Thisthesisdealswithvariousaspectsofnoncooperativegametheorybutthefieldofthe studyisattheintersectionofbilateralbargaining,endogenousnetworkformationand farsightedness.
Withtheideathatafullyspecifiedbargainingprocedurethatimplementstheefficient outcomecanbefound,thesecondchapterexaminesfewsimplecandidateprocedures. Thereisstillalottobelearnedabouttheproceduresthatcouldorshouldbeimp le-mentedinthecontextsequentialbargaining. However,evensimplisticbargain ingproce-duresdon’tnecessarymatchtheefficientoutcome,andtherecan’tbeaconsensusonthe bargainingprotocols. Althoughthisremarkcouldseemnegative,itdoesn’tconcludeto itsinfeasibilityanda mechanismthatkeepstrackoftheorderingofsequentialbilateral negotiationsthatleadstotheefficientoutcomecanstillbefound.
Thesecondchapterprovidesresultsonthestabilityofnetworksof manufacturers andretailersgivenanadjustablelevelofdepthofreasoning.Iemphasizethatarather limitedprojectionissufficienttoreachthehighestlevelofanticipationandthattheusual definitionsofoptimalityorefficiencydoesn’tfitwellthelevel-K solutionconcept.Itis obviousthatthelevel-K solutionconceptshouldbestudiedindifferentsettingstoshed newlightonusualresultsregardingeconomictheory. However,alternativedefinitions ofoptimalityorefficiencythatfitaset-basedsolutionconceptshouldalsobeofgreat interestforfutureresearch.
Theset-baseddefinitionofthevonNeumann-Morgensternfarsightedlystableseta l-lowtheemmergenceofanendogenousallocation.Basedonstandardassumpt ionsonbar-gainingschemes,thestablesetsandtheallocationrulearesimultaneouslydetermined.
Althoughfurtherresearchledtotheconclusionthatthesolutionconceptisnotgood atdealingwithvariousformsofexternalities,thevonNeumann-Morgensternfarsighted stabilitysolutionconceptremainsofinterestinthecontextsthatfitstheassumptions.
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Title: Bilateral BargainingandFarsightednessin Networks: Essaysin Economic Theory
Abstract
Thethesisconsistsinfouressaysthatdealwithbargainingandnetworksinnoncooperativegametheory. Thefirstchapterintroduceriverbargaininggamesinthecontextofexternalities. Theseawallbargaining gamedealswithanoncooperativeapproachofaninvestmentgameinacontextofpositiveexternalities. The mainresultshowsthatthepositioningoftheagentsimpactstheirincentivestositatthebargaining table,leadingtoachickengame. Anintermediaryplayershouldleadthenegotiationstoimprovethesocietal welfare.IntheRiverbargainingproblem,anoncooperativebargainingonaflowingresourceinthepresence ofnegativeexternalities. Resultsshowthatdependingontheinstigatorofthebargainingsequencesbutthere areanalogiesbetweensolutionsundertheATSandtheUTIprinciples. Thesecondchapterdealswiththe formationofnetworksof manufacturersandretailersinthepresenceofnegativeexternalitieswhenplayers arelevel-K farsighted. Theresultsshowthat,(i)arelativelylowleveloffarsightednessissufficienttoreach theinfiniteleveloffarsightedness;(ii)usualdefinitionsofoptimalityorefficiencyfindlimitationswhenit comestobeconfrontedtoaset-baseddefinitionofstability.(iii)Ifthereistransitivecorrespondencebetween thepairwisefarsightedstablesetandthelevel-∞ farsightedstableset,thenthissetislikelytobestrongly efficient.InAllocatingvalueamongfarsightedplayersinnetworkformation,weproposestheconceptofa von Neumann-Morgensternfarsightedstableset withbargaining. Underthissolutionconcept,thestable networkssoasthecomponentwiseegalitarianallocationruleemergeendogenously. Thischapterprovides necessaryconditionsunderwhichavonNeumann-Morgensternfarsightedstablesetwithbargainingsustains thestronglyefficientnetworks.
Keywords: Bargaining,Networks,Farsightedness
Titre: N´egociationsbilat´eraleset Clairvoyancedansles R´eseaux: Essaisen Th´eorie Economique.
R´esum´e
Cetteth`eseconsisteenquatreessaisquitraitentden´egociationetder´eseauxenth´eoriedesjeuxnon coop´erative. Lepremierchapitrepr´esentedesjeuxden´egociationsdansuncontexted’externalit´es. Lejeu den´egociationsurladiguetraited’uneapprochenoncoop´eratived’unjeud’invest issementdansuncon-texted’externalit´espositives. Lesincitations`aprendrepartauxn´egociationssesynth´etisentenun”jeu delapoule mouill´ee”. Lesresultats montrentqu’ilestsocialementplusefficacequ’unjoueurinterm´ediaire m`enelesn´egociations. Le probl`emeden´egociationsurlarivi`ereestunjeuden´egociationnoncoop´eratif surl’utilisationdelaressourcefluvialeenpr´esenced’externalit´esn´egatives.Ilexistedesanalogiesentreles solutionsobtenuesdanslescasdel’ATSetdel”UTI.Ledeuxi`emechapitretraitedelaformationder´eseaux deproducteursetded´etaillantsenpr´esenced’externalit´esn´egativeslorsquelesjoueurssontclairvoyants dedegr´e-K. Lesr´esultats montrentque(i)undegr´edeclairvoyancerelativementfaibleestsuffisantpour atteindrelaclairvoyanceabsolueouinfinie;(ii)lesd´efinitionshabituellesdel’optimumoudel’efficiencene conviennentpasparfaitement`aunconceptdestabilit´eensembliste.(iii)S’ilex isteunecorrespondancetran-sitiveentrelastabilit´eclairvoyanteparpairesetlastabilit´eclairvoyantededegr´einfini,alorsl’ensemblestable peutˆetreefficient. DansAttributiondelavaleurentrejoueursclairvoyantsdansleprocessusdeformation der´eseau.Ils’agitd’unchapitreth´eoriquequiproposeleconceptdestabilit´evon Neumann-Morgenstern avecn´egociation. Dansceconceptdesolution,lesensemblesder´eseauxstables,ainsiqu’uner´epartition
´
egalitaireauseindescomposantsdur´eseausontd´etermin´esconjointement,etde mani`ereendog`ene. Ce dernierchapitre meten´evidencelesconditionsn´ecessairespourquelesr´eseauxvonNeumann-Morgenstern avecn´egociationsoientefficients.
Mots-cl´es: N´egociation,r´eseaux,Clairvoyance
GroupedeRechercheenEconomieTh´eoriqueetAppliqu´ee(GREThA), UMRCNRS,Universit´edeBordeaux.
16avenueL´eonDuguit33600Pessac