There remains but little knowledge on micro-level factors driving popular opinion on inward FDI. In his research, Hanusch (2012) used prior Afrobarometer data to focus on perceptions of China’s role in Africa in connection with support for human rights and democracy. He found strong evidence that respondents who are concerned about human rights have less favorable attitudes towards China. Larue (2019) used the Afrobarometer data to analyze if individual affinity for economic, social, and cultural rights is an important indicator of individual attitudes toward China’s engagement in sub-Saharan Africa. He found only little support for this connection and emphasized that people’s attitudes towards China’s influence are economically
driven. Sautman and Hairong (2008) attempted to determine if there is variance in people’s perceptions based on age or gender. They concluded that ‘people over 55 were 9.6 per cent more likely to think China’s policies more harmful than those of western countries and 4.4 per cent more likely to view China as potentially harmful to Africa, compared to those under 25; males were 14% less likely to see China’s policies as harmful than female respondents’ (Sautman/Hairong 2008: 734). These findings are interesting but have little explanation force, as gender and age do not say much about why people are more likely to support China’s engagement in their countries. As FDI inflow is also a consequence of the increasingly globalized world, socioeconomic factors should be relevant to explanations of the differences in how people perceive China’s active role in Africa. For example, in contrast to modernization theories, the aforementioned dependency theories have argued that FDI can have negative effects on the distribution of incomes (Adams 2009).
Globalization has caused winners but also losers. Academics and policymakers have expressed concern that increasing globalization – both in the form of FDI and international trade – is causing dramatic changes in labor demand in the developed world (Driffield/Taylor 2000). This means that demand for unskilled workers has been and will continue to decline. While they were referencing highly developed western countries there, the concept can be transferred to developing countries as well. Before the 1950s, FDI was concentrated in the primary sector and resource-based manufacturing. ‘The availability of natural resources was the most important host-country determinant of FDI. In the 1980s and 1990s, this market orientation was continually shifting toward services and technology-intensive manufacturing (Noorbakhsh et al. 2001: 1594/1595). The consequence of this new orientation of
For the case of China, this trend is even more dramatic, as – in contrast to western companies – Chinese companies ‘tended to keep local recruiting to a minimum and recruited mostly their own professionals and laborers’ (Zhao 2014: 11). For example, Chinese companies in Angola hired 70–80 percent of its workers from their home country. The reason for this is that China itself continues to have a problem with
underemployment, especially in rural areas (Zhao 2014). That the strategy to counteract this problem has been to send Chinese workers to African countries is thus not particularly surprising. Another reason why low-skilled workers might tend to be more critical toward China is poor working conditions. African workers in Chinese MNCs often work under dangerous circumstances, especially in the mining industry, and they work for exceedingly low wages. In 2008, mining workers went on strike in the Chinese-owned Chambishi copper mine and fought for higher wages:
‘About 500 miners demonstrated and stones were thrown to members of management of !the mining company, who wanted to talk to the miners’ (van Dijk 2009a: 171). Another aspect was demonstrated by Alden (2005). He emphasised that African domestic industry sectors lose from the spread of Chinese influence on African markets. He argued that ‘the balance of trade favors China as local industries and merchants have been hit hard by the flood of inexpensive Chinese wholesale and retail shops used to establish networks to sell goods’ (Adisu et al. 2010: 5). Tull (2016) added that local manufactures cannot compete with Chinese manufactures, as they have low production costs and market prices (Adisu et al. 2010). Traditional primary production sectors in African countries have been weakened as well, according to van Dijk (2012a). Harrison and Aitken (1999) found that foreign investments can generate crowding out effects, as it ‘increases in foreign ownership negatively affect the productivity of wholly domestically owned firms in the same industry’
(Harrison/Aitken 1999: 616). This problem is especially visible in the textile production sector. Today, most textile manufacturers in Africa are of Asian origin (Xiaoyang 2014). Asian countries, including China, are ‘shaping the development of the whole cotton-textile-apparel value chain in southeast Africa’ (Xiaoyang 2014: 6).
The African manufacturers market share has been reduced with China’s rapid growth of low-cost textile production (Agri Eneji et al. 2012). Selling consumer products in general has become more important to China: ‘The Chinese have developed a network of small Chinese traders, which assures sales in regions where other salesmen don’t come anymore’ (van Dijk 2009b: 12). Similar trends can be observed in the agricultural sector where Chinese investments have increased significantly in recent decades (Buckley 2013). Many researchers have seen great potential in China’s engagement in the agricultural sector, as it may help to improve domestic firms’ practices and technical knowledge. That said. ‘it risks increasing the vulnerability of traditional subsistence farmers and smallholders’
(Bräutigam/Xiaoyang 2009: 687). All these factors suggest that traditionally important labor markets in African societies have been challenged by the increasing
Chinese presence. Consequentially, it is assumed that low-skilled workers benefit less from Chinese FDI in their countries and are thus are more critical toward China’s engagement.
H2: Low-skilled workers have more critical perceptions towards the growing economic influence of China in their countries than workers with higher
skilled jobs.
Connected to this first hypothesis is the level of education, which is assumed to influence popular opinion as well. It is argued that the degree of education might be relevant as well; especially in developing countries, education level is connected with how close citizens are to the political establishment. Pandya (2016) found increasing support for inward FDI with a higher level of education. This connection can be explained again with globalization theories. According to Gabel (1998), human capital, which includes education, is positively correlated with support for economic integration. He based the influence of human capital on the ability of individuals to survive in a highly competitive labor market that involves a liberalized economic policy. As FDI flows are increasingly spent on capital – industries that are both knowledge and skill-intensive – well-educated people become increasingly attractive for multinationals (Pfeffermann and Madarassy 1992; Noorbakhsh et al. 2001). One more important point to make is that education in sub-Saharan Africa is still underdeveloped; disparities in these societies are high (Majgaard/Mingat 2012):
Almost 60% of youth between the ages of about 15 and 17 are not in school (UIS Unesco 2020). Thus, education level in sub-Saharan Africa can say much about the social status of a society. It is assumed that Africans with a higher educational background are more positive toward China’s growing economic and political influence in their countries.
H3: Citizens with a lower educational level have a more critical attitude toward the growing political and economic influence of China in their countries than
higher-educated citizens.
Another important driver might be the conditions in which people live. Chinese FDI is often concentrated in specific regions – the so-called special economic zones (SEZs) where China conducts massive investments (World Investment Report 2019). These zones are often located in urban or urbanizing areas. In Zambia, for example, where
China seeks copper and other raw materials, most of the investments flow exclusively to said Copperbelt region. Other regions in the country, in contrast, receive nothing. In the fourth hypothesis, it is assumed that people living in urban areas are more positive toward China’s engagement than people living in rural areas.
H4: People living in urban have a more positive attitude towards China’s increased political and economic influence than people living in rural areas.
In addition to the places where people live and work, individual economic and social status is likely incredibly important as well. Aligning with the consequences of globalization that low-skilled workers and low-educated people benefit less from inward FDI, it stands to reason that individual economic situation also plays an important role. Melgar et al. (2012) found empirical evidence showing that people with a low personal income tend to support protectionist measures more than people with higher incomes. However, income as an objective indicator has shown to be an insufficiently accurate measurement, as wellbeing can be perceived individually.
Individual living conditions can be defined as ‘the individual possession of resources in the form of money, goods, services, mental and physical energy, social relations, physical security etc. by means of which the individual person may control and consciously direct his/her living conditions in so far as the necessary arenas are available’ (Anderson/Poppel 2002: 201). It is assumed that people who rate their current individual living conditions as good have more positive perceptions of China’s growing political and economic influence in their own countries.
H5: People who rate their current individual living situation as good are more positive toward China’s engagement than people who perceive their living
conditions as bad.
Individual living conditions are not the only factors important in shaping people’s attitudes towards China; individual perception of the economic situation in a country and how it has changed can be a relevant driver as well. Representatives of economic voting theories have argued that voters' perceptions of economic conditions are related to their political attitudes. In his research, Gabel (1997: 92) concluded ‘that it is the ‘subjective’ economy, as perceived by EU citizens, rather than the ‘objective’
economy, as measured by economic indicators, that influences support for European integration.’ Beaulieu et al. (2005) found out that people in Latin-American countries
in which GDP growth was higher tend to be more supportive of trade. Additionally, Hudson et al. (2004) highlighted that a good economic situation in a country increases the probability for support of EU membership in Eastern Europe.
Following this argumentation, it is expected that the subjective perception of the country’s economic situation also affects people’s attitudes toward China’s growing engagement.
H6: Citizens who think their country’s economic situation has improved during the last year have more positive attitudes toward China’s increased political and
economic influence than people who have not perceived significant improvement.
All six hypotheses are tested in a quantitative analysis using large N data from the Afrobarometer social survey. The database and the methodological approach will be explained properly in the next chapter.