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Fire investigations by the DBR Fire Research Section 1964-1965
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Firefighters Pluck Trapped Persons From Hotel Balconies (Photo Credit Bill Lingard. Photo Features Ltd., Ottawa)
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL CANADA
DIVISION OF BUILDING RESEARCH
FffiE INVESTIGATIONS BY THE DBR FIRE RESEARCH SECTION
1964-1965
by
G. W. Shorter. J. J. Shaver and M. Galbr eath
ANAL VZED
Ititernal Report No. 333 of the
Division of Building Research
OTTAWA November 1966
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PREFACE
The Fire Research Section of the Division of Building Research continues to study fires in the field. This report, the seventh such report to be issued, presents summaries of the fir es that have been studied during the years 1964-65. During this period, visits were paid to the scene of a fire at Brockville, Ontario, which involved several buildings, and to a church fire at We strnount , Quebec; all other fires investigated were in the Ottawa area. Experience gained at these field investigations continues to provide useful information on fire behaviour and fire protection features of buildings.
In all of this work, the Section is grateful for the co-operation received from fire officials and, in particular, members of the Ottawa Fire Department and the office of the Ontar io Fir e Mar ahaI.
The authors of this report are G. W. Shorter,
a mechanical engineer, Head of the Fire Research Section, M. Galbreath, an architect who is a member of the Fire Research Section, working on fire matters related to the National Building Code and
J.
J. Shaver, a member of the Code Secretariat, whose main duties are in connection with the National Fire Code.Ottawa N. B. Hutcheon
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FIRE INVESTIGATIONS BY THE DBR FIRE RESEARCH SECTION
1964-1965 by
G. W. Shorter, J. J. Shaver and M. Galbreath
This report covers fire investigations carried out by members of the Fire Research Section during 1964-65. All investigations except one at Brockville, Ontario and one at Westmount, Quebec were carried out in the Ottawa area where, in many cases, helpful assistance was given by members of the Ottawa Fire Department. As in previous reports, summaries of the fires investigated are presented, followed by photographs showing the pertinent factor s
reported upon. In each summary the fire is described
under the following headings: (a) General, {b] Construction, (c) Separations, (d) Exits, (e) Spread of Fire and (f) Remarks. A detailed synopsis is used as a lead-in to each summary
to introduce the type of occupancy, chronology, weather and an estimate of the amount of the loss incurred.
Data for all the fires reported upon since 1950 have been used for the brief analysis appearing in Appendix A. Graphs (Figures A-I, A-2 and A-3) show the frequency distribution of fires by (a) month, (b) day of week and (c) hour of day, respectively. In addition, other miscellaneous data on the fires by occupancy are presented in Table A-I. It should be emphasized that this analysis illustrates the distribution of only those fires which have been investigated by the Fire Section and does not necessarily apply to fires in general.
The building r eferr ed to in the synopsis for each summary is always that in which the fire originated. The losses reported refer not only to that building but also to any others involved in the fire. The figures given are only approximate values and may vary considerably from the actual losses sustained. They are included, however, to give SOme estimate of the severity of the fire.
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Included in this report is an excellent example of the seriousness of fires that occur in buildings under construction. The result was a half million dollar loss and a substantial delay in occupying the building.
Three examples of smoke problems in buildings ar e included. In one, a 13 -stor ey apartment building, corridor s remained relatively fr ee of smoke although a severe fire occurred in a 12th floor suite. In the other two cases, one in a 12 -storey hotel and the other in a
4-storeyapartment, the smoke problem was severe. The frontispiece to this report shows rescue operations dur ing the hotel fir e.
There are several examples of fires spreading to adjacent buildings. One of these occurr ed in a town about 70 miles from Ottawa, situated on the banks of the St. Lawrence River. In this case, several buildings in the heart of the business district were severely damaged or destroyed. Another spectacular fire involving several buildings occurred in an area in Ottawa which had been expropriated by the Federal Government. All the buildings involved wer e unoccupied and awaiting demolition, and therefore the reported loss is exceedingly low in spite of the size of the fire.
Other DBR Internal Reports in this series on fire investigations are: 1950-1954, No. 78j 1955, No. 101j 1956 , No. 1 40 j 1957 -1 958 , No. 181 j 1959 -1 962 , No. 293 ; 1963, No. 311.
DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 1/64
Date of fire: 1 Jan. 1964 Occupancy: Residential
Day of week: Wednesday (row housing)
Time of fire: 11.45 p. rn , No. of storeys: 2
Weather: 15° F - R. H. 88% Location: Ottawa
NW wind 8 mph, Estimated loss: $42, 000. light snow.
General: The fire in this 4-unit row housing was the result of an act of arson. Earlier on the same day fire fighters had extinguished fires on the first and second floors of the dwelling indicated in the photograph (Figure 1) and the circumstances concerning these fires were under investigation. On the second response to the building, the fire fighters found the roof totally involved and the neighbouring buildings threatened. An additional threat to the control of the fire was an operational gas furnace in the unit of origin which could not be approached to close the gas line. Fire fighters succeeded in preventing the fire from reaching the basement, assisted in their defense by the massive stone foundation and the failure of the fire to penetrate the sole plates of interior wall framing members before hose lines became available to control the fire.
This structure was damaged in the spring of 1958 by a previous fire which began in the basement of the third unit located next to the present unit of origin. That fire was reported as DBR Fire Study No. 14/58 in DBR Internal Report No. 181. As a result of the 1958 fire the structure was altered to 2 storeys and the interior was renovated, creating the present building. The former appearance of the building may be seen by observing the 3-storey building with the mansard-type roof on the right of the building of origin (Figure 2). The 3-storey structure
duplicates the former appearance of the building of origin.
Construction: The 2-storey building was of wood-frame construction on a wide stone foundation. Outside cladding was brick veneer. Interior walls were finished with plaster on wooden lath covered in most cases by several layers of wallpaper. Wooden floors were laid on wood joists. Two two-storey, porch-like wooden additions having a floor area of approximately 80 sq ft were attached to the rear of the building on each side of a narrow court projecting into the centre of the structure. The court provided a light-well
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for the interior units of the four -door row. The porch -like structures were roofed with wood plank covered with asphalt shingles. The roof of the main structure was supported on wooden member s 2 ft above the ceiling of the second floor. Interior party walls did not extend into the roof space and the result was a large undivided roof space over the entire structure. The perimeter of the roof was covered with tinned sheet, and the roof surface was of wood plank covered with tar and gr a vel buil t -up roofing.
Separations: A street width and a yard and vacant lot which extended to the str eet behind provided substantial spatial s epar ations at the fr ont and r ear of the building. The building of origin was separated from the neighbouring buildings by a IO-ft lane on the east side and a. 4-ft dividing
space on the west side. There were no windows on either the west or the east sides of the building.
Exits: All units of the 4-door row contained exits at the front and rear of the building on the ground floor. The second-floor occupants were required to leave by an open stairway that followed the inside wall leading to the front door.
Spread of fire: The third fire this same day was discovered burning on the second floor of the porch-like structure at the rear of the unit of origin. Flames penetrated the roof and spread rapidly throughout the open roof area. Fire dropped to the concealed space between the ceiling of the fir st stor ey and the floor above via non -fir estopped partition walls, and thence, in the same manner, towar ds the cellar where the efforts of the fire fighters contained the fire.
Structures on both sides of the burning building were threatened so that fire fighters had to devote considerable attention to protecting exposures.
Remarks: In spite of the object lesson presented by the first fire in this structure renovations were made without providing the proper fire stops. The result of this omission was very severe damage to the structure and the hardships caused the occupants. Only the efforts of the fire fighters pr evented this fir e from becoming a conflagration.
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DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 2/64
Date of fire: 14 Feb. 1964 Occupancy: Mercantile and
Day of week: Friday assembly
Time of fire: 4.30 p. rn , No. of stor eys: 3 plus cellar
Weather: 16°F - R.H. 610/0 Location: Ottawa
W wind 10 mph, Estimated loss: $135,000. clear.
General: Late in a winter's afternoon a fire was discovered in the basement of this 3-storey, 75-year-old building (Figure 3). A number of customer s wer e shopping at the tim e in the variety store that occupied the ground floor. Unfortunately, there was a delay in transmitting the alarm to the fire department. The alarm was actually turned in by the proprietor' of the adjoining store. One reason advanced for the delay in discovering the fire was the fact that the smoke was drawn out at the r ear of the building which faced a vacant lot rather than through the store and onto the busy street at the front. The rapid development of heavy smoke forced the fire fighters from the building shortly after their arrival, so their main effort was directed towards preventing the fire from spreading to adjacent buildings. Approximately 3 hr elapsed before the fire was brought under control.
Construction: This 3 -storey building was approximately 90 ft long and 55 ft wide (Figure 3). At the rear of the building
ther e was an attached 2 -stor ey addition, approximately 25 ft long and 55 ft wide. The ground floor and a portion of the cellar
in the original building were used as a retail sales area by a variety stor e and the remainder of the cellar provided a furnace room. The cellar beneath the addition served as a storage area for the variety store. The entire second-floor area was occupied as a ballroom, and the third floor provided lodge facilities for a fraternal order.
(a) Original Building. - Steel beams spanning the width of the building were the principal structural members. These beams were supported by the north exterior wall and by a 12 in. thick brick wall enclosing the stair well on the south side of the building (Figure 4). All exterior walls were loadbearing brick 16 in. thick. Floor sections were composed of hardwood
flooring laid over tongue -and-groove subflooring bearing on 2 - by 10 -In, wood joists, which wer e in turn supported by
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-steel beams. The roof consisted of built -up roofing applied to 1 in. tongue-and-groove planking resting on 2- by 8-in. wood joists which were in turn supported on steel beams. The stairs and landings in the enclosed stair well were constructed of wood and were supported on wood joists. Ceilings wer e plaster applied to wood lath, wher eas plaster was applied di r ectly on the brick perimeter walls to provide a smooth -finish interior surfac e.
(b) Addition. - The exterior walls were concrete block with a stucco finish. The wooden floors and the flat built-up roof wer e supported on wood joists. Plaster applied to metal lath provided the interior finish.
Separations: The front of the building faced west and was located approximately 60 ft from the l-stor ey buildings on the other side of the street (Figure 3). The front of the building at gr ound -floor level was all glass display windows or doors, whereas on the second and third floors there was a centre window 6 by 6 ft flanked by two sets of windows
4 by 6 ft. The north wall was parapeted 18 in. above the roof of an adjoining 3-storey hotel building. There were no openings in this wall which abutted the brick wall of the hotel building nor in the north wall of the extension. The north wall of the extension fa'c e d enclosed balconies located in a jog at the southeast corner of the hotel building. These balconies were linked by metal fire escapes which provided a second means of egress from the hotel. The south wall of the original building was unpierced by windows, but the south wall of the addition had barred windows at the second-floor level, which overlooked the flat roof of the 1 -stor ey structur e at the r ear of the adjoining building. The rear or east wall of the original building had been pierced in order to provide access to the addition at the second -floor level (ballroom). On the first floor the wall had been partially removed to permit extension of the
store's merchandising area. The rear wall of the extension which faced a 50 -ft vacant lot was pierced by several windows and doors.
Exits: At ground floor level the front entrance to the store was via a pair of glas s door s J and a r ear exit was pr ovided
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of an open stairway to ground floor or through a door leading to that portion of the basement located in the addition and thence up a set of stair s to a rear door. An enclos ed stair well (south side of building, Figures 4 and 5) opening onto the str eet at ground level provided one exit from second and third floors. In addition, there was a metal fire escape on the front wall of the building serving the second and third floor s (Figure 3). A metal fire escape to the roof of the addition provided egress from the rear of the ballroom.
Spread of Fire: The fire originated in the basement in the area where the furnace r oorn was located and spread quickly in the basement area of the original building via open doors to the basement area in the addition. Oil tanks located ther e produced lar ge quantities of oily black smoke that quickly
spread throughout the building. Open flames were first seen at the rear of the ground floor of the 2-storey addition.
The fir e then spr ead vertically by means of the open stairway to the ground floor and through the floor of the addition.
It then travelled up to the second and third floors via openings breached in the rear wall (east) of the original building.
Although the fire was confined to the building of origin, the adjoining buildings suffered smoke and water damage.
Remarks: It was unfortunate that the delayed alarm permitted the fire to gain such a foothold prior to the arrival of the fire department. The rapid spr ead was also influenced by the fact that an otherwise effective separation between the furnace r oorn and the area containing the oil tanks was rendered ineffective by doors being left open. These open closures contributed to the rapid involvement of the basement area. The heavy smoke and flames pr oduced by the burning oil sever ely handicapped fir e -fighting operations within the building.
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DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 3/64
Date of fire: 26 Feb. 1964 Occupancy: Residential
Day of week: Wednesday (row housing)
Time of fire: 7. 00 p. m , No. of stor eys: 2 1/2
Weather: 22° F - R. H. 52% Location: Ottawa
NW wind 10 mph, Estimated loss: $24,000. overcast.
General: Around 7.00 p. m , a young boy playing with matches started a fire on the second floor of the second unit from the end of this 4-door row (Figure 6). There was some delay in turning in the alarm while the occupants attempted to put out the fire; consequently, the building was well involved when the fire department arrived. Although this building was scheduled for demolition its destruction irnrn ediately left 47 people hom eless who had to be accommodated elsewhere. The five families involved escaped with only the clothes they were wearing.
Construction: This 4-door row was of wood-frame construction having a brick veneer exterior cladding. Interior finish was plaster on wood lath. Beneath the brick veneer was a layer of tar paper and then wood sheathing. Unfortunately, there were no fire stops in the walls that were insulated. At the rear of each section was an extension, thr ee of which wer e clad on the outside with brick veneer. On the left rear extension roll roofing had been applied over wood sheathing. Wooden sheds had been added to each of the extensions. The wooden roofs in all cases were covered with roll asphalt roofing. There was an open space between the third-floor ceiling and the roof for the complete length of the building.
Separation: The front or west wall faced a street width which provided a substantial spatial separation as did a common rear
yard for the back wall. On the south side there was a 12-ft space between this building and the adjacent 3 -st or ey apartment. On the other side was a laneway forming an effective separation from the next building.
Exits: There was a front exit to each unit (Figure 6) and a rear exit through the wooden sheds at the rear of each unit. There wer e also exterior stair s to the top floor, steel on one side and wood on the other (Figure 7).
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Spread of Fire: The fire spread quickly via non-fir estopped walls and partitions to the space between the ceiling and the roof. It rapidly involved this space, and pieces of burning material then dropped down in various places. The whole building was involved but fir e did not spr ead to adjac ent buildings.
Remarks: There is a great deal of this type of construction in Ottawa, having an open space between the upper ceiling and the roof for the entir e length of the building. It would seem
to be both practical and desirable to consider installing partitions in this space to form separate compartments and thus delay
the spread of the fire. Building regulations now require complete separation between units in all new row housing.
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DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 4/64
Date of fir e: 5 May 1964 Occupancy: Garage (private)
Day of week: Tuesday No. of stor eys : 1
Time of fire: 5.00 p. rn, Location: Ottawa
Weather: 76°F-R.H.31% Estimated loss: $50,000.
SW wind 5 mph, cloudy.
General: A fire which originated in or near some private wooden garages quickly involved the garages and then spread to neighbouring buildings, eventually damaging housing units (Figures 8 and 9).
Effective action by the fire department prevented the fire from involving other buildings in the vicinity.
Construction: The garages that first became involved were all 1 storey, wood frame, wood clad with tar paper roofing. The dwelling units that became involved were all framed with exterior claddings as shown in Figure 9. Almost all interior finishes w e r e wood lath and plaster, and the roofs were all flat having asphalt roof coverings.
Separations: The separation distances between buildings are shown in Figure 9. The locations of the window openings in most of the buildings involved can be seen in Figure 8.
Exits: Exits played no role in this fire but in general consisted of a front entrance and rear entrance to each dwelling unit at the ground -floor leveL
Spread of Fire: The fire originated in or near the garages shown in Figur e 9 and then spr ead to the other buildings. It was stated that several explosions occurr ed which blew burning material onto the adjacent buildings and attached wooden sheds. As a consequence, residences were damaged to varying degrees and several wooden garages and sheds were destroyed (Figure 9). Some scorching occurred on the rear wall of the dwelling at the top of Figure 9.
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Building Number Damage
(see Figure 9)
50 Interior gutted
54 Roof and rear of dwelling
extensively damaged
56 Burned-out roofless shell
58 Burned -out r oofles s shell
109 Eaves and roof burned
III Rear wooden porch burned
113 Scorched r ear wall
Remarks: In the interval befor e the arrival of the fire department a small conflagration had been cr eated by the rapid apr ead of this fire. Fires were burning on the roofs and in concealed spaces of the surrounding residences, and the wooden sheds and garages wer e well involved. Spatial separations pr ovided by the demolition of former neighbouring structures and the street widths prevented immediate spread and allowed the fire department to gain control. A lack of water or equipment in this instance, however, would have permitted the propagation of a serious conflagration. This ar ea of Ottawa was part of that portion of the city which was destroyed by the large conflagration that occurred in 1900*.
* Shorter, G. W. Ottawa -Hul l Fire of 1900. Division of Building Research, National Research Council, Ottawa, Fire Study No.7, June 1962. (NRC 6802)
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DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 5/64
Date of fir e: 15 May 1964 Occupancy: Business and
Day of week: Thursday personal services
Time of fire: 10. 20 p. rn, No. of storeys: 4
Weather: 55° F - R. H. 45% Location: Ottawa
SW wind 19 mph, Estimated loss: $475,000. cloudy.
General: A daytime fire which occurred in the machinery room of this lar ge administration building during the final stages of construction resulted in an extr emely high los s , Although there was comparatively little damage to the building itself, almost all of the mechanical equipment in the machinery r oom had to be replaced. Unfortunately, this fire resulted not only in a large property loss but also in a considerable delay in occupancy which proved most frustrating to the owner. At the early stages of the fire three men took refuge on the roof
(Figure 10). Before the arrival of the fire department, two of the men climbed down a construction scaffold at the side of the building (Figure 11). Standpipes were not functioning at the time and thus wer e not available to attack the fir e in the initial stages or assist the fire department operations.
Construction: This building was of fire -r esistive construction throughout having a protected structural steel frame. The only areas involved in the fire were the machinery r oom (penthouse) and three service shafts. The service shafts and the walls of the machinery roam were constructed of structural clay tile pierced by a number of grille openings. At the time of the fir e
same of the steelwork in the machinery room was not fire protected. The floor was a reinforced concrete slab, and
the roof was constructed of precast concrete slabs with built-up roofing. The materials that made the biggest contribution to the fire were the asphalt vapour barrier attached to fibreglass insulation on various air ducts and styrofoam insulation on the chilled water lines. At the time of the fire the building was still under construction so there were many openings in the enclosing members of shafts which would not occur in the finished building. The floor area of the machinery r oom was approximately 3300 sq ft.
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Separations: The building itself is separated from other buildings by large clear areas in the form of lawns and roadways. Within the building each floor is separated from the other by concrete floor slabs and enclosed stair wells. In addition, various areas of individual floors are separated by fire walls and protected openings. As the main fire took place in the machinery room in the penthouse (Figure 10) there were no adjacent compartments to become involved. Although there were openings at the bottom of the service shafts, the draft or flue action induced in these shafts due to openings in the penthouse, including a set of double doors open to the roof, prevented the fire from spreading in the lower floors.
Exits: Although the building has a numb er of enclos ed stair wells, none of these was involved. The only installed exit from the
penthouse was a set of concrete stairs down to the floor below. There was also a set of doors at the rear of the penthouse (opposite end to that at which the stairs were located) which opened onto a roof area (Figure 10).
Spread of Fir e: Although it could not be said with certainty, it would appear that a piece of hot metal or perhaps a cigarette fell down the shaft and lodged in SOme combustible material. The fire was not discovered until it began to spread. In addition, there was a delay in turning in the alarm as witnessed by the conditions shown in Figur es 10 and 11 which show the sight that greeted the fire fighters on their arrival. The fire quickly spread on the combustible vapour barrier and styrofoam
insulation producing tr emendous quantities of thick black smoke. There was almost complete burning of all combustible material in the ar ea including insulation on electric wiring. Practically all of the equipment in the machinery r oom was so severely damaged it had to be replaced, including the elevator control panel which had just been installed.
It would appear that this fire was a "hot fire" for a relatively short interval of time due to the nature and location of the combustible material involved, which was spread out over alar ge surface. An estimate was made of the potential heat that might be produced by the total involvement of available combustible materials. This was in the order of 16, 000,000 Btu's distributed over a space having a floor area of 3300 sq ft giving an equivalent fire load of less than 1 lb/sq ft. This order of magnitude of fire load is not normally considered to be high
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from a structural viewpoint; in fact, exposed structural steel was not damaged in this fir e. This order of heat quickly liberated, however, can result in an extremely high loss to vulnerable
mechanical and electrical equipment.
Remarks: During construction buildings ar e particularly vulnerable to fire damage. Workmen may be using equipment such as welding torches, and lar ge quantities of combustible materials and wrappings may be distributed around the building. There are likely to be many openings in fire separations that will be closed when the building is completed. With the increase in the quantity and cost of mechanical and electrical equipment being installed in modern buildings the potential loss is greater than ever. Ever y pr ecaution pos sible should ther efor e be taken to r educ e the probability of fir e starting and spr eading.
The National Building Code has a section devoted to Construction Safety Measur es that ar e applicable to buildings under construction. These include recommendations for house-keeping, provision of fire extinguishers and a requirement stating that where standpipes are to be installed these must be provided, together with hose and valves, "ready for fire
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DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 6/64
Date of fire: 8 June 1964 Occupancy: Commercial
Day of week: Monday and industrial
Time of fire: 9. 15 p. m , No. of storeys: 1
Weather: 67°FR.H.610/0 Location: Ottawa
S wind 5 mph, Estimated loss: $70,000. scattered clouds.
General: A fire which broke out shortly after 9.00 p. m, in this building located on the outskirts of Ottawa provided a
spectacular sight (Figure 12) to hundreds of spectators.
The fire was not detected immediately because of the isolated location of the building and, as a result, the fire department was faced with a fully developed fire upon their arrival. The light type of construction enabled the fire to quickly gain a hold on the building so the fire department's only concern was to prevent its spread to neighbouring buildings.
Construction: The dimensions of this single storey building wer e 48 ft wide by 120 ft long by 16 ft high. This was a wood-framed building; it consisted of an office across the front about 16 ft deep and a building materials storage area in
the rear portion. Insul board, 3 iri, insulation and galvanized sheet metal formed the walls of the office section. The storage area was clad with aluminum siding on the west side, with
galvanized sheet metal on the east side, and the rear wall was covered with wood siding. The roofing over the whole structur e was galvanized sheet metal as shown in Figure 13.
Separations: There were no buildings located closer than 100 ft but a number of storage piles of lumber were located at the rear and to the east of the building, the closest being about 50 ft
from the building.
Exits: Exits played no part in this fir e. There was an exit serving the office area and a door led from there to the storage area. There were also loading doors in the storage area.
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-Spread of Fire: The fire, thought to have been caused by children playing with matches, was first reported by two boys around 9. 15 p. rn, The fire quickly spread in the building and was still burning vigourously around 10. 15 p. rn, as shown in Figure 12. Several piles of lumber ignited, the closest pile being 50 it away and the farthest pile ignited was 72 ft away. The fire department confined the fire essentially to the building of origin.
Remarks: This type of construction affords little in the way of fire endurance. It is interesting to note that the galvanized sheet metal stayed intact, coming down when the supporting wooden members failed, whereas the aluminum siding
disintegrated except where it was insulated by wooden studs or cross braces (see Figure 13).
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DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 7/64
Date of fire: 13 June 1964 Occupancy: Residential
Day of week: Saturday No. of storeys: 3
Time of fire: 11. 30 p. rn, Location: Ottawa
Weather: 69 0
F - R. H. 59% Estimated loss: $38,500. W wind 12 mph,
clear.
General: Shortly before midnight a fire of undetermined origin broke out in one side of a 2unit row house, claiming the lives of two young children who lived in the unit in which the fire originated. This fir e not only involved the 2 unit row but spr ead to an adjoining dwelling.
Construction: This building was of woodframe construction. Interior cladding was horizontal and vertical wood boarding, with wood lath and plaster as interior finish. The front, or north face of the building, was brick veneer (Figure 14).
The exposed side walls were wood covered with tinned sheathing; the rear wall was treated in the same way. The roof was
composed of roll roofing over wood plank and covered with tar and gravel.
Separations: A street width at the front and a yard at the rear provided spatial separations. On the east side there was a
5 -ft lane between the building involved and the adjacent house. On the west side the building involved abutted the adjacent building which was of similar construction.
Exits: Each unit of the 2 door row had an open staircase leading down fr Om the thir d floor to gr ound floor level. At this level a hall led to a front entrance and also provided access to the r ear of the dwelling. At the rear there was
an exit through the 1 storey portion of the dwelling. In addition, ther e was a metal fire escape, the landing of which extended across the back of and opened onto thirdfloor windows. This escape led onto the roof of the Istorey portion.
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Spread of Fire: The fire quickly spread through the unit in which it originated, trapping two children. A lack of effective interior fire separations and fire stopping in the walls and in the roof space allowed the fire to spread quickly to the adjoining unit. At the same time the fire spread to the adjacent building through those portions of the walls that abutted each other. The fire was confined to the building of origin and the adjoining dwelling on the west.
Remarks: The type of construction used in these buildings allows fire to develop readily, particularly in exterior walls, without being detected for SOme time after it has started. It would appear that the fir e quickly involved the central staircase, trapping and killing two children in a secondfloor bedroom and forcing four people to jump from the third floor when both the stairs and the rear fire escape were cut off
by fire in the stairway. There was no effective fire separation between the 2 unit row housing and the adjacent dwelling.
In fact, the arrangement of abutting wood walls made it extremely difficult to extinguish fires in the concealed stud spaces.
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DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 8/64
Date of fire: 14 July 1964 Occupancy: Commercial
Day of week: Tuesday and industrial
Time of fire: 10.30p.m. No. of stor eys: 2.!z
Weather: 69°F R.H. 71% Location: Ottawa
S wind 6 mph, Estimated loss: $180,000. cloudy.
General: Late in a summer evening fire severely damaged this building which had been built many years previously on the city's main east west thoroughfare. Renovations to the building had taken plac e over the year s , including addition,s and the installation of combustible interior linings over the original plaster finish. Fire quickly spread through the building which housed electrical appliances for sale and
extensive service facilities. A considerable loss was incurred due mainly to the large stock of electrical appliances and
service equipment.
Construction:
Main building. This was a very old building constructed of s ol.i drna.s orrr y with wood joisted floors and roof construction. The front wall was constructed of stone (Figure 15), and the other exterior walls were 8 iri. brick walls (Figure 16). The roof was roll roofing on wood boarding. The building was supported on a stone foundation. The interior finish was wood lath and plaster furr ed out with 2 by 4in. studs and then covered with gyproc and wood fibreboard.
Additions. There was a 2storey slant roof 8in. brick addition at the rear (Figure 16) which was approximately 12 ft 6 in. by 12 ft in ar ea. Attached to this was a single-stor ey sheet rn etal shed.
Separations: The front or south wall faced a street width, and the rear wall faced a vacant yard providing substantial spatial separation. The east wall was separated from the adjacent building by a 10 ft laneway. The west wall abutted the building next door.
pst 18
Exits: There was a central staircase and one front and One r ear entrance at groundfloor level.
Spread of Fire: The fire which was supposed to have started from a soldering iron left on a beam quickly involved the
interior of the building and the brick addition but did not spread to adjacent buildings.
Remarks: The lack of fir e separations within the building and the use of combustible lining materials were the two major factors in the rapid development of this fire.
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DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 9/64
Date of fire: 20 July 1964 Occupancy: Commercial and
Day of week: Monday industr ial (vacant)
Time of fire: 12.20 a. rn, No. of stor eys: 3
Weather: 58° F R. H. 78% Location: Ottawa
E wind 7 mph, Estimated loss: $8950. clear.
General: Shortly after midnight a fire occurred in this vacant building and then spread to other buildings before being brought under control. The area in which this fire occurred was ravaged by fire during the 1900 OttawaHull conflagration*. In recent years the Federal Government has expropriated a great deal of property adjacent to the Ottawa River for development purposes. This area was included in the expropriation scheme; thus many of the buildings located there had been vacated. Unfortunately, it was not possible to demolish all of the buildings at once in the expropriated ar eas
so the empty buildings invited vandalism which often takes the form of arson as in this case.
Construction: The steelframed building in which the fire originated was 3 storeys high and 175 ft long by 90 ft wide (Figure 17). The wooden floors and sheetmetal roof deck were supported on the structural steel frame. Tar and gravel roofing was used. This basementless building had block masonry exterior walls, with the exception of the east wall which was wood frame with aluminum
clapboard siding over sheet metal. A sprinkler system had been installed in the building but at the time of the fire it was inoperative. On the north side ther e was another single stor ey building 150 ft long by 75 ft deep (Figure 17) which had originally been part of the other building but had been blocked off for SOme time. This building had masonry exterior walls and abutted a 2storey brick building on the north. The roof was wood frame with tar and gravel roofing. Other buildings involved in the fir e have their construction noted in Figure 17.
* Shorter, G. W. Ottawa Hull Fire of 1900. Division of Building Research, National Research Council, Ottawa, Fire Study No.7, June 1962. (NRC 6802)
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Separations: The east and west sides faced street widths and were 50 to 60 ft from buildings on the other side of the street. On the west side there were thirteen 8 by 8ft wired glass windows in steel frames. There was a block wall between the two Ia r ge buildings, and the walls of the 2 stor ey building at the northern end were brick but unfortunately had second floor windows overlooking the large singlestorey building. Other abutting buildings had blank masonry walls facing the
building originally involved. In addition, there was a considerable amount of open space surrounding the burning buildings as a result of previous fires or of the demolition carried out as shown in
Figure 17.
Exits: As exits played no part in this fire and as destruction was so complete no attempt has been made to describe them.
Spread of Fire: The fire, which was set deliberately, originated on the second floor at the east end of the building. It quickly spread through the building and then spread to adjoining buildings shown on the plan. It spread through cracks, windows, wooden eaves, roofs, etc. In all cases there was direct flame impinge-ment. Although a great many sparks were produced, extensive patrolling prevented spread by flying brands, and the fire
department was able to prevent spread to nearby buildings by radiation. It became very hot in the street facing the west side of the large buildings as the wired glass eventually all broke and thus alar ge radiating surface was provided. This situation became even worse when second and third floors collapsed and SOme scorching occurred to buildings acr os s the street.
A cedar telephone pole located about 8 ft from the burning building was charr ed to about
i
tot
in. depth and wooden members inside the building of 2 and 4 in. thickness were charred to about the same depth. It took almost 2 hr to bring the fire under control.Remarks: The Fire Section had previously investigated two other fires in this area*, the location of which are shown in Figure 19.
*
Shorter, G. W. and C. G. Burnett. Fire Investigations by the Fire Research Section, 1950 1954. Division of Building Research, National Research Council, Ottawa, DBR Internal Report No. 78, (Fire Studies Nos. 3 and 9), March 1956. 21
The major factor causing the early collapse of the main structur e involved in this fir e was the inability of unprotected steel to withstand high temperatures without
weakening and collapsing (Figures 17 and 18). Wooden floors, structural member sand roof decks provided all the fuel for this fir e, sufficient to cause the total los s shown.
One of the major differences in fighting fires during the present time as compared to 1900 when the great confla-gration razed the entire area is the amount of water under pressure available at the fire scene. The effective fire streams produced at this fire enabled the fire fighters to prevent further spread of the severe outbreak.
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DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 10/64
Date of fire: 30 July 1964 Occupancy: Residential
Day of week: Thursday No. of storeys: 12
Time of fire: 2.20 p. rn, Location: Ottawa
Weather: 69° F R. H. 360/0 Estimated loss: $600.000. WNW wind 19 mph,
scattered clouds.
General: A fire which started under a wooden stairway in the basement of this hotel resulted in a severe property loss and three deaths. Although the fire was confined to the basement and ground floor, smoke spread through the building because selfclosing doors in enclosed stairways were propped open. Two employees died from smoke poisoning and one guest died of a heart attack. The actuation of a manual local alarm system allowed most of the guests to leave the building unaided. Other guests were rescued from their rooms by fire department ladders that were raised to the windows (see frontispiece). In one instance, two people were rescued by a rope lowered from the roof.
Construction: This 12 stor ey building was originally constructed as an apartment building in 1956 and converted to a hotel in 1958. It was a T ahap ed structure, with one section 110 ft long facing the street (Figure 20) and the other section 140 ft long. It was a reinforced concrete structure and the interior finish was, for the most part, metal lath and plaster. The floors were concrete slabs, and the exterior walls were brick. Plywood, hardboard, vinyl wall covering and combustible fibreboard ceiling tiles were used in the main lobby, dining rooms and cocktail lounge in the first storey, in a cocktail lounge in the basement and in the basement corridor leading from the foot of the stairway to the lounge. This combustible finish was not coated or treated with fire retardant materials.
Separations: The front or noth side of the building faced a substantial str eet width and a par king lot (Figur e 20); the west side, which contained no windows, was located about 8 ft from adjacent buildings. The rear (south) wall of the Tee abutted a 3storey brick building and there were no wall openings between them. On the east side there was a 10ft lane and then a one storey brick building on top of which cars were parked at the rear.
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Exits: An enclosed stairway was located at the front of the building at the intersection of the corridors of the two wings. The other was located at the back end of the rear wing. The front stairway was fitted at all levels with selfclosing doors. Exit from the building was from the stairway door at the first-floor level thr ough the lobby to the front door of the hotel, a distance of about 35 ft. The rear stairway was enclosed except at the firstfloor level. Exit from this stairway at the fir st floor level was via a corridor and then thr ough the lobby, a distance of 140 ft. Unfortunately, at the time of the fire many of the doors in the enclosed stairways were blocked open.
Spread of Fire: Shortly after 2.00 p. rn, a fire was discovered in the janitor's closet under a wooden stairway to the basement cocktail lounge (Figure 21). When discovered the fire had already broken out of the closet and spread to the plywood panelling on the stairway. Employees attempted to extinguish the fire, the local alarm was pulled to warn guests and the fire department called by phone at 2. 18 p. rn, The use of the standpipe hose from the front stairway pr evented closing the stair door at the basement level. which allowed smoke to fill the stairway and render it useless as a means of es cape. As the fire swept up the open wooden stairway to the combustible finish in the first storey, smoke rolled into the rear main stairwa y at the open fir st floor level and boiled out of the proppedopen doors at every storey, filling all the corridors with smoke and cutting off every escape route inside the building. Most of the guests wer e able to get down the stair-ways before they became untenable. Several guests, however, were trapped in their r o orn s by the smoke and had to be rescued by fire department ladders from the lower storeys or by ropes dropped from the roof to windows in the upper storeys.
Direct fire damage caused by flaming combustion was ess entially confined to the ground or lobby floor which contained restaurant and bar facilities. Smoke from the fire spread
throughout the building. There were three deaths as a result of this fir e.
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-Remarks: The openings in the stair well enclosures were probably the major factor in this fire. If the fire had occurred dur ing the night when people wer e asleep the situation might have been far more serious than it was. The fact that the
manual alarm was quickly sounded after the fire was discovered and that the fire occurred in the middle of the afternoon when those guests in the hotel at the time were up and dressed probably allowed more people to leave the building unaided than could otherwise have been the cas e.
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DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 11/64
Date of fire: 4 Dec. 1964 Occupancy: Mercantile
Day of week: Friday No. of storeys: 3
Time of fire: 12.45 a. rn, Location: Ottawa
Weather: 15°F R.H. 61% Estimated loss: $149,000.
NNE wind 13 mph, cloudy.
General: An early morning fire severely damaged this building which housed a wine store and a shoe store on the ground floor; the upper two floor s wer e vacant. This building adjoined an 8 stor ey building so ther e was SOme concern as to whether the taller building would catch on fire, particularly when the roof of the lower building became i nvolved, The fire had obtained a g oe d hold in the basement and was spreading rapidly throughout the structure prior to the arrival of the fire department. The very heavy smoke encountered by fire fighters hampered firefighting operations and spread a pall of smoke over lar ge areas of the city.
Construction: This building was steel framed having 10 and 12in. beams. The 8in. columns, set on short concrete pillars in the basement, were encased in plaster. The exterior walls were concrete block and concrete brick 8 in. thick, and the front wall of the building was faced with a glazed panelling. Interior finish on both walls and ceilings was plast er on wood lath. The floor s , compos ed of tongue-and-groove hardwood flooring covered in places with vinyl asbestos floor tile, were supported on wood joists carried between the steel girders. In the retail shoe store the ceiling was covered with tin sheathing. The roof was a built-up tar and gravel roof with wood joists which were laid on steel girder s , The front section of the building was 3 storeys high whereas the rear section was only 1 storey. The area of the front section was approximately 30 by 25 fttthe rear section being 30 ft by 20 ft. There was a partial basement used entirely by the shoe store; with a set of stairs from the basement to the rear of the store.
26
Separations: The front (north) side of the building was Ioc at ed on a wide street (approximately 100 ft) which provided sub-stantial spatial separations. On the east and west sides ther e were fire walls. The rear of the building faced a large vacant lot which provided substantial spatial separation as well as space for firefighting operations. Interior separations were not effective in controlling the fire which spread freely (no apparent fire stops) in floor ceiling spaces and partition walls. The west wall of the adjacent 3 storey building was parapeted (Figure 22) whereas the east wall of the taller building had windows in it.
Exits: The retail stores on the ground floor had front and rear exits. The upper floor s had an enclosed stairway on the east side of the building, the entrance to which may be seen at left centre of Figure 22 (near the light standard). 'Steel fire
escapes provided emergency exits from the rear of the building.
Spread of Fire: The fire of undetermined cause originated in the basement of a shoe store (right side of ground floor) in wall or ceiling and spr ead to stock and shelving. Fire fighter s
reported they had entered the basement but were driven back by rapidly developing fire. Burning leather, plastic and rubber footwear produced lar ge volumes of smoke which hampered the fire fighting operations as the visibility became very bad
preventing the location of the seat of the fire. Fire travelled between floor and ceiling joists and up and down partition walls totally involving the front of the building. It also burned
through the floor of the wine shop (left side of ground floor) but much of the combustible material in the stor e did not burn, although there was evidence of its being exposed to heat and smoke.
Remarks: Lack of fire stops in concealed spaces allowed the fire to spread throughout the building. The lack of a fire-resistant ceiling in the basement allowed the fire to get out of control in a short time.
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DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 12/65
Date of fire: Day of week:
14 April 1965 Wednesday
Occupancy: No. of star eys:
Group AAssembly 2 and bas em ent
Time of fire: 5.00 p. m. Location: Ottawa
Weather: 51 0
F R. H. 33% Estimated loss: $3000. WNW wind 12 mph,
scattered clouds.
General: A fire of incendiary origin which occurred in this vacant school building caused severe damage to the building, severely gutting the interior. Although the whole building quickly became involved the fact that there were open areas on all 4 sides not only reduced the exposure hazard but provided space for the firefighting operations that prevented the fire from spreading to adjacent buildings.
Construction: This was essentially a 2 storey building with basement except that there was additional usable space under the central flat portion of the roof (Figure 23). It was of solid brick construction with wooden floor joists and roof members. The interior finish was lath and plaster and the roofing around the perimeter was asphalt shingles. The roof of the central portion was covered with asphalt builtup roofing, and the
floors and roof were wood. The building which was approximately 32 by 55 ft was built in 1898.
Separations: The front or west side of the building faced a str eet and ther e was a distance of 65 ft to a building across the street. There was a yard at the rear and it was 54 ft from the school to a wooden fence across the yard. On the north side ther e was a distance of 19 ft to the solid brick wall (no windows) of an adjacent 2 star ey 3 door row which had a flat roof. From the south side it was 55 ft to the adjacent house across the schoolyard. All sides of the building had window openings (see Figure 23) except the rear wall which had two small windows only in the second storey.
Exits: There was an open central wooden staircase with a front entrance and a rear entrance approached through an attached shed at the rear. There was also an iron fire escape to the second floor as shown in Figure 2. Actually, exits played no part in this fire because the building was vacant at the time.
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Spread of Fire: The fire which started in the basement eventually involved the whole building, sever ely gutting
the interior. The fir e department said that the whole building was involved in smoke upon their arrival. The roof fell in around 6. 20 p. rn , Heavy dense smoke poured from the building for approximately
It
hr ; this probably resulted not only from the burning asphalt roofing but also from furnace oil stored in the basement. The fire was contained in the building.Remarks: The delayed alarm and the open central stairway resulted in the building becoming well involved in fire by the time the fire department arrived. Further delay occurred when a hydrant nut blew, requring fire fighters to hook up to another hydrant.
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DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 13/65
Date of fire: 3 May 1965 Occupancy: Residential Day of week: Sunday No. of star eys: 13 plus 2 star ey Time of fire: Reported 8. 32 p. rn , penthouse and
Weather: 69°F R.H. 51% 2 basement floor s
W wind 9 mph, Location: Ottawa
overcast. Estimated los s: $88, 000.
General: The fire occurred in a 2 bedroom suite (1000 sq ft) on the 12th floor of a highrise apartment building of 243 suites. The suite was filled with alar ge quantity of wooden furnitur e. The occupant of the suite had returned to his r oorn s at 6.15 p. rn,
He proceeded to clean the oven in the kitchen, prepare a meal and retire to bed. The fire appears to have sta r t e d in the kitchen and developed while the occupant was asleep. Fire was observed by occupants of neighbouring buildings to the south and by the occupants of adjacent suites. The alarm was received in the fire station at 8. 32 p. rn , When the firemen approached the building, flames were observed extending beyond the edge of the balcony. The occupant had awakened and, finding that escape past the kitchen door to the corridor was impossible, took refuge on the balcony. He remained there during the period of the fire and made his way through the apartment to the corridor after the fire was out. Standpipes in the stair well were used to supply water to extinguish the fire.
Construction: The structure was of reinforced concrete, having columns at about 20 ft o. c. and a flat concrete slab (Figure 24). Woodframed doubleglazed windows extended across the full
width and height of the suite. The concr ete slab projected 5 ft
a
in. beyond the windows to form a continuous balcony. The wallsseparating the apartments were continued out to the edge of the balcony. This was enclosed in part by a low concrete wall and in part by a metal balustrade. Two glazed doors provided access from the suite to the balcony; one in the living r oorn and one in the bedroom (Figure 25). The iin. gypsum plaster on 3/8 In, gypsum lath was suspended on furring channels about 9 in. below the concrete slab. The ceiling was perforated by 5 grilles close to the windows. The space between ceiling and slab formed a plenum through which warm air was distributed to the rooms. The warm air heating system in each apartment was self-contained and controlled by individual thermostats. The air was drawn from the apartment, passed over the heating coils
ＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭｾＭＭｾＭＭＭｾＭＭｾＭＭＭｾＭＭ］Ｍ
30
(steam heated) and circulated through the plenum. An exhaust fan over the cooking stove controlled by a switch in the kitchen carried air dir ectly to the exterior through a 12 by 2 In, damper over the windows. There was also an exhaust system from each bathroom powered by a fan in the penthouse. This system was always in operation. The c omrnon corridor was heated by warm air under pressure from a heating unit in the penthouse; thus there was a slightly higher air pressure in the corridor s than in the apartments.
Separations: The separation between the apartments was provided by a 10 in. thick hollow concrete block wall plastered on both sides. The wall between the corridor and apartment was the same except that it was an 8 -Ln, block. The arrangement of the heating/cooling
system made it unnecessary for warm air ducts to pass through the fire separations. The superintendent reported that no water had penetrated the floor to the apartment below, apart from a
small quantity that filled a lighting fixtur e.
Spread of Fire: The fire was confined to the compartment of origin. The large picture windows in the living r oorn and kitchen areas were destroyed completely. The window in the bedroom nearest to the kitchen was cracked but still in place. There was no spatial separation problem because there are no buildings to the south at the elevation of the 12th floor. The apartment door. a 1ｾ i n, solid cor e wood door in a steel fram e, was still intact after the fir e. The interior surface had been charr ed to a depth of about 3/8 in. in the upper part of the door. Fir e had penetrated the ceiling above the fire at one or two points. The plaster had
separated from the gypsum lath over a larger area. On the walls the final coat of plaster had separated from the base coat near the c entr e of the fir e. The metal damper over the windows taking the exhaust from the range hood had melted, leaving a hole about 3 by 1 in.
Smoke: Smoke had filled both bedrooms and bathroom. It is assumed that the large windows were out when the firemen arrived. When the superintendent and the firemen approached the door of the suite ther e was no smoke in the corridor but only a light smell of burning. When the door was opened the corridor filled with smoke to a level about 3 ft 0 in. to 3 ft 6 in. above the floor but cleared in a short time.
