1) Among these refugees were some 350 Sierra Leonean children separated from their families. Many of them had earlier been forcibly drafted as child soldiers and later voluntarily crossed the border to take up arms and fight in other conflicts as members of a different armed group. In 2005, a survey conducted by Human Rights Watch con-cluded that most of these young fighters had been promised financial rewards and that most were unable to articulate the political goal of the group they were fighting for.
The risk of re-enlistment was exacerbated by the high levels of youth unemployment, corruption and deficiencies that dogged the disarmament, demobilization and reinte-gration programme (DDR).
) A report published in August 2005 by the UN Office for West Africa indicated that the high levels of unemployment across West Africa, especially among the youth, posed a threat to regional stability. This was reiterated in a report published in 2007 by the UN Secretary General who also emphasized the need for a region-wide reform of the security sector to put an end to instability.
3) Recruitment and deployment of children During the rebel incursions against Guinea from Liberia and Sierra Leone between 2000 and 2001, over 7,000 young men will-ingly enlisted into the Young Volunteers, a militia group made up of civilians backing the Guinean army. The government had promised to enlist them into the regular army but only a few of them were actually recruited. The number of children who were not recruited into the Young Volunteers could not be established and their presence in this militia was systematically denied by government authorities.
4) Officers were trained on the rights of the child, especially with the aim of prevent-ing the recruitment or use of child soldiers. A former member of the Young Volunteers said he was recruited at age 13. Only a handful of the members of the Young Volun-teers completed the demobilisation process and so the status of those who were not demobilized could not be clarified. Some are still in possession of their weapons and according to sources, they continue to operate as volunteer soldiers, while others are employed to provide security for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and UN agencies based in the Forest region. It was also reported that some mounted road blocks to raid vehicles and extort money from passengers. In March 2006, the UN
gees were placed in camps and their movements restricted. They would be frequently attacked and murdered by the Guinean population while Guinean soldiers would look on unconcerned or actually egg them on.
The increase of the population in these areas drove up demand for social services in a country already struggling to deal with its poverty situation. These demands could not be met and so the region was plunged into trafficking, wanton violence and insecurity. Both indigenes and refugees alike paid a high price for the resulting insecurity: growing illicit trafficking, wanton murders and rape, increased insecurity, unstable political climate. The result was that the already precarious living conditions of the people worsened.
Evaluation of Exit Strategies: Analysis and Perspectives (Strategic Assessment)
With the breakdown of State institutions, Guinea was faced with institutional instability, insecurity, violence, a slumping economy and poverty. Strategies were implemented to bring peace to the coun-try and pave the way for Guinea to move from its current status of a fragile state to a more stable and modern one. How effective were these strategies and what are the possible prospects?
Minimum treatment
These were responses aimed at dealing with security and humanitarian emergencies.
estimated that some 4000 volunteer soldiers, all or most of whom were about 18 years at the time, were operating in the Forest region of Guinea. These soldiers provided their own uniforms and hoped to be officially recruited into the national armies.
5) Armed groups. Many of the people who had fought in neighbouring countries were from Guinea. Indeed more than half of the over 600 foreign fighters identified and disarmed in Liberia were of Guinean origin. The proportion was the same for foreign child soldiers who were repatriated from Liberia by the International Committee of the Red Cross (IRCC).
Source: Initial Report on Guinea to the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child Doc. UNO. CRC/C/3/Add.48
National responses
These only aimed at putting out the “fire” without solving the real problem. The responses helped to curb the attack in 2000 and calm political, social and security tensions, which had characterized the period between 2001 and 2008. The Guinean army beefed up by civilian volunteers and retired soldiers and funded by the Government and economic operators, tried with relative success to push the rebel forces back in mid-December 2000.
The army launched a vigorous offensive which pushed back the rebels who had set up their head-quarters at Yendé Millimou, in Kissidougou and threatened to take their attacks as far as Conakry, through Faranah and Mamou. At the national level, State institutions, most political parties and civil society organizations also condemned the rebellion.
Diplomatic and mediation initiatives
These were principled condemnations from ECOWAS (adoption of a motion condemning such in-cursions), US/China Bilateral Cooperation and the UN Security Council which adopted a resolution condemning the attacks on Guinea.
Management of the humanitarian crisis
Specialized UN Agencies like UNDP and OCHA played an active role in the management of the humanitarian crisis and the provision of relief to displaced persons right from the beginning of the border conflict that broke out in 2000 between Guinea and its neighbours -Liberia and Sierra Leone (Table 9).
Table 5.9: Management of the humanitarian crisis and assistance to displaced persons
Management and assistance Outcome
Meetings held between October 6 and December 20 for the setting up of the OCHA Country team of a Humanitarian Coordination Committee.
Sharing information on displaced persons Coordination of aid and initiatives First mission of the United Nations’ Office for the Coordination of
Hu-manitarian Affairs (OCHA) to Conakry on the sub region including Cote d’Ivoire.
Production in October 2000 of a Strategy Paper on managing the risks of humanitarian crisis.
Second mission of the United Nations’ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to Conakry.
Production of a document; « Donor’s alert ».
Opening of a permanent OCHA office in Conakry, in early 2001. It had three employees and a support staff.
Production of a consolidated multi-sectorial document, « Flash Appeal » for emergency appeals.
Launch by the UNDP (responsible for building capacities in management and coordination of humanitarian support as well as support for the reha-bilitation of grassroots communities) of a project to support the National Solidarity and Rescue Committee with communication equipment and means of transport for sector focal points.
Release of 50,000 USD for the supply of com-munication and transport equipment for sector focal points.
Source: ECOWAS, 2000, UNDP, 2001
The activities of the UNHCR and its partners on the field were coordinated from Conakry and de-centralized at sub-office level. These were scaled up from September 2000 due to rebel attacks. The coordination office in Conakry had 26 international staff, 3 JPO, 121 local staff, 18 UNVs, a Security Officer, many consultants, and four sub-offices in Forest Guinea and Maritime Guinea. The monthly Inter-Agency Coordination Committee meetings continued; the UNHCR coordinated its interventions with WFP (Food supplies), UNDP (Environment), UNICEF, WHO, UNESCO and UNFPA (Census).
Crisis exit strategies
(i) Initiatives of the Mano River States with the Summit of Heads of State of the Mano River Union (MRU) in Bamako, on 2 March 2 2000, under the auspices of ECOWAS, with RUF Representa-tives in attendance. The meeting was to take stock of the follow-up to the Abuja Summit of 16 September 1999, and to facilitate dialogue and reconciliation among leaders of the three coun-tries, in order to revive the Union.
(ii) ECOWAS Initiatives with the high level meeting of the Heads of State of Guinea, Mali, Liberia and Sierra Leone (8th and 9th May 2000 in Conakry), on monitoring and implementation of the accords towards finding a participatory approach to peace in the sub region, a precondition for
strong regional integration. The creation of an effective mechanism to ensure proper controls and security at the borders was also suggested.
(iii) The Conakry Meeting saw the active involvement of women through NGOs such as « Femmes Africa Solidarité » and the « African Women’s Committee for Peace and Development ».
The meeting that was held on 16 December 2000 in Bamako had agreed to deploy a 1676-strong peacekeeping force along the 1215 km long border separating the three countries, for an initial peri-od of six months. The OAU had voted 300,000 USD to support the operation while Nigeria, Senegal, Mali and Gambia offered to deploy troops and provide them with logistical support while waiting for support from the international community. This mission was not carried out because the Guinean authorities opposed the deployment of ECOWAS Troops.
ECOWAS Peace and Mediation Committee:
Convened an urgent meeting of the Joint Security Committee of the Mano River Union in Sierra Leone sent a request to the Joint Security Committee of the Mano River Union
UN Security Council with a mission to Guinea on 8th and 9th October 2000 as part of a tour of the sub-region. The mission comprised eleven ambassadors who held discussions with Guinean authori-ties and the UN Team on issues related to the rebel incursions in Guinea, restoration of stability and security in the sub-region and steps to ensure the safety of humanitarian workers as well as possible recommendations to the Conference of Heads of State and Government for immediate deployment of a Military Observer Mission along the land and coastal borders of Guinea and Liberia.
In December 2000, a strategy paper was developed on refugee assistance and management of the hu-manitarian crisis, to manage the huhu-manitarian crisis created by the massive displacement of people.
The Government established a National Organization for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (SENAH) while the UN Country Team set up a Humanitarian Coordination Committee (SNU).
Post conflict responses to security issues Demobilization
More than 7000 young men were willingly enlisted into the Young Volunteers, a militia group made up of civilians who supported the Guinean Army (International Crisis Group, 2005). In spite of the Government’s commitment, only a few of them were recruited into the Army. Other children demo-bilized for fear of being stigmatized (the phenomenon of child soldiers).
Management of the Social crisis
Signing of the Political Accord in May 2008
After the strike-induced crisis of January and February 2007, an agreement signed between the Gov-ernment and the Unions in May 2008 to end the crisis (See box below) led to the appointment of a Prime Minister with extended powers. Such powers, in reality, were not as extended as they appeared to be in the agreement.
Challenges in the implementation of the May 2008 Accord
Notwithstanding some positive aspects (setting up of the INEC and release of 19 billion Guinean Francs to political parties on the condition that they participated in at least two elections in Guinea and obtained at least 3% of votes cast), the implementation of the accord failed to ease the political tension and despite the lull, the implementation of the accord ran into some difficulties (Box 5.8).