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DOCU NET RBSURE 05922 - B1566594 ]

(Review of ray's Efforts To Develop TACFIRE]. LCD-78-116;

B-163074. June '2, 1978. 10 pp. + 7 enclosures (28 pp.).

Leport to Sen. illiam Proxsire; y Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller

Ii3sue Area: Automatic Data Processing: Design, Development, and Installation of Software (106).

Contact: Logistics and Cosaunications Div.

Budget Funct,on: iscellaneous: Automatic Data Processing

Organizatior. Concerned: Department of the rm7.

CongressionAl Relevance: House Comittee on rmed Services;

Senate Consittee on Armed Services. Sen. illia. Proxmir.

Auter moacre than 10 years o effort, the rayes Tactical Fire Direction System (TACFIRE) was completed 4.n January 1978.

The Govtrriment ust now decide whether TCFIRE should enter full-sca.a production while comunications, aintenance, equipment, and software problems still exist. The TCPIRB

equipment tested during Operational Test III and scheduled for product n is not the equipment the rmy plans to field; the

potential replacement for certain TCFIBB components. Computer programs for nuclear fire planning and corps artillery

operations need to be tested and completed before TCIRE is fielded. The programs need to be rewritten because of changes made to nuclear doctrine in July 1977, but rewriting ham not yet

begun. The TACFIRE coupiler, a program that converts prograner language to achine-readable instructions, contains at least 27 deficiencies that could disrupt computer operations and cause data processing errors. The production decision should be

delayed to give the ramy tinme to: somplete software development;

correct known system problems and deficiencies; complete . development, testing, and evaluation of new equipment and

associated software; and assess the ipact that the changes will have cn t.e TACFIBE contracts, production schedules, and

?eployment requirements. The Secretary of Defense should direct the rmy to delay full-scale production of TCFIRB to permit the program to be reassessed. (RRS)

COMPTROLLE GENERAL OF THE UI4ITED STATES WA5IHNGTON. D.C. 2054

B-163074 Junie 2, ]978

The Honorable Williai Proxmire United States Senate

Dear Senator Proxmire:

Pursuant to your June 21, 1977, request, we have reviewed the Department of the Army's efforts to develop the Tactical Fir. Direction System (TACFIRE). Our findings, conclusions, and rcommendations, presented orally to your staff on Febru- ary 3, 1978, are summarized below.

TACFIR LDFVFr,OPMENT COMPLETED

AfteL ;aore than 10 years of effort, TACFIRE's development phase was completed in January 1978, when Operational Test III ended. The Government must now decide whether TACFIRE should enter full-scale production. The Amy Systems Acquisition Re- view Council is to make this decision in September 1978 based on the results of Operational est III and other factors.

We don't know whether the test results will show that TACFIRE is ready for production, since the Army's calcula- tions of the results have not yet been completed. However, our observations indicate that some problems, including com- munications, maintenance, equipment, and software problei.s, still exist.

Communications problems

TACFIRE uses digital communications and a digital mes- sage device to link the forward observers with the TACFIRE computer at the battalion level. This link is the primary path for inputting fire mission ata into TACFIRE. The Army encountered roblems with it during Operational Test III.

The tactically deployed forward observers of the 2/19 Field Artillery Ba-talion, using the digital message device with standard rmy field radios, were unable to consistently transmit fire missions digitally to the battalions' fire direction centers. Raw data recorded by t-e Army testers

LCD-78-116 (941134)

B-163074

showed that only 28 percent of the tactically deployed forward observers' igital transmissions during the test- ing period were successful. When digital communications did not work, the forward observers reverted to voice com- munications.

The Army has r'ot identified the cause of the communica- tion problems. Hoever, the problems may be caused, partly or wholly, by the use of standard Army radios designed pri- marily for voice communications. This was true even though the radios used in the test were finely tuned ano supported hy extraordinary maintenance measures, including special

training and the use of civilian depot maintenance personnel.

Maintenance problems

Equipment was repaired under a different maintenance concept from that intended for use in the test. The planned concept required equipment users to make 90 percent of the repairs onsite within an hour and to report those that could not be made within that time to the direct support mainten- ance battalion. The maintenance battalion was to make all other repairs except those requiring general support or depot-level maintenance.

However, during the test, equipment users reported equip- ment breakdowns immediately to the maintenance battalion,

which in turn replaced troublesome components with operable ones. The replaced components were then sent to a Litton- operated maintenance facility for repairs. This facility handled depot-level maintenance, which will be done at Toby- hanna, Pennsylvania, when TACFIRE becomes operational.

Because the maintenance concept was not followed, the

test was not a realistic exercise of the system. Consequently, the test did not provide sufficient data to properly deter- mine the mean-time-to-repair, spare parts allocations, validity of the maintenance concept, or ability of the equipment users

t3 make repairs. Without a fully developed and tested main- tenance capability, there is little assurance that TACFIRE will be maintainable under critical operational conditions.

Equipment and software problems

B-163074

between failures of 150 hours. The problems included many computer dumps and freezes like those experienced during

the earlier Developmental Test III and vauLous quipment problems involving line printers, digital data terminals, digital message devices, and mass core memory units.

The dumps and freezes shot down computer operations and caused (1) systems to be reloaded and restarted and (2)

data bases to be reconstructed at a frequency not expected of a computer that has completed its development phase. De- spite these problems, testing was not delayed, primarily be- cause of backup computer procedures and the different main- tenance concept employed. According to a testing official, had the intended maintenance concept been used, testing would have been administratively stepped because the spply of spare parts and components would have been exhausted aftr days of testing.

Bec 'se of the problems, the operational test results most likely will not conclusively show that TACFIP is opera-- tionally ready or that it should enter full-scale production without corrective actions. Those problems alone may be sufficient to delay production. However, ot more signifi- cance is TACFIRE's lengthy development, which has produced, in our opinion, a technologically outuated system that ap- parently will be obsolete before production is completed.

As a result, the Army plans to make major changes in key TACFIRE components.

NEW EQUIPMENT TO REPLACE TACFIRE COMPONENTS

The r'ACFIRE equipment tested during Operational Test III and scheduled for production is not the equipment the Army plans to field. The Army has identified new equipment based

upon today's technology as potential replacement for certain TACFIRE components. The equipment is being developed with Government funding but has not yet been tested as part of TACFIRE.

Battery level computers

The Army is developing a battery level computer to give the firing batteries a computational capability integrated with TACFIRE. The computer will replace the obsolescent computing device called FADAC, which was fielded in 1964, and the TACFIRE Battery Display Unit, which provides the

3

B-163374

batteries with firing data. Its introduction into TACFIRE will satisfy a longstanding requirement for battery-autonomous operations.

The battery level computer needs to be cested with TACFIRE, particularly to determine the adequacy of the in- terfacing software. This s to be done n November 1978.

Replacement computer

The Army has idertified two fourth-generation computers (one Litton and one Contro. Data Corporation) as potential replacements for the TACFIRE computer, which is tech-

nologically outdated. It is competitively testing these computers at the irection o the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The iurpose of the testing is to introduce competition into TACFIRE and other major development pro- grams, such as the Tactical Operations System and the Missile

Minder which use the TACFIRE computer, and to determine whether to retain o. replace the TACFIRE computer. The testing was scheduled to be completed in March 1978; the replacement decision will be made in September.

Replacing the TACFIRE computer with a modern technology computer offers a number of advantages, including faster

computations, increased operational reliability, fewer main- tenance requirements, and compactness. The latter advantage would allow the Army to reduce the size of the TACFIRE

equipment and thus increase operating space, which is presently cramped, within the van housing the equipment.

ilso, the replacement would eliminate potential supply prob- lems of providing parts for outdated circuitry and subcom- ponents.

Acquiring a new TACFIRE computer would significantly affect the program. Its introduction would delay production schedules to permit system testing. Also, if it is not the Litton computer, all production options not exercised will be voided and new contracting may be required. According to Litton and Control Data, enough of the new computers could be available for system testing in November 1979.

Digital message device

The digital message device is used by the forward ob- server to input target information into TACFIRE. This

B-163074

technology and to reduce it3 sizes The new device should be available for testing with TACFIRE by June 1980.

Secure digital measase device

The present digital message;-device is unsecured. Trans- missions need to be manually encrypted. Otherwise, they

must be sent in clear text that can be intercepted and used by enemy forces to disclose the forward observer position, friendly units' locations, and other tactical information.

This deficiency is being corrected through the development of a rypto device, which is now available for testing with TACFIRE.

Digital data terminal

The digital data terminal is the communications equip- ment link between the computer and TACFIRE's input devices.

It is being redesigned to incorporate new technology that will increase communications throughput and reliability.

The increased throughput is significant because the Army's new fite support team concept substantially increases the number of forward observers that will be inputting data

into TACFIRE. The faster terminal, which should be ready for TACFIRE testing in June 1980, will provide a greater capacity to handle the increased communications.

Magnetic tape unit

A new magnetic tape nit, used to load the TACFIRE com- puter, has been developed to correct operating deficiencies.

This unit is pre.:ently available for testing.

Digital plotter map

The existing plotter map is subject to mechanical fail- ure and is considered inadequate. Electronic maps that have been developed and are being tested should be available in June 1982.

TACFIRE APPLICATION SOFTWARE NOT COMPLETED

Ccmputer programs for nuclear fire planning and corps artillery operations need to b, completed and tested before TACFIRE is fielded. The programs that had been written for luc]ear fire planning need to be rewritten because of changes

5

- 363074

made to nuclear doctrine in July 1977. This rewriting has not yet begun.

TACFIRE is supposed to operate under the Army's corps structure, in which the corps commander directs and controls the artillery at all echelons. This requires TACFIRE, and particularly the computer programs used at the corps, divi-

sion, and battalion echelons, to be interoperable and in- tegrated. TACFIRE has accomplished this at the division and battalion levels, but the programs needed to automate the corps operations and to integrate them into TACFIRE have not yet been developed.

The development of the corps programs will affect the completed ptc of TACFIRE. Changes to division and bat-

talion computer programs, communications software, and operat- ing procedures will be required to integrate the corps

artillery operations into TACFIRE. Also, more equipment will be needed to process the additional workload. The effort will be substantial, but until it is completed and tested, TACFIRE will not be a complete system.

The Army received a proposal rom Litton in August 1977 to do the development work. The proposal has not been

accepted, purportedly because of the Army's desire to do the work in-house. The Army presently does not have a work r.an or a target date for completing the work.

TACFIRS COMPILER IS DEFICIENT

The TACFIRE compiler, a program that converts programer language to machine-readable instructions, was purchased from Litton. It contains at least 27 deficiencies that can dis- rupt computer operations and cause data processing errors.

These deficiencies have been identified by Litton, which has proposed to fix them for about $600,000.

NEED FOR SMART TERMINAL

TACFIRE includes a variable format message entry device tnat provides two-way digital communications between the fire direction center and remote users. This device con- stricts communications because it cannot be programed to perform certain functions and it lacks the ability to store

The need for a programmable or smart

B-163074 CONCLUSION

The new equipment developments offer the Army an oppor- tunity to improve and upgrade TACFIRE before it enters full- scale production and to preclude costly retrofitting. This opportunity--coupled with the nee'd to cc.nplete software

development (particularly corps software) and the uncertainty of whether TACFIRE, as presently configured, will work

adequately after it is fielded--indicates that the production decision should be delayed.

The delay will give the Army time to (1) complete soft- ware development, (2) correct known system problems and de-

ficiencies, (3) complete development, testing, and evalua- tion of new equipment and its associated software, and (4) assess the impact that the changes will have on the TACFIRE contracts, production schedules, and deployment requirements.

It will also give tiL Army an opportunity to plan and incor- porate the Reserve Forces requirements into the TACFIRE

program. Presently, none of thoae requirements are in the program, although the Reserve Forces have about 55 percent of the Army's artillery.

We recognize that delaying production may affect TACFIRE's October 1980 scheduled deployment to Europe, where it is most

needed. However, we believe that the advantages of deploying an improved, completed, and fully tested TACFIRE would justify delaying deployment. This belief is compatible with those of the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doc-

tine Command and the Commanding General of the U.S. Army, Europe.

The latter has stated that a complex system such as TACFIRE should be thoroughly tested in the ontinental

United States and then issued to Europe with proven logistic, maintenance, and training packages. de added that the de-

ployment of TACFIRE with the battery computer system was con- sidered a significant advantage.

The Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command has stated that while the need to deploy a combat multiplier such as TACFIRE to Europe at the earliest possible date is understood, t danger of hastily introduc-

ing a new complex system before establishing a thoroughly stressed logistics package, refined and tested doctrine (especially corps), plus equipping our force wit a mixture of equipment, greatly outweigh the advantage of early

7

B-163074

introduction. These statements were made in rsponse to an inquiry into whether TACFIRE should be deployed 10 months earlier than scheduled.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Army to delay full-scale production of TACFIRE to permit

the program to be reassessed, Specifically, a special De- fense Systems Acquisition Review Council should be convened to consider the two alternatives of redesign and redirection of the program to incorporate the system improvements that have been identified. Of these alternatives, we recommend that TACFIRE be redirected so that the Active and Reserve Forces can be equipped with an improved, completed, and fully tested TACFIRE within the shortest time. The details of

this recommendation are included in our briefing document.

AGENCY COMMENTS

We discussed our review with officials of the Cffice of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of the Army.

The Army's Director of Combat Support Systems (Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development and

Acquisition) acknowledged the existence of the system im- provements. According to him, development programs often lag ehind technology and continual attempts to catch up would tend to keep programs in the development stages. He said that new equipment or improvements will always be available but that at some point a decision must be made to go with a certain equipment configuration or technology.

He concluded that in such cases, a system can be upgraded by retrofitting or replacing equipment with higher perform- ance equipment or components.

We agree that technology is elusive and that retrofitting is a way of catching up after a system i developed and

produced. However, in the case of TACFIRE, technology that can improve the system is available now, before full-scale production begins. Moreover, the enhancements under consid- eration constitute major realignments of the system. We be- lieve that the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council should determine hich of the improvements we itemized

should be included in the production configuration and which should be postponed for future incorporation.

B-163074

The officials also commented on the various test results, including our observations of Operational Test III, and fi-

RnciaI matterc. Where appropriate, we modified our brief- ing document to accommodate their views.

Your staff requested a copy,.of the briefing document containing the information presented above for your use during hearings on the fiscal year 197.9 military budget.

We are formally transmitting a copy of that document as enclosure I. Five classified pages have been withdrawn,

but we can provide them to you separately if you wsh.

We are also transmitting the following information, requested by your office, as enclosures II through VII.

II. Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, daLt ' January 28, 1975, concerning production approval or TACFIRE.

III. Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research and Development), dated

February 20, 1975, concerning TACFIRE Program Supplementary Guidance.

IV. General Blanchard's message, dated August 5, 1977, concerning TACFI'E deployment and fielding.

V. General Starry's letter to General Kerwin, Army Vice Chief of Staff, dated August 26, 1977, con- cerning TACFIRE deployment in Europe by Octob.r

1980.

VI. General Kerwin's letter to General Starry, dated September 12, 1977, concerning'TACFIRE deployment in Europe.

VII. Abstract of Modification 130 to the Litton TACFIRE contract, which established a $1 million incentive

for Litton to fix software problems.

9

B-163074

If you desire, we will gladly meet wth you to discuss TACFIRE in greater detail or provide other assistance.

As discussed with your office, we are sending copies of this letter and enclosures to the Chairmen of the Senate

and House Committees on Appropriations and Armed Services, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, and other interested parties.

S ti y yours

Comptroller General of the United States Enclosures - 7

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