Hiqb sc1l:001 Students' Views of' the Nature of' Science
Ma ur i c eA. Barry
A ThesisSubmittedin Par tial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for aMas t ers of Education Degree (Curricu lumand In s t r uc t i on) Memorial Unive rsityof Newfoundland
November15 , 199 0
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For the pastye a r andahalf this thesisha s consume d most ofmy ti me andcrea t i ve en e r g y . During the entire ti me, from theor i gina l co nc ep t ion of the idea of thi s project right up until the date of final sUbmi ssi on, mysupervi so r , Dr.AlanK. Griffiths has been asour c econt i nual suppo r t and encouragement. The Ma ny hoursheha s spend as sist ingme ....ith this thesis, coupled ....it h his highstandardsof ex pe c t ati o n havere s u l t e d in whathas been forme themost satisfying project I ha ve eve r unde r ta ke n. l owehim a great debt of gratitUde.
I alsoowe my wifeJosephinea si mi l a r debt for hersup port andpatience.
i i
Abstract
Th is stud y exa mi n e d hi gh sc hoolstud e nts'viewsof the nature of scie nc e. Ast r a t ifi e d ra ndom sample of 32 st uden tsch os e n fr omni neschools inea s te r n andcentra l Newfoundlandwereinterviewed on an ind i v i du al beeLe, The inte rv iew swere semi -struc t ur e d and were administe redin generalaccordanc ewithan interv iew guide. The tran s cr i pts were reduc edto asetof ind iv i d ua lizedconce ptual inventorie s. The frequ encyof occurren c e ofeach representativ e statementwa s talliedand tabu lated. A numberof generaltrendswereidfmtlfied. Most students wez-efou nd to have diff i cultyestab li shing the domain of sc ienceal tho ug h manytended toview thepra ct i c e ofscienc e as cumulative . Al t ho ugh themajo r i ty of the samp leasse rted that scientificinformation was tentat i ve andpr ov is iona l , they tended toregard fa c t u a l in fo rma tio n insciencet-';be absoluteand irrefutable. Scien t if i c the oriesappe aredto be only understoodinanaive se n s e in tha t most sub j ects regarde dtheoriesas suggested explanations fo r fairl y discrete events asopposedto elaborate int erpret ive frameworks. In accordanc ewith previous l y documented evidence (Aikenhead. 1987) many sUbjectswe r e found to
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equ a t e the te rm "scienti f ic la w" with the moreco mmo n legal usageof theword. Fi na lly , el ementsof what Nadeauand De sau t el s (1984) term as naivereal i s m. blissful empiricism, credu lousexperilnentalismandex c e s s i v e rationalism were foundto be quite prevalentinth e transcripts.
'l'ableot Contents
CRAPTER 1: 'l'he Problem•• • ••• • •••••• •••••••••• • •.••• • •• • 1 Introduction
Some Views of the Nature of Science
Iv
How scienceprogresses Thenatureof scientific th e o rie s Thenature of scientificknowledge Studying the Nature of Science Purpose ofthe study Researc hQuestions De limi t a t i on s of study Limita tions
10 15 as 20 20 21 22
Cha p t e r 2: Reviewof theLiterature••••• • • • ••• •• •••• • • • 24 scienceTeache rs' conceptions of the Nature
of Science
Students' Conceptionsof The Nat ure of Science- -Quanti tativestudies Students'Conceptions of theNa t ure of Science--Quali t a tiveStudies ResearchMet hodologies
Inte rv i e wi ng procedures
24
27
30
35 35
Analys isof data
SUll\JlIary of Ma j orRese arch in tostuden t s' Conceptionsof the Natureof Science
Ch a p t . r 31 R••••rchpe.iq D •• • •• •• •••••• ••• ••• • •• •••••••
Procedure- -OataGathering The interview guide The sample Assumptions Data Analysi s
Reliabil ityand validity
Ch apte r .: Re a ulto •••• • •• • ••••• ••• • •••• •••• • •• ••• ••• •••
student Views ofsci enc e Generalviews Motivationfor research Scientific observation scienti f ic method Change inec fe n ce St u de n t ViewsofScienti f ic Fac t s
Ho wscie n t i f ic fac t s areob t ai n ed The nature of scientificfacts StudentVi e ws of Scien t i f i cTheories
Genera l understanding of theorie s The natureof theories The functionof theori e s Ho w theoriesch a nge
J8
.5
55 55
65
76 80 81
.6
'8
117 student Viewsofsci en t i f i c Laws
Generalunderstandinq of laws The functionof laws
The Prevalenceof scient is tie Views 1n theSample
Cbapter51 COlloIu.iollll ••o••0• ••• •••••••• •• ••• • •••• • • •••117 Summary of Results
Impl ications tor Teaching
ProgramswithII bet.terphilosophical basis 121 The useotla n gu a g e
Direct io nsfor Future RQsearch
Reterancas •••••• ••• ••••••••• •••• ••••••• • • ••• •• • • ••••••••12 7
Appendix AI TheIntervie" Qurel• • ••••••• •••• •0••0••• ••••135
AppendixB: 8_pl•• of Intervie .Transcripts •••• ••• • • •. 138
ap~n4izc: CODCleptual Inventori• • •• ••••••••••• • •••••• •159
Appall4i .D: Ind i v i du a l i .e d Ouest.lODD.irllls ••••••• •• ••• • •191 vi
vii
Ta b l e1: Re p r ese nt at i on s or SUb j ect:.GeneralVie ws ..•• • • 56 otScience
Ta bl e 2: Rep resenta t ion...of Subje ctVi ews on the ••••• ••
MotivationBehind scien tificRe s earc h TableJ: Representat ionsof Subject Vie ws on . . .. ...•. ..
scientific Obae rva t io n
Table 4: Repre s en tationsof Su b ject Viewson what ••..•• Cons titutosa scI e n t if ic Met h od
Tab le5: Repres e nt ati on s of Su bjec t Views onche r.qe•••• inscience
Tab le6: Rep rllls.ntat i ons of Subject Views onHow•. .•.. 82 Scientif icFactsar eObtained
Table7: Repr•••nto t i onsof SubjectGeneral Vi ews•••• •••
onThe Nature ofscienti fi c Fa ct s
Tab lea: Repre sentat i onsof SUbjectVi ews onWhat••.•... 90 constitutesII.Theory
Table9: Repre sentat i onsof Subj e ctVi ews on Th e•.. •••.• OVerallNature of Theories
Ta ble 10: Representations of SubjectVi e ws on The•• •••••
Fun c ti o n of Theories
Tab le11: Rep resentationsof sUbject Views on •••. .• ••••• Chang_and Theories
Tabl e 12 : Repre s enta t i on s of Su b j ectGeneral Vie ws ••••••10 3 of: Scie n tificLaws
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Tabl e 13:Repres entations or Subje ctVie wson th e ••• •...10 8 Functi on of scienti f icLaw.
Table14:The Pr eva lenc e or sci e n tis ticViews in ••••••• •112 th e Sa mpl e
Introdu ction
:It is generallyagreed that the promotionof cons i s t en t ane! mature viewsotthe nature ofsc ie n c e isavalid goal of science education. Indeed in its RlDport36 (1984). the Science council of canede stre s see!the importance of thi s objective . St u di••t:~.Orpwood ane! Alalll Cl~a4)ane! by Ot"pwoodandao u queC1984} however, in d ica t e that practi c e does not coincidewellwith intent. The s e st udi e s showed thatman y can a d ian teachers do not reg-ard th e nature of scienceas importantand that theypla c e muchIaOr e elllp h a s is on enabling-studentsto learn the various concepts associatedwithscience than they do ondevel o p i n gconc e pts of the nature ofscie nc e. Orpwo04 and Ala. (1984) repo rted that lDany curriculum ma t e ri a l s in us e inCan a di a nK.::hools ind icatea lack of elDphasis on the nature of science. It has been pointedout (Robinson, 1969)that many scie n c e curricu laarenotto u n d e d 011 sound or consi stentideas in thephi l o s o p h yotscience. Despite the greatvolumeot:
literature available on the philosophy of ecfence , educators have been reluctant to apply the more mature andvsound views to new curricula.
According to Robinson (1969) and Summers (1982), teachers as well as students shouldunderstand the nature of sctence . In fact, Scheffler (1973) states that it is even more critical that science teachers have\:-"1 developed conceptions of the nature of science than i t is for scientists and other normal practitioners of science.
Similarly, Robinson and Summers argue that teachers, as professionals, should know what it is they do and how they do it. Both Robinson and Summers further suggest that teachers' conceptionsofwhat i t is ....hay are doing may intluence the way in which they teach. unfortunately as has been pointed out by ogunniyi and Pella (1980), Rowell&
cevenrcn (1982), sHeh&0Malik (1977), these views may be of
<lrathernaive nature. Nadeau and Desautels (1984), who
criticized much teaching as contributingto a unrealistic view of science, state that scientism is, in fact, re i n f o r c e d by teachers Who pay insufficientattention to the nature of science. Nadeauand Desautels note five separate unacceptable viewsof science that may exist inthe! minds of teachers and students:
Naive RealislIl l The belief that scientific knowledge is an exact; reflection of things as they really are, that science furnishesus with a set of facts th a t correc tlyend faithfully describe reality.
BU •• fulhpirici •• , Thebelie fthat all scientific knowledge arisesdire c t l y andnclusively trollobservation of ph enomena. In thisviewthepr a c t i ce ofsc i e nc e is basic allyseen as the relentlessgatheringof observati onal data \:ll.ichwill pointsingul arl y , objectivelyand conclusivelytothe truth .
Cre4ulouB EZ'P.rbentalislll: The beliefthat experimentati on make spossibletheconc lusive ve r i f i c a ti onof hyp ot hes e s.
Thisviewse es experime ntationas anobjectiveand complete ly trust worthyre s ol ver ofdifficul tywit.dnthe sc i e nt ific world.
Blind Ide.l i llll : The belief tha t the scientistis a comple t elydis intereste d. objectivebeing. This view qui te ef fe c ti ve l y ellbodieswithi nevery scientist .the imageot thepe r f e ct scholarof science whilere ma i ni ng alltoo obl iviousofhis or her hu:aanna ture.
Bxc. . .iveaaU o na U . .: The beliefthatsciencebring!,.<IS
grad uallycloser tothe truth. In thisview,the pr a c t i c e ofsc i e nc e overthe centuriesbas been cumul a tive andas ti me proceeds,acr-eandmoreknOWledge is beingunc ov e r e d as mankindmarche s ste adilyonwards in quest of theultillate truth.
It ispos siblethatthe exi ste nc e of suc h views lIay Le reinforc edby teach e r swho, themse lves , hold simila r views of science. Thi svi e w isexpand edupon byDuschl (1985 , 198 8) who no t estha t current scienceeduca tionprog rams,as well as the teachers thems elve s , te ndto promotemany of
these inaccurate beliefs. Duschl makes a strong case for a major attempt to bring the philosophical underpinnings of current science programs more in line with current philosophyand views of the nature of science; views which, in recent years, have matured and become more generally acceptable. According to Duschl, scientism will prevail until others such as historians and philosophers are involvedinthe constructionof sciencecurricula.
80meviewsotthe Na ture or Scienc e
HoW science progresses.
Little agreementappears to exist about the answer to the question "What is'the Natureof Sc i e nc e ?" A reading of philosophers such as Kuhn, Popper, Lakatos and Feyerabend only serves to make this point painfully clear.
Disagreement exists about even the most fundamental assumptions of the scientific enterprise. Some writers, sucn as Popper (1959), assert that it is essentially a rational process While others,such as Kuhn (1962), postulate that the fundamental cause of change inscientific thinkingis predominantlysocial.
Possibly the most simplisticview of science is one which may be termed naive inductiyist. According to this viewI science 1.5 seen as something which is based on e>.:perience. Information thus obtained is assumed to have
aris en froma numbe rof impa rtial and unbia s ed observations byobj ec t i ve indiv iduals. It isfurthe r assumed tha t these observati ons ha ve occur red ....ithsuff i c i e nt frequency to att ract the atte ntionofthepersons invo l ve d. Universal la....s, wh i ch may beusedto predictfut u r e events, may arise asgenera l izationsare madefrom man y observ at ions . In this view, the emphasisis on pred i ction of futur ebeha v i or with atypic al sit uatio n inv olv i nga scientist, af t er studyinga numberof beh av i o r s insome system ,generali2ing this beh a viorto even tsouts ide thesy ste m. That is notto say thatthe naive indu ct i vist consi d ers explanation irre levant- -in some instan c e s exp lanati oncanpl a ya significant part.
Fo r the induc tivi s t, exp lana tionwoul d als o arise from gen erali z a t i o ns fr o m seriesof observa ti o ns . The naive indu ctivist ass umestha t thepra ct it ioners of sciencear e deta ch ed in the s-ensetha t the ydonot let pe rs o nalopinions and fe el i ng sconflict wi th theirinvestigations. Th e practice of sci e nce is thereforeviewed asthe cons tant gatheri ngof obse rva tionaldata andthe repe t i t ion of expe r ime ntsin ordertobuild up a da t a ba s e sufficientfor gen erali zation. In thi svi e...., science is basi ca llyan add it iv eproc e s swhich advance s asmoreand more observ ations accumulat e.
Analterna tive viewpo i ntto theabove, one ...hi c h may be te nned falsificationist , sugge s ts thatscience prog r e s s e s as poor theo r ies arere p lace d bymore ade qu a te one s . The acceptabilityofall sta teme nts dep e nds uponthe ir ability
to withstandtesting . Good the o ries must the re f ore be falsifia ble. In fac t, asa highly falsi!iabletheory would be broadlyapplicabley.ith fewre s tricti o ns , it is tobe preferred over morelimi ted the o r i e s. Much workin science therefore consistsof finding the shortcom.i ngs incurrent the or ies and re.ediatingthe deficiencieseither by moc:!ifyl ng the current the o ryorby deve lopi ngcomp letely new ones. Scienceisthere forese en to proceed alonga more or les s ra tionalcourse. As apro bl e m emerges,a widevariety of explanat i onsarepos ed. Theseexplanatio ns willra nge from minor mod if ications to cu r rent the ory tobroadly specul ative--even bfz arre--s t atements. Pro bl e ms will be quickl yidentifie dwithma nyof the se stateme ntsand the y must bere j e cted.. Inti me , only a fewof the original stat ements willre ma inandthe previouspco bl emswillhave been remedied. xeve ver, ne w problenswill occur and the processre pe a t s along diffe rent linesof enquiry . As the possibility always exists thatthe o rie s maybe found deficie nt, the ymu s t al waysberegarde d astentati v e . A mor e soph i s ti c a t e d fals i f icationistvi e w alsoal lowsfor the exist enceof multiple ch e or-Lee,
Boththenaiveind uct ivis t and the falsi fic a tionist views placeimportan c eontheobjectivi tyof obse rvat i o n:
that differentob s e rv ers, when vi e wi ng the sa me ev en t, wil l int e rpret it inthe same way. Forthe naiveinduct i v ist, it istheobjectivityof observationwhichgua ra ntee sthatmany mutua l ly ag rea a l.>l e event sareseen andre c og ni z e d. Forthe
falsificationist , asobservat ion isoften used to ref ut e theory , it mustbe trusted. This belief,however, isope n to question. One f.i nds thatitis impossible to makean obs ervationstatem e nt witho ut mak ingat le a st someuse of the te rms, co ndit i o ns or vari a bles definedpreviouslyin some theo r etic alframework. For example, supposethat a st u de n t wastomak e an obs ervation st a t emen t af te r ob se rv ing the behav ioroftwomagnetswhich had been laid, unbek no wnst tohim , in such a waytha t the likepo l e s were in close co n j u nc t ion withone another . Ave r ysimp l e such sta tement would be "the magn e ts re p ell ed ." Ifoneana lyz es thi s seemi n g l y neutralsta t e ment , i t maybe seenthat the stateme ntcan only be understood wi t hi n a theo retic al framewo r kwhi ch pre su ppos e s thatmag ne tsexist , tha t there issuchan entity asa fo r c e, thatobje cts can appl y suc han entityon oneanotherthro ugh some dis t ance and fina llythat th i s ent ity results inso me motionwhich ca nbe obse rved.
In thiswa y, then, it wouldbe naivetoassumetha t any observation,dulyrec orded, co u l d ev erbe leg iti mate l y rega rdedas obj e ctive. Infa ct itiscle arthat, themore prec ise the obse rva tion stat eme nt , the mor e pre c i s ethe use of theo ry. Observa t i o nst a temen ts, the n, canonlybe unders t oodwithinthe theo r e t i c alframework usedby the observe r and he nc e mayno t be regarded as objec t ive. Being grounded in theo rythen, theseobservation st a tements mu st onlybeconsidered as secure asthe theoryin ....hich theyare to be interpreted. The naive inductiv i st, who us e s
observation as the basis for future work, is therefore placed in a difficult position. If observation data can only be understood within the framework of existingtheory then it cannot be true that observation is used to generate scientific knowledge and i t can hardly be trusted to generate new theory. Likewise,the falsificationist,who relies on observation to falsify inadequate statements, is left somewhat disarmed and forced to contend with the tact that the observations may themselves be flawed.
A different view,postulated by Kuhn (1962), suggests that sociological factors are of more importance with respect to progress or change in science . scientists attempting to flesh out the currently accepted paradigm are said to be practicing normal science. For those scientists, this paradigm, which is essentially the whole body of currently acceptable theories,definitions and operating procedures has been absorbed through practice and training.
"Normal" scientists may find it difficult to express the accepted paradigm in a propositional manner but it is powerful in the sense that it bears up well under scrutiny, at least inits time. In Kuhn's view, practitionersof science are powerfully guidedby the prevailing paradigm and tend not to assume i t to be false when difficulties arise. Such difficulties are normally regarded as anomalies rather than contradictions. When important diffiCUlties do become apparent, however, a crisis may develop. The process of normal science may, for a great many scientists, give way to
a period of revolut i onary scie nc e as a more acceptabl e paradigm is sought. When fo u nd , the acceptanceof this paradigm maybebased upon manyfactor s, notnecessaril y deductionor proof of adequacy; some sc ientis tsmayeve n decide to rejectthe new paradigmand continue work ing within the old one. In this way, science may be considere d as some t h i ngwhic h doesprogress, but it is not nec e s sa r ily the case that sci e nc e progres se stowards some unive r s ally acce p t e d truth.
In another view, Lakatos(197 4 )sees sci e nc e as cons isti ngof researchprograms. To becon sid e r e d scientific, theseprograms , which closelyresembleKuhn's paradig ms, must have acohe rent framework . Acc ording to Lak a tos , two heuristi c s, the pos i t iveand thenega tive, determine respect i velyhow sci enceshould pro c e edandwha t sho u l d not be reje cted. The~of theprogram,the collection of stat ementsand definitionswhichunder lie it, is prote ctedby the negati ve heu r i s tic . Proble ms fou nd with the programmust be correctedbymodify ingthe supporting st a t e me ntssur r o undi ng the hardcore. Scientistswho decide to modify thehard co rear e ma king such fund a me ntal changes that theyare actually opting out of that rese arch pr og r a m.
The workof sci entists whochoos e toremain withi n the programisguidedby thepositive heu rist ic . This positiv e heuri sticneed not be well-de f ined. Infact Lakatos (1974) admitsthat it ma yonly consistof partiallyar t i c u lat e d suggestionsor hintsonhow to proceedaridwhat to change.
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Lakatos'use of research programs allows him to distinguish between scientific and non-scientit'ic ones. To be considered scientific,programs !!lust be consistentand able to survive without recourse to ad hoc additions and conditions. In thisvi e w, research programs can be consideredas progressivei fthey appear to be stimulating new ideas and infol"Jlation. Thosewhichare continually le,lding to difficulties which are not solvable within the accepted framework are considereddegenerative.
A finalview to be considered here stems from Feyerabend (1975), who sees science as something vh Lch can onlybe understood on anindi v i dua l basis. The fundamental driving for c e behind science and scientists is different for each individual; the idea of one universally acceptec scien t i fi c method makes little sense. According\;0 Feyerabendtheonly conclusionpossible about science is that i t exists and has put in place mechanisms which guaranteethatit will continue to do so. Thus the scientifi c enterprise is seen as a morass of individuals, each pursuing his or her own interests.
The nature of scientifictheQrjes.
Hodson (1982a,b) and Cha1lllers (1982) describe two views ofo:he nature of scientific theories which they respectively label~and instrumentalist . The realist approach assumes that the world exists independent of us. In this view more adequate and acceptable tbecrte e are
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consideredas cl oserapproximationsof the ··truth". Seen in this mennex, the practice of scienceappears to be a process sitlli1ar to that of completing a jigsaw puz a Le, Asti me goes on an das more advancements are made one canbette r discern the tr uena ture of theSUbject of the investigations. The dynamicnature of theories wouldth e r e f or e bese e n as closer and closer approximationsof trut hwith the final result being,hopefully. truth itself. Thisapproachallowsone to view theo r i e s as eit hertrue or false.
A fundamentalprob lemwith a strictly realisticview is that most theoriesdeal withidealized si t uations. Many theories inphysics , for example, deal withthe behaviorof particlesand waves ince rta i n, strictly specified conditions. These conditions,however,rarely occ ur naturally and aremoreoften manifested alongwitha host of othe r circumstances. Althoughthey do not normally occur , then, we assume that if they were present the behaviorof thebody in questionwould be correctly and accurately predicted or explained . This, in turn, leads to a senseof detachment from rel\lityandthe r e f o r e compromises the sense ot realism .
Accordingto the instrumentalist approach , theories would be seen as useful guides: asconvenientfiction s:as wor k a bl e explanationsof observed phenomena. The valueof a theorywould be mel\s u r ed against its usefulness. The theory is notrequired to actually re pre s e nt phenomenaas they
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exist. Itis, instead, required to present a workable explanation which could be put to some good use. There is no direct link between observation statements and statements within the theory. The observation statements, more or less, are descriptive while the theoretical statements are usefully interpretive. Though they are derivedfrom the observations. the theoretical statements need not make exact literal use of them. The theories are not intended to explain so much as to predict. Theories, however, often lead to novel predictions--ones of which the original proponents may have been unaware. In this way, many theories can be considered as having their own ontological existence. Astrictly instrumentalist view has great difficulty in satisfactorily explaining this occurrence.
Another view, one which may be termed as~ instrumentalism,pluralistic rea] ism or unrepresentative nli.i§mwas presented by Chalmers (1982). According to Chalmers, no distinctionismade between theoretical language and observational language. Chalmers further asserts that neither presents the world as it actually is. In presenting a somewhat unified combination of theoretical and observational language, Chalmers suggests that despite the fact that Jcnowledge is toso me extent derived from the external world, the contents of many of our ideas cannot be observed, although itis often useful to treat them as things which actually do exist. The very nature of the theories we hold depends on the way in which we view the
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world. If, for somere a s on , we cha nge ths wa y inwhichwe view the world, the nature of acceptab lescientific theories must alsochangeas we wouldnoW' viewthe worldas consistingof somewhatdifferent things. Thisview acknowledgestheexistenceof reality andofthe possibil i ty ofth e existenceof a realistictheory. It does not, however, r~quirethat the theory inquestion be reg<;..;dedin a strictly realisticway in that the constructsused in i t do not have to corresponddi r ec t l y wit h real ity.
Nagel (1969) considers theories as general assumptions or inst rument.sfor use in sc ientificinves t i g a tio ns. For him,th e o ri e s basically functio n as in t e r pr e t i v e frameworks and are mainlyuseful in that they al lowthe scientistto organize and interpretobservational data. Nagel's descript ionoftheo r i e s includes three categoriesWhich correspondto scientificthe ori e s . Strateg icvariable the orie s , the sill'lplest, merely listthe rerevent, factors involved. These are low in complexityand are difficult to eitherconfirm or refute as they makeno behaviorclaims.
Limited generalizations, the secondty pe of theory, describe some measure of dependence between variables. As the name suggests, these theories are inductive in nature. Nagel te rmedth e most complexty pe as integ ra tedsystems. These relyon inter-relatedand mutuallycompatibleconcepts. They may be quite extensive and have considerable ability to predict and explain events . Itcan be seenthat Nagel' s genera J.Iyinductive viewscontrastsomewhat with those of
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Popp er (195 9 ). PopperI who 1ses se n t i a lly a
fals if icat ion ist , choosestoad opt a mor ededu ctive out look towar dsthe prac t i c e of sci e nceandof the test i n g of theo r i es in particu l ar. Like other fals ifi c ation istsPo ppe r asser ts that theoriesar e fals ';'tiablebut not ver i fia b le. Howeverhe further stat es that the pz-c oess is qu i te deductive in natu r e. Scientific 1a....s,he states, arete s t ed purel yby deducti ve met hods .
A dif f e ren t viewpoi nt was descr i bedbyPenrose (1989) whodistingui she s amongthr ee types of th e ory:supe rb, yg1y!and te nt at i ve. Theories, inorder to meritthet~tl e super bmus t be grea tl yapplicab l e to there a l worldand l'IIust predict even ts witha ver yhi g h degree of accu racy.
Examples would in c lude Newt on'scl ass ical theor y,Maxwe ll's electromagnetic the or yandEinste in' s ge ne ra landspecial theoriesof relativity . Usef u l th e or i e sdi ffer from superb theo ri e s mainly intha t the yha venotbeen full y exp lored and tha t the i r pred i ctiveability is consider ab l y less , though st i l l usab l e. ExaDp1t.~swou l d includ e theGell- Mann - Zweigquar k mode l ofhadrons andth e bi g bangori g i n of the universe. Theth ird ca tego ry , tentati ve th eori e s , di f fe r mai n lyfrom theus e ful theo r ies in that they lack sign i f ican t experimentalsupport. Some examples from this categorywould in c lu de supe r s t r i ng theor ies as we llas the sever a lgra nd un i fie dtheorie s (GUT ' s). Itmaybe seentha t Pen r o s e ' s viewis essential ly instrument alist innatu r e. He mak es no clear distinctionbetween theories and mode l s ,
15
choosing even to include a few models--the so-ca l l ed
" stdndard model" for instance--asexamples/')ftheories.
Penrose'sconceptionof theory issystemic in natur e.
Rather than treating theorIesassugg est e d answers or explanations tosp e ci fi c problemshe deals wit h theo ryas a unified system of concepts. The examples ci ted above , for instance , would be impossible tost a t e in brie f andon l y exist asa sy s tem of re l a t e d andclea r ly definL.:concep ts . Inorderto expla in any of the theorLeeme nt ione d onewou ld esse nt i a lly have to descr-Ibe a fairly comp let e wo rld vie w.
Th e natur eof scie n t ific knowl edge
At theextreme s, onecan adopteither a~or a
~orientationtowards scien t if ic knowl e dge . A relativistposition wou l darise if i twereunders tood that scient i fi c knowledgeca nonlybeund e r s tood wi thinit s historical andso c ial per sp ecti ve :that there is no universa lcriterion on which to jUdgethemeri ts of a particUlar pie c eofsci entificinf o rma t i o n. Ac;::ord ing to thisvi ew i t isnotunr easona b le , then,that diffe r e nt sc i e nt i ficco mmun i ties wouldattach diffe ringva l ues tothe same piece of informat iondependingon its applic abilityto each ind ivi d u a l si t ua tio n. A certain fact or theory, which may be jUdgedto bequi t eus e f ul by onegroup, may no t be beneficialorevenaccu r a te toanot h e r group . The rationalist, on the otherhand, is more apt to believ e in theexistenceof thi s universalcriterion of va lue. Whereas
16
relativistswould havegreat difficulty in distinguishing betweenscience and non-sc ience, rationalists are capa ble of easilymaking the distinctionbyusing this criterion as a guide.
Hod s on (1982a,b) sug g e sts anotherfundamental area of differencein perspectiv e , noting thateso;e ntla lly the r e are thr e eways 1.1whi chone canvi e w thenatureof scientific kno wledge. The fi r s t is temed the~~!.view. In itscie nc eisseenasa persona l construc tio nconsistingof ind i vidualscientists ea ch wi t h hi s or her own be]Lefaand perspect i ve s. Sci e ntific knowle dgeis there fo reunique to theind ivi dual con c e r ned. The second, the obje ct iv i st view, sees scient i f ic knowledge assomethingwhich exists independent ofthe sci e ntist s or the persons tnvcave d wi t h it. Thi skno....le dgecansometimeslead to uninte ndedeffect s and can resultin situations of whi ch the original proponentswe r e unaware. The thirdvi ew, the con sensus view seessc i e nti fic knowle dge assomet h i ng which is accep tedby and subs ervient to thecommuni t y . Itsva l u e ca n be eval uated ac c o r di ng to the extenttowhi ch it me etsthe commun i t y 1s needs .
Chalm ers (1982) also presentsa some....hatsimilar fund amental bi fu r cat ion of views. If one con s iders sc i e nt ific kncwjedqe inthe waythat it is unde rs tood by ea c h individual , then i tmustbe conc l uded tJ'atthe exten t of that knowl e dge muchbe broad inde e d. Each indi vidual
17
likely interprets each pieceof info rmati on inawaywh i c h isuniquewithmoreconc e pts being fo rmed fromsimpler ones. If onewishes to ar r iveat theroot or fundame ntal ass umptions th e re f o re, onemay have tocon te ndwith the problemof infiniteregress. If morecomplex ide a s are built upon simpler ones andth eseintur narebuilton ones even mo r esi mpl ethen where doe s thepr oc e s s end? In order to dealwiththi spr obl em one wi ll have toeithe r have to assume thatthe mindis in it s e lf capableof constructing senseofthe known un i v e r s e and justifythe~
~or instead assumethat true informationcan onl y be crea tedfromsense data--ob s e rv at i o ns --a nd justifythe classical empiricisttradition.
Onecan,however , considerscientificknowledge in yet anotherway. Consider a fair lycomplex bod y of physical the o ry, say quant ummechanics. Thisbody of information is such that it cannot be summarizedbrie fl y . It can onlybe understoodwithi n acomplicatedframework of supporting conditi ons, te rms andobservations. I tis powerfulto the extent that it can result in quit eno ve l--eve nbi za r r e- - predictions, andcomplextoth e ext ent tha t many teams of scientistscan viewitand workwith itin qui tedifferent ways. Aviewwhichonly unde rstandsthis bod y of info rmat i on on anindividualbasis can easilybeseenas inadequate. One woul d tend instead to ascribeto this body of information an indi v i dua l charac t e r sothat when several diffe rent peop l e spe ak ofIIqu an tum mechanics"each knows
,.
thatthe othe r is speaking of a set bod y of knowledge, equallyaccessible to both. Th i s is no t to implY that both individuals must ascribethe exact same meaningto the theory. Twoindividualsmay have differe ntvi e ws of ath ird person. Itmustst i l l be conclUde dthat that thirdpe r s on stillhas his own individualexistenceeven thou gh thatas perceivedbyth etwooutsiders may be di f f e r e nt fo r the simplerea son thatbothhavelikely haddifferent experienceswi ththat thirdperson . In the sameway wemay asso ciatewitha theoryits ownindividualexistence a1 though we need not expect all pe ople to have the same inte rpre tationsof tha t existence.
stu!!ybgthe lIat,uraof Science
From ti me toti me science curriculum researchersha ve beencon cer ne d with identifyingst ude nt s ' understandings of the natureof scien tificpracticeand ofscientific knowledge. Met hodologies haveincludedthe useof questionnaires (Baruf a l d i: Bethel IiLamb, 1977: Lamb, 197 7 ; Rowell &Cawthron, 1982; Ande rse n , HartyIiSamuel, 1986;
saunders,1986),tests (Crumb, 19 65; Trent, 1965; Kimball, 1967: CareyIi stauss, 1968: 1970: Mackay, 1971;OgunniyiIi Pella, 1980: Ogunniyi ,1982: 1983;Lede rman, 1986a , b : Ai ke nhe a d , 1987;Aikenhead,Fleming Ii Ryan, 198 7; Lederma nIi Zeid ler,1987) and interviews (George, 1987; Fleming, 1988;
LedermanIiO' Malley, 1990 ). It isgl::nera llyagreed,
19
howev er, that instruments developed have all been flawed in one way or another (Aikenhead, 1973;Doran,Guerin&
Cavalieri, 1974:Lucas, 1975: Ma yer,1982:Aikenhead, rleming&Ryan, 1987). One difficulty is as s oc iated with researchers'differ ingunderstandingof the natureof science . Ano t he r isthe pos sibilityof what Mun by (1982) ref e r s to as thedoctrine of immaculate perc e ptio n,the poss ibilitythatstudents may interprettest items erroneouslyor otherwisein differentways than was intended.
Fewre s e a r ch ers ha ve adopted an approachwhi ch has involved interviewingstudents about the nature ofscience and its pr odu cts, despitethe fact thatscienc eeduc ators have been greatly pre-occup iedwith int erv iewi ngst ud en ts about their understandingof a range ofscientificconce pts.
Such researchha suncovereda divers i ty ofconceptua l understandings andmisunderstandi ng s , and tha '·.students typicallydevelop con cept ualfr a mewor ks (Dr i ve r {,Eas l e y , 1978). It seemsine v i tab l e that this phenomenon will ca r r y ov erintost u de nt s ' understandingof the nat ur eof science i tself. Despitethe existen ceofsuc h individual frameworks, st ucie nts typicallyoverl a p with re spect to parti cul armisconceptions (Griffithsand Preston , in press). Further thesemisconceptionsoften displ aysimil ar ity acr oss grade levels (Osborne&Cosgrove,198 3). He nc e awe ll~
defined approac hto determ iningconcept ions and misconceptions at one gradelevelma y well be applica b leat
20
other le vel s . The present study was conceived with this in mind.
Pure a ••ot the study
The study attempted to obtain qualitative datarelating to student views of science in order to furtherthe understanding of what students are actually thinking rather than to see whether they are adequate in light of what the philosophers think. Rather than focusing substantially on the prevalence of the concepts, an attempt was made to highlight thediversity of views which exist. Finally an attemptwas made to highlight specific instances in which chose conceptionsactuallydiffer from accepted models.
Res earch Qu e stions
The study focused on the following research questions: 1. How do studentsvi ew science in general?
b. How do students conceptualize change in science?
2. How do students believe scientific knowledge is obtained?
b. What are students' conceptionsof the nature of scientific knowledge?
3. What are students' conceptions of the natureof scientific theories?
- -- - - --- - - --
21
b. What arestudents ' conc e ptio ns of the fun c ti on of sc ient itic theorie s ?
4. What are st u de nts' conc ept ions of th e natureof scientific la ws ?
b. What are st ude nts ' conce pt ionsofthe func tionof scientificlaws?
D8111111tations ofstudy
It isnec e s s aryto delimitth e findi ngsof the study in severa lways.
1. The studywa s limit edto stude ntsinone particular age group. Spec ifi cal ly, the study foc us e d on "l e ve l three " stU de nts in a numberof schoo ls of the New fou n d landand Labra d orHigh School system. These studentsvere inthe i r la st or 185t but one year of highschoo l. Al though, stric t lyspeaking, results canno t be generalized to othergro ups, the r e isno reasontobe l ieve thatsimi lar resu l t s wou l dnot ha v e beenobtained forot he r gro ups .
2. As the conc eptsexaminedin th i s stUd y arebasi cally philosophica l inna t u r e and stude nts ne e d a certain amount ofmaturi ty to deal withthem in ameaningful fa shi on, it was decided that studyinga youngerage gr o up mig ht prod uce ran dom respo nses. Different re s u lts might be obtalne dwi t h younge r subjects.
22
3. Local geography also played a significant role in the selection of subjects for the study. As schools in the province of NeWfoundland are widely separated, efficiency dictated that thesample had to be chosen from schools in a fairly small geographicarea. Only stUdents attending school in central and eastern Newfoundland were inclUded in the study. It is possible that results are not generalizable beyond this group. However there is no reason to believe this group to be atypical of stUdents in North America in general.
4. In addition all SUbjects were interviewedbythe same investigator. As will be seen in chapter three, major efforts were made to minimize bias reSUlting from this but the possibility exists that other investigators would obtain different results.
1. Because the interview method was used, the sample size was limited to 32 SUbjects. While this number should be SUfficient to provide an adequate overall pictureof the stUdents' concepts, it is not large enough that the list of data obtained can be considered exhaustive. However, given the nature of the data sought, an
23
exhaustive list of responses is unlikely regardl essof samp l e size.
2. Reliability isan important factor in all research studies. As theinterview method wasusedin this st udy , reliability was quite difficult tocon t roL As willbe outlined in chapterthree. a number of ste ps weretakento obtainmax imum reliability withinthe chosenmethod.
24
Chapter 2 Reviewof the Literature
science'rchl ch. rs ' Copceptio n . of th e Nature ofBehne e
Rubba and Andersen (1978j describe the nature of scientific knowledge along seven dfnens Icns as follows:
b.oral: Scientific knowledge does not include directions forus e. Moral jUdgement is not inherent in the knowledge but must come from those who wish to apply it.
Cr.ative : scientificknowledgeis created by the human intellect.
Deve lopmental: Scientific knowledgechanges over time.
Thoughit may be falsifiedor modifiedit may never be proven and mustalways be viewed in itshi s t o ric a l context.
PersllloDious: Althoughcomplexity is not shunned, simplicityisalwayssought.
T.stabl.: scientificknowledge is sUbject to publi c empirical test. Va lidi t y ofre s ul t s may be supported by such tests.
unified: Althoughscienceisofte nseen as consisting of di s cre t e par tswitt>.namessuchas "Biology"or "Physics", it
25
is understood tha t th e s eareal l mere lyfacets of one large r sys tem i zedwhole.
Fro mthe s e dimensions Rubba and Andersen develope d the Nat u re of Scientific Knowl e dg e Scale (NSI<S), a likertscale instrument. The instrume nt wasde s i gn e d to see how students' views of scientificknowledge compare with the above. Resul tsfrom studiesinvolv ingthe use of the instrume nt to dateappear to indica tethatfe w students ' beliefs are in st r ictagreement wi th th e model. As the instrumentis an objectiveone, however, it does not point out what 'those alternative views are or to what extent or extreme the studentste nd to adhere tothe m.
Several of the stUdi esreported inthe literature showed concern overthe adequacyofte a ch e r sI conce ptionsof the natureof scien c e. Host of thisconcern was grounded inthe assumptionthat the way a teache r performshis or her duties depends onhi s or her view of science. Te a ch e r s who view science as a collect ionof facts would therefore tend to teach the subject as a collect ionof facts. Teachers who, on theothe rhan d , viewscienceas apr oc e s swou l d te nd to take a more enqui ry orientedapproach to instruction. In many cases it is simplyassumedthat thete a c he r s ' concept ionsof the natureof science wi llha ve a pr ofound effect on thos e of theirstud-ants. Evidence examined, however does not appearto suppo rt th i s idea.
26
In an intric atelydesignedstudy, Lederman&Zeid l e r (1987) attemptedto findout whethertherereallyis a rel ati on shipbetwee ntea chers ' under stand i ng ofthena t ur e of science and changes in students' concep tio ns ofthe nature of science. The Nature of scient i fic Kno:de dg e sc a le wasadmin i s te r ed to a sampl eof 18 te a che r s and thestudents inoneof eac h of their classesat thebeginni ng andend of a school te rm. Duringthe inte rveningtime, tr ained observersvisitedthe classes to record the interactionsin th e classr oom. Af t e r observations werecomplete, 44 classroomvar iableswere iden t i f i ed . Based on the resu lts ofNSKSand onthe observations, anattempt was made to see howthe variab lesdiscriminated between te ach e r s wi th differing conce ptionsof the natureofscientificknowledge.
None ofthe varia blesexcept "Down Time "was foundto di s criminate significantlyamongthehigh and low groups.
Lederman interpre tedthis as providingevidencethat teacher behavio r doe s not vary grea t lyas a resul t of conceptionsof the na t ure ofscience. The res ul t of th isstudyappears to be that for teache r s to simpl y hav e val i dcon cep t ionsofthe nature of science is not eno ugh to infl uencestudents . The s e concep tionsmust be bal a nc ed wit heffective ins truc tional strategiesinorder topromot e valitlconcepts in st uden ts. Several ot he r studies reported by Lederman&
Dr ug er (198 5 ) and Lederman (1986a,b) ind i cate similar re s ults .
27
Btiudtpts' cope.ptions of TheN,tunof Bc!ene.--Ouantitat!v.
8lllin
I t appears un like ly that stu d ents'concep tio nsof the nature of scienceare co ns ide rabl y in ag reemen t wit h the major philosoph icalpositions ofthe day. Onthe contrary, studies re porte dby Carey and stauss (1968, 1970 ) pr ovide evidencetha t students' vi e ws dif fersignificantlyfrom more accepted ones. More recent studies re port e dby A.ndersen (1986) and by Lederman (1986b) indica tethat,al thoughthe differe ncesmaynot be as gr e a t as once thoug ht ,st ud e nts ' conceptio ns sti l l differ significantlyfrom the accepted models. unfortunate ly, these studiesdo not provide in formationindicatingin what wa ythe students' positions differed fromthe accepted models.
Evidenceexi s t s tha t st udents'conceptions canbe influencedby the courses they take. Klopferand cooley (1963) , usinga la rg era nd om sample,discoveredthat those st udentswhoha d been exposed tothe "history of science"
cases performed significantlybetter on theTest On unde rsta ndi ngScience (TOUS)than didun tre a t e d students.
Howeve r , two studieswhichappe ared shortly after produced conflictingevidence inthisregard. Tr e nt (1965) attempted to find outwhetherstudentstaki ng PSSC physics understood th enatu r e of sciencebetter thandidstudentsenrolled in more tradi tionalcourses . The investigationcontrolled for menta l ability andprior knowl e dgeof science. The two
2.
groups consistedof students in the two t}'fles ofcou rses in 52 schoolsrandomly selected from schoolsteachingeachof the two types of sciencecurricula. Taus and the otisQuick Sc o r i n g Mental Ability Testweread mi n ist e red. Analys i sof va ria nc e betweenthe sc hoolmean scores onTOUBfo r the two type s ofcu r ricu l asho wed no si g n i fica n t differenc es,thu s indicating thatthepssecurriculum wa s equ a l l yef fective in attainingst u de nt sc i e nc e understandingasmea s ur e d by TOUS.
Trent po inted ou t thatsomedi ffe ren ce sdid occurbetwe en different scho ol s utilizingsimilarcu r ricu l a , pos s i bly indi c at ingthe pre s enceof other factors , suc has te ac h e r attitude andteaching st y l e.
Evidence some wh a t inco nfl ict with Tr e nt' s stUd y was offeredby Crumb (1965) . The res Ultsindicated that st u dentsst Udy i ng PSSCphysicsdidinfact ob ta i nbetter scores on TOUSthandid stude n tsstud y i n g a traditi onal physicsco u rseal t ho u gh the fa ctthatthesamp lewas not random rai ses some doubt abouttheovera llva:"'idity of th e re s ults. Howeve r Crumb di d statethat"theirdistribu t i on by sch oo l siz e, typeand loc at ionis bel i e v ed to be quite representat i v eof those in the area" (Cr umb, 1965, p2 49) . As thesetwo reports diffe r in findi ng swhile rema i ni ng basicallysi mil a r in design , it is diffic ulttosayfo r certain whatamo r e ge neraltrend wouldbe. Both st udies we r e fairlyregional. Eac hsamp l e,thoughquite la rge, was only sel ect e d from one particularareainthe uni t e dst a t es.
2.
It ispossiblethat findingswould tend tovar yfromregion to reg i on ac c o r d i ng to othe rvariables exte r na l tothe trea tments. Bothresearch ersexpressthe belie f that courses can make adiffere nce inst ude nts ' conceptions.
Several other st u di essupp o r t this. Ba r u f al d i , Bethel &
Lamb (1977) . Bi11eh &Hassan (19 7 5) and ogunniyi(1983) all foun dsigni ficant course effectson te a c h er's ' and prospectiveteache rs ' concep tionsofthena t ure of science.
Al thoug h thosestudies were concernedwiththeconc e pt i o ns held by pre-serviceteache r sand ot he r universitystudents, i tis not al toge therunreasonable to assumetha t similar ef fec ts wo ul d be found for highschool students. No further pub lishe d studiesappear to be availablein this area, howeve r.
In society ingenera l there maybe an unwritten assumption that olderpersonsare morephilosophical than youngerones. It also appearstobe aasuned bymany writers th at older pe r s on spos s e ssbet te r conceptions than dothei r youngercounterparts. Ma ck a y (1971) investigated the way tha t stude nts ' conceptions about the natureof science chang e over ti me. In Ma c ka y' s st Udy, TOUS was administered to ara ndo msampl e of1556 scie ncestudentsin gradesseven to ten . The tes t was re-administe redto 1203 of those stude ntsat the end of theschool year. comparisonsof the me a n sco resindica ted that st ude ntsdid improve overthe school. year, as there-test scoremeanswere signi ficantly hi g her. Furt hermore ,evidencewas provided that students
30
conceptionsimp r ov e d sig n i f icant lywithagoe asth eme an sore s of students in upper grades ....ere signIficantlyhig he r thanth os e of thele s s advancedstudents.
n w n b' conce p tion . otthe Hatun of &e ience- -oualitativ e
~
Aninv est i gAt i o n undertakenby Rowel l an d Ca wt h r on (1982) attemptedto shed more ligh t on th e questio nof stude nts ' conceptions . A questio nn a ire was admi nisteredto 300stu.dents andstaffof severalAus trali anUnivers i tie s . Fromthere s u l t softhi s questionnaireit was concluded that mos t science-orientedstude nts teste d tendedto agreewith the more deductivePopperianmodel thanwithth e socially orien tedKuh nia nmod e l. Th isstUdy wa s unfortunately flawed insevera l respects. Its findings mus t betherefore inte rp r e t ed withcaution . No validityor reliability data we r ere po rted for th e instrulte nt used . In lac' there vasno indicati ongiven that anattempt hadbe e nmad e to ob tain th i s infonJIation at all. As thewh o l estUd y was based on this ins trullent, thevalid i t y ofthest ud y is also ques tio nable . In additionthesamplewas non-ran do m, CO" ;isting mainlyof volu nt ee rs. Henceit may not be representati v e an d the re sults may not begenerali z able.
Aqualitative st ud ywa s reportedbySa u nd e r s (1986) in which information was obtai nedon the natureof scienc e fro m students, professorsand te a c hers. Subjectswere asked to
31
respond to thequestion"Whati.sciebce?" The re sults were grouped andcate g o rized. It wasnotedthat tea chersand profes sorstendedtodes cribesc i en ceas both pro c e s sand prod uc t whez-ees the studentstendedto prevteeonly limited ans werssuc h as "sc ience isthe studyof .••" It wa s not ed that7%of the teachersand pr o f e s sorsde s c ri bed science as knowl e d geal one whe reas
2:'
of thestude nts des cribede.cLence as consis t i ngotbothproce ssandknowl ed g e. Saunders ' st ud y isnotwithout flaws . Essaytestsare no t very reli abl e andare oftendifficult to interp ret. Saunders' mode l wa s al s o a ve r y limitedone ,consi sting of onl y two parts; kno wl edge and proc e s s. The study isnone t heles s important asit showsthat students ' concept i o n softhe nature of science ar egeneral in na t ure an dtha t theymay , wi thtime , become mor e pre cis e. Finallyth e studypr o vides somedataabout what te achersand students actuall ythi nk aboutscie n ce rathe r thanchecking for ama tch againsta co ns t r uc ted model of thena tureof scienc e .A cas e studyof a tee na ger ' svi ew ofthena tu r e of sc i e nc e , reported byGeor ge (1987), revealed much qualitativ e data. In particUl ar, the sUbject int erviewe d app e a red tosee scie nceas truth , thus indicati nga view whic htendedtowardstherealist vie....de s c ribedearlie r. Some evidencewasalsogive n whichindi catedthatthe subjec t's vie....s were so mewha t simi lar toseveral of the sc i e ntist icviewsdescri be dby Nad eau andDesaute ls (1984 ) . As thiswas aca s e study, the resultsare notge ne r ali zable
32
al t ho ugh thestudywa s usefu l inthat the ri c h qualitative data indicated several areas fo:':futurestudy.
Recent studiesbyAikenheaci (19S?),Fleming(1987), Ryan (1987) andAi kenhe a d, Fla mi n g and Ryan (1987) also provide qualitativedataonstudents' conceptions. These stUdies , Which werebutpar t of a much larger one, involved administeringtheViewsonSc ienceTechnologySocietyScale (VaSTS). aninstrume nt developedby the autho rs ,to a stratifiedsample of 10800 graduatinghighschoolstudents.
In the study.students wereasked to take one of several postti a ns on eachof several aspects of scientific knowledge,scientists, and scienceand society, and were alsorequired to write a paragraphexplainingthe i r reasoning. The studyshowed a great diversity ofst ude nts ' views and providedind i catio nthat a broad rangeof explana tionsexistedfo rthos e views.
unfortunatelythere was some evidence that the podtion tha t the students tookwithre s pe c t totheirvi e ws of the natureof science was not the one in which they actually believed (Aikenhead,1987,p476). Students often expressed oneview and in justifying i t ecta,"'l lyprovided contradictoryst ate me nts or statements which indicated bel iefin another view . A certainamount of im.-nediate fe e d ba c k froma re s e arc he r may have alertedthe stud e nt to this fact. The limitationspos ed by forcingthe students to adopt one partiCUlar expressionover anothermay have also
33
preventedthemfrom fullyexpressing whatever conceptionsor misconceptions theyhe l d. Thismay havebe e n due to the fa c t that students were required to providebriefwritten explanations. Hence there s ults of the study may have been affectedbythe students'ability to put their thoughts on pa pe r in the timeal 1ot~ed. Aikenhead, Flemingand Ryan (1987, pISS) recommendedfu r the r studies to providegreater clarificationon,as wel l asth esour c e of,studen ts ' beliefs and the firmnesswith whichth e y heldthos e beliefs.
Semi-structuredinterviewswererecommended to fac ilitate this. In addition, the authors indicatedtheirbeliefs of the directionsin whichfuture studies should take:
Thepreci sion of communication (thegoodness of fit) between a students' paragraphand VOSTS
"student position"ismuc h greater tha nthe precision of communication betweenastudents' paragraphand hisor he r "agree"or "disagree"
response. If one objectivelysc o r e d theVOSTS responses,one ....ouldsacrificeprecision onthe altarof quantitativemethodology. (p156)
Fleming (1988), in a follow-upstUdy, surveyedthe views held by 200ch e mi s t r y majorsin all four yearsof an unde r g r a duate prog ramat a Canadian University. Responses to theVOSTS statementsin writ tenparagraphform ind ica t e d that the vi e....s heldby those studentsdiffered on ly slightly from thos e held by highschool students. Theuse of seml-
34
structuredinterviews in thisstudyals o provideda good deal of insight into thevi e....s heldby those samest ude nts.
Many of thestud entswere foundto equatescie nc ewiththe creationandverificationof factsalthough asi gn ifica nt numberindicatedthe irbeli efthat, insc i e nce, fa ctsdo not ex ist. Like thestudentinterviewedbyGe o rge (1987 ), in manycase s , sUbj ect s wer-efound to associ ate mission- orientedscience with medical research. Inaddi t i o n , the results ind i cat e dtha t the stUdentsdidnottendto takea critical stand , butinste a d acceptedscienti f ickno wl e dg e as faith.
ot her than the above st ucU es , little more tha nske tchy dataexiston the natureof students' co nc e p tions. Byand large, stude nt s ' co nc e pt i o ns donot appea r to be aswell developedas thoseof theirteachers. Giventha t most student ' s cog n i t ive abilities are inva r i o us st agesof development, it isunrea s o nabletoexpect th e llltohave soph istica tednot i onsof the nature of science as such conceptions wo uldrequirea high degreeofab s tractio n.
Overalltheamount of information availa b l e on thestudents' vf eve ofthe nature ofscie nt i f ic knowle dg eis sma ll. Given the gr eatco nc ernexpres s e d abouttheimporta nc e of an understandingof the natureof the sc i e nt ific ente r prise , this isindeedsurprising.
35 Research xe t.ho do l og ie,
Two general methods have been used to study misconceptions related to a number of scientific concepts. These methods will now be reviewedfor their general usefulness for the present study. Anderson&Karrquist (1983). Ben Zui (1 9 8 6 ).Doran (1972) and Gardner (1986) have all utilizedtechn iquesbasedon the useot questionn aire s and have su c c e e d e d in deter1\liningthe prevalenceof so me common mi sconceptions . such techniques , hcvever, require th a t some knowledge be known beforehand about the natureof the misconceptions in order to be successfuL A major advantage of questionnaires ....; that a large sample size becomes feasible. Ins1tuations where the generalnature of th e misconceptionsis relativelyunknown, st ud i e s based on intervie....ingtechniqueshave provedsuccessful. Hackling&
Garnett (1985), Arnaudin&Mintzes (1985),Osborne and Gilbert (19BO) as well as Watts (1983) are among those researcherswho have successfullyutilized such methods.
Interviewi.ng procedures.
A number of data recording techniques areava ilabl e. Simpson and Arnold (1982), for example, utilized note tak ing as the principal recordingtechnique. This methodresults in reasonably briefand detailed accounts of the interview but also ha s several disadvantages. I tis particularly susceptibleto bia son beh alfof the intervie....ex, Note
J6
tak i ng cannot success f u l l y showsUbtle differe nc e s impo s ed bythe respo nde nt's intonation . Inadditiontherealways re ma i ns the pos s i b il ityth a t wha t is re c o r de d is inaccurate orinco mple t e.
Several investigato rs. incl udingHackling&Garnett (19 85) andWa tts(1983), ta p edth e ir interv iews. Theus e of audiotapes offerssignificant improve me nts over note taking. Intonat i on is also re c o rd ed, thus leavi ng the investigatorfree at a late rti meto take such factors as co n fidencein one's answe r into account. The ta p e d inte rviewmay also be checkedagain by the same investigator or by another to check reliabil ityorto check for errors of omi ssion or commission onbe hal f of theinve sti gato r. The useofvideotapeha s also been foundhe l p f u l inseveral st udieslncludingthoseby Aguirre&Eri c ks o n (1984)and Erickso n(1983). Video offers the additional advantage of al lowi ng the investigato r to see the SUbjectsworking. This te chni qu e woul d prov ees pe c i all y beneficial if theinterview ....ere centered aro u ndsome particUlar ta s ks.
Researchersha ve differingopinionsabout the level of st ru c t u re that shouldbe imposed on the interview situation . AsPosn er andGertzog(1982) no t e , the purpose of the exerciseis to t;lain in f ormationfrom the stUde nts, not the reverse. For thi s re a s on somere s e arch e r s such as Erickson (1983 ) le ave the intervie wunstructu red . othe r researchers li keAr na ud in and Hi nt ze s (1985) as ....ellas Snei de r and
37
Pulos (198 3 ) . in th einterestof con s erv i ng reliability , ado p t a mo restruc tu r e dstyl e. Al l re s e arc he r s attempt to maintai n fle xibil ity. The struc tu reisus e d mainly as a gui de. Whensituati on s wa rrant , there s e a r c h e r is permi tted to seek clarification.
Anumbe r of particular interviewing te c hni que s also exist.Champagne, Klopfer , De s e n a and squires (198 1) describe ConSATI a method for discovering the ways in which students structure various concepts . Basica l lythe method inv olv e sthere s e a r ch e r presentinga number of conceptnames to subjects. The names are typed on cardsandthe student is toldtoarrangethe m inSOme logicalorder andto explain there a s o n i ng used. The researche r has a sheetwhich contai ns allthe concept names andconnectsthem together with line s in thesa mewa ythe studentdid. The reasons the st ude nt providesarewritten onthe lines. The methodha s beenused successfu l lybyth os e authorsin showing howthe struct ureof conceptsin geology change wi t h instr uct ion .
A technique labeledthe Int ervie w AboutIns t a nc e s (IAI) has beendescribedanduse dby severa l di f f e r entresearchers inclUdi ngOsborneandGilbert (1980) andwatts (1983). The technique involve s basicallytwo phases. Firstthe SUbject ispre s e nt e dwith a ser iesof cardswhicheither do or do no t ill ustratea concept. Next the interviewer, by asking a seriesofprob ing questions, at temptsto determi ne thedepth of theSUbject'sunderstand inqof that concept. Osborneand
3.
Cosgrove(1983)modified the IAr in an Interv iewingAbout Events tec hn i que wh ich involve s the sUbject being presented with a series of events, suchas wa t e r mel t ing . The sUbject is then asked, through aseries of probing que s t i o n s , to explain theev en t in as much deta il as possible. The authorshave used thete c hn ique to showthat sUbjects can have varyingconceptions of change of state.
Analys isof data.
As recordedinterviewdata is difficu l t tointerp~e t di r e c t l y, most researchers re d u c e theirinterviews to writ tentranscripts. Most ten d to favour verbatim tra ns cr i pt f', althougha number ofot he rtechniquesare available . PInes, Novak, Pos n e r " VanKirk (1978) advocate para ph rasingthe quest i o ns and resp o n s e s intoa series of decla rativestatementsby the su bject. Thisproc e d ur e has, bc vev er- , been cri ticized as beingflawe d in tha t it may tend to "pu t wordsinthe studen t 's mouth",especiallywhenthe inte rvie wer asks very specific questions which requireonly simpleyes/no responses.
Althougheasier to interpre tthanrawinterview re c o r di ngs, transcriptsare stillexceedingly difficult to interpretas the y containso much unstructured information.
To fur therreduce the data,Er ickson(1983). Arnaudin (1985) and others ha ve uti lized conceptualinve nt o rie s. This te c hniqu ere qu ire s the researcher to examine the transcripts and attemp t to extract allcon ceptsand/or misconceptions
39
expressed during the interview . In thi sway, a faI r l y lengthy transcriptcan be reduced to ase t of fa i r l Ywell- definedconc e p tsormis conceptions .
8uamary of Major R. . .arob intostuOtnt" conoeption, of the Nature of Science
Students ' conce ptio nsof thena tur e of scienc e are unlikelyto be in strict agreementwiththoseof the major philo sophers (ca rey&St a uss, 1968, 1970 :Anders on , 19 8 6 : Lede rma n , 19 8 6b). A wide div ersity ofvi ewp oints and concep t ionsdoexist. Howeve r thoseconcept ions heldby students ar e li kelytobe some wha t va gu eandundeve l o ped (Ai kenhe a d, 1987; Fleming, 19 8 7:Ryan,19 87 ;Ai ke nh e ad.
Fleming and Ryan, 1987). Res earch indicates thattho se concepti onscanbemod ifiedbyappropriate instruction (Baruf ald i.Bethel &Lamb,1977; Bille h. 1975;ogun niy i, 1983). Addi tiona l l y itapp ea rs that st ud e nts'ooncep't.Lons of the nature of sciencetendtobeco me moresoun d and reason ableasst ud e ntsmat ur e (Mackay, 1971 ). It is unc l e a r exactlyhowfirmly thosecon ceptions are heldalthough rese archon othe r scient i f ic conc e ptsindic ates tha t st ude n t sar e likelytoho l d tenac iouslytoexisti ngco nc epts (Driver, 1978).
One oftheearlybarriers tofruit f ulres e arc hon st ude n ts ' conception s of the natureofsciencewas the lac k
40
of agreem en t among philos op he r s onwha t wasthena t ureof scien ce. AslIuchearly re s ea r ch wasba s ed up o nmodelswhich hadbeen cons tructedbythere s earche rs, the findI ngsof manyst udi e smustbeinterp re ted wit h cautionas th ey lItay only apply specifically to eleme nts of themod e l s used ratherth a n tothepr a cti e e sc i en ceas a whole. Howev er . as Dusc hl (1985) andHod s on (1985, 19 88) nc ee, muchof the ear lier disaq r e e ment hasbeendeal t wIthandmoremutually ag r e e ab lemodelsexist eve n thoughsome differencestil l rema in aswa s pointedout in Chapter one.
Althoughqualitativedataha v e beenmadeava ilable by st ud I e s conductedby sever a lresea rcherslnclud:.ng Aike nhead. FlemingandRyan,.. numbe r of questionson the na t ure ofst ude nt s ' concep tions remain. These authors reeo_e n d the us eof se.i-stru ct u red interviewsin futu re stud i e s inorder to obtain mor edetailed information onthe natureof stUdents' co nc e ptions. The pre s ent stUdy attempts todo th i sbyexaminingin detaI l the be liefsofa sample of stude nts in their senior yearof high school. The following cha pte r de s c r i be sin detail the procedure s used.
41
Chapter 3 ResearchDesign
Consi derationof available data-col l ec t i o n procedures suggestedtwo pot entiallyprofitab leap proaches. These were elther to develop an d administe r anap propriate
que s t i onn a i r e or todevelopand administeranappropriate int e rv i e w sched ul e . Use of a question naire ha d the major advantage tha t it could sUbstant ially reduce the cost of the stUd yby makingitunnecessaryfo r the rese a rcher to be presen t. Howeverit also hadthe disadvantagetha t answers thusobtained alsodependto a great ex tent on the studen ts' abil i t y toexpres s themselves in writtenform . As manyhi gh school studentsare seriouslydeficie n t in thi s ar ea, results obtainedinwrittenform maynot acc u r at e ly mirror stUde nts ' actualconceptions. In addi tion , essay it el\ls woul dnot allowthe researcher thefle x i bil i ty required in probing subjects'thoughts in or der toseekclarificatio n . Overal l it was felt thatus eof a questionnairewou ld inc r e a s e reliabilitybutdecreaseval idity. Hence an inte rv i e wpr o c edur e wa sused.
In addition, to facilitate thelate r analysis ofthe da t a , allinte r vi e ws weretape recorded . Detailed note-
42
ta k ing such as that donebysimpson andArt ,old (19 82 ) , was not utilized forseveralre a s on s. Theseincluded susceptibility to bias onbeha l fof the inte rvie wer, inabilityto successfullysho wsUbt le differ en ces which ma y arise from the respondent'sintonation and the pos sibility th atwhat was recordedmightbe in accu ra te or incomp lete.
Dueto theti me-c ons uming nat ureof intervie ...studies . sample sizewasstrictlylimited. Thirt y -twosUbjectswere involved. All inter viewswere audio ta p e d. Videotape was not utili ze d as thebulkof the interviews centeredaround theoretica l ide a s and theinv e s t i g ator cculdsee no additional benefits arisingfrom actual l yseeingwhatthe participants mightdo while thinking.
Procedure--Data Gathering
The intgrv iew gui de
Researchershave differing opinions on the level of structuretha t shouldbe impos e d on the intervie wsituation.
As Posner and Gertzog (1982) not e, the purpose ofthe exercise is to gainin f o rmati on fr o mthestudents, notthe revers e. Fo r the purpose of thisstudy, a semi-structured interviewwas deemed to bethe most appropriateapproa ch. Dueto the inherent broadnessofth etopi c,to o much structurewould have resultedin a too nar ro w ra nge of ideas. Ho we ve r for the samere a s o n , to o lit t lestructure
43
would hav e re sul ted intoo much data . The firs t stageof the study ther efore involvedthe prepa r ationof an interview schedule. As a comp l e t e l y struct uredin tervie w wa s not des i r e d , questionswere of a genera l na t ur eand were designed to elicitas muc h studen t respons e as poasLb j e, Additional promptssuch as"t e l l •• •or . uout ••oilor"ll'bat doyouIIB a ft vb enJOUsay ••oilor ev e nsimply"Why ?" were used as necessary. Ace r t ain amount of overlapwas allo....ed betwe e nthe questionstoallowfor pos si ble tr i an gu l a t i onas ame a ns toal l o w the researcher tocheckfor relia b il i t y . Overall , the guidewas vi ewedas somewhatflexi ble in na tu re . Wheresituat ions warranted,ro olll was leftfor clarification.
A twostag eappr oach ...as usedin pilotingthe guide.
The initialdraftof theguideWBSte stedon fiverandomly selectedstude nts fromanall-qradeschool. Hoteswere taken duringtheinterviewand the recordingswere later checkedto identi t y speci fi c problells . Inpartic ular an effortwas mad etoensu r e that as fe w unnecessary cuesas possiblewer e provid edbythe questions. The guide was re v i s e d inlightof thefindings andwas againpiloted on three students rando mlychosen from ano the r all-grade sc h oo l. As SUbsequ e nt analys is of the record i ngs resulte d in no furtherrevi s i o n inthegu ide, i twas jUdged sa tis factoryand ready for use.
I'
.. . .
..
The final formof the gui de consisted ofquestions groupedin fourmajorcl u s ters . Thegui de is rep resen tedin Append i x A. The first cluster ccmtaineda set of seven questions of a generalna t ur e and wasde s i gn e dto obtainthe sUbjects' conceptionsof the scientifi centerp r isein general. In particular, theque sti on s in this sectionwere designed to establish studentviewsof the domain of science,studentviews of scienti ficme t hodand studen t views ofcha ngein science. Thesecondclustercontained questionson the nature of scientificfacts . SUbjectswere asked "What is a factin sc i en c e? l. an d....ere thenasked to pr ov i de an example. The remaining que s tio nsinthatclus t e r attemptedtoascertaintherelationbet ween that fa c t and the scienti ficenterprise in general aswe ll as to find whet herSUbjects cons ideredscienti ficinforma tion to be questionableand tentativeor absolute. The natureof scientific theorieswas investiga tedby the third clus te r.
SUbjects were aske d"Whatisa tbeory1"andwere then requiredto pr ovid eanexampl eof one. The remainder ofthe questio nswere desi gned to elicit SUbjects' responses on the rel at i onsh i pbe t wee n theories and ecdence, Inan effortto determinewhetherstudents' views were fundamentally instrumentalist or real ist ,a pair of quest ionswereasked. SUbjectswere firstasked what the or i e s ar eused for and thenwhet her they aremodels or realistic descriptions. In the fourth cl us te r SUbjec tswere firstaske d "Whatismeant bya scienti fi claw?" Thosewho successfully prov i ded a
