DESIGN OF RESEARCH REACTOR FACILITIES

GENERAL

6.1. The research reactor shall be designed in such a way that the fundamental safety objective (see paras 2.2 and 2.3) is achieved. The general design

requirements in this section shall be applied in the design of all types of research reactor. Additionally, a set of specific design requirements shall be applied as appropriate to the design of structures, systems and components for particular reactor types.

6.2. Application of the design requirements is an interactive process and the requirements shall be implemented throughout the design, with full consideration of the results of the safety analysis (see paras 6.119–6.125).

6.3. The achievement of a safe design requires that close liaison be maintained between the reactor designer and the operating organization. The designer shall arrange for the orderly preparation, presentation and submission of design documents to the operating organization for use in the preparation of the safety analysis report.

6.4. The design of the reactor facility shall consider not only the reactor itself but also any associated facilities, such as experimental devices, that may affect safety. In addition, the reactor design shall consider the effects of the reactor on the associated facilities at all the stages of the reactor’s lifetime (e.g. in terms of service conditions, electromagnetic fields and other sources of interference).

6.5. The design of the research reactor facility shall consider the different modes of operation (e.g. operation on demand rather than continuous operation, operation at different power levels, pulsed operation, operation with different core configurations, changes in the overall configuration of the reactor or assembly and operation with different nuclear fuels). In the design of the safety systems, due consideration shall be given to the stability of the reactor at different modes of operation.

PRINCIPAL TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS Requirement 7: Main safety functions

The design for a research reactor facility shall ensure the fulfilment of the following main safety functions for the research reactor for all states of the facility: (i) control of reactivity; (ii) removal of heat from the reactor and from the fuel storage; and (iii) confinement of the radioactive material, shielding against radiation and control of planned radioactive releases, as well as limitation of accidental radioactive releases.

6.6. A systematic approach shall be taken to identifying those items important to safety that are necessary to fulfil the main safety functions and to defining the conditions and inherent features that contribute to, or affect the fulfilment of, the main safety functions for all states of the facility.

6.7. Means of monitoring the status of the reactor facility shall be provided for ensuring that the main safety functions are fulfilled for all states of the facility.

Requirement 8: Radiation protection

The design of a research reactor facility shall be such as to ensure that radiation doses to workers and other personnel at the research reactor facility and to members of the public do not exceed the established dose limits, and that they are kept as low as reasonably achievable for operational states for the entire lifetime of the research reactor facility, and that they remain below acceptable limits and as low as reasonably achievable in, and following, accident conditions.

6.8. The design shall ensure that facility states that could lead to high radiation doses or large radioactive releases are practically eliminated²⁰ and that there are no, or only minor, potential radiological consequences for facility states with a significant likelihood of occurrence.²¹

Requirement 9: Design

The design of a research reactor facility shall ensure that the reactor facility and items important to safety have the appropriate characteristics to ensure that the safety functions can be performed with the necessary reliability, that the research reactor can be operated safely within the operational limits and conditions for its entire lifetime and can be safely decommissioned, and that impacts on the environment are minimized.

6.9. The design of a research reactor shall be such as to ensure that the requirements of the operating organization, the requirements of the regulatory

20 The possibility of certain conditions occurring is considered to have been practically eliminated (i.e. eliminated from further consideration) if it is physically impossible for the conditions to occur or if the conditions can be considered with a high level of confidence to be extremely unlikely to arise.

21 Requirements on radiation protection and the safety of radiation sources for facilities and activities are established in GSR Part 3 [7].

body and the requirements of relevant legislation, as well as applicable national and international codes and standards, are all met. The design shall consider human capabilities and limitations and factors that could influence human performance. Adequate information on the design shall be provided for ensuring the safe operation, utilization, maintenance and decommissioning of the reactor facility, and to allow subsequent modifications to be made and new experiments to be implemented.

6.10. The design shall take due account of relevant available experience that has been gained in the design, construction and operation of other research reactors, and of the results of relevant research and development programmes.

6.11. The design shall take due account of the results of deterministic safety analyses and, as appropriate, complementary probabilistic safety analyses to ensure that due consideration has been given to the prevention of accidents and to mitigation of the consequences of any accidents that do occur.

6.12. The design shall be such as to ensure that the generation of radioactive waste and discharges are kept to the minimum practicable in terms of both activity and volume and that wastes and discharges are classified.

Requirement 10: Application of the concept of defence in depth

The design of a research reactor shall apply the concept of defence in depth.

The levels of defence in depth shall be independent as far as is practicable.

6.13. The defence in depth concept (see paras 2.10–2.14) shall be applied to provide several levels of defence that are aimed at preventing consequences of accidents that could lead to harmful effects on people and the environment, and at ensuring that appropriate measures are taken for the protection of people and the environment and for the mitigation of consequences in the event that prevention fails.

6.14. The design:

(a) Shall provide for successive verifiable physical barriers to the release of radioactive material from the reactor;

(b) Shall use conservative margins, and the manufacturing and construction shall be of high quality so as to provide assurance that failures and deviations from normal operation are minimized and that accidents are prevented as far as is practicable;

(c) Shall provide for the control of reactor behaviour by means of inherent and engineered features, such that failures and deviations from normal operation requiring actuation of safety systems are minimized or excluded to the extent possible;

(d) Shall provide for automatic actuation of safety systems, such that failures and deviations from normal operation that exceed the capability of control systems can be controlled with a high level of confidence, and the need for operator actions in the early phase of such failures or deviations from normal operation is minimized;

(e) Shall provide for structures, systems and components and procedures to control the course of and, as far as practicable, to limit the consequences of failures and deviations from normal operation that exceed the capability of safety systems;

(f) Shall provide effective means for ensuring that each of the main safety functions is performed, thereby ensuring the effectiveness of the barriers and mitigating the consequences of any failure or deviation from normal operation.

6.15. To ensure that the concept of defence in depth is maintained, the design shall prevent, as far as is practicable:

(a) Challenges to the integrity of physical barriers;

(b) The failure of one or more barriers;

(c) The failure of a barrier as a consequence of the failure of another barrier;

(d) The possibility of harmful consequences of errors in operation and maintenance.

6.16. The design shall ensure, as far as is practicable, that the first, or at most the second, level of defence in depth is capable of preventing an escalation to accident conditions for all failures or deviations from normal operation that are likely to occur over the operating lifetime of the research reactor.

6.17. The levels of defence in depth shall be independent as far as practicable to avoid a failure of one level reducing the effectiveness of other levels. In particular, safety features for design extension conditions (especially features for mitigating the consequences of accidents involving the melting of fuel) shall as far as is practicable be independent of safety systems.

Requirement 11: Interfaces of safety with security and the State system of accounting for, and control of, nuclear material

Safety measures, nuclear security measures and arrangements for the State system of accounting for, and control of, nuclear material for a research reactor shall be designed and implemented in an integrated manner so that they do not compromise one another.

Requirement 12: Use of the graded approach

The use of the graded approach in application of the safety requirements for a research reactor shall be commensurate with the potential hazard of the facility and shall be based on safety analysis and regulatory requirements.

6.18. The use of a graded approach in the application of the safety requirements shall not be considered as a means of waiving safety requirements and shall not compromise safety. Grading of the application of requirements shall be justified and supported by safety analysis or engineering judgement.

Requirement 13: Proven engineering practices

Items important to safety for a research reactor shall be designed in accordance with the relevant national and international codes and standards.

6.19. Items important to safety shall preferably be of a design that has previously been proven in equivalent applications, and if not, shall be items of high quality and of a technology that has been qualified and tested.

6.20. National and international codes and standards that are used as design rules for items important to safety shall be identified and evaluated to determine their applicability, adequacy and sufficiency, and shall be supplemented or modified as necessary to ensure that the quality of the design is commensurate with the associated safety function.

6.21. Codes and standards applicable to structures, systems and components shall be identified and their use shall be in accordance with the classification of the structures, systems and components (see paras 6.29 and 6.32). In particular, if different codes and standards are used for different types of item (e.g. for piping or for electrical systems), consistency between the codes and standards shall be demonstrated.

6.22. In the case of structures, systems and components for which there are no appropriate established codes or standards, an approach derived from existing codes or standards for similar equipment having similar environmental and operational requirements may be applied, or, in the absence of such codes and standards, the results of experience, tests, analysis or a combination of these may be applied. The use of such a results based approach shall be justified.

6.23. Where an unproven design or feature is introduced or where there is a departure from an established engineering practice, a process shall be established under the management system to ensure that safety is demonstrated by means of appropriate supporting research programmes, performance tests with specific acceptance criteria or the examination of operating experience from other relevant applications. The new design or feature or new practice shall be adequately tested to the extent practicable before being brought into service, and shall be monitored in service to verify that the behaviour of the reactor facility is as expected.

6.24. Acceptance criteria shall be established for operational states and for accident conditions. In particular, the design basis accidents considered in the design of the research reactor and selected design extension conditions shall be identified for the purposes of establishing acceptance criteria. For the design of structures, systems and components, acceptance criteria may be applied in the form of engineering design rules. These rules may include requirements in relevant codes and standards established in the State or internationally. The acceptance criteria shall be reviewed by the regulatory body.

Requirement 14: Provision for construction

Items important to safety for a research reactor facility shall be designed so that they can be manufactured, constructed, assembled, installed and erected in accordance with established processes that ensure the achievement of the design specifications and the required level of safety.

6.25. In the provision for construction, due account shall be taken of relevant experience that has been gained in the construction of similar facilities and their associated structures, systems and components. Where good practices from other relevant industries are adopted, such practices shall be shown to be appropriate to the specific nuclear application.

6.26. The construction shall start only after the operating organization has verified that the main safety issues in the design have been resolved and after the regulatory body has granted an authorization (e.g. a construction licence

or an authorization for modification). The responsibility for ensuring that the construction is in accordance with the design lies with the operating organization.

Requirement 15: Features to facilitate radioactive waste management and decommissioning

Special consideration shall be given at the design stage of a research reactor facility to the incorporation of features to facilitate radioactive waste management and the future decommissioning of the facility.

6.27. In particular, the design shall take due account of:

(a) The choice of materials so that amounts of radioactive waste will be minimized to the extent practicable and decontamination will be facilitated;

(b) The access capabilities and the means of handling that might be necessary;

(c) The facilities necessary for the processing (i.e. pretreatment, treatment and conditioning) and storage of radioactive waste generated in operation and provision for managing the radioactive waste that will be generated in the decommissioning of the research reactor facility.

6.28. This requirement shall also be considered in the design of any modifications, new utilizations and experiments.

GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR DESIGN

Requirement 16: Safety classification of structures, systems and components All items important to safety for a research reactor facility shall be identified and shall be classified on the basis of their safety function and their safety significance.

6.29. The method for classifying the safety significance of items important to safety²² shall be based primarily on deterministic methods complemented, where

22 Safety classification reflects the significance for nuclear safety of the structures, systems and components. Its purpose is to establish a grading in the application of the requirements for design. There are other possible classifications or categorizations of structures, systems and components in accordance with other aspects (e.g. seismic or environmental qualification, or quality categorization of structures, systems and components).

appropriate, by probabilistic methods (if available), with due account taken of factors such as:

(a) The safety function(s) to be performed by the item;

(b) The consequences of failure to perform a safety function;

(c) The frequency with which the item will be called upon to perform a safety function;

(d) The time following a postulated initiating event at which, or the period for which, the item will be called upon to perform a safety function.

6.30. The design shall be such as to ensure that any interference between items important to safety will be prevented, and in particular that any failure of items important to safety in a system in a lower safety class will not propagate to a system in a higher safety class.

6.31. Equipment that performs multiple functions shall be classified in a safety class that is consistent with those functions having the highest safety significance.

6.32. Structures, systems and components, including software, that are important to safety shall be first identified and then classified in accordance with their function and significance for safety. The basis for the safety classification of the structures, systems and components shall be stated and the design requirements shall be applied in accordance with their safety classification.

Requirement 17: Design basis for items important to safety

The design basis for items important to safety for a research reactor facility shall specify the necessary capability, reliability and functionality for the relevant operational states, for accident conditions and for conditions arising from internal and external hazards, to meet the specific acceptance criteria over the lifetime of the research reactor.

6.33. The design basis for each item important to safety shall be systematically justified and documented. The documentation shall provide the necessary information for the operating organization to operate the reactor safely.

6.34. The challenges that the reactor may be expected to face during its operating lifetime shall be taken into consideration in the design process. These challenges include all the foreseeable conditions and events relating to stages in the

operating lifetime of the reactor and to operational states and accident conditions, site characteristics and modes of operation.

Requirement 18: Postulated initiating events

The design for the research reactor shall apply a systematic approach to identifying a comprehensive set of postulated initiating events such that all foreseeable events with the potential for serious consequences and all foreseeable events with a significant frequency of occurrence are anticipated and are considered in the design.

6.35. Postulated initiating events shall be selected appropriately for the purpose of analysis (see Appendix I). It shall be shown that the set of postulated initiating events selected covers all credible accidents that may affect the safety of the research reactor.

6.36. The postulated initiating events shall be identified on the basis of engineering judgement, operating experience feedback and deterministic assessment, complemented, where appropriate and available, by probabilistic methods.

6.37. The postulated initiating events shall include all foreseeable failures of structures, systems and components of the reactor facilities and experiments as well as operating errors and possible failures arising from internal and external hazards for all operational and shutdown states.

6.38. An analysis of the postulated initiating events shall be made to establish the preventive and protective measures that are necessary to ensure that the required safety functions will be performed.

6.39. The expected behaviour of the reactor in any postulated initiating event shall be such that the following conditions can be achieved, in order of priority:

(1) A postulated initiating event would produce no safety significant effects and would produce only a change towards a safer and more stable condition by means of inherent safety characteristics of the reactor.

(2) Following a postulated initiating event, the reactor would be rendered safe by means of passive safety features or by the action of systems that are operating continuously in the state necessary to control the postulated initiating event.

(3) Following a postulated initiating event, the reactor would be rendered safe by the actuation of active items important to safety that need to be brought into operation in response to the postulated initiating event.

(4) Following a postulated initiating event, the reactor would be rendered safe by following specified procedures.

6.40. The postulated initiating events used for developing the performance requirements for the items important to safety in the overall safety assessment and the detailed analysis of the reactor facility shall be grouped into representative event sequences that identify bounding cases and that provide the basis for the

6.40. The postulated initiating events used for developing the performance requirements for the items important to safety in the overall safety assessment and the detailed analysis of the reactor facility shall be grouped into representative event sequences that identify bounding cases and that provide the basis for the