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Toronto fire of 1904
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL CANADA
DIVISION OF BUILDING RESEARCH
TORONTO FIRE OF 1904
by
G. W. Shorter
F i r e Study No. 1 3
of the
Division of Building Research
OTTAWA March
1964
TABIX O F CONTENTS
P a g e
DEVE LOPMENT O F THE CONFLAGRATION CONSTRUCTION O F BUILDINGS AND DAMAGE FIRE SPREAD BETWEEN BUILDINGS
OCCUPANCIES
DAMAGE T O CONTENTS
FIRE APPARATUS AND WATER SUPPLY SPRINKIXR SYSTEMS
AUXILIARY FIRE -FIGHTING AIDS
FINANCIAL LOSSES ,AND INSURANCE RATES COMPARISON WITH OTTAWA-HULL FIRE
S u m m a r y o f L o s s e s , F i r e Loads Involved Spread of F i r e CONCLUSION
PREFACE
The great Tor onto f i r e of 1904 not only shocked the nation but struck a s e r i o u s blow to the Canadian f i r e insurance industry. This f i r e occurred in the h e a r t of Toronto's mercantile district, the pride of the city, with m o r e wealth concentrated in a few blocks than in any other a r e a in the city. The buildings in t h i s a r e a w e r e a most imposing sight with their m a s s i v e m a s o n r y exterior walls. On 19 April 1904, a f i r e destroyed 100 of t h e s e i m p r e s s i v e buildings within a period of nine hours.
The Division, believing that t h e r e i s much to.be learned f r o m the l a r g e f i r e s of the past, h a s encouraged such studies. This paper discusses the development of the Toronto f i r e and the
resulting damage. It a l s o compares various f e a t u r e s of the Toronto f i r e with the Ottawa-Hull f i r e of 1900. This i s the second in a s e r i e s of p a p e r s describing historical Canadian f i r e s being undertaken by - the author.
The author, a mechanical engineer, i s Head of the F i r e R e s e a r c h Section, Division of Building Research.
Ottawa March 1964
N. B. Hutcheon Assistant Director
TORONTO FIRE O F 1904 by
G. W. S h o r t e r
The weather in Toronto on the evening of 19 A p r i l 1904, was cold and blustery. The a i r t e m p e r a t u r e was below f r e e z i n g ( 2 4 ° F ) aizd snowflurries w e r e o c c u r r i n g accompanied by s t r o n g winds f r o m the northwest at 30 mph. All w a s quiet in the h e a r t of T o r o n t o g s m e r c a n t i l e a r e a . Few people w e r e on the s t r e e t s a s a l m o s t a l l of t h e buildings i n t h i s a r e a had been closed since 6 p. m. At 8.04 p. m., a police constable patrolling h i s beat in the a r e a saw f l a m e s shooting skyward f r o m the elevator shaft of t h e C u r r i e Building, 58 Wellington St. ( F i g u r e 1) and immediately turned i n an a l a r m . Before the r e s u l t i n g conflagration was extinguished, it would d e s t r o y approximately 100 buildings, causing a p r o p e r t y l o s s of $10,350, 000.
F i r e Chief John Thompson, one of t h e fir st t o a r r i v e at t h e scene of the fire, immediately turned i n a g e n e r a l a l a r m . Having quickly decided that it was impossible t o s a v e the building occupied by E. and S. C u r r i e Ltd. (neckware m a n u f a c t u r e r s ) , h e concentrated the e f f o r t s of h i s department on confining the f i r e t o t h i s s t r u c t u r e . A s t r o n g n o r t h - w e s t wind drove f l a m e s f r o m the burning C u r r i e Building t o w a r d s t h e r o w s of unprotected windows of the 6 - s t o r e y building occupied by Ansley and Co. (wholesale h a t s and c a p s ) and the Gillespie F u r Co. (wholesale f u r r i e r s ) . T h i s building was located a t 56 Wellington St. i m m e d i a t e l y t o the e a s t and was s e p a r a t e d f r o m the C u r r i e Building b y a n a r r o w lane (12 ft) ( F i g u r e 1). In a n effort t o stop the s p r e a d of t h e f i r e a c r o s s the lane, Chief Thompson and s o m e of h i s m e n took a hose line t o the upper f l o o r s of the Gillespie -Ansley Building. In spite of t h e i r efforts, f i r e s p r e a d into the lower f l o o r s of t h i s building, t h u s cutting off t h e i r e s c a p e r o u t e s through the building. T h e y w e r e t h e r e f o r e f o r c e d to u s e t h e i r h o s e line t o slide t o the ground. Unfortunately, Chief Thompson suffered a broken leg in the c o u r s e of h i s escape and had t o be taken t o hospital.
A number of r e p o r t s of t h i s f i r e suggest t h a t t h e confusion r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h e accident t o the Chief and the consequent delay i n effective f i r e fighting a t the outset of t h e f i r e w e r e f a c t o r s in the f i r e getting out of control. Following Chief Thompsonws accident, Deputy Chief
J.
C. Noble became the s e n i o r officer in charge.DEVELOPMENT O F THE CONFLAGRATION
With both the C u r r i e and t h e Gillespie-Ansley buildings now burning the f i r e began t o s p r e a d rapidly to other buildings i n t h e
i m m e d i a t e a r e a . The t i m e s a t which t h e v a r i o u s groups of buildings began t o burn a r e shown in F i g u r e 2. Fanned by the high wind t h e f i r e
s p r e a d f r o m building t o building with such rapidity that within a n hour at l e a s t 12 s e p a r a t e s t r u c t u r e s w e r e ablaze with s t r e e t widths offering no b a r t o the f i r e ' s p r o g r e s s .
At t h i s t i m e a s s i s t a n c e was r e q u e s t e d f r o m neighbouring municipalities. Toronto Junction, E a s t Toronto, Hamilton, Brantford, London, Niagara F a l l s , N. Y.
,
and Buffalo, N. Y. all responded. Although m o s t of the d e p a r t m e n t s a r r i v e d 4 h o u r s o r m o r e a f t e r the s t a r t of t h e f i r e , t h e y p e r f o r m e d yeoman s e r v i c e in the final s t a g e s of t h e f i r e before it was contralled and stopped. T h e f i r s t t h r e e d e p a r t m e n t s mentioned a r r i v e d in t i m e t o a s s i s t in stopping t h e s p r e a d of t h e f i r e .T h e development of the f i r e m a y be studied b y using the plan shown in F i g u r e 2. The f i r e c r o s s e d Wellington St. which is
66 f t wide,
a3d swept i n a v e r y s h o r t t i m e f r o m end t o end of the warehouse and book bindery of Brown B r o s . and Co., 55 Wellington St. and t h e litho- graphing establishment of Rolph Smith and Co.,
49
Wellington St. ( F i g u r e 3). It then s p r e a d south a c r o s s P i p e r St. and t h e c o u r t y a r d (which i s about 40 f t in width) t o the w a r e h o u s e s on the north side of F r o n t St. The f i r e was pzavented f r o m spreading f u r t h e r in a n e a s t e r l y direction on the south side of Wellington St. by t h e action of t h e s p r i n k l e r s y s t e m s installed in the B r o c k Building a t the southwest c o r n e r ofWellington and Bay St. W. H, B r o c k and Co.,
68
Bay St., who1e::ale d r y goods, had installed in t h e i r building a s p r i n k l e r s y s t e m which w a s supplied f r o m two s o u r c e s of water supply: gravity tank and c i t y w a t e r connection. T h e r e w e r e a l s o outside s p r i n k l e r s f r o m the a l l e y windows a t t h e r e a r supplied by c i t y water. T h i s building did not bllrn until long a f t e r t h e surrounding buildings had burned down, t h e water c u r t a i n f r o m the outside s p r i n k l e r s preventing t h e f i r e f r o m entering t h e bi~ilding as long a s the water p r e s s u r e was safficient t o supply all t h e heads. The drain on the city water by the s t e a m e r s aild many h o s e s t r e a m s , however, weakened the p r e s s u r e until t h e r e was no water on the upper floors. It is thought that the f i r e then e n t e r e d t h e building through t h e upperwindows at the r e a r and that t h e ailtomatic inside s p r i n k l e r s opened. Since t h e s e w e r e supplied by a gravity t a n k a s well a s by city w a t e r , t h e y held t h e f i r e ia check until the tank w a s drained when, t h e r e being no m o r e water for t h e upper floor s p r i n k l e r s , t h e f i r e soon gained headway throughout the s t r u c t u r e and t h e building was completely
destroyed.
All the buildings on t h e north side of F r o n t St. west of B a y St. up t o and including the p r e m i s e s of Warwick B r o s . and
utter,
70 F r o n t St. (whole s a l e s t a t i o n e r s ) w e r e quickly involved and u l t i m a t e l y destroyed. Between the l a t t e r establishment and the Queen's Hotel (now the q p r o x i m a t e s i t e of the Royal York Hotel) t h e r e w a s an open s p a c e of 60 ft. The hotel was only slightly damaged. After s e c u r i n g a f i r m hold on t h e s e buildings, t h e f i r e c r o s s e d F r o n t St. and r a p i d l y involved the e n t i r e block between F r o n t St. and t h e Esplanade w e s t t o L o r n e St. The only buildings t h a t escaped w e r e t h e b r i c k office building located on the southeast c o r n e r of Lorne and F r o n t St., s e v e r a l s m a l l s t r u c t u r e s fronting on Lorne St. and t h e Esplanade owned b y the Hendrie Forwarding Co. The f i r e then t r a v e l l e d e a s t c r o s s i n g Bay St. below . F r o n t St. At about the s a m e t i m e the B a r b e r and E l l i s envelope f a c t o r y and s t a t i o n e r y warehouse, 43 B a y St. two doors n o r t h of: F r o n t St. b e c a m e ignited. The fire then s p r e a d north, south, and e a s t until all the buildingson both s i d e s of Bay St. between Wellington St. and the Esplanade w e r e burning, the f i r e having turned up Bay St. in the r e v e r s e direction f r o m which i t started.
In its e a r l i e r stages, the f i r e had s p r e a d up the west side of Bay St. a s f a r a s t h e Toronto Engraving Co., 9 2 Bay St. ( F i g u r e 4). On the e a s t side of B a y St. the f i r e had been held a t t h e Evening T e l e g r a m Building, 81 Bay St. a t t h e c o r n e r of Melinda St. T h i s building was a l s o equipped with a s p r i n k l e r s y s t e m but, although the front of the building was badly damaged, the f i r e was successfully fought with inside hand hose and no s p r i n k l e r heads opened. Good work was done a t t h i s building with a length of hand hose attached t o a roof hydrant.
When the warehouses on Wellington St. e a s t of Bay St. w e r e reached, the wind - w a s unfavourable t o i t s f u r t h e r p r o g r e s s and the f i r e - m e n w e r e able t o make a stand, preventing the conflagration f r o m c r o s s i n g Wellington St., but not without considerable damage t o the buildings on t h e north side of that s t r e e t . The f i r e w a s finally controlled a t the envelope f a c t o r y of Kilgour Bros. on the south side of Wellington St. T h e s p r i n k l e r s y s t e m and water c u r t a i n s installed a t t h e Kilgour Bros. Bag and Box Factory, 21 Wellington St.
,
played a m o s t important r o l e i n t h e f i r e D s control. Water f o r t h e inside automatic heads w a s provided by two gravity tanks ( F i g u r e 5) and by city water connections, while the outside heads w e r e supplied by city water and an auxiliary s t e a m e r connection. In t h i s instance the s p r i n k l e r s y s t e m s functioned in much t h e s a m e manner a s those a t the B r o c k Building. The e x t e r i o r s p r i n k l e r s continued t ofunction effectively until the p r e s s u r e w a s reduced (the s t e a m e r connection was not used) t o a point where water was not supplied t o the heads a t t h e upper w i n d ~ w s . The r e s u l t w a s that the roof of that portion of the
building fronting on Wellington St. and extending 200 f t t o the south was completely burned with s e r i o u s damage t o e v e r y window. T h e inside s p r i n k l e r s fed by the two l a r g e gravity tanks, however, continued t o operate a f t e r the m a i n s t p r e s s u r e failed. The operation of t h i s s p r i n k l e r
installation together with a system of good .division walls prevented the f i r e f r o m involving the whole structure.
A good example of s p r i n k l e r s supplementing a standard f i r e door was provided during the f i r e in the Kilgour Bros. factory. An
automatic standard sliding f i r e door was prevented f r o m closing by some obstruction, s o that a space about
6
in. wide was left. open; s i x sprinkler heads opened on the other side of the door f r o m the f i r e and prevented the f i r e from spreading t o the adjacent compartment. The only portion of this bxilding completely destroyed was that facing Wellington St. and extending back about 50 ft. Adjoining the r e a r portion was a 50- by 75-ft addition, 5 s t o r e y s high, which was a l s o protected with water curtains a t the windows that overlooked a furniture warehouse. Although the w a r e - house was completely destroyed and the heat from the f i r e intense, only a few panes of glass w e r e broken in the Kilgour addition. This addition a l s o diverted the flames s o that they beat on the side instead of the r e a r of the Minerva Manilfacturing Company's p r e m i s e s on Front St., and t o this fact m u s t be given much of the credit for stopping the s p r e a d of the f i r e a t this point.The eastward advance of the f i r e on the north side of F r o n t St. was stopped a t the Minerva Building, 12 F r o n t St. ( F i g u r e
6).
On the south side of Front St. nothing interfered with i t s p r o g r e s s , a l l thebaildings up t o and including the p r e m i s e s of McMahon, Broadfield and Co. (wholesale c r o c k e r y d e a l e r s ) w e r e destroyed. This point marked the e x t r e m e e a s t e r n limit of the fire, a space of about 25 f t separating the l a s t mentioned building f r o m the Customs House and examining warehouse, neither of which w e r e damaged. The Customs House had been chosen a s one point for a l a s t stand but s o overcome w e r e the firemen by heat and smoke that for a t i m e i t appeared a s though the vantage point had been selected too late; they hung on, however, and made a desperate stand-at the Minerva Building t o stop the eastward s p r e a d of the f i r e . The f i r e had spread south by this t i m e t o the wharves on Lake Ontario and boats had moved out into Toronto Bay for safety.
At 5 a.m. 20 April, the f i r e was s t i l l burning fiercely, but was under control, although flames w e r e bursting forth, a s though
unquenchable, from some buildings within the fire-swept a r e a . Bay St., south of Melinda St.
,
was in ruins and Wellington St. f r o m York St. e a s t t o almost Yonge St. was piled high with debris. Buildings on Front St. w e r e gutted from the Queen's Hotel t o the old McMaster Building, 12 F r o n t St., next t o the Bank of Montreal on the corner of Yonge St. All south of Front St. lay in ruins. On some s t r e e t s heaps of smouldering debris and b r i c k littered the pavements. On others, s o intense had been the heat that g r e a t hummocks of cracked asphalt had piled up and broke under the t r e a d of feet. P o l e s c a r r y i n g w i r e s had burned and toppled into the s t r e e t s adding t o the chaos. In spite of the extent of t h i s fire, no person was killed, although 25 men w e r e injured. CONSTRUCTION O F BUILDINGS AND DAMAGEThe construction of the buildings was typical of the
mercantile occupancies of that time. All the buildings w e r e of b r i c k construction with the exception of the McLaughlin flour mill, at the
corner of Bay St. and the Esplanade, which was built of stone. Ordinary wooden joist construction prevailed with the baildings having flat roofs, covered mainly with gravel. P r a c t i c a l l y a l l of the buildings had skylights constructed of light m e t a l f r a m e s with thin glass installed in them. The exposed side and r e a r windows w e r e a s a r u l e not protected. The average thickness of the walls above the foundation was 18 in. ; the a v e r a g e
height of the buildings was 4 s t o r e y s and the average ground floor a r e a was approximately 5000 s q ft. P r i o r t o the f i r e t h e s e buildings had been a most imposing sight ( F i g u r e s 7, 8) due in p a r t t o the massiveness of their m a s o n r y walls. In fact, t h i s d i s t r i c t had been the p r i d e of the city with m o r e wealth concentrated in these few blocks than in any other a r e a in the city.
T h e r e w e r e we.aknesses, however, in t h e s e buildings, of which the spreading f i r e quickly took advantage. The most important construction
weakness was t h e l a c k of protection f o r v e r t i c a l openings between
floors. In m a n y of the buildings t h e r e w e r e open elevator shafts, s t a i r - ways, lightwells and belt holes. Riddled by such unprotected v e r t i c a l openings, the f i r e once s t a r t e d , would quickly s p r e a d throughout a
building. Instead of e a c h s t o r e y being a s e p a r a t e compartment, a whole building was e s s e n t i a l l y one l a r g e compartment. In a l m o s t a l l of the buildings, due t o the n a t u r e of t h e i r business, which was mainly m e r c a n t i l e , t h e r e w e r e l a r g e quantities of combustible m a t e r i a l s . In m o s t of the buildings t h e r e w e r e t h e r e f o r e formidable f i r e loads (30 t o 50 lb/sq ft) which undoubtedly tended t o prolong the duration of f i r e s i n t h e s e buildings. In addition, the combustible m a t e r i a l was a v a i l - able in many of the buildings not only as balk fuel but a l s o a s t i n d e r and kindling. Tinder, for example, w a s often available in t h e f o r m of paper, and kindling in the f o r m of veneers. When fuel is available i n t h e s e l a t t e r f o r m s a f i r e will tend t o develop m o r e rapidly, which gives c r e d e n c e t o many accounts that f i r e s quickly involved a whole building.
Almost all combustible m a t e r i a l , such as wooden cornices, window t r i m m i n g s , f l o o r s and roofs, w a s consumed. The m a j o r i t y of m a s o n r y walls f e l l down but r o w s of b a r e c a s t -iron p o s t s r e m a i n e d in place, a number bent o r broken. Unprotected s t e e l and wrought i r o n I-beams and ;?osts w e r e bent and twisted ( F i g u r e 1). Stone columns and p o s t s w e r e badly spalled and s c a l e d s o a s t o r e n d e r t h e m unsuitable for future use.
F i g u r e 9 shows the s e v e r e damage suffered b y t h e m a s s i v e m a s o n r y buildings shown in F i g u r e 7. Undoubtedly t h e l a c k of effective compartmentation between s t o r e y s due t o inadequate f i r e r e s i s t a n c e of floor a s s e m b l i e s aild absence of protective e n c l o s u r e s a t v e r t i c a l openings was the m a j o r construction deficiency.
During t h e Toronto f i r e
98
s e p l r a t e buildings w e r e destroyed. The t o t a l a r e a covered by the f i r e was 19.7 a c r e s , including 4. 4 a c r e s of s t r e e t allowances, leaving the t o t a l block a r e a of the conflagration a t15. 3 a c r e s . The l a c k of adequate compartmentation between f l o o r s allowed whole buildings t o become e q o s i n g s o u r c e s which automatically made s p a t i a l separations quite inadequate. T h i s f e a t u r e w a s the m o s t important single factor responsible for that conflagration.
FIRE SPREAD BETWEEN BUILDINGS
Although f i r e s s p r e a d a c r o s s n a r r o w l a n e s between buildings with unprotected window openings, they a l s o s p r e a d a c r o s s s t r e e t s with widths of 6 6 and 78 ft. T h e s p r e a d of f i r e between bulldings h a s been a
subject of much study, p a r t i c u l a r l y of late, and m a n y m o d e r n building codes such a s the National Building Code of Canada have modified t h e i r spatial r e q u i r e m e n t s to c a t e r t o t h i s problem. Two examples have been worked out for buildings involved i n t h i s f i r e using t h e s p a t i a l s e p a r a t i o n t a b l e s given i n the National Building Code. The values obtained have
been based on t h e assumption that no construction separation was r e q u i r e d between floors. One example, concerns t h e C u r r i e Building, 5 8 Wellington St. in which the f i r e originated. In t h i s instance the front face of t h e
building would be r e q u i r e d by the National Building Code t o be 45 ft f r o m the lot line. In other words, t h e C u r r i e Building would have t o be spaced
90 ft f r o m the b ~ i l d i n g opposite it a c r o s s Wellington St. a s compared t o a
s t r e e t width of 6 5 ft. Another example is the building which was situated a t 3 8 - 3 6 F r o n t St. In t h i s case, due t o the occupancy, the front face would be r e q u i r e d by the National Building Code t o be 58. 5 f t f r o m the lot line o r 117 f t f r o m the building opposite. (The a c t u a l distance between
buildings w a s only 78 ft. ) T h e s e s p a t i a l s e p a r a t i o n s a r e based on the f a c t that t h e occupancies would be c l a s s e d i n t h e National Building Code a s having a high f i r e load. Even t h e s e values, however, a r e not sufficient t o eliminate t h e s p r e a d of f i r e indefinitely. They w e r e established on t h e b a s i s that f i r e department eqlipment would a r r i v e a t the s c e n e of a f i r e and effective f i r e fighting would commence before maximum radiation l e v e l s could be obtained.
OCCUPANCIES
The Toronto f i r e o c c u r r e d i n t h e c e n t r e of the m e r c a n t i l e a r e a which accounted for the l a r g e amount of combustible m a t e r i a l con- tained in the m a j o r i t y of buildings. Table I lists t h e c o n c e r n s burned out classified i n a c c o r d a n c e with the business c a r r i e d on.
DAMAGE T O CONTENTS
During t h e f i r e much of the combustible contents of buildings was consumed. Some i n t e r e s t i n g points r e g a r d i n g damage t o t h e
contents of buildings a r e provided in the r e p o r t of the G e n e r a l Committee of F i r e Insurance Co. on t h e Toronto Conflagration. The U n d e r w r i t e r s ' Salvage Co. of New York w a s engaged t o assist i n t h e handling of salvages.
A s t o r a g e and drying department was established in t h e upper f l o o r s of
t h e Toronto Brewing Company's p r e m i s e s and a s o r t i n g y a r d on Wellington
St., each i n t h e c h a r g e of a full staff of a s s i s t a n t s . Of the 41 r u i n s
examined, only t e n w e r e found t o yield anything t h a t would w a r r a n t t h e
expense of handling, n a m e l y seven wholesale d r y goods stocks, two whole
-
s a l e h a r d w a r e stocks and oile wholesale fur stock. T h e d r y goods s t o c k s proved the m o s t r e m u n e r a t i v e , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e salvage taken f r o m the
p r e m i s e s of t h e W.
R e
B r o c k Co., Limited, w h e r e a considerable amountwas found in the underground a r e a s . T h i s w a s 3. s p r i n k l e r e d building,
and it i s thought that the quantity of w a t e r distributed upon t h e m e r c h a n d i s e
accounts for t h e comparatively l a r g e salvage. T h e h a r d w a r e s t o c k s w e r e i n v e r y bad shape, hardened s t e e l tools, gun and r i f l e b a r r e l s and heavy
shelf h a r d w a r e being found i n solih m a s s e s , s o m e t i m e s of s e v e r a l t o n s
weight. T h e salvage of t h e f u r stock was not l a r g e a.-~d w a s only i n f a i r
condition.
Such salvage a s was found w a s g e n e r a l l y i n t h e neighbourhood
of the oatbreak of the f i r e . As t h e f i r e worked southward i t gained i n
heat intensity, p r e s e n t i n g a s a r e s u l t a completeness of combustion
r a r e l y s e e n even in m a j o r conflagrations. On F r o n t St. the h e a t w a s S O
almost no water was thrown on the p r e m i s e s south of this point. This i s c l e a r l y shown by the condition of the ruins
-
practically no salvage was found in t h i s locality.F r o m one or two accounts it would appear that the vaults used f o r the protection of r e c o r d s functioned quite well. F e r g u s Kyle in h i s a k i c l e "Incidents at a Great F i r e ,
"
Canadian Magazine, 1904, touched briefly on t h i s part. "There was an urgent call for experts to open the safes and vaults, and the local company, a s well a s those f r o m elsewhere, had men at work a s soon a s the t e m p e r a t u r e of the b r i c k s would permit. When the oven was opened, and, a s in most c a s e s , the batchwas found t o be not overdone, the waiting c l e r k s busied themselves with passing out the books and p a p e r s , knocking And blowing the dust f r o m
them..
. .
11FIRE APPARATUS AND WATER SUPPLY
The number and size of water mains in the f i r e a r e a we,re a s shown in Table 11.
T h e r e w e r e 21 hydrants within the a r e a of the c o n f l a g r a t i ~ n , with 4 hydrants immediately adjacent to the p r e m i s e s in which the f i r e originated. They w e r e mainly 2-way hydrants although some w e r e 3
-
and 4-way. The water p r e s s u r e a t the hydrants within the a r e a of the con- flagration varied from 70 t o 80 psi. In all, some 50 s t r e a m s w e r e running and the running p r e s s u r e would be represented by about 50 p e r cent of the above figures, o r s a y an average p r e s s u r e of 374 psi. T h i s p r e s s u r e would be further- reduced owing t o the breaking or melting of s e r v i c e pipes in the buildings destroyed. The s e r v i c e pipes would v a r y f r o m 1/2 in. t o 4 and 5 in.In the r e p o r t on this f i r e by the Toronto F i r e Department, r e f e r e n c e i s made t o a news item, dated 7 October 1904 in The Toronto Globe, which s t a t e s that Toronto's City Council had e a r m a r k e d $1, 150,000 t o be spent on improvements and additions t o i t s waterworks and was
considering the f u r t h e r expenditure of $550.~ 000 for still g r e a t e r p r o - tection against f i r e s . T h e r e p o r t a l s o s t a t e s that one of the r e s u l t s of the Toronto f i r e was the installation of the high p r e s s u r e s y s t e m which began operation in 1909.
The r e p o r t of the G e n e r a l Committee of F i r e Insurance Go. contains an inventory of t h e equipment and a p p a r a t u s held by t h e Toronto F i r e Department a t the t i m e of the fire. T h e t o t a l f o r c e of t h e Department including officers and m e n was 196. The Department had the following a p p a r a t u s fully manned and equipped:
s t e a m f i r e engines
65-ft "Champion" w a t e r tower (One is shown i n action i n F i g u r e 10)
86-ft a e r i a l turn-table hook and ladder t r u c k and portable w a t e r tower combined
65-ft a e r i a l turn-table hook and ladder t r u c k city hook and ladder t r u c k s
four -wheeled, two-hor s e c h e m i c a l engines
four -wheeled, two-hor s e combination h o s e and c h e m i c a l engine
hose wagons, with f i r e extinguishers attached h o s e c a r t
salvage wagon with 4,320 s q f t of r u b b e r c o v e r s sup2ly wagon
T h i s r e p o r t a l s o i t e m i z e s the quality and condition of the f i r e h o s e i n u s e a t the t i m e of t h e f i r e (Table 111).
Informatioil on a l a r m s and a p p a r a t u s responding is given In the s a m e report. The first a l a r m was given a t 8. 04 p.m. f r o m Box 12,
c o r n e r of King and B a y St. t o which the following a p p a r a t u s responded:. 7 hose sections, 3 engine sections, 1 a e r i a l truck, 1 hook and ladder t r u c k , 1 water tower and 1 salvage wagon. A g e n e r a l a l a r m w a s sounded a t 8. 51 p.m. calling out a l l sections. Outside a s s i s t a n c e was r e q u e s t e d
about 10. 30 p.m. Table IV provides information on the type of a s s i s t - ance r e c e i v e d and when it a r r i v e d .
S P R I N K U R SYSTEMS
T h r e e of the buildings in the f i r e a r e a had s p r i n k l e r systems. T h e s e w e r e t h e Brock, Kilgour Bros. and t h e Evening T e l e g r a m Buildings. It is i n t e r e s t i n g t o c o m p a r e t h e operation of t h e s e v a r i o u s s y s t e m s during the f i r e since they all played a valuable role. The B r o c k Building had both inside and outside s p r i n k l e r s y s t e m s with t h e inside s y s t e m being f e d f r o m both a gravity t a n k and city water and the outside s y s t e m f r o m c i t y water only. The outside s y s t e m prevented the f i r e f r o m entering t h e building until the p r e s s u r e i n t h e city m a i n s dropped, allowing the f i r e t o gain e n t r y a t t h e upper floors. The inside s y s t e m then functioned and held the f i r e i n check until the gravity tank was empty. T h i s building, which was i n the c e n t r e of the conflagration, r e m a i n e d f r e e of f i r e long a f t e r its neighbours w e r e well involved.
The inside s p r i n k l e r system, installed i n the Kilgour Bros. Building, was supplied by two gravity tanks and c i t y water and the outside s y s t e m b y city water and ail a ~ ~ x i l i a r y s t e a m e r connection. As i n t h e c a s e of the B r o c k Building, d e c r e a s e d water p r e s s u r e in t h e c i t y m a i n s eventually made the outside s y s t e m ineffective at the upper floors. With the l a r g e r tank supplies, t h e inside s y s t e m held t h e f i r e in check. T h e
outside s y s t e m protecting the windows of t h e 5-storey addition prevented the f i r e f r o m gaining e n t r y in spite of t h e fact that t h i s addition faced a f u r n i t u r e s t o r a g e warehouse that had been completely destroyed.
Although the Evening T e l e g r a m Building had a s p r i n k l e r s y s t e m , the f i r e was successfully fought with the hose connected t o standpipes, and no heads opened. In t h i s instance, a s with the Kilgour Building, the buildings w e r e on t h e edge of the conflagration and not i n the c e n t r e a s in the c a s e of the Brock Building.
AUXILIARY FZRE -FIGHTING AIDS
It is evident f r o m many r e p o r t s that v a r i o u s t y p e s of f i r e - fighting equipment w e r e used during t h e Toronto fire. F o r example,
J. William G e r r e d , writing i n The Toronto Globe and Mail, 17 A p r i l
1954, s t a t e s : "I think the (Queen's) h o t e l was saved by sentiment. T h e staff, the guests and the public a t l a r g e a l l pitched i n t o s a v e the Queen's.
It w a s a hot, long, drawn out battle i n w h i c l ~ e v e r y r e s o u r c e w a s used:
p ~ t s , pans, pails, hand h o s e s plus hundreds of blankets t h a t w e r e s p r e a d
over e v e r y vulnerable spot. I'
As is often the c a s e during conflagrations, consideration w a s
given t o the u s e of d.ynamite. T h e Toronto F i r e Department r e p o r t s t a t e s : "Although f l a m e s had a l r e a d y leaped a c r o s s sixty-six foot s t r e e t s , t h e u s e of dynamite w a s considered and Mayor Urguhart granted p e r m i s s i o n t o Deputy Chief Noble t o b l a s t a f i r e break. Stanley B a r r a c k s detailed a detachment of e n g i n e e r s t o do t h e job but a s dynamite could not be located, the plan w a s abandoned and t h e s o l d i e r s r e m a i n e d t o assist t h e police i n
controlling t h e crowds. 'I It is probably fortunate t h a t dynamite could not
be found as in m o s t i n s t a n c e s w h e r e it h a s been used, t h e effect h a s been
t o s p r e a d the f i r e r a t h e r than confine it p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e p r e s e n c e of a
high wind.
FINANCIAL LOSSES AND INSURANCE RATES
The total value of the p r o p e r t y destroyed w a s e s t i m a t e d t o be
$10,350, 000 ( p r e s e n t dollar value $36, 500,000). Of t h i s amount about
20 p e r cent w a s r e p r e s e n t e d i n buildings and about 80 p e r cent i n contents. B e s i d e s p r o p e r t y l o s s i t was e s t i m a t e d t h a t 6000 employees w e r e thrown out of work.
The r e p o r t of t h e G e n e r a l Committee of F i r e I n s u r a n c e Companies s t a t e s : "The t o t a l l o s s sustained by companies r e p r e s e n t e d
in t h i s committee as shown by s t a t e m e n t s obtained f r o m each office was
$175,000, the total insurance l o s s would appear t o be $8,-375,000 or 80 p e r cent of the total value of p r o p e r t y destroyed. The percentage of insurance t o value on buildings was about 65 p e r cent and on contents about 85 per cent. The 75 p e r cent co-insurance clause was operative under the r u l e s of the Toranto Board of F i r e Underwriters on both buildings and contents and was found in n e a r l y a l l policies."
As a r e s u l t of this heavy l o s s the Canaaian Underwriters Association immediately advanced insurance r a t e s in the downtown a r e a of Toronto by 75 p e r cent, and those in outside d i s t r i c t s by 40 p e r cent. Only r a t e s on dwellings w e r e not affected.
The schedule of r a t e s adopted for Toronto and made r e t r o - active t o 12 p. m.
,
19 April, the date of the fire, was a s follows:Congested district
-
On a l l mercantile schedule and other specially rated r i s k s , add $1 to rate.Outside district
-
On a l l r i s k s except dwellings and t h e i r contents add 50 cents t o rate.Residential s t o r e s
-
A reduction of 25 cents m a y be made on these r i s k s in outside districts, with the usual warranty. Where t h r e e -year policies a r e permitted, the e x t r a t o be added t o the three-year rate.Sprinklered r i s k s
-
fireproof buildings and contents-
Half the foregoing e x t r a s t o be added t o r a t e s on t h e s e risks.Co-insurance
-
A reduction of 15 p e r cent f r o m r a t e on buildings and 10 p e r cent on stocks m a y be allowed for the 80 p e r cent co-insurance clause.Similar i n c r e a s e s w e r e applied in n e a r l y a l l Canadian cities.
COMPARISON WITH OTTAWA-HULL
FLRE
OF 1900A comparison of various f e a t u r e s of the Toronto f i r e and the Ottawa-Hull f i r e of 1900 r e v e a l s a number of marked differences and a few, but important, similarities. A study of Table V, which c o m p a r e s weather
conditions at the t i m e of t h e s e f i r e s , shows a m a r k e d difference i n a i r t e m p e r a t u r e s although t h e s e f i r e s o c c u r r e d a t the s a m e day of the y e a r
within a week. T h e i r one common feature, a s t r o n g wind f r o m the north,
was m o s t important. In both c a s e s i t channelled t h e f i r e s t o w a r d s
s p a r s e l y occupied , a r e a s , thus allowing f i r e -fighting efforts t o be s u c c e s s
-
fully concentrated on t h e flanks of the fire. On the other hand, a t both f i r e s also, t h e wind undoubtedly i n c r e a s e d the s i z e of radiating f l a m e s on the leeward side of buildings, t h e r e b y i n c r e a s i n g t h e exposure hazard. In t h e Ottawa fire, flying brands f o r m e d f r o m burning wood shingles and borne by the s t r o n g wind g r e a t l y influenced the extent t o which t h e f i r e spread.
The types of construction involved in t h e two f i r e s v a r i e d greatly, a l m o s t a l l of t h e m having s e r i o u s s t r u c t u r a l defects f r o m t h e standpoint of conflagration hazard. In Ottawa and Hull the v a s t m a j o r i t y of t h e 3200 buildings destroyed w e r e wood f r a m e houses, having wood shingle roofs. The other buildings involved w e r e mainly i n d u s t r i a l and c o m m e r c i a l buildings. T h e s e l a t t e r baildings w e r e a l m o s t all of wood joist construction, many of t h e m being built e n t i r e l y of wood, with no
protection of v e r t i c a l openings in the multi-storeyed buildings. The
buildings involved i n the Toronto f i r e w e r e on the a v e r a g e 4-storey b r i c k buildings, having about 5000 sq f t of f l o a r s p a c e on each s t o r e y and w e r e used f o r m e r c a n t i l e purposes. They had wood joist floors, skylights,
open v e r t i c a l s h a f t s with l a r g e windows a c r o s s both front and back. F i v e contributory conditions for conflagrations a r e l i s t e d in r e f e r e n c e 1 of which 4 a r e concerned with construction. T h e s e four conditions a r e described a s follows:
1. contiguity of f r a m e buildings;
2. prevalence of combustible roof coverings;
the extension of m a n y f i r e s h a s been due t o the shingles r e l e a s e d f r o m burning buildings being c a r r i e d by heated air c u r r e n t s t o ignite distant buildings.
3. individual buildings of l a r g e a r e a o r e x c e s s i v e height, situated i n congested d i s t r i c t s , and s o constructed t h a t i n t e n s e i n t e r n a l combustion is rapidly s e t up; t h e s e m a y be low 1 - s t o r e y buildings of unbroken a r e a , such a s the wharf warehouse a& New Westminster, o r modern 6 - s t o r e y buildings with nurnerous v e r t i c a l openings that p e r m i t combustible goods on each floor t o ignite a l m o s t simultaneously.
4. l a c k of f i r e b r e a k s , such as solid b r i c k w a l l s and w i n d ~ w
protection; g a s e s and superheated a i r cannot be confined within a burning building and, under c e r t a i n conditions, jets of flame issuing f r o m window openings and doorways m a y s e t f i r e t o s t r u c t u r e s a t a considerable distance.
In general, conditions 1 and 2 w e r e the m a j o r f a c t o r s i n t h e
Ottawa-Hull f i r e , and conditions 3 and 4 i n the Toronto f i r e .
In both f i r e s , installed water s y s t e m s such as i n t e r i o r s p r i n k l e r and standpipe s y s t e m s and e x t e r i o r w a t e r c u r t a i n s played a n important role. One example of t h i s in the Ottawa-Hull f i r e was a w a t e r
s y s t e m t h a t had been installed in the J.
R.
Booth Sawmill. T h i s s a w m i l lw a s situated adjacent t o lumber p i l e s t h a t w e r e all burning, yet it survived because of the water system. F r o m the m e a g r e information available i t would appear that t h e r e was a c r u d e s p r i n k l e r s y s t e m installed a s well a s a number of standpipes, a l l supplied by Booth Co. pumps operating f r o m the Ottawa River. Much of t h e c r e d i t for saving t h e m i l l m u s t be given t o the u s e of hand l i n e s operated by m i l l employees.
In the Toronto f i r e t h e r e w e r e t h r e e buildings with s p r i n k l e r s y s t e m s , olle a l s o having a standpipe system. In t h e c a s e of t h e B r o c k Building, while the s p r i n k l e r s y s t e m funciioned effectively a s long as
water was available, it i s problematical whether t h i s building, which was
in the c e n t r e of the conflagration, could have been saved even i f adequate water had been available. At t h e Kilgour Bros. Building, which was on the flank of the f i r e , it would appear t h a t the s p r i n k l e r s y s t e m s (both inside and outside) enabled the f i r e fighters to stop the f i r e a t t h i s point. Although
s y s t e m installed, no h z a d s opened, a s employees using hand l i n e s f r o m standpipes w e r e able t o control the f i r e s p r e a d i n t h e building.
T h e municipal water s y s t e m s in both f i r e s w e r e s e v e r e l y taxed, but enough water was available t o allow t h e f i r e f i g h t e r s t o e x e r t
s o m e control a t the flanks of the fire. Although no a c c u r a t e f i g u r e s a r e available, it i s e s t i m a t e d that i n t h e Toronto f i r e 2$ t o 3 million gallons of water w e r e applied during t h e 9-hour period p r i o r t o the f i r e being brought under control. During the Ottawa fire, i t is unlikely that m o r e than 1 million gallons of water w e r e applied during the height of the ,fire.
r i c e r S, The Toronto f i r e w a s fought by 230 f i r e m e n and o.'f' including outside personnel, having the following m a j o r equipment:
5 s t e a m engines, 15 hose wagons and 2 w a t e r t o w e r s , and 30,000 f t of 2i-in. hose. The Ottawa f i r e w a s fought b y 70 f i r e m e n and o f f i c e r s , including odtside personnel. Equipment used included 5 s t e a m engines (2 f r o m outside), 12 hose wagons and 20,000 f t of 2i-in. hose. At both f i r e s considerable a s s i s t a n c e w a s given by l a r g e n u m b e r s of c i t i z e n s and s o l d i e r s , who f o r m e d bucket b r i g a d e s t o wet d ~ w n buildings on t h e flanks of t h e f i r e s , and extinguish s m a l l f i r e s outside t h e zone of t h e m a i n fire.
" F i r e Waste in Canada" s t a t e s : "NO conflagration h a s e v e r been stopped by organized a t t e m p t s at extinguishment. The m o s t powerful hose s t r e a m s a r e ineffective a t m o r e than 150 ft, t h e exact distance
depending upon t h e velocity of t h e wind. T h e horizontal r e a c h of f l a m e s driven by a gale, has, in m a n y instances, exceeded 1000 ft, and t h e buildings over one-half m i l e in advance of the f i r e have been ignited. Under such conditions, a f i r e department can fight t h e conflagration neither in advance of the f l a m e s nor f r o m t h e r e a r , because of t h e t r a i l of hot and burning debris. Operating on each flank of a sweeping f i r e , the e f f o r t s of a f i r e department a r e again of doubtful value, being s p r e a d over t o o l a r g e an a r e a t o p e r m i t effective work. Without attempting t o disparage t h e efforts of f i r e m e n i n dealing with conflagrations, it should b e recognized that t h e i r chief value h a s been in preventing f l a m e s f r o m
spreading a c r o s s the wind, and in extinguishing b r a n d s t h a t have alighted outside the zone of the fire."
In general, the Toronto and Ottawa-Hull f i r e s b e a r out t h e foregoing views. In both c a s e s , however, obstacles i n t h e path of the f i r e on the leeward flank enabled f i r e f i g h t e r s t o p l a y a r e l a t i v e l y
effective r o l e i n stopping the f i r e on t h i s flank. S u m m a r y of L o s s e s
Table VI shows the l o s s e s involved i n both f i r e s .
In the Ottawa-Hull f i r e 14,159 people w e r e r e n d e r e d h o m e - l e s s and a number 35 i n d u s t r i e s w e r e destroyed, w h e r e a s i n t h e Toronto f i r e the damage was r e s t r i c t e d .to m e r c a n t i l e p r o p e r t i e s . In the c a s e of t h e l a t t e r f i r e t h e r e w a s 80 p e r cent coverage by insurance, w h e r e a s i n t h e Ottawa-Hull f i r e t h e r e was only 40 p e r cent coverage, s i n c e t h e m a j o r i t y of h o m e s w e r e not insured. In o r d e r t o r e l i e v e t h e h a r d s h i p i n t h e Ottawa-Hull f i r e a relief fund w a s s e t up, t h e contributions of which amounted to approximately $1,000,000.
In the Ottawa - g u l l f i r e , the a r e a damaged b y f i r e w a s 7
1 6
a c r e s with over 3200 buildings destroyed, and millions of b o a r d f e e t of lumber consumed. T h i s f i r e was under c o n t r o l i n 134 hours. The Toronto f i r e devastated a n a r e a of 20 a c r e s , destroying approximately
100 buildings. The f i r e was under control i n 9 hours.
F i r e Loads Involved
Table VII shows a colnparison between f i r e loads, building a r e a s and f i r e a r e a s for t h e two f i r e s . " F i r e load" is the weight of combustibles in pounds.
As can be s e e n f r o m T a b l e VII, t h e r e a l l y significant d i f f e r e n c e in "fire loads1' is that contributed by t h e l a m b e r piles. In t h i s c a s e the f i r e would b u r n for a longer t i m e , and would e x e r t s o m e influence on t h e s 2 r e a d of the f i r e i n general, both by supplying flying b r a n d s and by radiating heat t o adjacent s t r u c t u r e s .
Spread of F i r e
In the Toronto f i r e , the p r o g r e s s of t h e f i r e along the v a r i o u s f i r e fronts ranged f r o m 1: t o 6 buildings p e r hour depending on a number of factors. Some examples a r e given below.
1. F i r e s p r e a d in those buildings located on t h e south side of F r o n t St., e a s t of Bay St. t o the e a s t e r n l i m i t of t h e f i r e was a t t h e r a t e of 6 buildings p e r hour. The s p r e a d was a c r o s s t h e s h o r t d i m e n s i o i ~ s of the buildings and in t h e direction of the wind.
2. F i r e s p r e a d in those buildings located on t h e north s i d e of F r o n t St. e a s t of Bay St. t o the e a s t e r n limit of t h e f i r e was at t h e r a t e of 5 buildings p e r hour. The s p r e a d was a c r o s s the s h o r t dimensions of t h e buildings and in the direction of t h e wind.
3.. F i r e s p r e a d in those buildings located on'the e a s t side of
Bay St. f r o m No. 4 3 Bay St, t o Wellington St. was at the r a t e of 3
buildings p e r hour. The s p r e a d was a c r o s s t h e s h o r t dimensions of t h e brrildings and against the direction of the wind.
4. F i r e s p r e a d i n a southerly direction on those buildings
located on t h e north s i d e of Wellington St. (Nos.
55
and 54) t o those located north of the Esplanade was at t h e r a t e of 14 buildings p e r hour. Thes p r e a d was generally a c r o s s the long dimensions of t h e buildings and i n t h e direction of t h e wind. In addition the f i r e had t o s p r e a d a c r o s s
s e v e r a l spatial separations.
5. F i r e s p r e a d i n an e a s t e r l y direction f r o m t h e C u r r i e Building t o the buildings on the e a s t side of Bay St. was a t t h e r a t e of
2
: buildings p e r hour. The s p r e a d was a c r o s s both s h o r t and long dimensions of buildings i n t h e direction of the wind. A c o r r e c t i o n h a s been applied i n calculating t h e s p r e a d a c r o s s t h e s h o r t dimensions. In addition t h e f i r e had t o s p r e a d a c r o s s s p a t i a l separations.
6. F i r e s p r e a d in those buildings located on t h e west s i d e of Bay St. f r o m No. 46 t o Wellington St. at t h e r a t e of 45 buildings p e r hour.
~ h ' e f i r e s?read was a c r o s s t h e s h o r t dimensions of t h e buildings and 0
against t h e direction of the wind. In t h i s instance, the buildings a l r e a d y burning on t h e e a s t side of Bay St. e x e r t e d a n influence which explains why the r a t e of p r o g r e s s is i n t e r m e d i a t e between the values with aild against the wind.
In t h e Ottawa-Hull f i r e t h e only a r e a f o r which information about the p r o g r e s s of the f i r e along a f i r e front was available w a s t h e r e s i d e n t i a l a r e a lying between Wellington St. and t h e Macadamized Road (now known as Carling Ave. ). T h e f i r e s p r e a d through t h i s a r e a i n 7 hours. An e s t i m a t e h a s been made of the p r o g r e s s of the f i r e f r o n t s through r o w s of buildings facing the two s t r e e t s immediately adjacent and west of
Division St. In one r o w it was a s s u m e d t h a t t h e r e w e r e 44 houses with t h e i r s h o r t dimension in the path of the f i r e and 28 h o u s e s with t h e i r long
dimension in i t s path. In t h e other r o w it was a s s u m e d ehat t h e r e w e r e 20
houses with t h e i r s h o r t dimension i n t h e path of the f i r e and 36 houses with t h e i r long dimension in i t s path.
If R
buildings p e r hour is t h e r a t e of s p r e a d for buildings1
with t h e i r s h o r t dimension facing t h e f i r e and
R
buildings p e r hour is the2
r a t e of s p r e a d for buildings with t h e i r long dimension facing t h e f i r e then
R
andR
m a y be e s t i m a t e d f r o m t h e following equations:1 2 44
-
+
-
28=
7 h o u r s R 1 R2-
2o +-
36 = 7 h o u r s R1 R 2 t h e r e f o r eR 1
= 18 houses p e r hour R 2=
6 houses p e r hourDuring t h i s f i r e it would appear t h a t t h e f i r e s p r e a d in t h e r e s i d e n t i a l a r e a of Ottawa was t h r e e t i m e s f a s t e r through h o u s e s whose s h o r t dimensions w e r e facing the f i r e than through those whosg long dimensions w e r e facing the fire. T h i s difference was prabably accounted f o r by the g r e a t e r s p a t i a l separations afforded by r e a r y a r d s than side
yards. The high r a t e s of spread a r e probably due t o the almost universal use of wood shingle roofs together with a high wind that prevailed at the time.
In the above calculations it has been assumed that the two f i r e fronts acted independently whereas they may well have been inter
-
related. If this assumption i s wrong, then the only comment that can be made i s that the f i r e spread at the r a t e of 9 buildings per hour.In both the Toronto and the Ottawa-Hull f i r e s wind was an
important factor. Once the extent of the f i r e became slich that it overcame the efforts of the rather meagre fire-fighting forces t o confine it, the
f i r e spread freely in the direction of the wind until i t r a n out of readily available fuel. The only favour able factor was that on the leeward flanks of both f i r e s t h e r e were obstacles in i t s path that enabled f i r e fighters t o stop the spread at these points. In the case of the Ottawa-Hull f i r e t h e r e was the escarpment on the eastern flank separating the remainder of Ottawa from that portion on fire, whereas in the Toronto f i r e these
obstacles were in the form of sprinklered or large solid masonry structures.
CONCLUSION
In the author's opinion, it i s most improbable that similar con- flagrations could occur today in these two urban centres under normal peace time conditions. Impravements in building regulations and the main- tenance of well-equipped f i r e departments provided with excellent municipal water supplies a r e such that it would be v e r y difficult for f i r e s involving m o r e than a few buildings t o develop. The virtual elimination of con-
flagrations in large urban centres on the North American continent has been one of the major achievements in the field of f i r e protection during the
fir s t half of the 20th century.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND REFERENCES . .
The author wishes to thank the National F i r e Protection
securing, and t h e i r generosity i n lending, photographs t o i l l u s t r a t e t h i s r epprt
.
The following books and publications w e r e u s e d as r e f e r e n c e s i n t h e reporting of t h i s f i r e :
F i r e w a s t e i n Canada b y J. Grove Smith. Commission of Conservation, Canada, Ottawa, 19 18.
T o r oilto conflagration. G e n e r a l Committee of F i r e Insurance Companies, S e c r e t a r y ' s Report. B r i t i s h A m e r i c a n As'sur
-
ance Co.Conflagration at T o r onto, Ontario. Bulletin No. 7 6, National F i r e P r o t e c t i o n Association, May 19, 1904.
A r e p o r t on t h e Toronto f i r e
-
1904. Toront'o F i r e Department, T o r onto, Ontario.Incidents at a g r e a t f i r e by F e r g u s Kyle. T h e Canadian Magazine, Vol. 23, 1904, p. 136-140.
Toronto's g r e a t f i r e by Norman Patterson. The Canadian Magazine, Vol. 23, 1904, p. 128-135.
Toronto r o m a n c e of a g r e a t c i t y b y Katherine Hale. p. 174-5. Ottawa-Hull f i r e of 1900 b y
G.
W. Shorter. National R e s e a r c hCouncil, Division of Building R e s e a r c h , Ottawa, June 1962. F i r e Study No. 7 (NRC 6802).
Information w a s a l s o obtained f r o m t h e following newspapers: Ottawa Citizen. 20-21 A p r i l 1904.
Toroilto Globe and Mail. 17 A p r i l 1954. Sentiment saved popular Queen's Hotel i n big 1904 f i r e by J. William G e r r e d .
TABLE
I
OCCUPANCIES INVOLVED IN THE
FIRE
WATER MAINS IN THE FIRE AREA
I
Diameter,I
s t r e e tI
No* Mains Of in.No. Destroyed
9
9
96
8 2 1 2 3 7 2 4 3 18 I Esplanade Bay Bay F r o n t F r o n t Nature of BusinessBoots and Shoes (Wholesale) Clothing Manufacturers
Drugs, Chemicals, Photo Goods and Oils (Wholesale)
F u r s , H a t s and Caps (Wholesale) H a r d-ivar e and Machinery (Wholesale) Millinery, S m a l l w a r e s and Fancy Goods
(Wholesale)
Printing, Lithographing, Book Binding and Stationery
Whitewear, Men's Furnishings (Whole s a l e ) Dry Goods (Wholesale)
C r o c k e r y and Lamps (Wholesale) Miscellaneous
QUALITY
AND
CONDITION OFFIRE
HC>SE 1" Chemical 2" Chemical TABLE IV OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE Municipality Kew Beach Toronto Junction E a s t Toronto Hamilt on BuffaloBrantford 1 engine, a r r i v e d too late for service
Niagara F a l l s 1 engine, a r r i v e d too late for service
London 1 engine, a r r i v e d too late for service
Apparatus 500 ft hose 500 ft hose 500 f t hose 1000 ft hose 2 engines 2 hose wagons (did not unload)
No. of Men 10 8 8 ' 10 Hour of A r r i v a l 10.45 p.m. 10.45 p. m. 10.45 p.m. Midyight 4. 30 a. m.
TABLE V WEATHER CONDITIONS TABLE VI FLRE LOSSES I TABLE VII
F
m
LOADS Weather Conditions 63" F, balmy s p r i n g day, snow gone, wind F i r e Ottawa -Hull Life Los s f r o m north up t o 30 mph. 2 4 " F , cloudy, snow- f l u r r i e s , wind f r o m northwest 25-30 mph.--
T o r onto F i r e Date 26 A p r i l 1900 P r o p e r t y L o s s No. of Bldgs. Destroyed o r S e v e r e l y Damaged T i m e of Origin 10.30 a. m. 19 A p r i l 1 9 0 4 Insurance Ottawa -Xu11 Toronto H u l l Lumber P i l e s-
-262.00 0.87 F i r e Load (x 106 lb) Bldg. A r e a 8.00 p. m. 9, 51 5 , 8 4 9 10,350, G O O Over 3200 100 3 , 8 5 5 , 5 9 5 1 7 8 , 3 7 5 , 0 0 0 0 (x 106 f t 2 ) Toronto Business D i s t r i c t-
-64.00 0. 51 I I Ottawa Res. 84.00 1. 31 F i r e A r e a 0. 8 6 10.80 1. 601
10.20 ( x 106 f t 2 ) Ottawa Lumber P i l e s Ottawa Ind. 47.00 1. 0 51
0 . 4 4 Ottawa Railway 1.30 635.00 55.00/
13.70 P r o p e r t y , Hull R e s , 2.1 : 1.21
0 . 9 2 Hull Ind. 0.30TABLE V WEATHER CONDITIONS TABLE VI Weather Conditions FLRE LOSSES Ottawa -Hull T o r onto TABLiE VII FURE LOADS 26 A p r i l 1900 19 A p r i l 1 9 0 4 F i r e Ottawa -Hull 7 Toronto
T o r onto Ottawa Ottawa Ottawa Ottawa Hull Hull Hull
Business Res. Ind. Lumber Railway R e s , L a m b e r
D i s t r i c t P i l e s P r o p e r t y
I
Ind* P i l e s 47.00 635.00 61.0 58.00 13.70 262.00---
Bldg. A r e a I 0. 51 1. 31 1. 0 5 2.1 1 . 2 0. 9 2 0.301
0. 87 (x 106 f t 2 ) 1 1-
-
-
-
-
- F i r e A r e a 0. 8 6 10.80 1. 60 10.20 0 . 4 4 1. 30 ( x 106 f t 2 ) 10.30 a. m. I - - - - [ 8. 00 p. m. No. of Bldgs. Destroyed o r S e v e r e l y Damaged Over 3200 100 63" F, balmy s p r i n g day, snow gone, wind f r o m n o r t h up t o 30 mph. 2 4 " F , cloudy, snow- f l u r r i e s , wind f r o m northwest 25 -30 mph. P r o p e r t y L o s s 9, 515,849 1 0 , 3 5 0 , G O O Insurance 3 , 8 5 5 , 5 9 5 8 , 3 7 5 , 0 0 0 T Life Los s 7 0 IFigure 1 View of buildings on north side of Wellington St.
,
we st of Bay St. following fire. Fire started in 4-storey building (Currie) in centre of photo.Figure 2 Plan of fire area, showing place where fire started and times (figures in circles) when various groups of
buildings were burning.
Figure 3 View of south side of Wellington S t . , west of Bay St. following fire. These buildings w e r e opposite the Currie Building where fire started,
Figure 4
The
fire swept up Bay St. to s o m e low buildings next toTthe Toronto'
,q--
,?
,.:s::.
f
c-,
-;
I...-
.;Engraving Go. These low buildings enabled the firemen t o stop the
northward p r o g r e s s at this point.
(photograph courtesy Public Archives)
;. ,*: rr 1 -4
,
,',.
, -, - - A ,.'."
,,: - g-5J,:::?. .,G t l "
I . , i - - ..-. .
, ..'-
: -+ -,!-q:W,.
I...
.& I ?'F;.,;?9-
-L , ,- - ' I -F i g u r e 6 The Minerva Building which b a r r e d t h e p r o g r e s s of the f i r e on the n o r t h side of F r o n t St., n e a r Yonge.
, >
' > ,
C"*
--
- . -7 - . ~ .m.
- I - , .o,>
, --:-,-i
F i g u r e 10 C o r n e r of Bay and Wellington St.
