Bridging the boundary--external process and performance in organizational teams

HD28

.M414

no.

WORKING

PAPER

ALFRED

P.

SLOAN

SCHOOL

OF

MANAGEMENT

Bridging

the

Boundary:

External

Process

and

Performance

in

Organizational

Teams

Deborah

G.

Ancona,

617/253-0568

MIT

Sloan Schoolof

Management

and

David

F. Caldwell, 408/554-4114

Leavev

School ofBusiness

Working

Paper

BPS-3305-91-BPS

June, 1991

MASSACHUSETTS

INSTITUTE

OF

TECHNOLOGY

50

MEMORIAL

DRIVE

CAMBRIDGE,

MASSACHUSETTS

02139

^^..i'-Bridyiny

the

Boundary:

External Process

and

Performance

in

Organizational

Teams

Deborah

G.

Ancona,

617/253-0568

MIT

Slo:in School of

Management

and

David

F. Caldwell,408/554-41 14

Leavey

School ofBusiness

Abstract

The

natureoftheexternalactivities in which groups engage

was

investigated using a

sampleof45

new

productdevelopmentteams. Three broad types ofactivitieswere identified.

The

levelsofthese activitiesratherthan simply thefrequency ofteam

members'

communication

withoutsiders

was

related toindependentratingsof

team

performance. In addition,patterns of theseactivitieswere monitored in the teams and fourstrategies toward theenvironment

were

derived.

Overview

Although groups have always been an important tool foraccomplishingorganizational goals, the

form

and use ofgroupsis changingrapidly. In responseto the acceleratingpaceof technologicaland marketchange, organizations arefrequentlydelegating

more

responsibilityto

temporary' teamsthan they havein thepast. Furthermore, organizationalunits oftenhave tobe

more

closely coupled than in the past, sometimes evenworking in parallel tocomplete assignments spanning traditional organizational units (Clark

&

Fujimoto, 1987;

Henderson

&

Clark, 1990).

Thus

work

group

members

must

frequently interactextensivelywithnon-team

members

to

complete their assignments.

As

this trendcontinues,organizational groups can notbe

viewed

as

bounded

units: ratherthey must be viewed as

open

systems interacting with othergroups or

individuals in theorganizational environment. Despitethe importanceofsuchexternallydependent

teams, relatively littlereseiu"ch has explored

how

they interact with othergroups and

how

those interactions can facilitate the accomplishmentoftheirassigned tasks.

Over

the past halfcenturysocial psychologistshave devotedsubstantial attention tothe fine-grained analysis ofbehaviorwithin groups.

Many

frameworks

exist forthat analysis including

models

ofgroup decision

making

(Bourgeois

&

Eisenhardt, 1988; Isenberg, 1986;

Nemeth,

1986), task and maintenance activities (Bales, 1983;

Benne

&

Sheats, 1948; Schein,

1988) ,

norm

development

(Bettenhausen

&

Murnighan, 1985),andevolution (Gersick, 1988,

1989) to

name

afew.

The

emphasisinprevious research

on what

goes

on

within the grouphas

been so strong thatdefinitions ofgroupprocess havedescribed it solely interms oftheinteractions

among

group

members

that transform resourcesinto a product

(Goodman,

1986;

Hackman

&

Morris, 1975). Gladstein (1984) found, however, that groupprocessentailed both internal group

process and boundary

managment.

Both internal andexternal

components

are thoughttobe

necessary topredict the perfomiance tothese

new

organization teams.

The

purpose ofthisresearch isto

examine

the relatively

unknown

pattern ofgroups' external activities withessential others. Specifically,

we

describetherange ofactivitiesteam

members

use to interactwith outsiders and

form

atypology;

we

test

how

external activities relate to teamperformance, and

we

examine

how

naturallyoccurring groups aggregate

member

activity

into strategies fordealing with others.

Literature

Review

Although themajor emphasis in group theoryhasbeen oninternal

team dynamics

there hasbeen

some

attention paid toexternal interaction. This

work

has typicallyfocused on the

amount

of information thatthe

team

acquires

from

itsenvironment (c.f. Galbraith, 1977;

Lawrence

&

Lorsch, 1967;

Thompson,

1967). This information processing approach isnormative; positing

that groups must

match

theirinformation processing capability tothe information processing

demands

oftheexternalenvironment

(Tushman

&

Nadler, 1990). Supportforthis approach

comes from

studies

showing

thatteamscarrying out

complex

tasksin uncertain environmentsneed

high levels ofexternal interaction to be high performing

(Ancona

&

Caldwell, 1991; Gresov, 1988;

Tushman,

1977, 1979). For example, inresearch and

development

teams, frequencyof

communication

within theteams

shows

norelationtoperformancewhile increased

communication

betweenthe teams andother parts ofthe laboratory

was

strongly related toprojectperformance

(Allen, 1984). High-performing teamsalso

showed

higher frequencies ofcomunication with organizational colleagues outside of

R

& D

than theirlow-performing counterparts.

However,

by

focusing primarily on thefrequency ofcommunication, these studieshave notaddressed the broader questions ofthepurpose and natureofthose communications.

In direct contrasttothe information processingtheorists,researchers examining

particularorganizational

phenomena

haveconcentratedonspecific activitiesenacted

by

groups.

For example, those studying innovation have focused on boundary spanning andthe transferof technicalinformation across

team

boundaries (Allen, 1984; Aldrich

&

Herker, 1977;

Quinn

&

Mueller, 1963; Katz

&

Tushman,

1979), those studying interdependence havefocused

on

have focused on political orpersuasive activities withexternal constituents (Dean, 1988; Pfeffer,

1981). Because they were studying specific organizarional

phenomena

theseresearchers did not usethe groupas a focal unit.

As

such, theyhavenot tried to

map

thefull range ofexternal

activitiesused

by

groups todeal with abroad setofenvironmental demands.

A

recent qualitativestudy offive consultingteamsdid

examine team

strategies toward

the environment (Ancona, 1990). Three strategies

were

identified: informing, parading, and

probing. Infomiing teams remain relativelyisolated from theirenvironment; paradingteams have

high levelsof passive observation oftheenvironment; and probing teams activelyengage

outsiders. f*robing teamsrevise their

knowledge

oftheenvironment throughexternal contact, seek outside feedback

on

theirideas, and promote theirteams'achievements within theirorganization.

Probing teams

were

rated thehighestperformers

one

yearafterformation. Althoughthisresearch specifically

examines

team-environmentrelations, itdoes so usinga small sample anda non-profit

organization.

As

such, theauthor

was

unable to statistically test

how

external activitiesclusterand

relatetoperformance.

The

generalizability tootherkinds of organizationsisalso unclear.

To

lookat external activitiesin isolation, however,istoforget thatacomplete theory of organization teams

must

look at both internal andexternal activities. Previous research hasbeen

equivocal about theextentto

which

a particular external

mode

of operationinterferswith

—

or

facilitates

—

the developmentofeffective internal operations. Certainevidencesuggests a negative relationship.

The

internal cohesion that exists underconditions of groupthink (Janis, 1982, 1985)

promotes external stereotyping and avoidance ofexternalinformation thatinterfereswithcurrent

group consensus.

The

intergroupliterature also suggests anegativerealationship between internal

andexternal activities.

Groups

often

become

underbounded-having

many

external ties but an

inability tocoalesce and motivate

members

to pull theirexternal

knowledge

together— or

overbounded-where

there is greatinternal loyaltyand a

complex

setofinternal

dynamics

butan

inability toreach outto the external world (Alderfer, 1976; Sherif, 1966). Finally, the conflict

outsiders withdifferent goals,cognitivestyles, and attitudes (Schmidt

&

Kochan,

1972;

Shaw,

1971).

Yetnotall studies indicatesuch a negativerelationship. In a study ofeight taskforces

Gersick (1988) foundthatgroups undergo amid-point change

where

they fundamentally shift their

basic operatingprocedures.

The

study suggeststhatteams

may

deal with internal and external

demands

sequentially,first acting

on

initial information

from

theenvironmentinisolation, then

emergingtoget furtherfeedbackand updatedinformationfi-om outsiders.

A

timingeffect

was

also

found in a study offive consultingteams

where

Ancona

(1990)foundthat teams thatwere initially

externally active but internally dissatisfied

came

tobe cohesiveas external interaction translated into higherperformance.

This Study

This study attempts tofill

some

ofthegaps leftfrom previous research. Itis an

exploratory study thatdescribes thenature ofexternalactivities, theirlink toperformance, and the

ways

in

which

realorganizational teamsdeal with bothexternal andinternaldemands.

The

Natureof External Activities. Beforeacompletetheoryoforganization groups can bedeveloped

we

needto

know

more

aboutthenature oftheexternal activitiesthese groups

undertake. Priorto hypothesis testing, oreven hypothesisgenerating,

comes

the stage of

description andclassification(Gladstein

&

Quinn, 1985).

We

need to

know

what

theseteams

do

in orderto ascertaintherelevant variables for such amodel.

The

firstgoal ofthis research isto

document

and classify therangeofexternal activities thatone typeof highly interdependentorganizational group portrays.

We

want

to

know

notonly

how much

communication

takesplace betweenagroup and itsorganizational context, but also the nature ofthatcommunication.

We

do

notonly want to

know

how

agroup transfers technical information, butalsoother typesof

communication

that

may

beused todealwitha broadrange of

External Activitiesand Performance.

While

descriptionandclassificationcan beseen as

ends in themselves, our secondgoal is to

examine

therelationshipbetween externalactivities and

performance.

Teams

are

formed

inorganizations to

meet

theneedsofindividuals andto carryout

some

assignedtask. Therefore, it

seems

importanttounderstand whetherexternalactivities facilitate thoseoutcomes. Ifthey do,

we

can begin to speculate

on

theunderlying causal factors linking external activitiesand performance.

Then

models ofteam performance can be generated

thatinclude both theirinternal andexternal components. In terms ofapplication,

we

may

then be betterable to suggest

how

organization teams can improve theirperformance.

Unlikethose researchers in theinformation processing school,

we

examine

the relationship betweendifferent t\'pes ofexternalactivity andperformance. Yetinformation processing research has already

shown

some

link between the

amount

ofexternal activity and performance. Thus,

we

also

examine

the linkbetween frequencyof

communication

and performance toascertain whetherourability topredictperformanceis

improved

throughthe

additionofthisdescriptive, content-based,approach.

Strategies.

The

thirdgoal ofthisresearch isto

examine

how

organization teams

organize themselves tocarryout externalactivity. In otherwords,

which

combinations or

packages ofactivitesoccurnaturally? For example,

do

some

teams

seem

to specialize inone setof

activities, whileothers are generalists?

Do

some

teamsnotengageinexternal activitiesatall?

While

in the firstpartofthis research

we

examine

therange ofexternal activitiesteam

members

mightundertake, notallgroups havethecapacity or willingnessto exhibit the full rangeofactivity. In thispartofthe research

we

look forpatterns to see ifteamstend tofollowparticularsubsets of

activity. Then,

we

examine

how

these patterns are relatedtootheraspects of

team

functioning

suchas internal task

work

and cohesiveness.

Such

an approach hasanalogues atthe individual andorganization levels.

At

the individual level,literiilly hundreds oftraitshave been identified.

A

person can be introverted or extrovened, have an internalorexternal locusofcontrol, orbe

dominant

or submissive. But

much

people. Thus, aparanoid personalityis

made

upofdifferent sets oftraitsthan acompulsive

personality, and eachrepresents a very different approach toward the external world.

At

the organization level, strategyresearchers havelongbeen interested inclassification schemes.

Several typologiesexist, including thatof Milesand

Snow

(1978)—defenders, analyzers,

prospectors—and Porter(1980)—cost leadership, differentiation,focus.

We

followthe

same

logic atthegroup levelas

we

seektodetermine theexternal strategies thatgroupswithin organizations use.

A

typology ofstrategies will allow usto

categorize groupsin ordertodifferentiate theirforms and the implicationsofthose forms. Just as

we

have learned alot

from

categorizing individuals asparanoid orcompulsive, and organizations asanalyzersor defenders, so too

may

we

be ableto understand

more

aboutgroups through this

approach.

We

usethe term strategyto label the patternsofexternal activity thatarefound. Thisis

nottosuggestthat such patterns are necessarilyintentional. Ratherthey representthesubset of

activitiesa

team

hasdemonstrated for agiven periodoftime. In contrasttothe

Ancona

(1990) study, these strategiesare derived statistically and arebased

on

a largersample.

Summary'.

While

the suidyof small groups hasbeendominated by an internal focus the natureofteamsinorganizationstodaycallsfora

more

external approach. In trying tobuild theory

that

combines

the external and internal approachesitis firstnecessary to

document

and classify external activitiessothattherelevant variablescanbediscerned. After

we

identify a setofexternal

activities

we

examine

their impact

on team

effectiveness toanswer

two

questions. First,

do

external initiatives

make

a differenceto

team

outcomes? Second, does

knowing

thetype of external activityimproveprediction overthetraditional information processing techniquethat

examines

frequencyofexternal activity? Finally,

we

explorethe

ways

in

which

on-going

organizational teams approachtheirenvironment, and

what

effectthathas

on

otheraspects ofteam

functioning. In short,

we

explore

how

teams,

which do

not have the necessary information and

resources within theirboundariestocomplete their tasks, approachtheirenvironment andjuggle

these external

demands

with theirinternalones.

METHODS

Description of

Groups

This studyinvolvedproduct

development

teamsin fivecorporationsin thecomputer,

analyticinstrumentation, and photographic industries. Alloftheteams

were

responsiblefor

developing a protot>'pe

new

product (not basic research)and transferingit to theirfirm's

manufacturing and marketinggroups. Allthe projects used

new

orevolvingtechnologies. For example, oneproduct automatedthe samplingprocess inliquidchromatography; another

combined

photographic and computer imagingprocesses.Alloftheteams

were

temporary; they

were formed

todevelopa specific prototypeand disbanded oncethe task

was

complete.

Each was

formally headed

by

a project

team

leader.

Team

members

nomially have specificfunctional or technical skills; this assignment

was

typically the individual'sprimaryresponsibility atwork.

Each

organizationprovidedaccessto asetofteamsthathad thefollowingcharacteristics: (1)all theteams hadtobe developing a

new

product (definedas a majorextension toan existing product lineor the stan ofa

new

productline); (2) toensure

some

broadconsistency inthe

complexity ofthe products, all productshad adevelopmentcycleofone andone-halfto three years; (3)forcomparabilityinperformanceevaluations, all theteamshad tobe located within a single division; and (4) teams ranged inperfomiance; however,

company

executives did notreveal

how

teamswere initiallyclassified untilall otherdatahad been collected.

Team

membership was

determined

from

company

recordsandverifiedwithteam leaders; averagesize

was

approximately

10 (s.d. 6.2).

Data and

Sample

This study usedseveral sourcesofdata. Interviewsand logs

were

used to generatealist of

different, and larger, set ofteamstodetermine theextent towhich they believed it

was

their

responsibility to

cany

outeach type ofactivity,the frequency ofexternal activity, the stateof

internalprocesses, and assessmentsof

team

performance. Interviews withthe leaders ofthe

teams that filled outthequestionnaires were

done

toget asecond assessmentof

team

performance and to get

background

information on theteams.

To

identify the setofactionsgroup

members

mighttake in dealing with others,interviews

were conductedwith 38 experiencednew-product-team

managers

(Ancona

&

Caldwell, 1987).

During these semi-structured interviews,

managers

were

asked todecsribethe interactions that

they,or

members

oftheirteam, had with otherindividuals outsidethe

new

product team.

We

askedthese

team

leaders tobe asinclusive aspossibleintheirdescriptions andtoincludeall forms

of

communication

including meetings, telephonecalls, and

computer

messages.

These

interviews

were

taped andtranscribed. In addition tothe interviews,

members

of

two

new

product teams

were

asked tokeeplogs ofall theirexternal activitiesovera

two-week

period.

The

interview transcriptsand logs

were

reviewed by fourindividuals (the

two

authors

and two

graduate students)

toidentify anexhaustivelistofactions team

members

and leaderstookin dealingwithindividuals outsidetheteam.

These

actions

became

the basis forquestionnaire itemsmeasuringtype of

external activity.

Questionnaireswere distributed toassess external activities, internal processes, and

performance.

The

questionnaires were distributed toteamsthatdid nottake partin theprevious interviewandlog datacollection.

A

total of

450

questionnaires were distributedto team

members

and leadersof47 teams. Since

many

oftheitems includedin thequestionnairerelated to

perceptions oftheteam, thequestionnaires distributedtoeach

team

included alist of

team

members

toensurethatindividualshad a

common

referent.

Completed

questionnaires

were

returned

by 409

individuals,yielding aresponserateofapproximately 89percent.

Response

rates

were

approximatelyequal across the fivecompanies; totalresponses per

company

variedfrom 39 to

129. Because

much

ofthe analysis

was

conducted atthegroup level,teams

were

includedin the

final sample only ifat least three-fourths oftheir

members

responded. This reducedthe

number

of

teamsinthefinal sample to45.

The

average ageofthe individualsinthe sample

was

38.6 years; 88 percent

were

male; and 75 percentpossessed atleasta four-year college degree. Approximately 77 percentofthe

respondents

were

employed

intheengineering orresearchand development functionsoftheir

companies; theremaining 23 percentwereprimarily

from

themanufacturingormarketing

functions.

Measures

Types

of

Boundary

Activity.

The

analysisoftheinterviewandlog data yieldedatotal of

24items including actions such as persuadingothers to supporttheteam, attempting toacquire resourcesfor theteam, and bringing technicalinformation intothe group.

The

24

boundaryactivities

were

convertedtoquestionnaire items

by

asking respondentsto indicate

on

five-point

Liken

scales the extent to

which

they felteach oftheitems

was

partoftheir

responsibilityindealing with people outside the team.

The

complete setoftheseitems is

shown

in

Table 1.

Amount

ofBoundar>' Activity.

Team

members

were asked

how

often they

communicated

with non-team individuals in the marketing, manufacturing, engineering and product

management

functions during theprevious

two

week

period.

They

responded

on

6-point scales anchored by 1

=

Not

atalland 6

=

Several times per day. Sincethese functional groupshaddifferent

names

in thecompanies, thequestionnaires were modifiedto

conform

tocompany-specificterminology.

Becausethesefourgroupsrepresented every

one

with

whom

team

members

would

normally

communicate

in theirwork, theseresponses

were

averaged.

Team

scores

were computed

by

averaging the individual scores

(X

=

2.54, s.d.

=

.78).

There hasbeen adebate in theliterature as towhetherorganization

members

canaccurately assess

communication

patterns. Bernard and colleagues (1980, 1985) claimthatasking people

how

much

they talk to othersproduces inaccurate results. Individuals forget

some

communications and over countothers. Otherresearchershave counteredthiscriticismby

showing

thatorganization

members

may

notreproduce exactlythe

communications

thathavejust occurred, buttheirbiasisin thedirection of long-term patterns of

communication

(Freeman,

Romney,

&

Freeman,

1987).

So

respondents arenotactually answeringthe question

"Who

did I

speakto in thelast

two weeks"

but "In a typical

two-week

period, with

whom

am

Ihkely tohave

spoken." Since our focus

was

this

more

general pattern ofcommunication, the broadmeasure of

communication

frequency

we

usedis appropriate.

Internal processes.

As

Goodman,

Ravlin, and

Schminke

(1987) have noted, task-oriented

groupprocesses

may

be

more

directly related toperformancethan

more

traditional affect-based

measures of group process.

Members'

perceptionsofthe teams' work-relatedgroup process were

assessedwiththree items. Individuals usedfivepoint Likert scales to indicate the team'sability to

develop workable plans, define goals, and prioritize work; high scores defined betterperceived processes (see

Hackman,

1983). Since a principal

component

analysis yielded a singleunderlying

factor,these threeitems

were

averagedto

form

a single scale(alpha

=

.86).

A

score

was

then

computed

foreachofthe

45

teams byaveraging theindividual scoresofthe

members

ofthe

team

(X =

3.69, s.d.

=

.43).

Many

ofthearguments suggesting anegative linkbetween externalactivitiesandinternal

process usecohesiveness asan indicatorofprocess. This

more

traditional affect-based measure

was

assessed using Seashore's (1954) four items.

These

fouritems

were

averaged to

fomi

a single scale (alpha

=

.91).

A

score

was

then

computed

foreach ofthe forty-five teams by averaging the individual scoresofthe

members

ofthe

team (X =

3.7,s.d.

=

.81).

Team

Performance. Following the stakeholderview oforganiztions, team perfomiance

cannot be seenas a simple, uni-dimensional,construct. First,as

Goodman,

Ravlin, and

Schminke

(1987) argue, group measuresofperformance

must

be both fine-grained andrelatedto thetask.

For example, ifagroup isresponsible forcompleting an innovative

new

product, then

performance measures should include the group's innovativeness notjust general

member

satisfaction. Second, Gladstein (1984) found thatevaluations ofgroup performancediffer

depending

upon

whether group

members

or

managers

aredoingthe rating. Thissupports Tsui's (1984) contention thatdifferentconstituencies often havedifferent definitionsofperformance and

suggests thatratings

from

thesevariousconstituenciesbe included in astudy ofgroup performance. Finally, groupresearchershave found a lag effectbetween groupprocessand performance (Ancona. 1990; Bettenhausen

&

Mumighan,

1985; Gladstein, 1984). This suggests

thatprocesses exhibited at time 1,ma>' impact performanceattime 1 or time 2.

Going

onestep

further,certain processes

may

have a positive effectin theshort-term but turnout tobenegative

overtime. Thus, thisresearch

examines

theimpactofexternal groupprocesses

on

several

measuresofperformance, asrated b)' both group

members

and top

management,

inthe short-term

and atprojectcompletion.

Performancedata

were

collected at

two

pointsintime.

The

firstcoincided withother data collection

from team

members

(time 1) and the second

was

approximately

two

yearslater,

when

teams had completed theirprojectsor werein thefinalstages (time2).

Top

division

managers

were

asked toassess the teams in their

company. Using

fivepoint Likert scales,theyrated each

team's efficiency, qualityoftechnical innovations, adherenceto schedules, adherence to budgets,

and abilitytoresolveconflicts. Although thesample size

was

small, the performanceitemsateach

time

were

subjected to a principal

components

analysis toidentifyunderlying patterns. Usingthe data collectedat time 1,

two

factors emerged.

One

factor

was

definedby theadherence to budgets

and adherence to schedules questions.

We

averaged those

two

items to

form

a single variable

we

call budgets and schedules.

The

remaining threeitemsloaded onthe secondfactor;

we

averaged

them

tocreate a variable

we

call efficiencyof innovation .

A

different factor structure

emerged

when

the performancemeasurescollectedattime2

were

analyzed.

One

factor,

which

we

label innovation

was

defined solely

by

the single qualityof technicalinnovationsproduceditem.

The

second,

which

we

label

team

operations

was

defined bytheremainingfouritems,

which

were averaged to

form

a scale score.

To

assure comparabilityoftheperformance ratingsacross

companies, individual scoresforeach

team

were adjusted by subtracting the

mean

ofthe scores

assigned to teamswithin that

company.

Thus

the performancescores

were

adjustedfor

company

and the overall

means

set to zero.

One

additional performance measure

was

collected attime 1.

Team

members

were askedin

thequestionnaireto rate theperformance oftheirteams

on

six dimensionsincludingefficiency, quality,technical innovation, adherence to schedules, adherencetobudgets, and

work

excellence.

These

itemswere completed by all individuals,allowing a principal

components

analysisofthe items

was

conducted.

The

analysis yielded a singlefactor.

A

score,

which

we

call team rating

was

assigned to each

team

byaveraging the individual

members'

scores(alpha

=

.83)

(X =

3.63, s.d.

=

.38).

Analysis

The

analysis

moves

through three stages: factor analysis,regression analysis, and Q-factor analysis. First, the

409

individual responses to the 24 boundaryactions are factoranalyzed to

represent the underlying structure. Factoranalysis allows ustodescribe external activitiesina

more

succinctand non-overlapping

manner

than ispermittedwiththeunwieldy

24

items. Factor scores are then calculated foreach individual and averagedto

form

groupscores.'' Factor

analysis yields severalindependentactivity sets

made

upof highlyrelatedexternal actions. Next, regressionanalysisis usedtodetermine the relationshipsbetween both frequency

and

typeof

activityand performance. Thisregression allows ustoevaluate theusefulness ofactivity types,

overand above theinformation processing model,in predictingperformance.

Finally, Q-factoranalysis is used toidentify clustersofteams usingthe

same

pattern of external activities. Q-factoranalysis issimilartoclusteranalysisinthatitcanproducea

taxonomy

ofexternal strategiesindicating

how

external activities

work

incombinations.

While

regression

"•Note:

modes

of aggregation other than averaging were tested to examine different assumptions

about

how

groups represent all individual

member

contributions. For example,

we

summed

individual scores under the assumption that a team's external activity is simply the

sum

of individual contributions.

Changes

in aggregation procedures did not significantly affect results.

analysis statistically isolates the independenteffectsofeach activity set, such a technique does not

tellus

which

combinationsorgestalts naturallyoccurand to

what

effect (Hambrick, 1983).

Q-factor analysis groupstogether thoseteams thatshare

common

approaches to theenvironment, and

thesegroupings can tlien be

compared

along otherdimensions such as internal process.

RESULTS

Types

of

Boundary

Activity

Individuals' ratings ofthe extent to

which

they

assumed

responsibility foreach ofthe

24

boundary

actions

were

analyzedwith a principal

component

analysisandavarimaxrotation. Four

factorswith eigenvalues greaterthan 1.0explained

60

percentoftotalvariance. Inspectionofthe

Scree plot supported thefourfactor solution. Table 1

summarizes

this analysisand

shows

the item

loadings greaterthan .35.

INSERT

TABLE

1

ABOUT HERE

Factors aredescribed byitems with loadings greaterthan .50.

The

firstfactorcontains 12 itemsthat reflect both buffering andrepresentational activities.

Examples

of buffering included

such things as protecting the

team

andabsorbing outsidepressure. Representational activities

includedpersuadingothers to supportthe

team

and lobbyingfor resources. Since theseactivities

represent bothprotective andpersuasivegoals,

we

label

them

as

ambassador

activities.

The

secondfactor

was

definedbyfiveitemsthatrepresent interactions

aimed

at

coordinating technical ordesign issues.

Examples

ofactivities in this set include discussing design

problems with others, obtaining feedbackon theproductdesign, coordinatingand negotiating with outsiders.

We

label these taskcoordinatoractivities.

The

third factor

was

made

up

of four items describing behaviors thatinvolve general scanning for ideasand information about thecompetition, themarket, or thetechnology.

We

label

this factorscout activity. Theseitemsdiffer

from

theprevious itemsinthatthey relate to general

scanningas

opposed

tohandling specific coordinationissues.

The

fourth setofactivitiesrepresent actionsthatavoidreleasing information.

We

labelthe

three itemsthatdefine thisfactor guardactivities. Since these activitiesdiffer

from

theotherthree

in thatthey

do

notrepresent initiativestoward theenvironment, but rather internalactivitiestokeep

things

from

theenvironment,

we

do

not include guard activities in subsequent analyses.

Factorscores were

computed

foreach individual and then averagedto

form

scores for

each group. Althoughorthogonal atthe individual level,

when

theindividual scores

were

averaged

tofomi group scores

some

intercorrelation emerged. Table2

shows

means, standarddeviations,

andcorrelations

among

all variables.

Ambassador

activities are positively correlated with task coordinatoractivities and negativelywith scoutactivities. Frequency of

communication

was

not significantly related toany ofthe activity setsat thegroup level. There were

some

relationships

between theseexternally-orientedactivitiesand internalgroup process. Frequency of

communication

was

significantlyrelated onlytocohesiveness, and the relationshipis negative.

Groups

with high levelsofambassador activitiesreported higherratings ofinternalprocess and

marginally higherratings of cohesiveness than groupswith

low

levelsofthisactivity.

An

opposite pattern

was

observed forscoutactivities.

The

levelofthatexternal activity

showed

small negative relationships withinternalprocess and cohesiveness.

Boundary

Activitiesand Product

Team

Performance

The

correlational analysis indicates

some

significant relationships

among

performance

measures, and between boundaryactivities and performance.

Not

surprisingly

some

performance measures are alsointerrelated. Recallthatthe

management

ratingsofperformance are adjusted bya subtractionofthe

company mean

toinsure comparability acrosscompanies.

The

two

time 1

management

ratingsofperformancewere positively relatedand werebothrelated to thetime 2

measure

ofinnovation.

The

teams'

own

ratings ofperformance

were

unrelatedto

management's

ratingsofperformance.

Of

central interest are the correlationsbetween theboundaryactivitiesandperformance.

Ambassador boundary

activities

were

positively associated with

managements'

ratings of teams'

abilityto

meet

budgets and schedules (time 1) and of

team members'

ratingsoftheir

own

performance (time 1). Thereisalso

some

relationshipwith

management

ratingsof innovation (time2). Higherlevelsoftask coordinatoractivities

were

associated with higherratings (two

significantat p

<

.05;

two

marginalat p

<

.10)

on

all four

management

provided performance measures (time 1 and time 2).

An

opposite pattern

was

truefor scout activities,

which were

negatively associated with ratings

on

the time 1 measures ofbudgets and schedulesand innovation

efficiency and thetime2

measure

ofinnovation as well as

team

ratingsofperformance. Frequency of

communication

was

marginally associated with time 1 meeting budgets and schedules and

efficiencyofinnovation, and highly negativelyrelated to

team

ratingsofperformance.

INSERT

TABLE

2

ABOUT HERE

Table 3 reports regressionequationsforeachofthe fiveperformance measures.

The

results are straightforward.

Adherence

to budgets andschedules (time 1)

was

positively related to

fi-equencyof

communications

and ambassadoractivities and negativelyrelatedto scoutactivities.

Efficiencyofinnovation (time 1)

was

negatively related toscoutactivities.

Task

coordinator

activity is

no

longerrelated totime 1 managment-ratedperformance, perhapsdue to multi-collinearity.

The

teams' ratingsoftheir

own

performance(time 1)

was

negativelyrelated to

frequencyof

communication

with others.

The

finalratings,obtained aftertheprojects were

completed

were

somewhat

different. Innovation (time2)

was

positively related totask coordinator

activitiesand negativelyrelated toscout activities.

Team

operations (time 2)

which

included

adherenceto both budgetsand schedules

was

not predicted bytheexternalactivities.

INSERT

TABLE

3

ABOUT HERE

Group

Strategies for

Boundary

Management

The

relationships

among

thegroup-levelmeasures ofboundaryactivities suggest thatteams

may

use consistent strategies todeal withoutsiders. Inotherwords, teams

may

make

clearchoices

(whetherintentionallyor not) toundertake certain boundaryactivities and notothers.

To

identify these strategies,Q-factoranalysis

was

used. Incontrast to

more

conventional R-factoranalysis, Q-factoranalysis is based

on

therespondents,rather than the variables, and seeksto

combine

or

condense respondents intodistinctly differentgroups within thepopulation. Q-factor analysis differs

from

clusteranalysisin thatthegroupings are based

on

intercorrelations between

means

and

standard deviations oftherespondents ratherthan

on

theabsolutedistancesbetweenthe respondei.ts' scores. Thus, Q-factor analysis

may

be

more

sensitive to patterns

among

the variablesthan absolutedifferencesin magnitude.

A

Q-factor analysis withavarimaxrotation

was

performedon the

45

groups usingthe

groupscores

on

the

ambassador

,task coordinator, and scout variables. Thisanalysis identified

fourdistinct sets ofgroups thataredepicted in Table4.

The

firstpartofTable 4

shows

theresults

ofthree

one-way

analysesof variance (with group size asa covariate) using groupscores

on

the

ambassador

, taskcoordinator, and scoutvariables asdependent variables.

The

Q-factoranalysis identified fourstrategies.

The

first concentrates

on ambassador

activitiesand very littleelse. In otherwords, team

members'

outside activitiesareprimarily as

ambassadors.

As

such

we

label this strategyambassadorial.

The

second strategy

combines

scout activities with

some

taskcoordination. Sincethis setofteamsis scanningtheenvironmentfor technical data ratherthan persuadingtop

management

ofitsachievementsit is labeled technical scouting.

The

third setofteams is relatively

low on

all dimensions, although thereis

some

minimalscoutactivity.

We

label this strategy isolationism. Finally,the fourth setofgroups have

members

feelingresponsibleforboth ambassador and task coordination activities,butlittle

scouting. This strategy avoids general scanning;it focuseson external interaction to both persuade others thatits

work

isimportant, and tocoordinate, negotiate,and obtain feedback

from

outside groups.

We

label this strategy comprehensive.

Table 4provides data illustratingproperties ofteamsfollowingdifferent strategies. There

were

significantdifferences in

communication

patterns across strategies.

Those

teamsfollowing theambassadorial strategy and theisolationism strategyhavethelowest frequency of

communication

withoutsiders and althoughnot shown,

members

ofthese teams spend the lowest percentage oftheirtime withoutsiders

(12%

and

10%

respectively). In contrast, technical scouting

and comprehensive teams havethehighest frequency ofexternal interactionand spendthehighest percentage oftheir time with outsiders

(18%

and

16%

respectively).

More

in-depth analysis

shows

that

ambassador

activity (found in teamsusing ambassadorial and comprehensivestrategies)

may

show

low

levelsofexternal

communication

because individualshavehigh levelsof

communication

with topdivisionand top corporate

management.

Tliisconcentrated

conimunication requires a lowerfrequency ofinteraction than the

more

diffuse

communication

patterns found withstrategiesinvolving scoutandtaskcoordinatoractivity.

The

latter involvehigh levelsofinteractionacross manufacturing, marketing, and

R&D.

The

external strategies haveimplicationsfor internal processesas well. Ambassadorial teams

show

the

most

effective taskprocesses andhighestcohesiveness. This

form

ofexternal interaction eitherpromotesuseful internal interaction,oreffective internal interactionallowsforthis

legitimating externalactivity. Thus, whileingeneral high levelsofexternalactivity are relatedto

poorinternal processes, certain types ofexternal activityfacilitate, orare facilitatedby, effective internal processes.

The

various strategies

show

differentrelationships toperformance.

While

both

ambassadorial and comprehensivestrategiesare related toachieving budgets and schedulesin the shortterm(time 1), only thecomprehensive strategy is positively relatedtoperformance over time (innovation,time2).

Both

the technical scouting teamsand theisolationism teams have poor

perfoimanceacrossperformanceindicatorsovertime (seeTable 4).

INSERT

TABLE

4

ABOUT HERE

DISCUSSION

The

increasingreliance

on

teams todevelop products and processesrequires thatteams

span traditional organizational boundaries. Funhermore,as levelsofmiddle

management

disappearteams aregiven increasingresponsibility todefine, market, carryout, and transfertlieir

work. These

new

responsibilities requireextensiveexternal interaction with organizational

members

outside the groups' boundaries. This study has exploredthe natureof those external

activities and theirrelationships tootherkey groupvariables. Results

show

new

models

ofgroup

process,

new

understandings ofthefactors related to group performance, anda typologyof group

strategies toward theenvironment.

Group

Process Revised

This studyidentifies fouractivity sets labeledambassador, task coordinator, scout, and guardactivities.

Ambassador

activitiesreflect primarily buffering,e.g. absorbing pressures and

protecting theteam, and representational activities, e.g. persuadingothersto supportthe

team

and

lobbying forresources.

Task

coordinatoractivitiesare

aimed

atcoordinationaround specific technical issues such asobtainingfeedback

on

theproduct designon negotiating deliverydeadlines with outsiders. Scout activities entail

more

general scanning forideasandinformation than the

specific,focused taskcoordination. Finally, as theexistenceofguardactivities indicates,these external activitiesare

combined

withinternalactivitiestodetermine thepermeabilityofagroup's

boundary.

Extemal

initiatives appe;irtoallow the group to accesskeyresources in theenvironment.

Ambassadorial activitiesprovide access to the

power

structure oftheorganization; they are

aimed

at

managing

vertical dependence. These activitiesprotectthe team fromexcessive interference

from

the top, and facilitate the group'slegitimacy and survival byidentifying key threats, securing resources, and promoting the

image

oftheteam.

Task

coordinatoractivitiesprovide access tothe

work

flow structure; theyare

aimed

at

managing

horizontal dependence.

These

activitiesprobably

fill in

many

ofthe gapsleft

by

formal integrating systems.

Through

coordination, negotiation, and

feedback, theseactivitiesallowfortightercoupling with other organizationalunits

who

also contributeto thegroup's final output. Scoutactivitiesprovide accessto theinformation structure;

they are

aimed

at adding tothe expertise ofthe group.

These

activitiesallow the group toupdateits

information base,providing

new

ideas and signalingchangesin technologies andmarkets.

Thisresearch suggests thatextemal activitiescan be effectively

combined

with internal

processes.

While

frequency of

communication

alone and scoutactivities are negativelyrelated to

cohesiveness andintemalprocesses, ambassadoractivitiesarepositively related tointernal

measures. Thus,teams appeartobe able tocoalesceifthey havespecific, focused extemalactivity

aimed

atinfluencingpowerful outsiders. Continuous high levels ofactivity

aimed

atobtaining

more

general information about theenvironmentinterfereswiththeteam'sabilityto setgoalsand develop support

among

members.

Since this ambassadorialactivity appearsto

improve

performance,while scout activity

dampens

performance, it appearsthattheextemal activities that

are associatedwith

good

intemal processesalso are associated with performance.

Although

allkinds of organization groups (e.g. task forces, salesteams, innovating teams,

and even top

management

teams) faceextemal dependencethese activitieshavenot been

incorporated intoour

models

ofgroupprocess. This research suggests that extemal boundary

activitiesbeadded totaskand maintenance activitiesinorderto

more

fully represent the fullrange of

what

group

members

do. Clearly, inorganizational settings

many

groups

do

not

work

inthe isolationcharacteristic ofartificial groups thatpreviouslyhave been studied. Real groups needto

manage

their boundariesandadapt totheorganizational environment.

An

enlarged

model would

also helpmanagers tostructure team activities tomeet internal and external objectives.

PredictingPerformance

As

theresultsindicate, the pattern ofexternalactivities are

more

important than simply thefrequency ofcommunication. Frequent

communication

ismarginally related to

management

ratingsof performanceat time 1 but notattime 2.

The

activity sets are

more

strongly related to

management

ratings ofperformance, than frequency. In addition,theactivity sets relatedtothe differentperfonnancemeasures in singularways.

Ambassador

activities

were

related totime 1

management

ratingsofthe teams'adherenceto budgetsand schedules.

Task

coordination

activities, however,

were

positively relatedto

management

ratingsofinnovation attime 2. In

contrast to thispattern, very generalintelligence gathering

-

definedby ahigh level ofscout

activity

-

was

associated

low

managerialratingsofperformanceatboth time 1 andtime2.

Analyzing

team

strategiesprovides alittle

more

insight into long-term performance.

While

ambassadorialactivities

seem

to be akeytoperformance, theireffectoverthelong-term

seems

tohold only in combination with taskcoordinatoractivities. Pure ambassadorial teams and

comprehensive teams

move

along

on

budget andschedule attime 1.

At

time2,however, the ambassadorial teamsarepooratinnovationand

team

operations, whilethecomprehensive teams

continueto bethe highestperformers. This suggeststhat while

managing

the

power

structure alone

may

work

in theshort-term teams that

manage

both the

power

structure and thework-flow

structuremaintain perfomance overtime. This findingissimilar tothatreportedby Zurger and

Maidique

(1990). Furthermore, notall task related activityiseffective.

Too much

scoutactivityis

relatedto

low

performanceratings. It

may

be that suchteams constandyreacttogeneral

environmentaldata and

become

unable to

commit

toproducinga specific endproductata specific pointintime. Or, it

may

be thathighlevelsofscout activity

somehow

reduces theefforts

team

members

put into the

more

performance-relevantexternal activitiesorintobuildingeffective internal processes.

A

verydifferent pattern emerges

when

the

team

ratesits

own

performance.

Teams

feel that they performwell

when

they concentrate theirefforts internally; theyrevealperceptionsof

performancethatarenegativelyrelated tofrequency of

communication

and positively related to

cleargoals andpriorities and high cohesiveness. Thus,predictorsof

management

ratedand

team-rated performancearevery different.

Team

members

may

well have followed an attributionprocess similarto thatdescribed

by

Staw

(1975), Calder(1977) andGladstein (1984). For example, Calder arguedthat individuals

have implicittheories ofwhat

makes

a leader.

When

they seeall oreven a

few

ofthese behaviors they attribute leadershipstatus to that person. Similarly, Gladstein foundthat group

members

label theirgroup as high performing

when

theyexhibit processcharacteristics (e.g. highlevelsof

intra-group coordination and strong internalprocess) thoughtto be linked toperformance. This activation ofimplicit theories then guides the interpretation ofsubsequentbehaviors.

Group

Strategies

This studyidentifiedfour strategiesthatgroups usetoward theirenvironment. In one set

ofgroups

members

concentrated solely

on

ambassadoractivities, so

we

label theirstrategy ambassadrial.

The

second setof groups had

members

concentrate

on

scoutactivities so

we

label

theirstrategy general scouting.

The

third setofgroups had relatively

low

scores

on

all activity sets

so theirstrategyis labeled isolationism. Finally,the last setofgroupsincluded

members

engaged

inboth

ambassador

andtaskcoordinatoractivities. This setofteams approached abroad setof

external constituentswitha broad rangeofactivities and theirstrategyisthuslabeled

comprehensive.

The

group strategiesobservedin this study arevery similarto thosefound by

Ancona

(1990)despite having been derived

from

averydifferent setof teams, in

companies from

different

industries, and using a ver>'differentmethodology.

Ancona

found one setofteamsthatremained

relativelyisolated from key external constituents,and anotherthatengaged inextensivescanningor "parading" withintheenvironment with no specific agenda.

A

third setofgroupshad high levels ofinteraction bothvertically and horizontally with theenvironment, and

engaged

inboth

self-promotion and idea testing with outsiders.

However,

inAncona's study there were

no

groups

exclusivelyfollowingthe political persuasion strategy.

These

two

studies togetherprovide supportfor the validity ofthese strategies as

representingrealpatterns found inorganizational teamstoday. In addition, this

taxonomy

provides abasisforcategorizinggroups anddifferentiating theirformsandthe implicationsof those forms.

These

strategiesalsoillustrate thecontributionofa content, ratherthan a frequency-based,

approach toexternal interaction. If

we

were to look at external frequency alone,teams following an isolationism andambassadorial strategy

would

be groupedtogetheras

low

frequency

communicators

and teams followingageneral scouting and comprehensive strategy

would

be grouped togetheras high frequencycommunicators. Yet such a classification

would

mask

great within groupvariance.

Funhermore,

given theuncertainty and complexityofthehigh-technology,

new

product

team

environment, one

would

predictthathighfrequency teams

would

bebetter performers.

As

shown, this is not always the case.

Finally, while

some

strategiesappeartobe

more

related toperformancethanothersthese

strategiesarenotautomatically followed.

The

coalition formation strategy

was

betterlinked toall

performanceratings thanother strategiesbutonly 10 outof

45

teams followed this strategy.

Othersfollowed onlyparts ofthe strategy,e.g. ambassadorial teams, or strategies notatall linked

toperformance e.g. general scouting teams. Future research isneededto ascertain whether groups

do

not follow optimal strategies becausethey

do

not

know

what these strategiesare, or they

know

them

but

do

not havetheresourcestoimplementthem, oriforganizational ortask variablesprompt

lessoptimalexternal actions.

Limitations

This study has

some

inherentweaknessesthat limitthegeneralizabilityofthe findingsand

the validity of the results.

The

study

was done

in high-technologyindustriesusing teams with high levelsofexternal

dependence

andcoordinationdemands.

While

this allowed usto

map

a

wide domain

ofexternal activities,the findings

may

notapply to

more

isolated,self-contained teams. Indeed,

we

argue thatthe internal perspective withitsemphasis on internal

dynamics

may

well predict performance inT-groups, laboratory groups, and

autonomous

work

groups-itjust

does not

do

wellfor thenew,

more

externally-tied organization groups. Obviously, theinverse

may

hold too, limiting theexternal perspective toorganizational groups such as

new

product teams, salesteams, or cross-functional task forces.

In addition, the study utilized subjective ratingsofperformance,albeit

from

multiple sources.

While

more

objective ratings such as percentoverbudget or actual saleshave been

suggested, (Clark

&

Fujimoto, 1987) it

was

ourexperience thatthese

numbers were

often interpreted through subjective lenses,

were

influenced by

numerous

otherexternal factors not

under the controlofthe team. (e.g. an

economic

recession) and

were

lessimportant than

managerial ratings indetermining promotions, futurejobassignments, and performance

evaluations. Nonetheless, subjective ratings arejust perceptions and

we

may

be

mapping

performance onto distortedperceptions. Finally, theuseofself-reportmeasures raises the

question of

how much

oftheexplained variance is

common-method

varianceand

how much

is true variance. This isparticularlyproblematicin investigating thelink between team-ratedprocessand performance.

Despite these limitations thestudydoes representone ofthe

few

large-scaleempirical studiesofgroups within organizations. Itdemonstrates thatwhilethe

dominant

internal perspectivehas stressed internal group processes, the externalperspective illuminates thewide rangeofexternalactivities that

many

organizational groupsexhibit.

Ambassador,

task coordinator,

and scout activitiesrepresentan added dimension of group process.

These

dimensionsare

configured in particularpatterns within thegroups studied here.

Some

groups concentrate

on

ambassadorial activities (ambassadorial strategy), others

on

scouting(technical scouting strategy),

others not

on

anything (isolationist strategy) and othersonboth

ambassador

andtaskcoordinator

activities (comprehensive strategy).

While

thestudy illustratesa strongerrelationship between

external activitiesand managerially-rated performance than forinternalprocesses andperformance, notall external strategiesareequally successful and higherfrequency ofexternal activity aloneis not

enough

to sustainperformance.

Key

activities are

ambassador

andtaskcoordinator. Yet the former, alone, only

works

in the short-term. Persuasion and political influence without

backup

of technical innovation anda solid product, isfound outovertime.

Therefore, this study hasgreatly

expanded

our

knowledge

ofthe external perspective. It

has

expanded

oursampleofgroups toinclude intact teamsin organizationsand usedthose teams to shiftour

models

of process and performance. There is supportfor

moving

the group-research lens

from

a position looking solelywithin thegroup, to

one

thatrotates

from

an inwardto an outward

perspective. Perhapsonly then can

we

learn toreconcile the alternative

models

of

team

members

and

managers

in terms oftheprecursors ofgroup performance, and

leam

to understandthe

new

kind ofgroupthatisso prevalent inthecorporatearena.

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TABLE

1

VARIMAX

FACTORY

LOADINGS FOR

BOUNDARY

MANAGEMENT

DIMENSIONS

n=409

Absorb

outside pressuresfor the

team

so it

can

work

freeofinterference.

Protect the

team from

outsideinterference. Prevent outsiders

from

"overloading" the

team with too

much

information ortoo

many

requests.

Persuade otherindividualsthat theteam's

activitiesare important.

Scan the environmentinsideyourorganization for threats to theproduct team.

"Talk up"the

team

tooutsiders.

Persuade othersto support the team'sdecisions

Acquire resources (e.g.

money,

new

members,

equipment) fortheteam.

Reportthe progressofthe team to a higher organizational level.

Findoutwhetherothersin the

company

support oroppose yourteam's activities.

Findout information on your company's

strategy orpohtical situation that

may

affectthe project.

Keep

other groups in the

company

infonned

ofyourteam's activities.

Resolvedesign problems with external groups.

Coordinate activities withexternal groups. Procure things

which

the

team

needs

from

other

groupsorindividuals inthe

company.

.785 .740 .719 .654 .636 .602 .592 .587 .553 .551 .549 .519 .417 .416 .417 .403 .449 .430 .421 .776 .660 .657

Negotiate with others fordeliver)'deadlines.

Review

productdesign with outsiders.

Findout

what

competingfirms orgroups are

doingon similar projects.

Scan theenvironment, inside or outside the orgiuiization formarketing ideas/expertise. Collect technical information/ideasfrom

individualsoutside oftheteam.

Scan theenvironmentinside or outside the organization fortechnical ideas/expertise.

Keep

news

aboutthe

team

secret from others

inthe

company

until the appropriatetime.

Avoid

releasinginformation to others in the

company

toprotect the team's

image

or product itis

working

on.

Control thereleaseof infomiation

from

the team in an effort topresentthe profile

we

want

to show.

.618 .515 .404 .791 .719 .424 .645 .491 .587 .823 .817 .592

TABLE

3

-REGRESSION RESULTS,

Budgets

&

Efficiencyof

Team

Innovation

Team

Schedules Innovation Rating Operations

(Time 1) (Time 1) (Time 1)

(Time

2) (Time 2)

Frequency of

Communication

.25+ .17 .46** .06 ,11

Ambassador

Activities .31 * -.04 .18 -.05 -.01

Task

Coordinator Activities ,19 .21 .09 .45** .20 Scout Activities -.JZy* -.38* -.12 ._44** .01 Adjustedr^