaps the longest experience with modern planning

techniques and now generally employ up-to-date methods and sophisticated econometric models in the preparation of their plans, National accounts are widely used, and input-output tables and commodity flow tables have been experimented with. For the optimal selection of projects to be included in the plan, the UAR devised an investment model, which was

l/ The Zambian Plan has a 42-column input-output table. Some other

plans with input-output tables are Mali (8), Tunisia (Three-Year

Plans 17 columns), Algeria (Perspective Plans 27 columns),

Morocco (30), the UAR (Perspective Plan and Five-Year Plans 33

and 83 columns).

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Page 22

used together with a flow-table comprising 300 commodities. The financial transactions were further elaborated in financial flow tables which bring out in greater detail the activities of corporate enterprises 3 the "banking sector, the treasury and other financial institutions, Inter-iiidustry relations were also assessed by means of input-output tables0

51. Tunisia has used aggregative models for determining the possi bilities of increasing the gross domestic product, bearing in mind various restrictions, mainly financial? such as the possibility of increasing gross domestic savings and the prospects of external financ ing, The model uses seven macro-economic aggregates! gross domestic product, final consumption, gross investment - with its two components - net investment and amortizations domestic savings and the external

deficit in goods and services.. Th^se various aggregates are inter related either by facts of definition or technical ratios. The model was used to determine1 the annual rate of growth for the GDP, and thus to ascertain the GDP at the end year of the plan. It was then supple mented with tables of transfer operations and those of mutual indebted ness. Tunisia has fairly detailed national accounts for the years 1953 and 1957? and these were used in drawing up the Plan and evaluat ing different aggregates. Input-output tables for the years 1957 >

I960 and 1970 were also prepared-, the one for 1957 being used for planning purposes. For example, it was used to forecast the inter mediate demand, although this was supplemented in many cases by the study of the estimated operations accounts of the various enterprises contemplated. In some oa^-'^j technical coefficients were borrowed from other countries, along with Algeria? France and the USA, The 1970 table was meant to check the PlanJs consistency,

52. As is shown in the Chapter on Plan versus achievement, the most sophisticated plans often pose problems of implementation in Africa, as local personnel who must, of necessity, see the plan through its execution, after it has been drawn up by expatriate experts, often

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Page 23

lack the training to understand all the ramifications of the plan, and thus to make adjustments in it when required. A developing country is often ;happier adopting what might be called the project-by-project approach, if only because it is easier to cope with and not very exact ing in its demands for general and sector planning data. It is note worthy that, without employing advanced methodology, African plans already tend to be rendered quickly obsolete by the march of events

(see Table l). It would therefore appear to be more realistic in the

circumstances to allow the pace of advance towards comprehensive planning to be dictated by the availability of resources locally not only for formulating the plans, but also for controlling their course.

5. Planning organizations

53. Many African countries have recognized the necessity for establish ing planning organs that enjoy sufficient independence and authority to ensure that they can carry out their obvious functions of not only formulating and, when necessary, revising the plan, but also co-ordinate the work of all the agencies responsible for implementation, recommend policies, measures and machinery for implementation, and oversee and report on implementation. In several African countries this recogni tion has resulted in placing the supreme planning organization under the control of Head of State or government. It is this body that has responsibility for deciding main objectives and directives and finally fixes the targets, and usually is composed of ministers and representa tives from the important economic sections of the community. Thus, in Tunisia, the Supreme Commission for Planning is presided over by the Head of State| so are the Planning Commission in Uganda and the Higher

Council for Planning in the UAR.

54. Next in line of authority is a ministerial committee which oversees the execution of the plan at the political level, although in some

countries this is left to the ministry responsible for planning (e.g.

Ministry of Economic Development and Planning in Uganda, General

Directorate for Planning and Economic Studies in Algeria, Secretariat

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of State for Planning and Finance in Tunisia). This organ usually

operates under the direction of the minister responsible for planning,

;l\ov.^}i in some exceptional caseo (eoge Tanzania), the Head of State

may assume this role*

55c This is singular lack of uniformity regarding the roles of these organs. These diversities coi;,"1.& "be seen also in the degree of planning responsibilities entrusted to ministries and regions or provinces. In Nigeria, for instance, the regions have so far exercised considerable autonomy, resulting in the formulation of the current regional plans, which are, to all intents and purposes, separate plans with very little

co-ordination among them* The Tanganyika Plan is also only for that section of Tanzania, though it has been indicated that the Zanzibar Plan will be integrated with it when it is prepared, On the whole,

however, the majority of the countries have introduced regional,district,

and local planning committees in a bid to involve the people more

intimately in the exercise of plan formulation as well as its imple ment ation«

Page 25

....-.■ CHAPTER II ,:

COIjIvIODITY PRODUCTION

56. In their bid to narrow the gap in living levels between themselves and the economically advanced countries, all the African Governments have announced far-reaching changes in agriculture and industry in their

current development plans. Agriculture, which on an average gives a means of livelihood to over 80 per cent of the population on the African continent, is singled out as the sector where the most extensive progress must take place. Without question, an improved agriculture will quickly raise the incomes of the majority of the people, now living at the level of subsistence, in a direct manner. It is also the provider of food for the people, a major contributor to foreign exchange earnings, and sup plier of raw materials for factories. Besides, any serious approach to the question of industrialization will have to be on the basis of an expanding domestic market, which can occur on a substantial scale only in conditions of rising rural incomes. Moreover, wherever the demand for labour by industry outstrips supply, as happens at certain stages of industrialization, the surplus labour could be obtained most readily only if agricultural productivity permits the release of part of farm labour.

57. There is the further fact that, besides investments directly con

nected with agriculture, any programme for modernizing this sector in

duces secondary investments in social and economic infrastructure, which

cannot but benefit the large rural populations. Sound industrial develop

ment is thus to be conceived only within the context of an agricultural

sector that is not only growing"fast but is also efficient. As regards

industry, it has been so enthusiastically commended for the undivided

attention of developing countries in the past decade, that it is a

mystery that the African development plans have not succumbed to'tne

temptatioh-Of concentrating on it to the neglect of agriculture. Indus

trialization's appeal does not merely lie in the fact that history has

established that economic prosperity has tended to be closely associated

with expanding industrial activity. The African countries seek through

■E/OTil4/QAP/9

Page 26

an enlargement of their industrial sectors a lessening of their dependence on imported goods 5 they can also enhance their "bargaining power and export earnings by upgrading their primary products "before export. Their uneasiness at the. prevailing state of affairs is graphically presented in the Tanzania Plans

"... at present we import more than eighty per cent of the consumer goods we buy - that is, excluding food. Hot only that, we export our sisal and then import ropes and mats made with it§ we export our cotton, and import cloth, we export our coffee "beans, and buy tinned coffee from abroad.

We buy shoes, biscuits and enamelware from other countries, having first exported some of the basic elements of these

goods." l/

58. The policy of raising the value of exports and import substitu tion has particular significance for agriculture in yet another sense:

balance of payments considerations demand that agricultural progress should, sooner or later, be underpinned through the supply of machinery, equipment, intermediate industrial inputs, fertilizers, pesticides and other agricultural inputs from domestic industries.

59 • Some plans also hope to increase employment opportunities through an expansion of the industrial sector, though it must be pointed out that in the majority of important industries, particularly those manu facturing for export, the scope for labour-intensive techniques is limited.

60. Finally, the role of industry in teaching new skills, increasing a country's supply of managers, and experience in modern production techniques, and generally introducing a country to the secrets of the age of science has been rightly stressed in many plans.

l/ Tanganyika Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development,

op» cit., pp. x and xi.

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.1. Planned growth of agriculture

61. The major inhibitors of African agriculture have been the subject of a fast growing literature—' and are well known. In nearly every African country subsistence production contributes over half of the GDP. The list of drawbacks is really long, and includes shifting cultivation and long fallow periods resulting in significant mismanagement of land

resources 1 or else over—grazing and over-cultivation culminating in soil erosion and poor yields| archaic land tenure systems that discourage farm improvements 5 plant and animal diseases and pests 5 insignificant applica tion of modern agricultural inputs, inadequate research, credit and marketing facilities,

62. African development plans reveal an awareness of this situation, and of the further fact that, given its weight as the largest segment in the economy, the structural change and rate of growth of agriculture must have a considerable impact on the entire economy. If agricultural output were

l/ See FAOs Africa Surveys Report on the Possibilities of African Rural Development in Relation to Economic and Social Growth, (Rome, 1962)|

FAO, The State of Food and Agriculture 1963s Review of the Second

Post-War Decade (Rome, 1963)7 UNESCO, Survey of the Natural Resources

of the African Continent (Paris, 1961)5 ECA and FAO, African Agri

cultural Development Reflections on the Major Lines of Advance and the Barriers to Progress (New-York, 1966)3 J. de Wilde and Associates, The Experiences of African Agricultural Development, John Hopkins University Press, forthcoming; R. Dumont, L'Afrique Noire est Mai

Partie, Paris, 1962 (an English translation of this work now exists)!

T.W. Schultz, Transforming Traditional Agriculture (Yale University

Press, 1964)5 E. Boserup, The Conditions of Agricultural Growths The Economics of Agrarian Change under Population Pressure (London, 1965)? C. Clark and M.R. Hanswell, The Economics of Subsistence Agriculture (London, 1964)5 FAO, Marketings its Role in increasing

Productivity, Freedom From Hunger Campaign Basic Study No.4 (Rome, 1962)sPo Gourou, The Tropical World (3rd edition, London, 1961)I

J. Dalton, Shifting Perspectives of African Agriculture, Proceedings of the Haile Selassie I Prize Trust Foundation Conference, Addis Ababa, October 19665 United Nations Science and Technology for Agri

culture, Report on the United Nations Conference on the Application

•of Science and Technology for the Benefit of Less-Developed Countries,

Vol. Ill, Agriculture (Hew York, 1963).

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to stagnate (or grow slowly) it would act as a "built-in depressor, even

if the rest of the economy were to grow at an impressively high rate per year. The extremely unsatisfactory overall growth rate of the African region in the first half of the Development Decade could "be traced largely to the sluggishness of this sector. Both food and agri cultural production on a per capita basis have slumped - a tragic repeti tion of the performance of the fifties - and the indications (Table 3) are that rapid population growth is straining this weak sector further.

TABLE 3

World grain trade by ma.jor geographic regions-^

(in million metric tons)

1934-38 I960 North America

Latin America Western Europe

Eastern Europe (including USSR)

Africa Asiar-'

Oceania (Australia and Few Zealand) +3 +6 + 8

Sources Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,

Development Assistance Efforts and Policies9 1966 Review, p. 78

a/ Plus = net exports? minus = net imports. Minor imbalances between

world imports and exports in a given year may be due to rounding or variations in reporting methods used by various countries.

b/ Including Japan.

63. The picture regarding grain reflects the general food situation

on the continent todays though not a serious food deficit area, Africa's prospects of moving permanently into the food surplus group of countries seem to be exceedingly remote in present conditions.

+ 5 + 9

-24

+ 5

+ 1 + 2

+39

0

-25

0 - 2 -16

+60 + 2 -23 -14 - 3 -30

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64. In the circumstances 9 planned agricultural growth rates ranging from 1.6 per cent to below 5 per cent for ten of the fifteen countries for which comparable; data 'are available (Table 4) appear generally inadequate, although it is a significant fact that both the high and

low targets have been difficult to attain.

65. All the plans announce a two-pronged strategy for lifting agriculture from its depressed condition. This consists, in the words of the Tanzania Plan, of (a) the Improvement Approach, and (b).the Transformation Approach.

The Improvement Approach seeks, at minimum cost and disturbance to the social structure, to bring about efficiencies in farm practices and consequently increased productivity. These objectives are to be met largely through the application of the results of research to better crop and animal husbandry, use of high-yielding and disease-resistant strains and breeds, widespread application of fertilizers, simple tools and draught animals and the provision of credit and marketing facilities.

The operations of research and demonstration stations are to be streamlined, and numbers of agricultural extension officers increased several times over.

66. The Transformation Approach is more spectacular, mainly because it calls for large investments and introduction of fresh fields of activity.

The Tanzania Plan contains one of the clearest descriptions of this method. Major agricultural projects will be' concentrated in the more fertile areas, accounting for about one-third of the total land area?

the remaining two-thirds consisting of semi-desert zones with poor and

marginal soils will be excluded from the agricultural projects within

the current plan period. Evacuations of population will be carried out

from those agricultural zones having between 30 and 50 inches of annual

rainfall and subject to extensive cultivations these will be regrouped

and settled in the most fertile zones, To achieve this, the planners

intend to set up a system of private and collective ownership of land,

as well as to introduce mixed farming and crop rotation. One of the

major aims of the transformation approach is to re-settle half a million

people^ by I98O in new agricultural locations. Areas to be newly settled

will include the river basin lands of the ?angani, Wami and Kilombero

whose agricultural potential is considerable.

PlannedgrowthinagricultureandindustrialproductionofselectedAfricancountries Annualgrowthrates Country..". Tunisia Sudan UAR Ethiopia Kenya Uganda- Tanzania Madagascar Mauritania Senegal Tcgr Dahcmey Ghana

Agriculture -.•TotalPood 2.8 4.0 5.2 2.3:./

7.4i/

.4.0 3.5 1.6 4.7- 3.5 5.0 5.63.8

Ccn^o (Brazzaville) 1.7 •••

SouthAfrica4.9.... Sourse:NationalDevelopmentPlans.

Total ... 11.2 »•. ... ... ... ... ... 11.1 ... .*e

20-7-2/

o••

Manufacturing 7-0: 27.2 14.5 12.2 35*1 8.4

Indvstry Mining 7.7 52.6 8.2 6.6 4.2 4.4

10.7^

6\6 ... 2.9

Basic facilities 7c1 7.0 2.6 ..e 000

Construction 9.0 .s.

1.0 ':

10.2 I803 11.3 12.7 1.6 -5.4 3.7 ...

O O

a/ Industry, Mining and Public Utilities excluding Transport, b/ Including handicrafts and cottage industries. c/ Power, Transport and Communication, only. d/ Industry and electricityo

3/Basicdevelopmentsectors*

%J Monetary sector only. gj Transport and Ccumunication and Public Utilities.

h/Electricity,TourismandTransportscnly.

l/ Energy, mining, industry and handicraft, j/ Other "secondary" services. h/ Transport only. l/ Handicraft and traditional activity. m/ Including construction. n/ Industry. 0/ Industry and Services

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67. Like several countries in the East African sub-region, Tanzania1s cattle wealth is considerable with an estimated 8.5 million head of cattle, thus giving the country one of the highest cattle-man ratios in the world. The long-term objective is to improve the quality of the animals by raising the average weight as well as the average calving and take-off rates. It is here that the co-operative movement is called upon to play a vigorous role.

68. By 1970, it is expected that about 70 per cent of all marketed

cattle will be sold through co-operatives, and 150 such cattle co operatives have been established to be financed by the Co-operative and Development Bank. According to planned livestock targets, monetized output should rise from about a third of total sector output in the early sixties to over 50 P©*1 cent by I960. To achieve such targets would imply mobilizing greater agricultural and community development staff, since the attitude towards cattle marketing, particularly of the Masai, is extremely traditionalist.

69. There is also the awareness of the need for mobilizing the energies of the rural masses through community development and settlement schemes, New village settlements are to be set up containing 250 families each, who will be assisted wjth land grant on a family basis. To ensure the viability of these projects, a comprehensive development scheme will be designed for each village, and farmers will only be granted land upon completion of a training course. In all, 69 villages will be set

up, each costing about £150,000 (a total of more than £10 million), or

about 8 per cent of total public sector investment.

70. This is a pioneer model operation which (assuming five persons to

a family) should draw into the orbit of rural modernization more than

80,000 persons. Although in terms of the total rural population this figure is insignificant, it nonetheless will give an impetus to agri cultural modernization along the lines experienced by these pilot villages in the decades beyond 1970. Indeed, such rural changes are merely pointers in a certain direction and their cumulative impact would be seen only over the next decade.

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71.. One of the measures to be employed for bringing about a rapid transformation of agriculture ic land reform and registration of title deeds. Kenya proposes to consolidate fragmented holdings, have them enclosed in many instances, and -;hus ensure that they can be legally registered, so that the/ will 1.3 acceptable security.for credit, In additions the new farm lay-out will, allow the provision of a rational transport system to aid pxocv.rcmeni: of agricultural requirements and marketing of produce, and the same title will encourage the improve ment of holdings and elimination o::' wasteful land litigation. The UAR Plan announces more drastic land reform measures designed to give the cultivator a larger and moro .".asting stake in the land he tills, and the plans of several other countries including Ivory Coast, Morocco

and Ethiopia also contain hintc of land reforms,

72. Agricultural modernization is also to be pursued through irriga tion, extended use of machinery, fertilizers, pesticides and other inputs* In some instances, these investments are coupled with the introduction of new cultures or expansion of existing ones and direct State participation in agricultural projects0 Thus, the Ivory Coast is to introduce oil palms, cotton and pineapples; Tanzania, cocoa,

soft fibres, rubber and palm oij§ Ofoana, sugar cane and cotton. In

the plan periods Somalia, Ghana, Konya and Tanzania are among the countries where Governments intend to take up agricultural production.

The reasons are varied? for iii3-';a-ioe, it is hoped that services such

as education, electricity and va.-'ze ..■ can be provided on an economical

basis on these large farm holdings. It is also urged that agricultural inputs, which are generally rather expensive, and also require skill in their application, could be use! more economically in these enter prises, which should develop ii.to centres for the rapid spread of modern techniques of agricultural practices and farm management.

73. All the governments are pledged at the same time to an expansion

in their traditional services v,o <-,gri culture, namely, agricultural

credit, research, pest control inoculation of animals, seed and