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MIT JAPAN
PROGRAM
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/ANTI-KOREAN SENTIMENT IN JAPAN AND ITS EFFECTS ON
KOREA-JAPAN TRADE Kurt W. Tong
MITJP 96-05
Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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OMIT Japan Program
ANTI-KOREAN SENTIMENT IN JAPAN
AND ITS EFFECTS ON KOREA-JAPAN TRADE
Kurt W. Tong MITJP 96-05
About the MIT Japan Program and its Working Paper Series
The MIT Japan Program was founded in 1981 to create a new generation of technologically sophisticated "Japan-aware" scientists, engineers, and managers in the United States. The Program's corporate sponsors, as well as support from the government and from private foundations, have made it the largest, most comprehensive, and most widely emulated center of applied Japanese studies in the world.
The intellectual focus of the Program is to integrate the research methodologies of the social sciences, the humanities, and technology to approach issues confronting the United States and Japan in their relations involving science and technology. The Program is uniquely positioned to make use of MIT's extensive network of Japan-related resources, which include faculty, researchers, and library collections, as well as a Tokyo-based office. Through its three core activities, namely, education, research, and public awareness, the Program disseminates both to its
sponsors and to the interested public its expertise on Japanese science and technology and on how that science and technology is managed.
The MIT Japan Program Working Paper Series provides an important means to achieving these ends.
Anti-Korean Sentiment in Japan
and Its Effects on Korea-Japan Trade
Kurt W. Tong*
Summary
This paper uses standard econometric analysis to assess the impact of popular sentiment in Japan on trade relations between Japan and the
Republic of Korea. Japan's colonization of the Korean peninsula was unusually intense, engendering strong anti-Japanese feelings among
Koreans, but also generating bitterness among Japanese who are reluctant to view their colonial efforts as a failure and are thus resentful of Korea's
marked rejection of Japan. Fifty years after the end of the colonial period, Japanese for the most part still have strong, negative prejudices toward
Korea and Koreans -- feelings which become more or less intense in reaction to historical events. The variation in anti-Korean sentiment, as reflected in
the monthly Jiji News Service poll of "liked" and "disliked" countries, can be used as an explanatory variable for variation in the pattern of bilateral trade. The regression analysis in this paper finds that anti-Korean sentiment
among Japanese has had a strong, statistically significant, and negative impact on the growth of Japanese imports from Korea. Findings concerning Japanese exports to Korea are similar, but less conclusive. When reliable time series data sets on political variables are available, both economists and political historians should consider using statistical techniques incorporating political variables more frequently, as a method to make the study of
"political economy" more exacting.
* Kurt W. Tong, a career U.S. diplomat assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, is currently Visitor at Tokyo University's Faculty of Economics. The contents of this paper are the sole responsibility of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Department of State or any other organization with which the author is or has been affiliated The author would like to thank James Marshall of the U.S. Information Agency for sharing his files of survey data. Comments are welcome; e-mail may be addressed to kurttong@aol. com.
11---Introduction
The power of nationalist sentiment can override all other considerations; it can dominate the minds of a people, and dictate the policies of government, even when in every possible way and to every
conceivable degree it is in sharp conflict with what seem to be and are in fact the basic economic interests of the people in question. To
accept as obviously true the notion that the bonds of allegiance must necessarily be largely economic in character to be strong, or to accept unhesitatingly the notion that where economic entanglements are artificially or naturally strong the political affectations will also necessarily become strong, is to reject whatever lessons past experience has for us in this field. -- Jacob Vinerl
In the loose languages of journalism and political science, it is frequently said that "relations between Country A and Country B have soured, both politically and economically," or conversely, "expanding economic relations between Country A and Country B are fostering an improved bilateral atmosphere." Such statements do not raise eyebrows because it is common sense to believe that, in international relations, economic and political factors influence each other significantly during the course of interaction between any two partners. But can the interaction between political and economic variables be documented and measured in a precise, quantitative way?
Although international relations theorists tend to discuss relations among states as a cold calculus of economic and strategic national interests, in fact history can be strongly influenced by the emotions and biases that groups of people naturally develop toward other nations and peoples.
Aggregated from the individual level to the national level, this phenomenon is "popular sentiment." Popular sentiment can have powerful effects on nation-to-nation ties. Also, popular sentiment (perhaps unique among the socio-political "intangibles" that impact history) can be measured and assessed reasonably accurately, using modern polling techniques. It is impossible to quantify the effects of any one individual on the measurable economic variables of international relations. But this essay demonstrates that it is in fact possible to quantify and assess the impact of broader popular sentiment on seemingly unrelated quantitative economic variables.
I Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
1950, p. 105.
A case study of Japan-Korea economic relations is especially suitable for this endeavor, for three reasons. First, economic relations between the two nations are well-developed, and of great significance to both countries. Japan is Korea's second largest trading partner and foreign source of capital, and probably its most important foreign source of manufacturing-related technology. Korea, meanwhile, ranks among Japan's key economic partners in terms of trade, as a host for outward foreign investment, and as a
competitor in international manufactured goods markets.
Second, as will be detailed below, emotions -- overwhelmingly negative -- run very deep between the two peoples, implying a powerful role for
popular sentiment in determining the course of political and economic relations. Political friction fueled by popular resentment is of course not unusual. Also, the expansion of international trade and investment is a normal, almost inevitable part of modern international relations. But what is unusual about Korea-Japan relations is that the contradictory trends of economic cooperation and mutual antipathy have both been so strong,
exerting themselves simultaneously over the course of the last three decades (using the establishment of formal ties between Japan and the Republic of Korea in 1965 as a starting point). The net result is a kind of "reluctant partnership," where Koreans and Japanese interact vigorously in the economic realm, but resent having to deal with each other each step of the way.2
The third reason for choosing Japan and Korea for this case study --essential to the exercise of quantification proposed for this essay -- is the availability of a consistent time series data set measuring popular sentiment in Japan-Korea relations. The Tokyo-based Jiji Tsushin news service has faithfully conducted a "liked and disliked countries" survey every month since
1971, enabling one to plot month-by-month changes in the attitudes of Japanese citizens toward Korea. For use in assessing "intangibles," consistent and reliable time series data sets of this type are quite rare.
This essay is divided into five parts. Section One contains a brief discussion of the historical roots of strong bilateral antipathy between Korea
2 For detailed analyses of modern political and economic relations between Korea and Japan, see Brian Bridges, Japan & Korea in the 1990's: From Antagonism to Adjustment, Ashgate Publishing, 1993,
Chong-sik Lee, Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension, Hoover Institution Press, 1985, or Kurt W. Tong, Distant Neighbors and Reluctant Partners: Popular
Consciousness and the Political Economy of Japan-Korea Relations, Princeton
University Woodrow Wilson School Graduation Thesis, 1987.
3
and Japan, while Section Two provides an overview of several data sets related to popular sentiment in Korea and Japan, to serve as additional background. Section Three introduces and describes the data set of economic variables and popular sentiment data at the center of this study. The data is
analyzed using standard econometric techniques in Section Four. Section Five contains concluding remarks on the implications of this study for further research.
I. Historical Sources of Mutual Antipathy
Japanese commentators sometimes use the expression "distant
neighbors"3 to describe the psychological aspects of Japan's relationship with
Korea. This phrase accurately captures the way Korea and Japan view each other. Geographically Korea and Japan are very close, and culturally,
linguistically, and historically Japanese and Koreans have much in common. Still, their very closeness only seems to deepen their mutual dislike. This dilemma is in turn capsulized in another phrase, pronounced "kin-shin zo-o"
in Japanese, which translates roughly as "closeness breeds dislike."4
According to this concept, the animosity between Japanese and Koreans is actually exacerbated by their cultural and ethnic similarity and geographical proximity -- a notion which is useful in explaining the perpetuation of mutual
antipathy between Korea and Japan in the postwar era. Still, the kin-shin
zo-o concept fails to explain how the "family feud" began. In order to
understand the roots of the mutual animosity between Korea and Japan, it is necessary to examine the record of Japanese colonial rule in Korea, which has set the tone for Japan-Korea relations throughout the second half of the 20th century.
Japan's Colonial "Intensity:" Japan's colonial occupation of Korea was unusual in several aspects, most notably the fact that the metropole nation was geographically close (as well as culturally similar) to the colony,
resulting in an extremely intense form of colonization. As Bruce Cumings explains, "Japan became the only world power to colonize its contiguous neighbors ... (facilitating) the settling of metropolitan citizens ... [and]
(raising) the possibility of an integral coordination and tying of the colonies to the metropole such that exchange time in market relations was
extraordinarily rapid, with railroads rather than sea lanes as the prime
medium."5 In other words, proximity to Japan made it practical (as well as
3 In Japanese, "chikakute toi kuni."
4 This concept is outlined, and criticized, in Lee Keun, Nikkan Sogo Rikai he no Kozu [A
Framework for Mutual Understanding between Japan and Korea], PHP Kenkyujo,
1982.
5 Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Princeton University Press, 1981, pp. 7-8.
desirable from Japan's perspective) for the colonizers to practice an uniquely intense form of colonial rule in Korea.
What do I mean by "colonial intensity?" Mainly this: To a much greater extent than their European or American competitors, Japan's leadership aimed to rapidly integrate Korea into the economic and social fabric of the Japanese Empire, treating it more as an annexed extension of Japan than as an overseas colony. Japanese commentators sometimes point out that this was not without its benefits in terms of the modernization of Korea's feudal and mostly agricultural domestic economy. But Japan's colonial policies, while often efficient in economic productivity terms, were onerous for the Korean people. Politically, socially, and culturally, Koreans were treated not as overseas colonial subjects but as an inferior class of citizens in their own land, with all the obligations but none of the privileges of citizenship in the Japanese Empire. Soldiers and police in colonial Korea were Japanese, as were tax collectors and local bureaucrats. At school,
children studied Japanese and were taught to worship the Emperor. Citizens could be punished for using their Korean names, speaking the Korean
language, or observing Korean traditions. The justification for this draconian style of rule was the need for Korean subjects to support the "common cause" of Japanese imperial success, a cause which found few followers among the alienated Koreans.
In the world view of the Japanese leadership of the time, the "cultural obliteration of Korea as an entity distinct from Japan, the extinction of
Korean as a separate language, and the end of Koreans as a separate people"6 all made perfect sense, even if this required policies of severe
political and social repression. Thus, political activity was sharply curtailed by the colonial government after the March 1 Movement uprising in 1919.
Forced conscription became common during the last years of Japanese colonial rule, including conscription of women to serve involuntarily as prostitutes for the Japanese Army.7 But more than mere economic or
political oppression, the indignity and insult of the misguided Japanese campaign to destroy Korea's national identity was probably the most
important cause of the distrust that still dominates Korea's postwar view of Japan.
6 Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex, Harvard University Press, 1968, pp. 73-74.
7 Roughly 100,000 Koreans were drafted into the Imperial armed forces, where many died or were imprisoned. Estimates of the number of Korean "comfort women" who were forced into prostitution range well into the tens of thousands (See George Hicks, The Comfort Women, W.W. Norton & Company, 1994.) Another often-overlooked tragedy is the case of the tens of thousands of Koreans killed or injured by the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. (See Kurt W. Tong, "Korea's Forgotten Atomic Bomb Victims," Bulletin of Concerned
Asian Scholars, January-March 1991.)
5
QIP----Divergent Views of History: Koreans emerged from colonial rule with a long list of (justifiable) grievances against their larger and more powerful neighbor to the east. Among these is the role that Japanese colonialism played in the division of the Korean peninsula and the resulting 1950-53
civil/global war, which inflicted great hardship on the Korean people.8
Koreans are angered when Japan's leaders claim -- as Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama did most recently on January 31, 1995 -- that "Japan
has no responsibility for the division of Korea into North and South Korea."9
Koreans also object strongly to the common Japanese view that Japanese colonial rule has in the long run served Korea well in its efforts to development economically. To be sure, under Japanese rule Korea's economy was rapidly and forcibly modernized. In order to consolidate Japanese
military and political power in its colonies, the Japanese authorities
established a sophisticated authoritarian administrative apparatus. And in order to develop the colonial economies to the point where they could
contribute to Japanese wealth, the Japanese government invested heavily in infrastructure and industrial capacity (particularly in northern Korea). As a result, according to most purely economic analyses, "the net effect of the
colonial relationship was an acceleration of Korean growth."'°
On the other hand, little of the resulting economic growth in Korea translated into prosperity for Korean nationals. By 1945, for example, only about one-tenth of the industrial establishments on the Korean peninsula were owned by Koreans, and investment by Korean nationals accounted for a mere 3% of total paid-up capital in the country." Management and technical positions were also usually occupied by Japanese. These barriers, combined with postwar capital shortages and the destruction of Japan's infrastructural legacy in Korea during the 1950-53 Korean War, meant that Korea's colonial era economic development actually provided only a limited impetus for
postwar Korean economic growth.
8 Like many decolonized nations, the Korea that emerged in 1945 was unstable socially, and
had only weak leadership -- conditions that made it susceptible to civil war. The division of the peninsula into zones occupied by Soviet and American forces was also a direct result of Japanese rule (and the desire of the Soviet military to capture all elements of Japan's retreating Kwantung Army in 1945).
9 Kyodo News Service, February 1, 1995. On Korean opinion see, for example, Lee Won Sul, "Japan is at the Root of a Divided Korea," Japan Times, November 4, 1995, op-ed page. 10 Randall Sidney Jones, The Economic Development of Colonial Korea, Michigan University Ph.D. Dissertation, 1984, p. 2.
11 Daniel Sung-il Juhn, "The Development of Korean Entrepreneurship," in Nahm,ed., Korea
Under Japanese Colonial Rule, Western Michigan University Center for Korean Studies,
1973, p. 127.
6
Therefore, when Japanese commentators insist on discussing Japan's colonial investments in Korea as a sort of"endowment" that Japan provided to the colonies,'2 Koreans bristle. In fact, the colonial economy during the later years of Japanese colonial rule was based on labor utilization policies
equivalent to slave labor. Historians on both sides of the debate use the term "labor mobilization," but while some Japanese use it to describe the
developmental process of drawing labor off the farms into the industrial economy, in the minds of Koreans the term conjures up images of divided families, hard work under severe conditions, and a meager existence in urban slums or labor camps. Many Korean laborers, particularly those who became part of the industrial work force after 1937, were conscripted against their
will and paid pitifully low wages. Thousands more Korean farmers lost their land to absentee landlords. In general, the Korean standard of living
showed very little improvement throughout the colonial period, despite rapid gains in overall colonial economic productivity and improving standards of living in the Japanese home islands.
Japanese Complaints: This record amply explains why Koreans continue to distrust and dislike Japanese, even decades after the end of
World War II. But why should Japanese have similar negative feelings about Korea and Koreans? After all, the Koreans were the "victims" of colonialism, not the Japanese.
Put simply, many Japanese (perhaps the majority) view Koreans not as victims of history, but rather as ungrateful and disloyal beneficiaries of Japanese leadership. It important to point out that the Japanese of the time felt entirely justified in using a firm hand in adminstrating Korea during the colonial period. Japan in the late 19th and early 20th centuries felt
surrounded by European expansionism, and at the same time Japan's leaders were consumed with a strong sense of national identity and destiny, emotions which were eventually translated into broad support for the militaristic
nationalism of the 1930's. Therefore, Japanese felt comfortable emulating the expansionist policies of Europe and the United States.
In dealing with their Asian neighbors, the Japanese of the colonial era were also possessed with a strong sense of national and cultural superiority. In their vertically-organized view of the world, the Japanese saw all other Asians as occupying a position lower than themselves. While practicing what the Japanese viewed as a mix of paternalism and authoritarianism in ruling
12 According to commentator Komuro Naoki, for example, "The relationship between Japanese and Koreans was not ... a relationship of subject and ruler. Japan was a friend, and it went to Korea in order to teach Koreans various things." Komuro Naoki, Kankoku
no Higeki: Dare mo Kakanakatta Shinjitsu [The Tragedy of Korea: The Untold Story], Kobunsha, 1985, pp. 150-151.
7
ao*lara---·rar-·I---·---·-Korea, the Japanese expected both loyalty and obedience from the new imperial subjects in the colonies. When Koreans objected to this
arrangement, before or after the war, the Japanese saw them as ungrateful malcontents.
The psychology of Japanese colonialism, and the Korean reaction to it, are eloquently summed up in this passage written by a Japanese-American soldier arriving in Seoul in September 1945:
I shall try to describe [this Japanese attitude] by paraphrasing their own words. Although they had ruled Korea kindly, albeit firmly, for over a generation, though they had established fine public schools to educate the ignorant Korean subjects to be fit subjects of the
emperor, though they had proclaimed the racial identity of the Koreans and Japanese, and though they had done all these good things unselfishly and in the best interests of the Koreans, who were simply incapable of helping themselves, yet the obstinate peninsula people persisted in retaining their characteristic traits, in keeping
their family names, in speaking and writing their own language and subversively acting like Koreans.'3
While most Japanese have accepted the inevitability of their military defeat at the hands of a unified West led by the United States, many have balked at recognizing the failure of their overseas colonial efforts, even five decades later. When, under severe pressure from the South Korean
government, Japanese Cabinet Minister Takumi Eto was forced to resign in November 1995 for telling reporters that Japan "did some good things" during its colonial rule in Korea, Eto was not voicing a minority view.'4
Nationalism and cultural chauvinism persist in Japan in the postwar era, and Japanese have been reluctant to give up their feelings of national superiority toward Asia. These attittudes translate easily into popular dislike of Korea and things Korean among the Japanese public. Add to this Japanese resentment of Koreans and the "attitude of superiority" Koreans assumed after the Japanese defeat in the Pacific War,' 5 as well as the
13 From a letter by Warren Tsuneishi, dated September 12, 1945, written in Seoul. Reprinted in Otis Cary, ed., From a Ruined Empire: Letters From Japan, China, and Korea, 1945-46, (Kodansha, 1975), pp. 32-34.
14
Eto was the sixth Japanese politician -- starting with Education Minister Masayuki Fujio in 1982 -- forced to resign for expressing "incorrect" views of Japan's colonial and war-time history. But Eto's case elicited the most forceful response yet from Seoul, which threatened to recall its Ambassador to Japan and cancel a planned bilateral summit meeting if Eto was not removed.
15 A 1978 survey by Ikeda Kenichi showed that Japanese felt stronger resentment toward Korea for their wartime defeat than they do towards China or the United States. Data in Tsujimura Akira, ed., Nihon to Kankoky no Bunka Masatsu [Cultural Friction
between Japan and Korea], Shukko Shoten, 1984, p. 16.
8
psychological need for Japanese to identify a group of people "lower on the ladder of status" than themselves, and one begins to have a fuller
understanding of the roots of Japanese prejudices toward Korea and Koreans. II. The Depth of Bilateral Antipathy
The Korean View of Japan and the Japanese: Koreans emerged from thirty-six years of Japanese colonial rule with valid grounds for a low
national opinion of Japan and the Japanese people. Rather than abating in subsequent years, this antipathy has been fostered as a basic element of Korean national identity, and persists until today. Consider, for example, the following results of a Gallup poll of adult Koreans conducted in March
1987:16
Most Liked Countries
USA Switzerland Australia Japan
Overall 1987 33.7 17.1 6.3 5.8 1983 45.5 17.1 3.4 1.8 By Age (1987) 20-29 27.3 19.2 5.8 5.3 30-39 29.7 22.4 6.4 6.6 40-49 44.0 11.9 8.3 5.1 Over 49 55.7 2.3 4.8 7.4
Most Disliked Countries
North Korea Japan USSR USA
Overall 1987 54.9 22.3 6.0 1.9 1983 54.0 14.7 22.5 0.6 By Age (1987) 20-29 38.3 31.8 5.9 4.9 30-39 58.8 22.2 4.9 0.7 40-49 66.2 16.4 4.7 0.0 Over 49 65.4 12.3 9.5 0.6
(% of respondents choosing each; only one choice allowed)
This data shows quite a lot. Forty years after the end of the colonial period, Korea's image of Japan was still overwhelmingly negative, as can be
seen from the 22.3% of Koreans who selected Japan as the country they liked
16 Gallup poll of March 20, 1987, as reprinted in Kawase Eimei and Sakuwa Tetsu,
Kankokujin wa Naze Nihonjin ga Dai-kirai ka [Why Koreans Hate Japanese],
Nisshin Hodo, 1987, pp. 125-128. Note: France, which is not included in this table, scored higher than Japan as a "most-liked" country in 1987. Japan was actually ranked fifth.
9
L---least, while only 5.8% of Koreans polled named Japan as their favorite
foreign country.1 7 Perhaps as important as the pro- and anti-Japan
sentiment figures is the trend for younger Koreans to have a less favorable view of Japan than the older generations. Although it may be that attitudes
simply change with age, this data could also be interpreted as predicting that Korean attitudes toward Japan may become even more negative in the
future, rather than (as one might expect) improving over time as the
experiences of World War II slip farther into the past.18
A number of words can be used to describe the way Koreans feel about Japan and the Japanese, ranging from fear, resentment, envy, distrust, and hatred to nostalgia and reluctant admiration. No matter which feeling is predominant at any one time, Korean perceptions of Japan are always heavy tinged by emotion. An American diplomat who has served in both Seoul and Tokyo explains:
Koreans harbor a number of convictions that have a strong effect on their country's relations with Japan. These convictions include feelings that: Japan takes pleasure in humiliating Korea; Japan's economic takeoff grew from the carnage of the Korean war; Japan bullies the physically weak (such as Korea) or the spiritually weak (such as the U.S.) while kowtowing before the strong (such as the USSR); Japan denies any cultural or moral debt to Korea; Japan
17 The 5.8% score for "most-liked" in 1987 was a large improvement over the 1.8% showing in 1983, perhaps reflecting the effects of the series of breakthrough diplomatic initiatives in Korea-Japan relations in the mid-1980s. Still, one must be careful in assigning cause and effect in any poll -- especially one such as this where the respondent is limited to one choice, so that the figures shown for each choice will naturally vary widely from one polling to the next as the focus of national media attention shifts in response to events. For instance, the number of respondents naming Japan as their "most-disliked" country also increased from
1983 to 1987, inconsistent with the trend on the "most-liked" side, but this may only be a reflection of the Soviet Union's exceptionally high "most-disliked" score in 1983 coming as a result of the shooting down of Korean Airlines Flight 007 that year.
Other portions of this poll break down anti-Japanese sentiment by segment of Korean society. Urban residents with more education -- in particular students -- register as the most anti-Japanese, while negative feelings about Japan are less pronounced among rural agricultural and blue collar workers.
18 A 1976 study of the attitudes of Korean college students found that 86.1% had "unfriendly" feelings towards Japanese, as opposed to only 28.6% for Westerners. (Hong Sung-chick, "Japanese in the Mind of Korean People - A Survey of Student Attitudes," in Hahn and Yamamoto, ed., Korea and Japan: A New Dialogue Across the Channel, Korea University Asiatic Research Center, 1978, pp. 209-210.) In fact, even Korean students who study Japanese, when asked why they did, often profess motives like "in order to prevent another invasion" or "to catch up with Japan," in addition to the usual "in order to get a good job." (Nishioka Masaru, "Kankoku Nihongo Senko Daigaku Gakusei no Nihonkan"
[TheViews of Japan of Korean Students Majoring in Japanese], Gendai Koria, November 1986, pp. 51-59.)
10
continues to mistreat Korean residents of Japan; and Japan exploits Korea economically and morally.19
In a 1984 survey, Kim and Oh found that the adjectives most
commonly agreed upon by Koreans as describing Japanese people were hard-working, organized, clean, fast, and selfish.2 0 Some of these adjectives
clearly have positive connotations. However, the terms most agreed upon by Koreans to describe Japan as a nation were: fast, active, pragmatic,
untrustworthy, selfish, and "harsh toward the weak while meek toward the strong." Thus, the Koreans surveyed had a considerably more disparaging attitude toward Japan as a country than toward Japanese as a people. A poll conducted by Gallup in 1982 asked 1,218 Koreans what first came to mind when they thought of Japan.2' The most common responses were:
Japanese Imperial Rule 29.1%
Shrewd or Sly 15.1%
Economic Power 4.1%
Cruel 3.9%
Economic Animals 3.7%
Hateful/Abominable 3.2%
Prime Minister Suzuki 2.0%
Selfish 1.5%
Hiroshima Atomic Bombing 1.5%
Clearly, Korean impressions of Japan have been shaped most strongly by the Pacific War and the colonial period preceding it. As political theorist Robert Jervis explains, "The only thing as important for a nation as its revolution is its last major war. Because of the dramatic and pervasive nature of a war and its consequences, the experiences associated with it will
deeply influence the perceptual dispositions of most citizens ... What was
believed to have caused the last war will be considered likely to cause the next one."2 2 In this framework, Korean concern with the "Japanese threat" --whether it be economic, military, political, or cultural -- makes sense.
Certainly, Koreans do not share the same faith in Japan's postwar pacifism that Japanese, or Americans, possess.2 3
19 Spence Richardson, unpublished paper on Japan-Korea relations presented at the Japan Defense College, 1986, p. 20.
20Tsujimura Akira, ed., Nihon to Kankoku no Bunka Masatsu [Cultural Friction
between Japan and Korea], Shukko Shoten, 1984, pp.80-81.
21 Gallup Poll results printed in the Yomiuri Shimbun, August 13, 1982.
22Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton
University Press, 1976, pp. 266-267.
23 An anecdote: At the 2nd annual Japan-Korea Student Forum held in August 1986 the Korean delegates were clearly concerned with the possible renaissance of Japanese militarism. The Korean students had all read translations of the January 1986 Sankei
The Japanese Image of Korea and Koreans: Japanese antipathy towards Korea, the causes of which are described above, is still significant, and has been exacerbated in the postwar era by diplomatic conflicts, Korean demands for Japanese apologies about the colonial period, and the persistent problems of the Korean minority in Japan.
Japanese perceptions of Korea and Koreans were at their most negative in the 1950s and 1960s, when the political wrangling between the two countries was at its worst. In an often-quoted 1962 survey by Izumi Seichi, for example, Koreans ranked next to last on a list of peoples Japanese "liked" (Blacks ranked last), while 75% of the respondents felt that the words "deceitful" and "scheming" best described the character of the Korean
people.2 4 For much of the postwar period, the Japanese image of Korea was of a "dark, closed, oppressed, or warlike" country under the domination of a dangerous military dictatorship. In a 1978 survey, for example, when asked what first came to mind when they heard the word "Korea," participating
Japanese responded as follows:25
Kim Dae-jung Incident 16.1%
Conflict between North and South 13.8% Recent rapid economic growth 13.6%
Korean War 12.1%
President Park 11.6%
Park's dictatorial rule 10.0%
Prewar colonial rule 9.7%
Martial law 7.0%
In general, it is likely that the Japanese image of Korea as a nation has been shaped primarily by political factors rather than by economic or cultural determinants. But although that image is still largely negative, many Japanese have begun to recognize the strategic and economic importance of Korea to Japan. In a survey by the Prime Minister's Office conducted annually, the percentage of Japanese who thought that Japan needed to have good relations with Korea rose sharply from 32.0% in 1978 to
50.3% in 1984.26
Shimbun series calling for a stronger military as part of Japan's "internationalization." None of their Japanese compatriots had noticed the series in Japan.
24Izumi Seiichi, "Nihonjin no Jinshuteki Henken [The Racial Prejudices of Japanese
People]," Sekai, March 1963, pp. 83-84.
25 Tsujimura, op. cit., p. 13. The Kim Dae-jung Incident occurred in August 1973, when the Korean Central Intelligence Agency abducted the well-known democracy advocate from a Tokyo hotel.
26 When asked why they thought that way, 53.3% responded "because Korea is so close (physically)." Sorifu [Prime Minister's Office], Gekkan Yoron Chosa [Monthly Public Opinion
12
In looking at the Jiji News Service data set at the center of this study, however, what is most remarkable is the tenacity of Japanese persons' anti-Korea sentiment. Athough increasing numbers of Japanese may recognize that Korea is important to Japan, there has been relatively little growth in the number of people who say they "like" Korea, and a continuing high proportion of Japanese who say that they "dislike" Korea:
How does this compare with Japanese attitudes toward other
countries? Following are annual averages from the Jiji News Service survey for certain representative countries:27
1994 1991 1987 1983 South Korea 3.7 2.9 2.6 1.6 North Korea 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 Liked Countries China 12.1 10.7 20.8 16.4 USA 43.3 44.3 38.4 37.3 USSRICIS 0.8 2.1 0.9 1.0 Switzerland 42.5 40.6 38.5 38.2 Surveys], December 1984, p. 6. This sharp increase in "Korea awareness" was undoubtedly sparked by the Chun-Nakasone diplomatic initiative, as well as general awareness of the rapid growth and increasing regional importance of the Korean economy. Over the same period, the score for China rose from 63.9% to 77.2%.
27 The figures for 1961 and 1965 are reprinted in Shin Hee-suk, "Analyses of Public Opinion in the Process of Japan's Foreign Policy-Making with Special Reference to the Normalization of Korea-Japan Relations," Korea Observer, Summer 1980.
13
Sentiment Toward Korea -- "Dislike" and "Like" I. RR O 30.0 ',; 25.0 a) , 20.0 s 15.0 c 0 o 10.0 0 r 5.0 g 0.0 oo .o..~*.4MYWI IT - ) Cl) M C I) - r_- r- cO co C: oC C m cM m ) a c0s cr s: 6^YI --- --- ----
---1979 1.1 0.4 12.5 35.2 1.6 37.2 1975 0.8 0.8 10.8 23.4 2.4 33.6 1971 1.5 1.0 4.8 26.3 3.7 34.9 1965 1.3 1961 1.4 Disliked Countries
South Korea North Korea China USA USSR/CIS Switzerland
1994 18.0 56.1 12.2 6.7 44.3 0.3 1991 19.2 44.4 14.3 7.0 35.6 0.3 1987 19.2 36.2 4.6 7.0 51.2 0.2 1983 19.4 30.5 5.7 6.3 54.9 0.2 1979 22.6 28.0 8.0 3.9 43.9 0.3 1975 25.0 25.3 8.3 7.7 27.0 0.3 1971 12.6 24.1 21.6 10.5 29.4 0.4 1965 23.0 1961 41.6
(% of respondents choosing each; up to three choices allowed)
The limited progress in Japanese attitudes toward Korea seems singularly unspectacular when compared to changes in Japanese attitudes toward China, another Asian colonial era antagonist that is highly sensitive
about historical issues (China scored 35.4% on the "dislike" scale in 1962, but only 4.0% in 1986). Japanese like neutral, unobtrusive Switzerland with its reputation for natural beauty and quality products, but are concerned with staying one competitive step ahead of Korea, the Asian newly industrialized country mostly closely following Japan's rapid industrial growth pattern.
The competitive dynamic is a powerful phenomenon on both sides of the Korea Straits, extending even to sporting competition. In a 1981 survey
regarding athletic competition, for example, Korea ranked second behind the Soviet Union in the order of nations which Japanese most resented losing to in athletic contests. China ranked fourth. When the same question was put to Koreans, 65.8% named Japan as the country which they most disliked
losing to, while 27.0% selected North Korea.2 8 In fact, anyone who has
attended an athletic event pitting the national representatives of Korea and Japan against one another can testify to the powerful loyalties exhibited by the supporters of each side. Writing about the 1986 Asian Games in the Los Angeles Times, Randy Harvey described the situation as follows: "South
Korean sports fans still beg their teams to beat the Japanese. For that matter, they beg every team to beat the Japanese...The South Koreans' favorite team is South Korea. Their second-favorite team is whoever is
playing Japan."29
28 Tsujimura, op. cit., p. 76.
29 Randy Harvey, "South Koreans' Success is Sweet," Los Angeles Times, October 4, 1986, p. 4.
14
rarrrri;rr-An official Japanese government survey, also conducted annually, confirms the lack of improvement in Japanese sentiment toward Korea.3 0 Asked whether they feel "close" or "not close" to Korea, consistently half or more Japanese respond "not close" -- despite Korea's cultural and physical proximity to Japan. In fact, in this survey the most significant change in Japanese responses from 1978 to 1994 would appear to be the decline in the proportion of respondents saying they "don't know" how they feel:
Feelings Toward Korea31
Close Somewhat Don't Know Somewhat Not Not Close Close Close Overall 1994 7.9 34.0 5.1 35.0 18.0 1990 9.6 33.1 6.5 33.4 17.4 1986 9.2 30.5 8.5 33.3 18.5 1982 7.7 32.5 11.0 31.6 17.3 1978 12.1 28.0 14.7 25.5 19.7 By Age (1992) 20-29 3.9 32.3 3.5 38.6 21.7 30-39 7.3 34.6 3.7 34.6 19.7 40-49 8.1 35.5 4.7 33.5 18.2 50-59 9.9 36.3 3.8 30.0 20.0 60-69 10.2 36.5 6.4 28.1 18.9 Over 69 10.8 26.1 8.9 31.5 22.7
(% of respondents choosing each; one choice allowed)
Differences between age groups in Japanese sentiment toward Korea is much less marked than in Korean sentiment toward Japan, but the data shows the same pattern of stronger anti-Korean sentiment among younger Japanese.
Clearly, anti-Korean sentiment in Japan is strong, and deep-seated. Attitudes have changed somewhat as Korea has earned respect for its economic (and more recently, political) accomplishments. But it could still take decades to wear down anti-Korean prejudices in Japan.3 2
30 Sorifu [Prime Minister's Office], Gekkan Yoron Chosa IMonthly Public Opinion Surveys], April 1995 and previous.
31 The categories in Japanese are: "Shitashimi wo kanjiru;" "Dochira ka to iu to shitashimi wo kanjiru;" "Wakaranai;" "Dochira ka to iu to shitashimi wo kanjinai;" and "Shitashimi wo kanjinai."
32 Direct contact with the other country seems to be the most sure way to improve psychological relations. The study by Oh and Kim shows that Koreans who have been to Japan have substantially more positive attitudes about Japan and Japanese people. (Tsujimura, op. cit., p. 94.) A similar study by Inamasa reached the same conclusion about Japanese who had traveled to Korea. (Tsujimura, op. cit., pp. 32-43.) Thus, while generational change cannot be counted on to shift popular consciousness, attitudes could still change significantly over time.
III. Data Sets
With the above background in mind, one can proceed to the data analysis exercise of measuring the impact of negative sentiment on bilateral economic relations. More specifically, this analysis looks at whether popular sentiment in Japan (together with three economic variables, namely, the exchange rate, economic growth, and direct investment flows) can help explain fluctuations in Japan's imports from (and exports to) South Korea.3 3
Key Variables: The following data series are utilized:
IMPORTS = Quarterly data on the year-on-year percentage change in the value of Japan's imports from South Korea, adjusted for inflation using the Japanese wholesale price index (WPI). The raw data on trade comes from the Summary Report on Trade of Japan, published monthly by the Japan Tariff Association, and data on Japan's WPI from the International Financial Statistics, published monthly by the International Monetary Fund. SENTIMENT = Quarterly data combining and averaging the month-by-month scores for South Korea in the "like" and "dislike" categories of the ongoing survey of Japanese public attitudes toward foreign countries released monthly by the Jiji Tsushin news service. The "sentiment" index is produced by subtracting two times the "like" score from the "dislike" score.
EXCHANGE RATE = Quarterly data on the year-on-year percentage change in the exchange rate, measured as Korean won per Japanese yen. The raw data is taken from the IMF's International Financial Statistics.
JAPANESE GROWTH = Quarterly data on the year-on-year percentage growth of Japan's real gross national product (GNP), taken from the IMF's International Financial Statistics.
DIRECT INVESTMENT = Year-on-year percentage change in the total of Japanese direct foreign investment in South Korea, correcting for inflation using Korea's producer price index (PPI). Since quarterly raw data is unavailable, annual change data is inserted for quarterly year-on-year change values. Data for 1994, not yet available, is forecast based on the linear trend from 1984 to 1993. Data for 1978 to 1993 comes from Korean
33 The link between the exchange rate and imports is obvious, as is the link between Japanese economic growth and growth in imports (expected to be positive). Japanese direct investment in Korea is included as a variable due to the growing consensus in economic studies that overseas investment -- particularly manufacturing investment -- will lead to both increased exports and increased "reverse" imports. Korean investment in Japan is not considered because it is relatively very small in magnitude.
16
---Ministry of Finance data reprinted in the Korea Statistical Yearbook, published by the Bureau of Statistics of the Economic Planning Board. As direct investment data divided by source country is unavailable prior to 1978, Japan's direct investment is calculated as a proportion (extrapolated from Japan's average share of the total from 1978 to 1987) of the total foreign direct investment reported in the Balance of Payments Yearbook published by the IMF. Data on Korea's PPI is taken from the IMF's International Financial Statistics.
EXPORTS = Quarterly data on the year-on-year percentage change in the value of Japan's exports to South Korea, adjusted for inflation using the Japanese wholesale price index (WPI). The raw data comes from the same sources as the "IMPORTS" series described above.
KOREAN GROWTH = Quarterly data on the year-on-year percentage growth of Korea's real gross national product (GNP), taken from the IMF's
International Financial Statistics. Data for the fourth quarter of 1994 is forecast based on the prior four quarters. Data for 1971 and 1972 are based on annual, not quarterly, real Korean GNP growth.
Notes on the Variables: As can be seen from these definitions, the economic time series variables included in this study are all growth
variables, measuring changes in the various economic indices rather than their absolute value. This method is adopted to fit the paper's central hypothesis that public sentiment may be able to impact the rate at which bilateral trade expands.3 4 (Assessment of the effect of public sentiment on the absolute size of trade flows would require a cross-sectional analysis, beyond the scope of this study.) Only the SENTIMENT index is treated differently. This stems from my belief that the raw index on popular
sentiment is the best measure of the "intangible" force that can impact how economic variables change; changes in popular sentiment may also be appropriate, but seem less likely to give accurate results.
As constructed for this study, the SENTIMENT index also gives the "like Korea" responses twice as much weight as as the "dislike Korea"
responses. (The index figures, subtracting the "like" score from the "dislike" score, are still always positive because the "like" proportion is consistently much smaller.) This weighting stems from my belief that the positive
feelings toward Korea of those Japanese who "like" Korea are more likely to impact their decision to buy or not buy Korean-made goods than are the negative feelings of those Japanese who "dislike" Korea. This is because the "like" and "dislike" responses are tied to different thought processes. Those
34 Usefully, growth rate series also exhibit more statistical stationarity than absolute data series, reducing the probability of spurious correlations between variables.
17
---saying they "dislike" Korea are probably considering Korea as a
political/economic/historical entity, whereas those who say they "like" Korea may be thinking of Korea as a cultural entity. The "like" thought process therefore seems closer to the buy/not buy decision than the "dislike" calculus. For example, a person may decide to respond that they "like" Korea because of they enjoy Korean food, which they may want to buy, but will probably not
say they "dislike" Korea because they do not enjoy kimchi.
When inserted into the econometric estimate, the explanatory
variables are all lagged according to the number of quarters one would expect that it would usually take -- given time for trade orders to be planned and carried out -- for the explanatory variables to have their maximum impact on trade decisions. Thus, the EXCHANGE RATE and GROWTH variables are lagged three quarters since that is an appropriate length of time for
macroeconomic factors to have an impact. SENTIMENT is only lagged two quarters, since negative feelings could conceivably cause trade orders to be cancelled mid-transaction. DIRECT INVESTMENT is lagged six quarters when explaining Japanese imports, due to the time required for plants to be set up and products made, but only lagged three quarters when explaining Japanese exports, since investment-related equipment will likely be shipped relatively soon after an investment commitment is made.
Some concluding notes on the data used may also be useful. Although the Jiji Tsushin data is available monthly, quarterly data is used to enhance the reliability of results, since aggregation should mellow the impact of one-time measurement errors. At the same one-time, for the economic variables year-to-year changes are measured instead of quarter-to-quarter changes, in order to adjust the data for seasonal cycles (which can be particularly evident in Korean data, with slow fourth quarters and booming first quarters).
Parameters of the Data: Before proceeding, finally, the reader may find it useful to look at the size and shape of the economic data sets involved, starting with Japanese trade with Korea (recall that the data used for
calculating the sentiment index has already been considered in detail in Section Two above). As can be seen in the following chart, Japan runs a consistent trade surplus with South Korea. Although bilateral trade has, in the main, grown fairly rapidly throughout the period studied, this growth has not always been consistent. In particular, bilateral trade slumped in the mid-1980s, and again in the early 1990s:
18
The dynamics of the won/yen exchange rate can be seen in the chart below. Although the won/yen exchange rate is generally driven by adjustments in the values of the won and yen, respectively, to the U.S. dollar, it is also plain that the won has
generally appreciated against the yen over the period studied, as would be predicted by Korea's generally higher rate of inflation and more rapid economic growth:
Korea-Japan Exchange Rate
c 0 10.00 8.00 6.00 4.00 2.00 0.00 - x Ln ,- c -ra I- r - - Il- r co CX a, C, m c c a "
--Japanese GNP has generally grown rapidly recessions coming in 1974-75 and 1991-94:
L r.- c0:
co co : m cn I
m C" D ( c" C"
I
over the period studied, with major
19
Japanese Trade with Korea
- 800 0, 9.600 -- 400 c - 200 O 0 } I V'rT - C= M LO C N r r ra_ co C co W M M m o CO C" C" V T - - - f- - I· C _
I
iI :
Japanese Gross National Product
Finally, figures for (new) Japanese direct investment in Korea have fluctuated rather wildly around a general declining trend, with investment booms coming in the early 1970s, and again in the mid/late 1980s, probably as a result of domestic Japanese asset price inflation increasing liquidity:
IV. Study Results
The main equation to be calculated, then, has growth in Japanese imports as a dependent variable, and the sentiment index, exchange rate changes, the rate of growth of the Japanese economy, and the rate of growth of Japanese direct investment in Korea (lagged appropriately as discussed above) as explanatory variables. Results are as follows, with t-statistics inserted below the coefficients:
20
K
-;M Mn -CO E W 400,000 C 300,000 X 200,000 c 100,000 o *- LD '- - - L - - C ' M C Cc (c Cc cC n cc n M Cn cM cM I-- I--- ~ ~- ~- 1--- -- ~ - 1- ---Japanese Direct Investment in Korea .- R__ E _ 40 X 30 , 20 c 10 = o m - M MC n N- O m on r- cr M r- r- r- r- r- 0C CO co C CO O) m C cM cm C0 C c C C) cn C m C) ---··---~~~- ~~~---·---·-·- ·... . --- --- ·--- ·--- - --- -- --- - ---
I----A
IMPORTS= 10.94 + -2.19*SENTIMENT + 0.89*EXCHANGE RATE
(0.76) (-3.32) (5.00)
+ 7.60*JAPANESE GROWTH + -0.05*DIRECT INVESTMENT
(5.58) (-1.81)
R-squared = 0.54
In short, negative feelings about Korea among Japanese are shown to have a statistically significant dampening impact on Japanese imports from Korea, and the magnitude of the effect is quite large! For each point increase in the sentiment index, this equation predicts that, given historical trends, the growth of Japanese imports from Korea will be slowed by 2.2 percentage points. In other words, we can document that the legacy of Japanese colonial rule -- in the form of negative Japanese sentiment toward Korea -- is slowing the expansion of economic interaction between the two countries.
These results imply a major impact on bilateral economic relations. Making "what if' projections based on regresssion analysis of this type has numerous potential pitfalls. But in theory one can conclude that if, for example, Japanese sentiment toward Korea in the 1990's were to improve to the same levels as Japanese sentiment toward China (all other factors remaining unchanged), then imports from Korea would grow at a much faster annual rate -- higher by as much as forty percentage points per year.
As for the economic explanatory variables, the results are predictable. A stronger won is associated significantly with greater expenditures on Japanese imports from Korea, showing the J-curve effect despite the time lag of three reporting quarters. The health of the Japanese economy in general, as reflected in its annual growth rate, is the explanatory variable with the greatest influence on Japanese trade. A one-percentage-point increase in Japan's annual economic growth rate will accelerate Japanese imports from Korea by 7.6%. The impact of Japanese direct investment Korea on Japanese imports is not statistically significant, except at the 10% level. (This may be due to the indirect calculations required to produce the data series, as noted above. But at any rate, the coefficent's negative sign also runs counter to expectations; it is not clear by what economic mechanism Japanese direct investment in Korea could lead to reduced Japanese imports from Korea.)
The net result is a rather successful modeling of Japanese imports (with a high R-squared term of 0.54), clearly underlining the important influence of popular sentiment on economic interactions.
What if we try the same exercise with modeling Japanese exports? The results are not so illuminating:
21
"IliL1I---EXPORTS = 20.27 + -1.07*SENTIMENT + 0.22*EXCHANGE RATE
(2.42) (-2.29) (1.51)
+ 0.48*KOREAN GROWTH + -0.03*DIRECT INVESTMENT
(1.70) (1.47)
R-squared = 0.14
Among the explanatory variables, only the coefficents for SENTIMENT and KOREAN GROWTH are statistically significant (the latter only at the 10% level). Of the two, surprisingly, popular sentiment seems to have a larger impact on Japanese exports to Korea than does Korean economic growth conditions. Still, the R-squared term for this equation is quite low, meaning that most of the variation in Japanese exports to Korea remains unexplained. It is possible that economic structure or regulatory factors play an important role, given the very large and statistically significant constant term in this equation.
V. Conclusion and Implications
Variation in anti-Korean sentiment among the Japanese public, as reflected in the monthly Jiji News Service poll of "liked" and "disliked" countries, is a useful explanatory variable to explain variations in the
pattern of bilateral trade. The econometric analysis in this paper finds that anti-Korean sentiment among Japanese has had a strong, statistically significant, and negative impact on the growth of Japanese imports from Korea.
Japanese imports from Korea grew rapidly during the period studied, averaging 15.6% real annual growth, while the Japanese economy only grew at an average of 3.9% in real terms. But if Japanese sentiment toward Korea -- which according to the measure here averaged 15.4 points over the period studied -- had been more favorable, Japanese imports from Korea may have
grown more rapidly. If, for instance, the pattern of Japanese "dislike" toward Korea had shown the same improving trend as the score for Japanese
"dislike" of China, the sentiment index could have averaged 3.0 points over the period studied, meaning -- in theory -- that Japanese imports from Korea might have grown at a much faster rate of 42.6% per annum!
Of course much caution should be exercised in interpreting these findings to avoid cavalier assertions of cause and effect. Making "what if' projections based on regresssion analysis of this type has numerous potential pitfalls. Also, more exacting analysis than contained in this paper is needed to explain the practical mechanism whereby popular sentiment impacts economic
activity. Still, the results of this study recommend that -- when reliable time
22
________ _11 1llir__ ---1.- .._-. -11--- -.·--1-1---^*IX...-
series data sets on political variables are available -- both economists and political historians should consider using statistical techniques incorporating political variables, in order to add depth and precision to analysis of the various phenomena of "political economy."
23
..
Data Set
IMPORTS SENTIMENT EXCHANGE JAPANESE
RATE GROWTH 1971 25.82 10.0 4.84 4.08 8.36 9.1 10.31 4.86 2.86 10.0 23.65 3.68 21.96 9.4 30.09 4.87 1972 23.25 9.2 39.24 7.32 31.88 9.2 37.41 7.81 50.03 7.4 22.93 8.16 38.85 5.8 15.52 9.79 1973 83.28 5.8 15.09 10.21 128.59 5.5 15.18 8.94 157.53 11.0 13.34 6.84 182.96 14.8 9.05 4.99 1974 130.45 12.6 -3.32 -0.85 71.07 13.7 -5.91 -0.95 5.41 23.2 -11.35 0.09 -37.28 24.5 -1.46 -1.31 1975 -47.99 25.4 19.26 1.16 -29.09 23.9 16.97 2.92 -2.57 20.8 22.00 2.86 18.72 23.0 12.07 4.71 1976 51.06 21.3 -3.22 5.73 51.74 19.7 -2.28 3.92 36.52 20.4 2.38 4.11 31.94 20.9 3.41 3.21 1977 17.56 20.8 5.91 4.79 2.01 20.7 8.71 4.77 -7.02 19.9 9.34 4.13 -13.00 20.7 18.89 5.37 1978 -7.95 18.7 20.18 4.59 -10.47 18.2 24.71 4.59 -7.66 17.5 38.12 5.43 15.15 18.0 29.64 5.20 1979 24.15 20.1 17.95 5.26 40.62 16.6 1.37 6.15 40.06 21.5 -11.94 5.68 15.57 23.4 -20.14 5.17 1980 -13.92 19.2 -0.48 4.91 -21.23 21.2 15.71 2.87 -29.78 26.2 26.05 2.87 -26.21 27.7 52.53 3.33 1981 -9.07 21.1 36.24 3.30 -6.93 20.9 20.64 3.70 DIRECT INVESTMENT -29.03 -29.03 -29.03 -29.03 -32.81 -32.81 -32.81 -32.81 111.72 111.72 111.72 111.72 -28.36 -28.36 -28.36 -28.36 -62.40 -62.40 -62.40 -62.40 32.85 32.85 32.85 32.85 4.71 4.71 4.71 4.71 -27.19 -27.19 -27.19 -27.19 15.64 15.64 15.64 15.64 -70.70 -70.70 -70.70 -70.70 -26.34 -26.34 EXPORTS KOREAN 16.73 -0.89 -5.44 -3.62 -13.11 -9.70 -3.54 25.68 55.09 62.51 60.49 71.02 96.84 76.32 58.38 31.62 -14.57 -11.07 -23.41 -7.57 20.89 24.96 38.34 18.98 32.91 31.69 27.65 27.67 34.45 19.17 12.16 1.03 -3.40 3.96 17.81 15.69 6.16 -4.29 -21.78 -19.80 -17.33 0.72 GROWTH 9.75 9.75 9.75 9.75 7.31 7.31 7.31 7.31 22.14 10.75 4.54 -7.13 2.77 -2.27 -0.41 7.75 4.59 11.34 17.85 17.32 32.81 38.23 37.28 22.04 16.61 10.41 17.62 19.00 20.26 24.02 20.25 9.89 19.73 12.56 12.46 11.02 1.50 -1.95 -0.12 -9.82 2.08 4.65 24
15.92 19.5 6.08 3.73 -26.34 24.55 5.92 33.15 18.9 -0.69 2.93 -26.34 5.29 13.19 1982 18.62 16.2 -6.60 2.61 2.02 -0.88 1.63 17.96 17.9 -3.85 3.80 2.02 -9.52 5.18 11.68 19.9 -3.12 3.35 2.02 -10.54 7.15 -14.97 17.7 -6.48 3.94 2.02 12.96 1.53 1983 -9.07 16.4 5.03 3.17 316.50 8.54 9.50 -7.92 18.0 8.59 2.29 316.50 17.80 10.39 -3.43 16.0 13.00 3.26 316.50 24.11 11.37 31.02 14.4 18.03 2.52 316.50 18.32 7.44 1984 26.31 13.4 7.80 3.91 -2.58 33.62 16.51 24.29 12.8 7.30 4.89 -2.58 23.66 10.44 31.34 11.6 2.83 3.91 -2.58 13.46 11.55 15.37 10.0 -1.82 4.52 -2.58 13.03 7.68 1985 5.03 11.1 -5.53 4.55 119.03 10.34 4.99 17.11 12.4 -0.54 5.08 119.03 -1.20 4.39 -5.97 10.3 11.15 5.14 119.03 -8.61 5.37 -13.63 12.8 29.30 5.69 119.03 -3.12 5.66 1986 -4.30 14.5 45.36 2.97 -61.35 -6.34 10.79 -16.25 14.3 50.85 2.61 -61.35 5.09 12.38 0.42 15.2 53.06 2.59 -61.35 11.01 13.60 24.64 14.8 26.00 2.56 -61.35 6.22 11.69 1987 36.46 13.0 18.08 4.14 254.29 12.09 13.33 35.56 12.7 11.25 3.04 254.29 8.54 13.94 38.56 15.7 -2.92 4.54 254.29 12.36 9.40 32.11 14.5 8.65 5.37 254.29 4.20 8.24 1988 29.80 9.9 7.88 6.46 37.24 0.59 17.99 40.54 11.7 0.93 6.53 37.24 -3.87 10.07 38.66 8.1 -1.66 6.65 37.24 6.42 13.97 17.10 11.3 -5.79 5.64 37.24 8.57 8.01 1989 19.98 13.8 -12.48 5.29 -34.05 12.52 6.33 16.28 14.2 -17.44 4.41 -34.05 15.23 6.34 13.38 14.6 -13.09 4.62 -34.05 15.64 5.08 13.33 14.4 -15.30 4.86 -34.05 17.39 6.98 1990 0.69 14.0 -11.47 4.10 -51.42 8.86 10.06 -3.69 14.7 -5.38 6.21 -51.42 16.01 9.74 -11.41 16.0 4.93 4.77 -51.42 5.73 9.76 -12.94 13.1 16.23 4.30 -51.42 11.23 7.01 1991 -7.94 12.3 15.49 5.21 -8.97 19.24 8.86 0.01 14.8 14.62 4.19 -8.97 8.35 9.63 -1.85 13.7 8.44 4.04 -8.97 2.91 7.20 2.39 12.7 6.37 3.69 -8.97 1.36 6.31 1992 -4.36 13.4 10.72 2.76 -32.88 -12.03 7.31 -9.89 16.5 14.70 1.77 -32.88 -15.65 7.22 -13.00 15.4 17.90 0.86 -32.88 -17.09 6.29 -13.29 15.4 10.08 0.11 -32.88 -21.62 4.21 1993 -8.67 13.1 9.96 0.31 81.59 -10.60 3.96 -12.98 11.5 20.81 -0.05 81.59 -8.40 4.71 -3.65 14.2 21.48 0.15 81.59 -5.37 6.69 25 ... ·.. "· ~ _
-5.78 15.4 16.84 -0.15 81.59 1.47 6.43 1994 2.80 10.6 14.41 0.66 4.27 9.69 9.15 8.81 9.5 7.50 -0.10 4.27 16.20 6.94 4.69 10.3 5.87 0.36 4.27 23.46 7.71 16.55 12.0 7.62 -1.63 4.27 19.65 7.96 26 -F --;
