Workshop Determiners and inferences Paris 13-14 June 2012
Weak definites as relational definites
Francis Corblin (Université Paris-Sorbonne &IJN) Terminology :
Weak definites:
Pierre a pris le train
Pierre est passé à la banque Marie va à l’école
Telic definites : Corblin 2011
A sub class of weak definites with location verbs and animate subjects : Pierre est à l’école
Marie ira à la plage Relational definites :
Le père (frère, cousin) de Marie Le menu du restaurant
Le docteur de Marie
NB: Nouns used in overt relational definites can be used in bare definites : Le menu était copieux
Le docteur examina Marie
The paper gives arguments supporting the following claim:
Weak definites are relational definites.
I gave in a previous paper (Corblin 2011) some arguments against the theses that weak definites are generic definite or intensional or kind-referring NPs. I will not come back to these arguments. Aguilar & Swarts (2010) published after this paper was under press seems to be the most recent version of weak definites as kind-denoting expressions and does not give new arguments in favor of this view.
1. A working hypothesis for definiteness : definites as functions
Any definite NP, weak or not, share the property that like a function, it returns one and only one entity satisfying its lexical content.
The idea that definiteness is interpreted as an instruction to the effect that the descriptive content of the NP is used as a function returning one individual is worth trying.
The familiarity use of definite NPs are uses in which, considering the set of entities made salient by the on-going discourse, the content of the definite NP returns one and only one entity satisfying the content.
{a, b, c, d…} the x Only one of a, b, c, d satisfies x
x returns the value “true” for exactly one entity.
The relational use of definite NPs is even closer to the classical notion of function. The use of the takes for granted that the content of the NP can be interpreted as a function returning a single entity when taking another entity as argument.
the x x (a) returns a single entity b This child is alone. The mother does not care for her.
In both cases, familiarity and relational cases, presupposition and accommodation plays a crucial role :
For familiarity definites, it is assumed that the definite operates on a set of known entities such that its descriptive content can return a unique individual. The discourse domain is thus narrowed down by different parameters (proximity, salience) in such a way that the definite be felicitous.
A doctor told me I had better stop smoking The doctor…
For relational definites, the parameters permitting a functional interpretation are adjusted. If the noun is ambiguous (sortal/relational) the relational interpretation is selected, and the argument-parameters of the relation are accommodated in order for the content to return a unique individual (i.e. in such a way that the relation is supposed to be a function).
The definite NP returns typically a new entity. All we know is that the entity is obtained as a value of the function.
To sum up :
Definite : the X = X is used as a function returning a single individual
Familiarity Relational
X picks up the only x : X x of a X is a relational meaning
set of old discourse referents. R (a) is functional, returns a single individual.
Example : a dog, a cat… the cat a baby … the mother
Note that the functional approach of definiteness does not see weak definites as so special a priori.
At face value, they exhibit some typical properties of relational definites : they do not refer to an old discourse referent, and they emerge only with lexical heads which can be associated with roles, functions in the broad sense (school, hospital).
2. Overt Relational definites : Mary’s doctor
For overt relational definites (e.g. Marys’doctor) the content on the definite NP is “complete”, as opposed to short definites (e.g. the bank), in the sense that a relational N (doctor) comes with the expression of its argument (Mary). The constraint imposed by definiteness is that the content of the NP is used as a function returning a unique individual.
The semantics of relational Ns is associated to the following implication:
Mary’s doctor (x) doctor (x) & R (x, m)
To be Mary’s doctor, an x must be a doctor, and moreover x must satisfy a certain relation R to Mary.
The way this R relation is determined in context is rather complex and has been studied by many authors (Barker, Milner, Corblin).
Consider for instance the following context. Sue, head of a detective agency, is in charge of the protection of doctors during a medical conference. Assume that she assigns the doctor a to Mary, a detective, and consider the sentence (1) :
(1) Mary’s doctor was Indian.
Since the context provides a way of instantiating an R relation in such a way that the relational meaning becomes functional, the considered determination of R is chosen (or at least is an open option) :
Mary’s doctor = the unique doctor assigned for his protection to Mary.
Now consider contexts in which no such relation is accessible. You are asked to interpret
“Mary’s doctor” out of the blue.
The choice of definiteness takes for granted that an R relation is supposed to be accessible, such that for this R, the meaning “doctor (x) & R(x, m)” be functional.
Since there is no way to do it on the basis of the specific discourse context, only general knowledge regarding doctors and humans is supposed to be accessible and able to make the nominal content functional.
The question is then : what kind of relation R is part of the shared common ground and could make the description functional? What is used in this example is the knowledge that typically, most humans call upon a single individual for taking care of their heath during periods of time which can be rather long. Many details should be discussed : the fact that doctor is a
relational term seems to be part of its lexical meaning, and is attached to the name for any of its uses; the fact that it can be turned out to a functional term is true only for most humans in most part of the world, and it is only recently that such a general rule holds.
The point is that the use of definiteness for Mary’s doctor, in the absence of any specific information, implies that for the speaker, there is an accessible R relation turning the meaning
“doctor (x) & R(x, m)” to a function. The hearer is thus invited to accommodate the
underlying presuppositions : the world of reference is such that for most humans there is, at a given t one and only one doctor that humans consult for their health, Mary is one of those humans, and the NP refers to the unique individual who is the “regular” doctor of Mary at t.
And this is exactly the kind of meaning enrichment which is triggered by the choice of the definiteness if there is no other specific way provided by the context for determining R in such a way that the nominal content be functional. Roughly speaking the interpretation of Mary’s doctor is :
Two comments : this enrichment is based on the lexical meaning of doctor, and on the knowledge of the word described by the sentence and on nothing else. It does not depend on what the sentence itself is about. It will work in any kind of sentence.
The whole mechanism is as follows : the speaker uses the x, which amounts to assume that x is functional; the hearer is thus asked to take for granted that what can make this content functional holds ; that is to say, the word described by the sentence is such that for a person there is a unique doctor she calls upon for her health, at least during a period. Of course the sentence is strange if Mary is used, say for a bear, of for a Cromagnon man. Moreover it must be shared that for most x (at least for some) the nominal content is functional, and the use of the forces to admit that this is true for the x under consideration.
Known problems of relational definites regarding unicity cannot be discussed here : the wing of a plane, Mary’s arm, etc…
General idea : for relational nouns returning a small number of entities (the feet of a table, wings of a plane, arms of a person), the strict unicitty constraint is relaxed.
Suggestion : The X returns one and only one individual, and x, the descriptive content must narrow down the choice to a very small number of entities, the difference between them being of no special relevance in the discourse context.
An interesting property of some overt relational definites : sloppy readings (2) Mary likes her doctor, but John hates him
Possibly (John hates his own doctor) And so does John
In a nutshell: sloppy readings are open for anaphoric expressions (pronouns, ellipsis) iff their antecedent is a relational definite NP finding its argument by means of an anaphoric relation bound within its own sentence.
See the literature on sloppy readings for more details.
3. Bare relational definites without contextual anchor : The doctor asked Mary to stop smoking.
A bare definite like the doctor will have to find either a familiarity reading 3(a), or a relational one 3(b), which means, in the second case, finding an entity of the context as its argument.
(3)a Mary was in love with a doctor, but the doctor was married.
(3)b The medical service was fine, although the doctor was awful.
Relational contextual interpretations like (b) have been studied extensively under the heading
“associative anaphora” since Hawkins (1978), or called “bridging”.
Cases like (4) have received, to my knowledge, less attention:
(4) The doctor asked Mary to stop smoking.
They have interesting properties:
1. The definite NP can be used “out of the blue”. No element of the previous discourse has to be lexically related to “doctor”.
2. But in that case (out of the blue interpretation), the content of the sentence must be strongly related to what a doctor, typically does.
A sentence like (5) for instance, requires strongly a contextual anchoring, some other hints for recovering a functional interpretation of the definite NP.
(5) The doctor was drinking a glass of water 3. Sloppy readings are licensed.
(6) The doctor asked Mary to stop smoking, but he does not ask anything to me
“He” is possibly my doctor.
4. The sentence comes with a meaning enrichment which is distinct from the one associated to
“the doctor of Mary”.
Compare (7)a and (7)b :
(7)a The doctor asked Mary to stop smoking (7)b Mary’s doctor asked her to stop smoking.
Many speakers agree that (7)b implies (7)a, although the reverse is not true.
Roughly : the doctor in (a) means , “the doctor Mary consulted for her health at t”, although (b) means “the regular doctor of Mary”.
It is thus impossible to derive the doctor in (a) as a mere “anaphoric” version of Mary’s doctor”. A crucial difference is that the kind of interpretation exemplified in (a) is not licensed in any context, although the interpretation licensed in (b) is:
(8) The doctor is bald
Only felicitous as a familiarity case, or as relational definite finding a lexical anchor in the close context, although Mary’s doctor is bald is fine in any context and preserves the interpretation (the regular doctor of Mary).
The definite of 7(a) is thus licensed in situ, by the kind of property referred to in the sentence, which has to be a property closely related to the lexical definition of the N heading the NP:
Doctor : individual whose role is to examine and cure patients.
In a sense, this is not very different from the classical cases of associative anaphora : (9) Someone was injured. The doctor was on the spot very soon.
In this case the previous sentence introduces an injured person. The definite NP mention a doctor, assuming that “doctor” is a relation that you can narrow down as a function in this specific case. The interpretation is : “the unique doctor x, relevant for this injured person”.
The main difference is that in (7)a it is the event referred to within the sentence ‘a doctor is asking Mary to stop smoking”, which licenses the use of the definite NP : “the unique doctor required by an individual health examination involving pieces of advice for your health”.
It is interesting to compare (9) and (10) :
(10) Someone was injured. A doctor was on the spot very soon
A doctor does not imply that the considered individual was the unique individual relevant for taking care of the wounded person. Maybe he was just passing by…
Interesting question : how do we compute “the unique individual relevant for…”
by the noun:
e.g. A doctor is someone taking care of people health
In most sentences involving someone health, the doctor will be licensed in situ as “the unique x someone consulted for one’s health, at t, the time location of the event referred to in the sentence.”
Some comments :
1.The individual referred to in the sentence is specific, and the NP is by no mean “generic”.
It is most often not familiar, but this is true for any relational definite.
2. The fact that sloppy readings are licensed is directly derived by the assumption that such NPs are relational and find their argument(s) in their own sentence.
3. We make the assumption that in “ the doctor asked Mary…” doctor is a function based on an R relation taking Mary as its argument : we are committed to this claim for deriving sloppy readings. We do not make the assumption that the same function is used in both cases. On the contrary we hold that different R relations are used in order to explain that Marys’s doctor is the regular doctor of Mary, whereas The doctor asked Mary is not interpreted that way. We hold crucially that the doctor is interpreted on the basis of an R relation which takes the event referred to in the sentence as its own argument, but that Mary’s doctor does not, and does not depend on the predication of the sentence.
4. The fact that the doctor is a relation with free variable arguments is confirmed by tthe interpretation in the scope of a quantifier : “Each student consulted the doctor” (possibly as many doctors as students).
4 . The so-called weak definites are bare relational definites interpreted in situ.
In my view the doctor in the previous examples and the classical cases of weak definites belong to the same natural class, although weak definites can be considered as a specific subclass of relational definites. I will try to establish this point at least for telic definites.
The crucial difference is that bare relational definites interpreted in situ are licensed by predications related to the specific relation conveyed by the noun (e.g. The doctor examined Mary), although telic definites are just licensed by sentences implying that a person is somewhere, or goes somewhere.
Let us consider the typical cases of telic definites, which are most often listed as typical examples of weak definites.
(11) Mary goes to the bank Again we can contrast :
a’. Mary goes to the bank b’. Mary goes to her bank
In (b’), an overt relational definite, the interpretation is that Mary goes to a bank x, such that a relation R (x,m) returns a unique individual. As above, the interpretation is that Mary goes to the individual bank which is her regular bank.
This meaning enrichment is preserved for any sentence :
(12) Mary goes to her bank because she had left her umbrella.
It is not implied by this sentence that Mary goes to her bank in order to do what a bank is designed for, although this is a likely implicature.
The only accessible option of our theory is that « the bank » (if acceptable out of the blue) in (a’) is a bare relational definite interpreted in situ. The meaning enrichment is that “Mary is going to the most relevant bank at t for doing what people usually do in a bank”
In Corblin (2011) I call this interpretation telic, and I draw a link (following other scholars – Borillo, Stvan a.o.) to the notion of telic qualia of Pustjovsky.
In Corblin 2011 for French, Asic & Corblin 2012 for Serbian, we show that telic definites are licensed for polysemic Nouns (place/social institution) and for verbs (and prepositions) which does not impose a spatial interpretation of the NP.
In a nutshell :
telic definites occur with potentially locative verbs (to be, to go) and for a very restricted subset of prepositions (those which does not require a strict subcategorization of their complement as a spatial entity).
Analysis :
The definite’s head noun can be interpreted as sortal (a special place, building) and can also be interpreted as relational and based on a telic qualia (a bank is designed for money matters).
NB : Again I make a clear difference between the bank of John, and John goes to the bank.
The interpretation in situ is, in general, an open option for relational definites if the event referred to in the sentence provides arguments of the relevant sort.
What we have for telic definite is the reference to the location (static be or dynamic go) of a person w.r.t. a place/social institution.
The doctor examined Mary Mary went to the bank To examine someone to go to a given location
Specific to doctor Common to such entities (place/inst) The distinctive property of telic definites (as compared to bare relational NPs in general) is that in situ we find a reference to an eventuality which is common for entities of that kind : humans typically goes into places devoted to activities rending services to humans.
It takes as arguments the reference points of is own sentence : x : bank x & R (x, m, e)
e being the event of Mary going (being) to an individual bank.
The key part of the definiteness is :
1) there is an R relation binding an individual bank, Mary, and an event (Mary’s going to an individual bank at t).
2) this relation returns a single individual.
Lexically bank provides the content of R, exactly as doctor does.
The most typical relation a bank has to a person is when the person acts as a client of the bank. Hence the relevance of the telic qualia.
Conclusion : telic definites are bare relational definites in situ taking as arguments the
individual and the event referred to in the sentence. The R relation is specified on the basis of the telic qualia of the head noun of the sentence (as the most accessible R triggered by the head noun).
References :
Aguilar-Guevarra, A. & Zwarts, J. 2010, Weak definites and references to kinds , Proceedings of SALT 20: 179–196.
Asic, T. & Corblin, F. 2012. "Telic definites and their preposition(s): French Vs Serbian"
Workshop Languages with and without articles 2012, Paris.
Barker, C. 1992 "Definite Possessives and Discourse Novelty", Chicago Linguistic Society Proceedings , , p. 26-41.
Carslson, G. & Sussman, R.S. 2005. « Seemingly Indefinite Definites », In Linguistic
Evidence, eds., S. Kepsar and M. Reis. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Corblin, F.(2011) Des définis para-intensionnels : être à l'hôpital, aller à l'école, Langue française, nº 171 (3/2011) Détermination et prédication .p. 55-77.
Corblin, F.(2001) "Défini et génitif: le cas des définis défectifs", in Cahier Jean-Claude Milner, Jean-Marie Marandin, ed., Editions Verdier, pp.19-54.
Flaux, N. "Les syntagmes nominaux du type le fils d'un paysan : référence définie ou indéfinie?", le Français moderne 1, 1992, p. 113-140.
Flaux, N. "Les syntagmes nominaux du type le fils d'un paysan : référence définie ou indéfinie?", le Français moderne 2, 1993, p. 23-45.
Milner J.-C. Ordres et raisons de langue, 1982, Paris, Seuil.
