Résumé : La fin de la guerre du Pacifique a vu le développement de trois
caractéristiques structurellement déterminantes des activités de pêche dans l’Asie de l’Est : le développement de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer (UNCLOS), la cristallisation de conflits territoriaux surtout situés dans les zones maritimes, et le taux de croissance rapide des industries de pêche, couplés avec l’épuisement tout aussi rapide des stocks de poissons dans les eaux territoriales. Les relations sino-japonaises se sont normalisées en 1972, de sorte que les deux pays ont signé le traité de paix et d’amitié entre le Japon et la République populaire de Chine en 1978. Un nouvel accord est entré en vigueur en 2000 pour une période initiale de 5 ans et a été plus tard prolongé. Il a établi une zone de pêche commune dans la mer de Chine orientale, appelé les mesures provisoires de la Zone (PMZ), englobant notamment les délimitations contestées de la ZEE afin de régler les problèmes territoriaux et d’éviter les obstacles juridiques graves concernant la coopération en matière de pêche. La zone est administrée par un comité conjoint des pêches (JFC), dont le rôle est de recommander des quotas de pêche, d’agir comme un forum pour le dialogue entre les deux parties, de prendre des mesures pour la conservation des ressources, et de calculer le nombre de navires de pêche autorisés dans les zones de pêche ainsi que les captures totales autorisées (TAC). L’exemple récent des bateaux de pêche chinois opérant illégalement près de l’archipel d’Ogasawara met en évidence les faiblesses de l’appareil de surveillance. Les activités de pêche illégales n’ont pas besoin des lacunes du droit international pour prospérer, et les exemples récents de près de 200 braconniers chinois de corail faisant intrusion illégalement dans la ZEE japonaise, autour des îles Ogasawara, le rappellent, même
si on peut supposer sans risque que la situation politique préexistante entre la République Populaire de Chine et la République de Chine (Taïwan) a sans aucun doute eu un rôle à jouer. Derrière ce phénomène, il y a des causes sous-jacentes qui alimentent la pêche illégale.
La tendance future en matière de surveillance maritime sur les activités de pêche dans cette zone et ailleurs est probablement double. En termes de « répression », l’utilisation croissante des technologies telles que les satellites et les drones aidera à surveiller l’activité des navires de pêche et à améliorer l’efficacité des garde-côtes, bien que leurs moyens actuellement limités restent toujours un problème. La conscience de la situation globale ne signifie pas nécessairement que les organismes compétents auront les moyens à leur disposition pour traiter ces questions, surtout si les pressions économiques actuelles continuent. En termes de « prévention », un moyen souvent négligé, mais tout aussi primordial pour lutter contre les problèmes de pêche illégale, est la gestion des industries nationales de la pêche. Adapter la taille des flottes de pêche aux besoins du marché et à la disponibilité des stocks de poissons est indubitablement un moyen essentiel dans l’amélioration de la surveillance maritime efficace en mer. Par exemple, face à un ensemble de facteurs et conjonctures, l’industrie de la pêche taïwanaise a été contrainte de réduire sa flotte de pêche et d’aider à la reconversion de ses pêcheurs. Il peut même être possible d’envisager le renforcement des accords de pêche et le développement de la gestion conjointe des zones maritimes contestées comme un moyen de promouvoir le dialogue politique entre les parties à un niveau global et d’éviter de nouveaux incidents impliquant des pêcheurs et des garde-côtes.
Abstract: The end of the Pacific War saw the development of three structurally-
defining features of fishing activities in East Asia: the development of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), the occurence of territorial conflicts mostly located in maritime areas, and the rapidly growth rate of fishing industries coupled with the equally rapid depletion of fish stocks in territorial waters. Sino-Japanese relations have normalized in 1972, and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed by Japan and People’s Republic of China in 1978. A new agreement came into effect in 2000 for an initial period of 5 years, and was later extended. It established a common fishing zone in the East China Sea, called the Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ), notably encompassing the disputed EEZ delimitations in order to shelve territorial problems and avoid serious legal hurdles regarding cooperation on fisheries. The zone is administered by a Joint Fisheries Committee (JFC), whose role is to recommend fishing quotas, to act as a forum for dialogue between the two parties, to take measures for the conservation of resources, and to calculate the number of fishing vessels allowed in the fishing zones as well as the Total Allowed Catches (TAC).
The recent example of the Chinese fishing boats illegally operating near the Ogasawara archipelago highlights the weaknesses of the surveillance apparatus. Illegal fishing activities do not need international legal loopholes to take place, and the recent
examples of nearly 200 Mainland Chinese coral poachers illegally trespassing in the Japanese EEZ around the Ogasawara islands act as such a reminder, although one can safely assume that the preexisting political situation between the PRC and the ROC has no doubt had a role to play. Behind this phenomenon, there are underlying causes that drive illegal fishing.
The future trend in maritime surveillance on fishing activities in this area and elsewhere is most likely two-fold. In terms of «repression», the growing use of technologies such as satellites and drones will help monitor the activity of fishing vessels and enhance the efficiency of coastguards, although their currently limited means will still remain a problem. Overall situational awareness does not necessarily mean that the relevant agencies will have at their disposal the means to tackle these issues, especially if the current economic pressures continue. In terms of «prevention», an often overlooked but equally primordial way to curb problems of illegal fishing is the management of domestic fishing industries. Tailoring the size of fishing fleets to the needs of the market and the availability of fish stocks is indubitably an essential means to improve efficient maritime surveillance at sea. For example, faced with a set of factors and conjunctures, the Taiwanese fishing industry has been forced to curtail its fishing fleet and help with the reconversion of fishermen. It may even be possible to consider strengthening fishing agreements and developing joint management of disputed maritime areas as a means to promote political dialogue between the parties on a comprehensive level and avoid further incidents involving fishermen and Coast Guards.
The end of the Pacific War saw the development of three structurally defining features of fishing activities in East Asia: 1) the development of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), 2) the crystallization of territorial conflicts mostly located in maritime areas, and 3) the rapidly growing rate of fishing industries coupled with the equally rapid depletion of fish stocks in territorial waters.1 The conjunction of
these three features, which were not specific to East Asia2 but which have gained a
global reach due to the growing political and economic significance of the region, has highlighted the importance of tackling the issue of the legality of fishing activities in contested waters and the bases upon which maritime surveillance over such activities should be conducted.
This work will focus on one of the most symbolic cases representing the connecting point of these three trends, namely the juridical aspects of fishing activities based on the relationship between the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) and Japan. It will particularly focus on why the legal framework regarding fishing activities between these three parties has been so difficult to implement, and what the outcomes have been of such a complex situation regarding maritime surveillance. The consequences for maritime surveillance have been dramatic, as surveillance revolves around a trinity composed of territory, sovereignty, and legal basis. It is the prerequisite to the enforcement of legal norms. Without proper enforcement, the rules are rendered inefficient and surveillance useless. And without proper surveillance, management and control of fisheries resources and fish stocks is undermined. This issue is particularly poignant with the rise in fish consumption, and the improvement of fishing technologies in China, which threatens the resource sustainability of the fish-abundant seas of the region.
Surprisingly enough, current literature does not frontally tackle the consequences of the ambiguity of the legal status of maritime surveillance between these three parties, and even less so regarding the quadratic relationship between the interest of fishermen, legal bases, maritime surveillance and interstates relations.3 Hence, this
work aims at highlighting the consequences of and on fishing activities when the legitimacy of the legal framework is flawed by territorial disputes, or, in the case of Taiwan, by the non-recognition of a party as a State. In this context, it seeks to explore the provisions under which maritime surveillance can be implemented.
1) Review of the state of world fish stocks, FAO, 2011, B.10 Northwest Pacific, pp. 141-150.
2) Likewise, the developments of UNCLOS have created maritime disputes in Europe as well. This was
notably epitomized by the long lasting "Cod Wars" between Iceland and the UK.
3) Regarding the Sino-Taiwanese relationship on fishing matters, see H.S. Tseng, C.H. Ou (2010), "Taiwan
and China, a Unique Fisheries Relationship", Marine Policy, Vol. 34, pp.1156-1162. On Taiwan-Japanese relations, see Y.H. Yeh, H.S Tseng, D.T. Su, C.H Ou (2015), "Taiwan and Japan, a Complex Fisheries Relationship", Marine Policy, Vol. 51, pp. 293-301. On Sino-Japanese relations, see Zou Keyuan (2003), "Sino-Japanese Joint Fishery Management in the East China Sea", Marine Policy, Vol. 27 Issue 2, pp.125- 142. On the overall international fisheries policy of Japan, see Roger D. Smith (2014), "Japan’s International Fisheries Policy: Law, Diplomacy and Politics Governing Resource Security", Routledge.
This work relies on the analysis of the legal contextualization of currently-applied domestic laws and international law, to which a three-levelf analysis grid will be added, ranging from local actors (fishermen and their cooperatives) to agencies enforcing maritime surveillance (coastguards and other related actors) and governments. After the presentation of statistical facts, we attempt to go further in exploring how the realities of ‘legality’ and ‘illegality’ are constructed through the overlapping dimensions of political power games, laws, territorial sovereignty and the interests of fishermen. From there, we will try to assess current related trends in maritime surveillance and their potential evolution. The method will be based on the use of open data, including statistical data provided by relevant governmental agencies in the case of Taiwan and Japan, as well as legislative texts.