Some examples from EDRAM countries

In practice, all of the approaches mentioned have been tried; some examples are given in the following discussion:

—National concerns as the driving force in repository development. An example of a successful project in this category is the WIPP deep repository for long lived (primarily military) transuranic wastes (TRU) in New Mexico, USA, that has been in operation for some years now. The large number of TRU surface interim storage sites dispersed over the country was a national situation that was considered to be unsatisfactory.

—Familiarity of the local population with nuclear technology. Examples of successful siting projects, where familiarity of the local population with nuclear issues may have been a factor, include the Olkiluoto project in Finland, the WIPP repository in the USA, the low and intermediate level waste repository at Forsmark in Sweden and the Kincardine project for a low and intermediate level waste repository in Canada.

—Public involvement in decision making. Examples here include the Swedish and Finnish programmes for the development of repositories for spent nuclear fuel. In Sweden, following a wide volunteer solicitation process that led to little success, SKB identified promising sites to host a spent fuel repository, but made commencement of a site characterization programme contingent upon receiving the consent of the local community. This approach has been successful in identifying two potential sites — Simpevarp and Forsmark — where the site investiga-tions are well underway. In Finland, after a cautious staged approach in which various options were investigated, attention was focused on two communities, which then competed to host the repository. For one of these sites, Olkiluoto, a general licence for a repository for spent nuclear fuel has been granted and underground exploration is underway.

—Importance of public acceptance. The selection of Wellenberg as the Swiss site for low and intermediate level waste (L/ILW) in 1993 was made by the implementer through qualitative comparison with three other short listed potential sites. In spite of widespread agreement (including by the regulator) on the technical merits of the site, the project subsequently failed, due to lack of sufficient public support. In the 1970s, technical experts, in closed session, selected a single site at Gorleben in Germany for HLW disposal; today the legitimacy of the process is still being challenged. Later, in the 1990s, a similar approach in the United Kingdom led to the selection of Sellafield as a preferred site for a geological

ISSLER et al.

repository for ILW but this subsequently failed to receive planning permission.

—Role of environmental impact assessments in the siting process. An example to illustrate the role of environmental impact assessment in providing a framework for discussion with the public on all aspects of a disposal project is provided by the Finnish programme for the development of a repository for spent fuel. It is interesting to note that the relevant national report explicitly states that ‘‘… an important part of the environmental impact assessment of the project was the involvement of various parties in the EIA procedure. Public involvement aimed at generating interaction between the parties responsible for planning the final disposal facility and those participating in the EIA procedure. The candidate municipalities played the main role.” [7].

—Multi-attribute analysis. In the USA, technical multi-attribute analyses yielded three potential sites for a repository for high level waste (HLW) and spent fuel, and from these a political decision by Congress identified the Yucca Mountain site. Although there is continued opposition at state level to the project, the US Department of Energy (USDOE) is currently preparing a licence application for repository implementation at the site.

—Voluntary approach. Japan has embarked upon a very wide solicitation process for volunteers, with comprehensive data packs being distributed to over 3000 communities. The results of this approach are awaited with interest.

6. SUMMARY AND FUTURE CHALLENGES

In summary, technological solutions to the safe disposal of radioactive waste exist, but public acceptance and political support for the siting process are critical elements in many countries. The most critical single requirement for successful repository implementation in a country is the political support needed to make people aware that the existing arrangements of interim waste storage (which may evolve, by default, into indefinite storage) should be changed towards the construction of repositories. Once such support is at an adequate level, the disposal concept, the siting process and the siting criteria can be defined, e.g. by national governments, but with adequate involvement of all stakeholders (all stakeholders should have the possibility to ‘help to make the rules’). The rules should be settled before the actual process starts. The siting process itself should be structured, open and transparent and it should be seen as being fair, with the possibility for local and regional stakeholders to participate and to influence decisions. A staged decision process, in which (initially) alternatives exist and that foresees the possibility of reversing

SESSION IIIa

decisions, may be helpful in this respect. Even an optimal siting process will not be able to identify the ‘safest’ site; this is neither possible nor necessary.

However, it should be demonstrated that different options and/or regions have been considered. Another factor that is considered helpful in the siting process is a strong and independent regulatory body that plays an active role by defining the safety criteria and critically reviewing the technical part of the implementer’s work and that takes part in discussions with the local and regional stakeholders (‘expert of the public’). Regarding siting criteria, all stakeholders should recognize the overriding importance of the safety criteria, even though in practice, socioeconomic issues (and environmental impact issues) may play a more important role in influencing public acceptance.

REFERENCES

[1] KERNENERGIEGESETZ (KEG) vom 21. März 2003 (Stand 28. Dezember 2004). SR 732.1 (2003).

[2] KERNENERGIEVERORDNUNG (KEV) vom 10. Dezember 2004. SR 732.11 (2004).

[3] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Siting of Geological Disposal Facilities, Safety Series No. 111-G-4.1, IAEA, Vienna (1994).

[4] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Experience in Selection and Characterization of Sites for Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste, IAEA-TECDOC-991, IAEA, Vienna (1997).

[5] OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, Public information, consultation and involvement in radioactive waste management: An international overview of approaches and experiences, OECD, Paris (2003).

[6] UNITED STATES NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, Board on Radio-active Waste Management, One step at a time: The staged development of geologic repositories for high-level radioactive waste, National Academy Press, Washington, DC (2003).

[7] POSIVA OY, The final disposal facility for spent fuel: Environmental impact assessment report, Helsinki (1999).

DISCUSSION

M. TAKEUCHI (Japan): What are your views regarding the attitudes of communities that are neighbours to a future host community?

ISSLER et al.

H. ISSLER (Switzerland): That is a sensitive issue. Neighbouring communities can be affected both during the construction phase and later, by waste transport operations. The environmental impact assessment and socioeconomic studies should take account of the affected neighbouring communities. Difficulties can arise particularly when affected neighbouring communities are not participating in a financial compensation scheme.

Experience has shown that it is helpful if the future host community and the neighbouring communities establish a working group to coordinate their positions.