Table of Content
INTRODUCTION ... 1
A-BORDER CONTROL STUDIES ... 4
B-A STREET-LEVEL IMPLEMENTATION PERSPECTIVE ... 6
C-IMPLEMENTATION AND DISCRETION ... 10
D-RESEARCH DESIGN AND INITIAL RESEARCH QUESTIONS ... 16
E-RESEARCH QUESTIONS EMERGING DURING THE FIELDWORK: PROCESSES OF TRANSFER ... 22
F-CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STREET-LEVEL IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH ... 29
G-METHODOLOGY ... 33
H-DISSERTATION OUTLINE ... 45
CHAPTER 1-SCHENGEN VISA POLICY-MAKING:SHIFTING COMPETENCE WHILE AUTHORIZING DISCRETION ... 49
A-IS SCHENGEN VISA POLICY A SPILLOVER OF THE SINGLE MARKET?THE LIMITS OF THE FUNCTIONALIST HYPOTHESIS: A COMPENSATORY MEASURE TO FREE MOVEMENT. ... 52
B-FROM 1993 ONWARDS: COMMUNITARIZING SCHENGEN RULES ... 57
C-EXTERNAL RELATIONS CONCERNS FOR NEW EU INSTITUTIONAL PLAYERS IN VISA POLICY: THE “FRIENDLY AND UNIFIED EUROPE” FRAME ... 59
D-REGULATING THE EXAMINING AND THE DECISION-MAKING ON SCHENGEN VISA APPLICATIONS: A SOURCE FOR NATIONAL DISCRETION ... 68
CONCLUSION ... 81
CHAPTER 2-MOROCCO:ONE THIRD COUNTRY BUT THREE NATIONAL CONTEXTS ... 84
A-THE HISTORY OF MIGRATORY MOVEMENTS ... 86
1) France ... 86
2) Belgium ... 89
3) Italy ... 93
B-VISA INTRODUCTION IN MOROCCO ... 96
1) France ... 96
2) Belgium ... 100
3) Italy ... 102
C-DISTINCT FLOWS ... 106
CONCLUSION ... 115
CHAPTER 3-POLICY NARRATIVES AND NATIONAL SENSE-MAKING OF VISA POLICY ... 117
A-UNDERSTANDING VISA POLICY IN MOROCCO FOR BELGIUM,ITALY, AND FRANCE ... 118
1) Belgium: visa policy as sensitive migration control ... 119
2) Italy: visa policy as scorned migration control ... 124
B-NARRATING FLOWS ... 129
CONCLUSION ... 137
CHAPTER 4-MANAGING VISA POLICY IMPLEMENTATION ... 139
A-THE MATERIALIZATION OF SOVEREIGNTY ... 140
1) State and private “borders on site” ... 143
2) Buffer zones and rituals of entering: processing people into visa applicants ... 148
B-MANAGING THE RELATION WITH THE FOREIGN COUNTRY: THE VISA APPLICATION PROCESS ... 155
C-THE VISA EXAMINING PROCESS: BUREAUCRACIES, ACTORS, AND TECHNOLOGICAL TOOLBOXES 162 1) The case of Belgium: bureaucracies and actors ... 162
2) The case of Italy: bureaucracies and actors ... 166
3) The case of France: bureaucracies and actors ... 170
4) Schengen and national technological toolboxes ... 173
CONCLUSION ... 180
CHAPTER 5-POLICY WORK IN VISA SECTIONS ... 182
A-VISA SECTIONS: A DOWNGRADED WORKPLACE? ... 185
B-THE ALLOCATION OF TASKS ... 186
1) The case of Belgium ... 186
2) The case of France ... 189
3) The case of Italy ... 191
C-DEVELOPING PRACTICAL AND LOCAL KNOWLEDGE TO PERFORM THE JOB ... 193
D-SYSTEMATIZING THE USES OF DISCRETION FOR THE EXAMINING OF APPLICATIONS: LOCALLY -EMPLOYED WORKERS, MANAGERS, AND PEERS ... 197
1) The case of Belgium ... 198
2) The case of France ... 200
3) The case of Italy ... 203
CONCLUSION ... 207
CHAPTER 6-THE OUTCOMES OF BORDERING POLICIES:DECISION-MAKING ON SCHENGEN VISA APPLICATIONS ... 209
A-DECISION-MAKING: AN ORGANIZATIONALLY GROUNDED PROCESS OF CATEGORIZATION WITH SHIFTING EMPIRICAL APPROPRIATENESS ... 210
B-THE CASE OF BELGIUM:A SPECIFIC OBJECTIVATION OF DECISIONS AND AN INTER-MINISTRIES QUARREL ... 214
1) The consulate visa section’s organizational purposes: managing the risk of enjoying legal opportunities and the risk for the welfare state ... 218
2) The Immigration Office: Old and new facts validating negative categorization ... 226
C-THE CASE OF FRANCE:THE PERCEPTION OF THE HISTORICAL APPROPRIATENESS OF THE
MIGRATORY RISK ... 239
1) The decision-making process ... 240
2) France: managing the risk of settlement and the risk of bypassing remote control ... 249
D-THE CASE OF ITALY:AN ORGANIZATION SHAPED BY UNCERTAINTY DUE TO NOVELTY AND LACK OF SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY ... 252
1) The decision-making process ... 254
2) Italy and Belgium: deserving applicants versus the risk of settlement ... 266
CONCLUSION ... 268
CHAPTER 7-SCHENGEN IN THE MAKING:STATES PRIVATIZING BORDER MANAGEMENT ... 271
A-VFSGLOBAL AND TLSCONTACT: ORIGINS AND DIFFUSION OF TWO DOMINATING PRIVATE SERVICE PROVIDERS ... 273
B-SCHENGEN STATES NEGOTIATING THE PRIVATIZATION OF BORDER MANAGEMENT ... 286
C-THE BURDEN OF IMPLEMENTING THE SCHENGEN VISA POLICY ... 291
D-REDIRECTING THE ECONOMIC AND NON-ECONOMIC BURDEN OF IMPLEMENTING THE SCHENGEN VISA POLICY ... 297
1) Collecting fingerprints: more than an economic burden ... 298
2) Getting rid of the duty of handling applicants ... 302
3) Avoiding blame ... 305
CONCLUSION ... 308
CHAPTER 8-OUTSOURCING IN PRACTICE:UNINTENDED EFFECTS ON THE POLITICS OF THE BORDER ... 309
A-BORDERING AT THE NONSTATE WINDOW: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE USE OF FRONTLINE POLICY DISCRETION ... 312
B-TWO NEW ORGANIZATIONAL ROUTINES:‘IF A DOCUMENT IS MISSING, THE APPLICANT IS REJECTED’ AND ‘IF THE LODGED APPLICATION IS INCOMPLETE, THE VISA WILL BE DENIED’ ... 319
1) Performance incentive mechanism as solution? ... 328
2) The workflow management software application ... 330
C-ASSESSING THE MIGRATORY ‘RISK’ WITH BLIND EYES ... 332
D-SOCIAL CONFLICT AT THE NONSTATE WINDOW ... 334
CHAPTER 9-TRANSNATIONAL POLICY-MAKING FROM BELOW:LOCAL AND PRACTICAL
KNOWLEDGE SHARING AND THE ROLE OF PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS ... 343
A-LOCAL AND PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE SHARING AND STREET-LEVEL POLICY CHANGE ... 345
1) Practical and local knowledge to manage visa policy implementation ... 349
2) Practical and local knowledge to detect risky travelers and common tricks of the trade ... 352
3) Practical and local knowledge sharing in a domain of national legislations: controlling ‘fake’ marriages ... 356
B-LOCAL KNOWLEDGE INFORMAL SHARING VERSUS LOCAL SCHENGEN COOPERATION ... 360
C-TRANSNATIONAL POLICY-MAKING FROM BELOW ... 364
CONCLUSION ... 366
CONCLUSION ... 368
D-MAIN FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTION OF THE THESIS ... 368
E-PERSPECTIVES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ... 375
REFERENCES ... 378
