Low-educated people see China more positively

In contrast to the skill level variable, education had a highly significant (p ≤ .001) and quite strong effect on people’s attitudes toward China. However, not as postulated in the third hypothesis, the effect was negative (r = - 0.0381, - 0.0342, -0.0353). People who had a low-level educational background tended to be more positive toward China’s growing economic and political influence in sub-Saharan Africa. These findings are very surprising, as most prior empirical studies found positive correlations between the individual level of education and support for neoliberalism or economic internationalism. In the case of Europe, people in the highest educational group are much more positive toward further European integration, while citizens of the lowest educational backgrounds tend to highly oppose European integration (Gabel/Whitten 1997). The argumentation behind that is quite similar to skill level: more educated citizens tend to be better able to survive in competitive labor markets (Gabel 1998). However, as our results show, these concepts are not fully transferable to the African continent and especially to the perceptions of China’s increasing investments. Evidently, effects of individual education and skill level on how people rate globalization development can be vastly

different or even opposite in developing countries. That is exactly what Jäkel and Smolka (2011) found in their research paper. They evaluated high support for international trade in poor countries like Senegal, Kenya, and the Ivory Coast. While they found high support for international trade among high-skilled respondents in the United States, the effect was the opposite in Ethiopia, the poorest county in their sample: ‘In Ethiopia a one-point increase in individual skill exerts a negative and significant impact on free trade preferences in the vicinity of one-and-a-half percentage points’ (Jäkel/Smolka 2011: 15). The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem argues that ‘free trade would increase demand for the country’s comparative-advantage goods and thereby shift employment toward the domestic industries where labor is most productive’ (McCulloch 2005: 3). In other words, free trade stimulates the abundant sector while it affects the scarce sector negatively.

Graphic 12: Fitted plot – highest education on people’s support for China

Notes: The x-axis shows the respondents’ highest levels of education. 1 means no education or some informal education, 2 means primary school and some higher school, 3 means some secondary school / high school and 4 means some university, university completed.

Following this argument Jäkel/Smolka (2011: 5) found that ‘in human-capital-abundant economies, high-skilled individuals favor free trade, while low-skilled individuals oppose free trade. In labor-abundant economies, this conflict of interests is reversed’. The economy in sub-Saharan Africa is still labor-abundant, as agriculture remains the main economic sector in sub-Saharan Africa, and most workers are self-employed (Sidebottom 2017, AGRA 2015). Human capital there is also rather low compared to western industrial nations. Following this argumentation, even if we do not measure people’s opinions on international trade, we may assume that Chinese inward FDI did not affect the main (labor-intensive) sector as greatly as may have been expected. Africa is at a different point of development than western countries. Measuring different indicators like FDI, trade in goods, and number of foreign embassies, the globalization index by the Swiss Economic Institute has shown that the economies in sub-Saharan Africa are still much less internationalized than most other parts of the world. Out of a total of 100 points on the globalization scale, the countries in sub-Saharan Africa cumulatively reached 50.38 points, while North America in comparison reached 71.14 points on the same scale in 2017 (KOF ETH Zürich 2020). In contrast to more globalized countries, the effects of globalization have not yet extended to the people in sub-Saharan Africa as much as far as those in other regions. This may explain why low-educated people in this part of the world remain more positive toward globalization and in our case China’s growing economic and political influence. Another reason why highly educated people tend to be much more critical toward China could be the elite’s fear of losing influence in their countries. Even if political elites welcome China’s engagement in their countries, Chinese FDI may also be regarded as a kind of threat to their privileged position in African societies because one of Africa’s major challenges in the near future will be how the post-colonial continent is going to be shaped ‘in the face of established and entrenched power structures’ (Makeka 2016).

The maintenance of power for the elder political and economic establishment is important: ‘Instead of departing office when their term ends, many of these leaders have chosen to stay on a little longer – in some cases much longer’ (Makeka 2016).

For example, Robert Mugabe held the presidency in Zimbabwe for 30 years (DW 2019). Globalization leads to societal changes – especially greater social inclusion or reduction of poverty (UNCTAD 2008). However, as is the case in developed countries, by offering opportunities for most people to create wealth, developing states tend to have economic and political systems that are extractive (Adeyemi 2017).

Table 4: Multi-level regression table – interaction effects

Notes: The calculated values show how the effects of all independent variables on people’s perceptions of China change if the amount of inward FDI relative to GDP changes as well. The interaction effects are calculated for all categories while the first category stays constant.

‘Those in the ruling class have a strong hold on political power, and use it to channel economic resources to benefit themselves and those close to them’ (Adeyemi 2017).

This common concern of maintaining dominance in the system may be one factor driving negative perceptions about China’s growing political and economic influence in sub-Saharan Africa. The regression table, including interaction effects between all micro variables and the FDI variables (Model 7 including FDI interaction effects on regional level is attached in the Annex), suggest that this connection may be true.

Highly educated respondents are even more skeptical toward China’s engagement if the amount of inward FDI is also high. The regression coefficient in the group of respondents with the highest educational background (r = -0.306) is more negative if FDI in the country (relative to GDP) is high as well.

Perception  of  economic  change  (5)   0.178***  (0.0544)  

Graphic 13: Fitted plot – Inward FDI doesn’t influence the effect

Notes: The blue line shows the effect of the highest level of education on people’s perceptions of China in countries where the amount of inward FDI is higher equal the mean value (0.29). The red line covers respondents living in countries where inward FDI is lower equal 0.29.

Lastly, it is also possible that low-educated people care less or are less informed about critics against China. The empirical support for the assumption that education leads to more democratic politics is high (Glaeser et al. 2007). This applies to sub-Saharan Africa as well. By using the Afrobarometer Large N survey, Evans and Rose (2007: iii) demonstrated that ‘educational level is the dominant social structural factor conditioning support for democracy’. The correlation plot below shows that people with a more expansive educational background have rated democracy as more important than lower-educated people. As China’s ‘no-strings-attached policy in the name of non-interference is attractive to some African governments, it is criticized for threatening to wipe out the efforts by global institutions to improve human rights and government transparency and undermining Africa’s forward march towards democracy’ (Zhao 2014: 7).

Graphic 12: Fitted plot – correlation education and democracy support

Notes: The y-axis shows people’s support for democracy. 3 means democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. The x-axis covers the respondent’s highest level of education.

As China’s ‘no-strings-attached policy in the name of non-interference is attractive to some African governments, it is criticized for threatening to wipe out the efforts by global institutions to improve human rights and government transparency and undermining Africa’s forward march towards democracy’ (Zhao 2014: 7). It is highly likely that low-educated people are less critical of China as a non-democratic state investing in their countries. In fact, the level of support for democracy, one of the control variables on the micro level, had a positive and significant effect on people’s perceptions of China’s growing economic and political influence in sub-Saharan Africa.

The third hypothesis, postulating that a higher level of education leads to higher support for Chinese engagement, can be rejected. The effect is vice versa. The null hypothesis that people’s education negatively affects how they rate China’s engagement is confirmed.