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Formation of coalition structures as a non-cooperative game

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Academic year: 2021

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Table 1: Payoff for the standard Prisoners Dilemman L 2,alone H 2,alone L 1,alone (0;0) {{1}, {2}} (-5;3){{1}, {2}} H 1,alone (3;-5) {{1}, {2}} (−2; −2) ∗{{1}, {2}}
Table 2: Payoff for an extension of Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Table 3: Payoff for two extrovert players who prefer to be together. Unique- Unique-ness of an equilibrium is fixed.
Table 4: Payoff for two “introvert” players, who prefer to be alone. Unique- Unique-ness of an equilibrium is fixed.
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