Overview of appraisal theory and research

In this section I want to do three things. First, to present a brief overview of the major concepts and basic assumptions underlying most appraisal theories, with a focus on Scherer's (1984a, 1984b) multi-component model of emotions, and to review some of the supporting evidence and common critiques. Second, to discuss the role that the social context plays in current appraisal theories. Finally, I discuss why the self-concept emerges as a potential key mediator of the effects of the social and cultural aspects of the context on the emotion process.

The origins of appraisal theories can be traced back to the work of Magda Arnold (1960) who was the first author to postulate explicitly that people are continuously evaluating or “appraising” the relevance of the environment for their well being and that these appraisals help account for different emotions. Soon after, Richard Lazarus (1966; 1968) made the distinction between “primary appraisal” of an event’s

implications for one's well-being and “secondary appraisal” of one's ability to cope with the situation. Both researchers emphasized the fact that it is the personal

meaning we give to ambiguous stimuli through appraisal that determines the emotions we feel. Since then, a growing body of appraisal theories of emotion have emerged, each specifying a set of appraisal dimensions in an attempt to better predict the elicitation and differentiation of emotions (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991a; Roseman, 1984, 1991; Scherer, 1984a, 1984b, 2001a; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Specifically, in the 1980's four appraisal theories were developed that proposed rather similar

appraisal dimensions (Frijda, 1986; Roseman, 1984, 1991; Scherer, 1984a, 1984b;

Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). These basic appraisal dimensions have been recently reviewed by Ellsworth and Scherer (2003) (see table 1.1 for a list of the basic dimensions).

Given the high degree of convergence between different appraisal theories we will focus on the appraisal dimensions suggested by Scherer (1984a, 1984b). When Scherer first described his component process model of emotions (see Scherer, 1984a and 1984b¹) he proposed five appraisal dimensions or “stimulus evaluation checks”

(SEC), namely: Perceived changes in the environment (i.e., Novelty), perceived intrinsic valence of the event (i.e., Intrinsic pleasantness), perceived significance of the event for goals (i.e., Goal Significance), perceived control, power and adaptability to the consequences of the event and perceived causal agent of the event (i.e., Coping Potential /Agency) and perceived compatibility with internal self-standards and external social norms (i.e., Compatibility with Personal Standards and Social Norms).

For Scherer these “stimulus evaluation checks” are performed in the same sequential order, although often in an automatic and sometimes unconscious way, when

confronted with an emotion antecedent event (Scherer, 1984a, 1984b). Thus, the different “appraisal profiles” that result from different evaluations of an event, determine the different emotional responses to an event.

Table 1.1. Comparative overview of major appraisal dimensions (adapted from Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003).

Frijda (1986) Roseman (1984) Scherer (1984a,b) Smith/Ellsworth (1985)

Certainty Certainty outcome probability Certainty

Intent / Self-other Agency cause: agent cause: motive

Human agency

Value relevance Compatibility with

standards external internal

Legitimacy

1Although the measures of appraisal dimensions used in this thesis were based on these earlier descriptions of appraisal dimensions we should note that Scherer's theory has continued to evolve and recently (see Scherer, 2001a) the appraisal dimensions have been greatly refined.

The first two appraisal dimensions, novelty and intrinsic pleasantness often operate automatically and unconsciously and determine the level of attention devoted to the event. The other three appraisal dimensions require more complex cognitive

processing due to more elaborated schema processing, conceptual reasoning or

comparison with internal and external standards. Scherer’s (1984a, 1984b) hypothesis is that after a fast and almost automatic evaluation of the first two appraisal

dimensions that establishes the impact of the event on the person’s general well-being, the other appraisal dimensions are evaluated: How does the event influence my goals? What or who caused the event? Do I have control and power over the

consequences of the event? Am I capable of adapting to its consequences? Are the consequences of the event compatible with my personal standards and with societal norms? Two persons can thus appraise the same event differently and have different emotional responses. If one person evaluates the event as important to her goals and needs and as obstructing the achievement of these goals, to be beyond her control, to have consequences that she can cope with, but that violates societal norms of justice, she may feel anger. If the other person was to evaluate the same event as moderately relevant to her goals and needs, as obstructing the achievement of these goals, to be beyond her control, and as having consequences that are difficult to adapt to, she may feel anxiety or worry. In this sense, there are as many emotion types as there are appraisal profiles.

Appraisal theories have received a considerable amount of empirical support from self-report studies, particularly in terms of the predictive power of appraisal dimensions in differentiating between emotions. In general, these studies have induced emotions by either asking participants to imagine an event or to remember a past experience when they experienced a particular emotion (Folkman & Lazarus, 1988; Frijda, Kuipers & ter Schure, 1989; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985); by presenting participants with vignettes, or scenarios that correspond to predicted appraisal

dimension profiles for a particular emotion (Roseman, 1984; Smith, Haynes, Lazarus,

& Pope, 1993; Smith & Lazarus, 1993); or by studying in-vivo situations (Scherer &

Ceschi, 1997; Smith & Ellsworth, 1987). Participants are typically asked to respond to questions about their emotions, and to questions concerning their evaluation of event in terms of the different appraisal dimensions.

Nonetheless, methodological questions have been raised about the use of self-report (Parkinson & Manstead, 1993; Parkinson, 1997; Parkinson, 2001) as in general participants are being asked to describe both the emotion experienced and the appraisal dimensions that corresponds to the emotion. The basic criticism is that participants' self-reports could be more representative of their stereotypes about what appraisals correspond to what emotions, than of the real relationship that may exist between appraisals and emotion response. More recently, Scherer and Ellsworth (2003) have reviewed additional criticisms of self-report methods used by appraisal researchers including social desirability bias, the difficulty for the participant to access the information necessary to describe processes involved in appraisal and emotion, and the bias imposed by the use of specific appraisal question developed from theory that may exclude other unknown appraisal dimensions.

In addition to self-report, growing numbers of researchers in the area have turned to non-verbal measurements including motor expression and physiological responses.

Recent empirical evidence has supported the link between appraisals and other components of emotion such as motor-expressive, including the voice (Banse &

Scherer, 1996), facial expressions (Smith & Scott 1997), and physiological responses (van Reekum, 2000; Smith, 1989). However, as discussed by Scherer and Ellsworth (2003) non-verbal measures also have important drawbacks, including the difficulty in identifying reliable non-verbal indicators for emotion and appraisals (e.g.,

comparable to facial muscles as indicators of differential expressions of emotion) and the difficulty in establishing the meaning of the different indicators. Furthermore, these authors suggest that instead of trying to determine the best method to study emotions, it might be more reasonable for researchers in the area as a whole to try to use multiple methods whenever possible, but above all to chose their methods as a function of their research question: Physiological measurements might not be the particularly suited to study appraisals of attribution and causality.

Finally, although the question of the determination of different emotion types has been extensively addressed, the question of emotion intensity has received less attention by appraisal theorists (Clore, 1994b; Frijda, Ortony, Sonnemans & Clore, 1992). This is mainly due to the complexity of its multidimensional structure and the

resulting difficulty in operationalization and measurement (Frijda, Ortony,

Sonnemans & Clore, 1992; Sonnemans & Frijda, 1994). According to Frijda and his colleagues (1992), emotion intensity will be a function of factors linked to the person (i.e., individual differences in terms of emotion response threshold or in terms of propensities for feeling certain types of emotion); the context (i.e., such as the expectedness of the event, perceived possibilities of coping with the consequences, support, etc.); the strength of concerns and goals at stake, and the seriousness or value of the event in relation to these concerns and goals. More importantly, these authors have argued that if conceptually it is assumed that the multiple components of the emotion process (i.e., cognitive processes, action readiness, subjective feelings, and physiological changes) contribute to the determination of it’s intensity, then we have to take into account that: 1) the proposed components have different dimensions reflecting the effect of emotion, 2) these dimension may sometimes vary

independently (e.g., the strength of bodily changes and the vigor of the emotional impulse); and 3) dimensions are assessed in different ways. Therefore, they argue that it is more appropriate and conceptually meaningful to talk about “dimensions of emotion intensity” rather than about a unitary “emotion intensity”. In fact, Sonnemans and Frijda (1994) have empirically demonstrated that overall intensity of emotions as felt by subjects can vary along five relatively independent dimensions: The

recollection of the event (e.g., to what extent did the event “pop” into your mind during the first 24 hours after the event?), the duration of the emotion, the strength of the action tendency, the importance of bodily changes, and the importance of the effect of the emotion on behaviors and beliefs in the long term. Edward’s research (1998) further illustrates the complexity of the relationships between appraisals and emotion intensity. His results revealed that there was not “one” appraisal dimension that systematically determined emotion intensity. On the contrary, for different emotions, different appraisal dimensions acted as “best predictor” of felt peak

amplitude (i.e., the maximum intensity reported for an emotion). For instance, for fear it was the importance of goal obstructiveness and degree of unexpectedness, for anger it was feeling socially superior and low self-evaluation, for joy-elation it was

importance of long-term consequences, for happiness it was extent of immediate goal conduciveness, and for sadness it was difficulty of short term adjustment to the situation.