Economic integration and commercial co-operation in developing countries: the case of the West African sub-region

GENERAL AGREEMENT ON T.ARIFFS AND TRADE Forty-first Commercial Policy Course 2 February ·- 15 June 1976

PRACTICAL WORK

Draft Study Prepared by: Kwasi YEBOAH-KONADU Ghana

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ECONOMie INTEGRATION AND COMMERCIAL CO·-OPERATION IN DEVELOPINWEST AFRICAN SUB-REGION G COill~TRIES - THE CASE OF THE

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TC(76)60

...A

April 1976

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TABLE OF CONTEnTS

Il

I. INTRODUCTION: ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE WEST· AFRICAN SUB-REGION II. THE MAIN ECONOMIC FEATURES OF THE WEST AFRICAN

SUB-REGION

III·. REGIONAL INTEGRATION EFFORTS IN WEST AFRICA

IV. LESSONS OF PAST EXPERIENCE

v.

THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES VI. WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS OF ECOWAS?

VII. CONCLUSION BIBLIOGRAPHY

(ECOWAS)

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3 5 11 14 19 21 23

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I. INTRODUCTION: ^ECONO~UC INTEGRATION AND ITS APPLICATION. TO THE WEST AFRICAN SUB·-REGION

It is perhaps appropriate at this point to indicexe that the c9ncept of economie integration involves at least four stages; namely, a custams tinion, a free-trade area, a ooi:mnon market and an economie union.

It

is in this context that the term will be used in this essay.

Especially within the past few years, a combination of VE~.rious features of the world economy have underlined the urgency of developing countries in particular to pool their resources together. The very frustrating recession and spiralling inflation in the market economy countries of the West, the unprecedented rise in the priee of petroleum products, and the wide fluctu-

ations in the priees of primary commodities, together with the resulting balance-of-payments crises in the developing countries, have all combined to give additional meaning to the call to the poorer countries of the world to co-operate in their commercial and ether economie activities.

All this is not meant to imply that it is only in recent times that the utility of co-operation has dawned on the international community. The idea of économie co-operation certainly predates the present century; but for practical purposes, one can just mention the fact that the founding fathers of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) did adequate recognition to this concept in

1948

and thus made legal provision for co- operation in the Agreement.1

/

- See 1/ GATT, BISD, Vol. IV, Part III, Art. XXIV.

~or oustoms unions and tree-trade areas, institutions

·.:>perati ve efforts among countries of the world today.

This Article makeS proyi~ion

which are pa~ic in all co-

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In the case of West Afiica, a~ will be seen later, tliere c~ be no doubt that there is a great need for the component countries (seme of them hardly viable as states at all) to move towards, a greater co-operation.

There are beth economie and _political reasons for such a co-operation.

In West Africa, gi ven the small market in the indi vi dual countries, beth in terms of population .and. income, (a notable exception is Nigeria, which bas a population of over

60

million) the demand for beth manufactures and non-manufactures is extremely limited. Even in Nigeria, which is the biggest in terms of market size, the demand for processed goods hardly

corresponds to more than that of an European or American city of two tt1i-llion people. The scope of demand in a majority of those countries does not extend beyond such items as textiles, footwear, kitchen utensils, etc.

In a situation such as this, it goes without saying that it is unreasonable, if not impossible, to establish economically viable import- substitution industries. Where these ha.ve been tried, the results have almost invariably been an utter dissipation of sc.ant resources. Ghana, under the Convention People's Party Government, is a typical case in mind.

For the landlocked çountries such as the upper Volta, Niger and Mali, there is an obvious need to seek closer links with the coastal countries. Such links naturally offer them unhindered, cheap, and guaranteed access to the seas, from which they may derive many economie benefits. In addition, the land- locked semi-desert Sahelian countries could supply the coastal countries with cattle, meat and labour. Co-operation will, in short, enable these countries to reap the benefits of economies of scale.

Besides tne economie rationalization for economie. integration, political arguments have been occasio~ally proffered, mostly by politiciens. A leading exponent of the c<;>ncept of Afr,ican Unity, the late President of Ghana, whi.le accepting the economie reas ons for integration, held the strong view tnat tne ..

. •. . . ·' .

best way for Africa in general to find a respectable place in .the comity of . nations wa.s to integra.te politically,.!/ Admittedly, Nkrumah bad reservations

1/ • . . . .. ·. . . . .

- ·see Nkiulnah, K.: .· :iAfrica Must. Unit~~; · ..

..

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TC(76)60 Page 5

sort of provide stopg.ap aid and to bail out the economies of ber former colonies, or individual parts of it, when the going bas been rough.

Furthermore» investment policies since World War II have created a discrepancy between the richer and the poorer countries of the region, as they have equally widened income level~ in individuel countries. For exsmple, whereas the GNP of Ghana stands at an impressive $2,250 million, that of Gambia is a nere $50 million. In almost all the countries, there are alarming discrepancies between the incomes of the urban elite and the rural inhabitants. The political and social implications are obvious ·~

mass rural-urban migration, unemployment, crimes, etc. Practically all the countries have, since Independence, embarked upon ambitious industrial~

ization schemes as a strategy for economie growth; but lacking in capital and the requisite technical know-how, many of these countries are turning out virtually the same manufactured products - textiles, footwear, etc. This has made it rather impossible to devise an appropriate industrial co-operation strategy.

Finally, n majority of the population of West Africa continues to eke out a living from tilling the land. As in the industrial sector, most of the erops produced in the agriculturel sector are.aloost the same and this situation does not therefore induce an exch~nge of products.

III. REGIONAL INTEGRATION EFFORTS IN WEST AFRICA

Efforts that gave birth to the Treaty establishing the Econo~c Community of West African States (ECOWAS, for short) were by no means un~que, signifi- cant as they were though. The years immediately after Independence in the early 1960s were particularly full of activities as far as integration schemes were concerned. The notable feature of these efforts, however, was that most of these schcmes were conceived and operated by the former French West African countries. Even though one cannet dismiss the efforts of the Anglophone countries, the fo.ct remains tha.t compa.red with the attempts. by

~heir French-speaking neighbours, English West African efforts at integration

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were only marginal. Seme writers hè.ve attributed this to ·the differences in the political orientation

of

the two colonial powers - France and Br. .

1/

J.taJ.n.-

The collapee of the AOF (Àfrique Occidentale F-.t:'ançaise), the Federation of French West Africa, in 1959, was indisputably a traumatic experience

especially to the poorer countries of the Federation. Senegal, in particular, which derived considerable benefits from the Federation was enthusiastic

about maintaining closer links with the rest of the ex~colonies on the attain- ment of their independence in 1960. It was, therefore, not accidenta!

that in 1959, under the aegis of the colonial adniinistration, these countries . . entered into a treaty establishing the Union douanière d'Afrique occidentale

(UDAO) - the West African Customs Union.

However, despite the enthusiffsm which characterized the installation of the UDAO, the Union ran into problems right et its birth over the dis-' tribution of custams receipts. Realizing the problems besetting the infant Union, the signatories decided, in 1966, to redically modity the UDAO, widening the base of membership in a deliberate attempt to involve English West Africa.

Consequently, UDAO was replaced by UDEAO (Union douanière des Etats d'Afrique occidentale). The objectives and modalities of the ne~ union remained basically the same - namely, to institute a common external tariff system in arder to foster greater commercial co~operation among the

contracting parties.

A thirà attempt, by all standards more ambitious, was made in 1970 when these same West African countries of French expression, with the

exception of Guinea, formed the Economie Community of West Africa

(CEAO).~/

1/ . . .

^{1" • • • Il}

- See: WJ.llla.m J. Foltz: 'From French West AfrJ.ca to the MalJ. FederatJ.è:m • Yale U~iversity Press, 1964, particularly chapter 2.

~/

^{It must .}be borne in mind· thnt the CEAO is· n'ct the seme

a.S

the ECOWAS, which is the lat est ·integration effort, embracin_g all the 15 countri~s of the sub-region, and which forms the subject matter of this dissertation.

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This Community was form.ed in Bamako, Mali. It is noteworthy that, d~spit~

genuine efforts to make both the UDEAO and CEAO really West African .. insti-.::. tutions, that is, invol ving both English and French-speaking West Africa, the English-.speaking countries. were conspicuously absent in both of tlleJ!l• . The main reason was that English West Africa was unhappy to be invited to

. . 1/ ,._ . . .

f

all these-meetl.ngs WJ.th only an observer status.- ..1"\.u J.nterestJ.ng Sl.de. o ·the Bamako; Treàty, which d.raw.s the att,ention o:6 the keen observer, is the

absence of both Dahomey and Togo. Guinee. had a.ll along been skeptical about these organizations because President Sekou Touré, like Dr. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, viewed these institutions as imperialist contrivanees rneant tc . . . .

organize West Africa more p~operly for exploitation by France and Britain, as the _case might be. But beth Dahomey and Togo were not intrinsically

OPP<?Sed to iz:ttegration.in West Africa; they were, however, opposed to any arra.Ilgements which

t~nded

to further alienate the two-groups of

~est Af'~icans

^·

- English-sp~aking and Freneh-speruting. Beth of them, however, orten attended CEAO me~tings a~ observera.

But, if French West Af'ricàns were a.dmired by.outsiders for their keen desire tc co-operate they were equally adjudged guilty of unnecessarily proliferating auch organizations, most of which had fundamentally the same aspirations, viz, the achievement of political and economie integration

among them. For exemple, many observera have proclaimed the establishment of the Conseil de 1 'Entente as rather supe~fluous. Admittedly, . 1 'Entente groups only Dahomey, -t.he Ivory Coast, .the Niger,- the Upper Volta and Togo (later). . ^. Its aim, according to its founders, was "to harmonize relat;ons between the member countries in t:q.e .poli tic al., social and economie spheres, w;ithqut impinging their sovereignty¹¹

.E../

In

o~der

to promote thi_s objective, a Solide.rity Fund _was: ,set up and a pro rata contribution from ~he tax :revenue of the member countries was leried. In 1966,- seven y_ears arter: the ,Council

liM.

Y. Asomaning: "The Economie Community of West African Historical Perspective". Dailz Graphie, Accra, 22 July 1975

2

/UNCTAD

publication: . UNCTAD/TE/67, .GE. 73-45663

; ~ .

States in a

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.-. :

was established; the Solidal'ity Fuhd wed:i replaced by the MUtuâl Aid: and · · ..

Loan Guararfty FUnd and a. permarierit secretariat" to 'ad:lninist:er the FUnd wa.s ^{f ·} establishéd in 'Abidjan. Despit.e ··the high: :h:opes thât ·were raised at' the

installationceremoni .. of Ent'entej··.it ·:·lÙr:ts not,. 'l:Ï:ké: the :UDEAO,. been• able· to raise the ;levèl of intra-Entente: .. tradè, mainl.y e:s à resûlt· bf the facfi that all thé mémber 'countries are producing virtually 'the seme' products - one sector, the modern ·one, producing for· export to .more advàriced coUntr:ies· and . the ether ·aect.or, the tradition:'al, engaged ·in production mairtly :fo:r local· · ·· · ' consumption,· as bas béen obseT'V'ed in the prec~ding chaptèr.

Apart from these more or less _multilateral arrangements, there were other groupings which were established to meet the exigences of two or three sta.t'ès. One can ci te in this connexion' the case of the very short-

l i ved

Mali

Fede~at,ion which was composed

or

^'s~negal and Mali (ex-French Soudan).

Tbis.union, established in

1960,

is worthy of note for ori~ main reason. A better understancUng of the interesting circumstances that led to tb~· ^ra.pid breakdown of this union helps those who choose to speculate on the chances

of future West 'African economie and political unions and also those who question whéther successful integration attempt·s in Weste·rn Europe and America should necessarily offer any hopes·to West Africans. and·peoples of the Third World in general, who are wont to point at· the apparent success o:f Europe as a sîgn of hope tor their own efforts. The éimplèst · answer to wby Mali failed could be round in the 'diffèrences in the politica! orien- tations of the two main personae draimàtis, :nemel.y, Leopold' Senghor and Modibo Keita, respect'ively of 8enegal and Sudan.

In

^{two ·qui te' notable}

domaine, namely, in those having to do with'economic develo:Pment· arid'.

relations 'd th F:te.rtcè, the·· two leader~s . had differe·' nt goals. In

aadi

ti on, the·

Senegalese leader-in pa.rtictillir felt th~t. the. continued existence bf the; · · · Federe:tion · threatened hiS political base, and therefore his opporturiity to· .. . · · · continue to

pl~

a significant role in African political life.

11

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' .~ ..... ^~ . -

l/Foltz, op. ciL

S~e pe.rticul~ly Çh~pt~r

^{I l for a_}

p~r~~pti~e . a~~~si~

of the circumsta.nces that lèd. to the "coliapse of· MÈili. ·· · · · :::: · ·

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The Organization of Senegal River States {OERS) established in 1968 by Gui:~ea, Mali, .Mauritanie. and Senegal, as is implied ~n its name had the main objective of undertak.ing a j o~nt development of the river .basin,

.. _,

e.s well as pooling their riparian resources together in order to develop ether aspects of their economies. In view of the inadequate communications which inhibited intra-OERS trade, a stuey was ca.rried out in 1970 by the ' member countries to firid ways and means of overcoming the problems which

had facèd them in the first two yea.rs. This led them to set up a permanent bureau for the promotion of inter-state trade and a preferential and a p~~

ments system among the four countries.

In addition to the Organization of the Senegal River States, West Africa has had two ·other bodies concerned with the development of river or lake basins. Thèse · are:

{a) the Lake Chad ·Basin Commission, set up in

1964

and involving Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria and Niger; and (b} t.he Niger River Commission, established in 1965 and

made up of Cameroon, Chad, Dahomey, Guinea, Nigeria, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, the Niger and MalL It bas

a

secretariat in Niamey, {Niger).

These two bodies have almost identical raisons d'être, namely, an

economie use of water resources, and within this framework, "the organization of :f'i.sheries, the co-ordination of energy policies; and the joint dev~lop­

ment of agr:i,culture and livestock raising¹¹

)J

It c.an ·be observed from the preceding pages that all the major efforts:

at integration in· West Africa have, by and large, been initiated by the · Francophone countries. As Asomaning succinctly puts it: "While the Franco:,;.

phones weré 'trying to · consolida.te the embryonic integration arrangements

. . .

le ft by ·the. colonial administration' and creating new cnes where. none existed·, in the Eriglish-speaking countries, one notes with dismay that the post-

independence period was a period of systematic disiritegration of the very

±/~ICTAD/TE/67, GE.73-45663,

page

52

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few centripetal institutions whicb vere erected by the colonial power"l( One ..

. . . . . . . .

ean cite such

detunet

West Afr1ean i~stitutions as the West Atrican Curreney Board, the Weet .Afriean Cocoa Reseàrch Institute, the West Atrican Airway:s Corporation, and the Weet African Court of Appenl., as exemples o-r the te1t

institutions Brite.in left behind in West Africa.

Nkrumah explains, in his "AFRICA MUST UNITE", _that he pulled Ghana out. of these _institutions bece.use they bore the marks of, colonialism, ·and the.~

auch regional organizations tended to blur the vider vision of Pan-A:f'ricanism.

The present· 'decade, ·however, opened an entirely riew che.pter in West A:f'rican integration history. The minor success and·, in certain cases,-down- right _failure of some of the institutions campelled $Ome of the Francophone leaders to review their positions. It he.d became clear _to some of t}?.~, at least, that no such moves could be effective without the participat~on of:

all countries of the sub~region, irrespective of pest colonial heritage.

It he.s already been mentioned the.t -Togo and Dahomey declined membership of the CEAO for precisely this reason; and, in 1965-67, the ex-President of Niger, Hamani Diori, condueted an extensive tour of West Africe. with the view to convincing his colléa.gues, both English-speaking and French-speaking, to accommode.te the re&lities of th-e time by creating a West A:f'rican Economie Union embre.cing all the eountries of the sub-region.

Efforts auch as this one vere given a further boost when the Economie Commission for A:rrica threw in its weight in 1967. As a result of his

personal diplomatie initiatives, the Executive Secrete.ry of the ECA was able to assemble Dahomey, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Mauritanie., Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo: and:-the Upper Volta in Acc:ra, in April 1967, to -sign the -~

Articles of Associo.tion establishing a West A:f'rican Economie Communi ty. : It· is worthy of note .t.hat ~~s:.was the first major attempt to bring t9gether - English_ andFrenc~:-speakingWest African countries in a bid to est!ioblish an economie unio~ among theJ:Il~ The· Accra meeting was tollowed, in .Aprill:968, . wi th the., signing of the Monrovia Protocol.

l/Asomaning, op. cit.

TC{76)60 Page 11

It is clear from the.above historical narrative that the road to ECOWAS has been rough and eventful~ What, then, have been the major !)bstacles towards the realization of the desire of West Africans to integrate their economies? The following chapter, in a rather modest way, attempts to answer this question.

IV. LESSONS OF PAST EXPERIENCE

It was argued in chapter one tbat tbere are a lot of benefits that could accrue to the individual countries of the sub-region if they could be persuaded to integrate their economies. Despite these indisputable advantages, the

various attempts at integration have scored only minor successes, if any at all; and intra-W.est African trade still remains at a very low ebb. A logical question·to ask is,why this failUre? There are same experts who name three. major weaknesses that have tended to militate against closer economie co-operation in West Af'rica. Peter Enahoro, the veteran Nigerian

journalist~ is one such person. Brief'ly, these factors are:

(a) the political balkanization of the sub-region into fifteen states (some of which are only micro-states);

(b) the. high costs required for rapid industrialization having tended to make these states rivals for faveurs in the capital· markets and lending bouses in Europe and America; and

{c) the absence of a large enough population to support mass

. . 1/

domest~c market~ng.-

The f'irst point is interesting and needs same elaboration: One of the lasting effects of' colonialism in Africa is the hideous scars it bas left on the ethnie map of the· continent. Where·as in· the past people coUld move freely from one·part·of the ·continent to another, under thè present circtnnstances visa requirements restrict people's moveme~t to a ver,Y cons{derable degree,

(Guinea, for instance, bas virtually shut itself from the rest of Africa)

-For Enahqro' s well-:-articulated views on the subject matter,1./ . see A:frica,

~~arch 1975, page 21

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and, "as the sense of nationhood has tak.en root in these new states, so has the jealous · awarèness of national id.entity in relation to other :Africé.n states .· grown, and with

it,

apprehensive guardiànship ·against ·threats ·of erosion of·

• • Il

1/

that ~dent~ty .- ·

Reinforcing the number of countries is the differ·ent political color- ations assuned by the different countries. For example, whereas Ghana under Nkrumah professed a policy of scientific socialism, the Ivory Coast.would have nothing to do with socialism, ¹¹Scientific'¹ or ¹¹African¹¹!

Plausible as these theses certainly are, they leave out other fa~tors

which have hindered a smooth integration of the sub-region.

One can immediately mention the inadequacy of a well-integrated. infra- structural system • . As Professer Kj eld Philip graphically. puts · it, ".In We.st Africa very few roads, and no railroads run parallel with the coasttt._gl · This describes to the etranger to the West. African scene the sort of road network that was bequeathed to the independent states by the colonial powers~

The whole of the transport network was geared to transport raw materials from the interior parts of the countries to the coas~ and to take manufactured goods from the harbour$ to the interior. Such a system, by all accounts, took very little car.e of trade and other needs of neighbouring countries. The alterna- tive to land transport (roads and railroads) is air transport which is too expensive to be .adopted as a reliable system at this stage of the economie development of the component states of the sub~region. Postal services are inefficient, and in many instances, calls have to be routed either :through London or Paris, as the case may be.

Hitherto, there have been not a :few countries in West.Mrica who have not be en able. tq ~e~ Jn concrete ~erms the immediate geins .that could · accrue to them from suoh co-~per.ative enterprises. Tllis is particularly the c·ase vith'·

1/E • •

- nahoro, 1b1d.

· 2

/ !'hilip· Kj eld: '¹Irttra..:Africe.n Economie Co-operation

and

.A.frica' s .. Relations with the EEC", ECA publication, 1972, page 3

TC(76)60 Page 13

the poo~est countries who cannot afford to invest their limited resources in enterprises whose returns cannot be immediate; a corollary to the above is the .tact that not many of the countries can muster enough financial and human resources to invest simultaneously on a large range of integrated projects so as to be able to absorb the initial ill-effects of integration.

Ghana, for example, has since the late 1960s gone into a number of

bilateral agreements with many of its neighbouring French-speaking countries.

Apart from the usual obstacles, it has been observed that an obstacle of no mean dimension is the linguistic barrier. Very few Ghanaians who have any

dealings with t~e promotion of economie co-operation (civil servants, business- men, etc.,) have any working knowledge of the French language. This problem

1

· is by no means unique to Ghana. It is only in recent years that the study of French ~d English (as the case may be) is being made compulsory in many of the countries of the sub-region.

In spite of the keen desire on. the part of practically all the countries to pursue a·policy of integration, many of them still maintain special

economie relations with either their former colonial powers, or certain trans- national corporations. This, of course, means a pursuit of different commercial policies. The Ivory Coast and Guinea are typical examples of two countries pursuing divergent economie policies and the English-speaking countries have always resented the close economie and political ties which the former French colonies have insisted on maintaining with France.

As vas seen in the case of the UDAO, there have been tremendous problems over the distribution of çosts and benefits. In a region where there are wide disparities in development the poorer countries have always been

suspicdotts of the activities of the richer eountries. It has been the case

that countries like ·the Upper Volta, Niger, and Mali have always been unhappy

about what they have viewed as the dominance of the Ivory Coast in many of the integration activities which they have been involved in·. Conversely, it is known that ~ the former AOF (the Federation of former French We-st African

coloni~s.) .prok_e, up owing to the Ivory-Coast' s unwillingness to ma.ke any real sacrifices for the benefit .of the poorer countries of the Federation. _{. .,}

TC(76)60 Page

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There is no· doubt that English West Africa was, for

a long time, unenthusiastic about forming ani unions vith their French

neighbours owing · to the fact of different monetary sy.stems - while the English- spealdng countriee ( except ·Li berie.) have by end large remained in the ·sterling zone, the Francophones have also remained in the franc zone; Francé's control

over the monetary policies of her former colonies is even tighter.

In addition to all these va.rious factors t·here is the important fact of lack of sufficient knowledge of the potentialities of other countri.es ·- la.ck of information about what happens in the neighbouring countries; this~

naturally, results from the fact that consumera have over the past years been conditioned to products which are manufactured in the former metropoli- tan countries, and also to the fact that almost all the se countries are producing similar goods. Another characteristic of commercial activities in the sub-region is that where procurement, production and marketing of goods are in the bands of foreigners and multinationals {as is the case in a majority of the former French colonies), these foreigners and multinationale tend normarly to look for markets outside the sub-region.

Last but not least, in a situation where a majority of these countries derive a substantial portion of their revenue from import and export duties, it bas been difficult to convince them to give up such revenue.

In the face of these difficulties which have beset past integration arrangements, the moot question is whether the ECOWAS can surmount them.

V. THE ECO!iO!.fiC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICA11 STATES (ECOWAS)

The treaty establishing the Econqmic Community of \vest African States, (ECOWAS, for short), vas signed in Lagos on 28 May 1975 by all the fifteen countries represented by eleven Hea.ds of State, two Prime Ministers and two Cabine~ Ministers. It bas fourteen chapters and sixty-five clauses. (articles).

The basic ai)ns and objectives can be found in the preambular chapt-er. . . In brief, the Treaty aims at promoting a higher standard· of living for ·.

. . ^{. .} '

the poeples of the contracting parties through economie cd-operation.

TC

this ·

TC(76)60 Page 15

endt the contracting parti~s .have pledged in the .Treaty to co-operate in all fields of economie endeavour: industry, transport~ telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources~ . commerce, monetary and financial

. .

questions and in social and cultural .matters. It is anticipated that co- operation in these fields will contribute to.the general well-being of the African continent.-1/

It is the aim of the countries concerned to ensure in stages:

(a) the elimination of customs duties and other charges having equivalent effect which have riitherto hampered closer co- operation;

(b) the er~dic~tion of quantitative and administrative restrictions on trade .among the contracting parties; . (c) the institution of a common external tariff system and a ·

uniform commercial policy;

(d) abo~ition of obstacles which have in the past made it difficult for persona, services and capital to move up and down freely in the sub-region; and

(e) harmonization of policies relating to agriculture.

All these are set out in Chapter I of the Treaty.

Chaptèr II ·deals with institutional arrangements. There. are five institutions envisaged by the Treaty, nemely:

- The Authority of the Heads of State and Government which shall be the

~ighes~ governing or~an of the.Community;

- the Council .of Minis:ters. consisting of two representatives of eàch cif · · · the member states;

. . ^.

- the Èxecutiv~ S~cretariat, to be headed by an executive. secretary ~ho will.be e:ppointed by the Authority.

·

. .

He will normally serve for a _. ~ . ^~ . . term .

or four years and be eligible for re-appointment for another fotir years

1/ECOWAS Treaty, Chapter I, Article 2.

TC(76)60 Page 16

only

}i

He will 'be assisted iri. his d.ày to dey administration by à supporting staff;

- the ·Tribunal of the Cdmm\mity whosé

inairi

function will be to ·settle ·disputes betlreen contrac·Üng ·'parties and to interpret the provisions or t11e "Treaty;²/ 'and, finally, Technical and Specialized Commissions on:

(a) Tr.ade, ~stems, Immigration, Honetary and Payments;

(b) Indus~ry, Agricult.ure, and Natural Resources;

( c) Trans,Port, Telecommunications a.nd Energy; and (d) Social and Cultural Affairs.l/

It was observed in Chapter IV of this essay that tariff barriers have contributed immensely to the low level of trade amorig .countries of the sub- region. The Anglophones in particula.r have found it very difficult to break into th~~arkets of the Francophone countries owing to the rather high ta.riff walls raised against them. Individual countries also maintain different ta.riff regimes, which is a further complicating factor.

In arder to overcome this problem, Chapter III of the ECOWAS Trea.ty attempts to resolve the is"sues involved in the different tariff syst~ms.

Among ether things, Article 12 of the Treaty states that ¹¹there wi;ll be progressively established in the course of fifteen yea.rs

...

a customs union among the member states. Within this union, custams duties, etc., on all imports shall be eliininated.¹¹ To emphasize theco-operative spirit, it is stipulated that a common ta.riff in respect of all goods imported into member countries from non-member states shall be established a.rid maintairted. 41 ·· •·

In arder to minimize the effect of elimination. of these ta.riff duties, which cértain"ly' wi.11. i~vol~e a loss of substantial revenue to· many of the

. . ... . . ^~.

membèr states, the exe~dse is spread over a long period of fifteen yea.rs ~

l/~COWAS

^Trea.ty,

~ha.pter

II, Article 8

2/I . .

- b~d., ArtJ.cle :11

J/

Ibid., Article 9

~/ECOWAS

Treaty, Chapter III,

Arti~les

^{13, 14 and 18}

TC{76)60 Page 17

The Treaty provides for the free movement of persans and also for

~ .freedom of residence. This, of course, is meant to make it possible .for . . . . art f t U . l / Th dr ft

commun~ty c~t~zens to work ~n any p o he n~on.- e a ers no doubt had in min~ the experience of the ~ast when putting in this provision.

One cardinal principle of the Treaty is to establish the basis· for effective co-operation. For this rea.son· there are elaborate provisions f'or industrial development and harmonization. Pa.rtzy as a result of different colonial backgrounds, and partly as a result of different ideological

. ' .

convictions, the different countries have hitherto pursued economie policies completely unmindful of what happens in their neighbouring countries. This naturally has made co-operation a very difficult enterprise in the past~ In order to overcome these problems, the Treaty enjoins the member stat~s to provide e~ch ether with information on major industriel projects. They have also undertaken to harmonize industrial incentives and industrial development plans, and finally to exchange personnel, provide facilities for training community citizens, and to go into joint ventures.2

/ These provisions are designed to eliminate the rather unhealthy rivalries and unnecessary dupli- cations which have been so coromon in the past.

Notwithstanding the many strides that have been made in the field of industrialization, West Africa is basically an agricultural region as hâS already been pointed out, and will continue to be so in the foreseeable future. It is therefore only reasonable that the Treaty makes ample room for co-operation in the field of agriculture. The ultimate aim i's to evolve a cammon agricuitural policy which will, among 'ether things, eliminate the

unnecessary competition and wasteful depletion of natural resources. Initi~lly, co-operation will involve exchange of information or experimenta, research

findings. rural de~elopment programnes and training sèhemes •. The second stage will be.towards the establishment of a common agricultural policy.

!/ECOWAS Treaty, Chapter IV

~/ECOWAS

Treaty, Chapter V, Articles 29, 30, 31

TC(76)60

Page 18

It is the hope of the contracting parties that co-operation in the agricultural field would evenbially lead to: ·

(a) controlled ievels of :production of :priroary e)cport goods ( such as cocoa, · èoffee, · rubber, timber, minerals, etc. ) (b) a ~ommon export sales :policy for these products, and {c) industriel :partnershi:p, with regard to the establishment

f . . . .

1/

o agro-based ~ndustr~es and process1ng agr1cultural goods.- Chaptèr VII is concerned mainly. with co-operation in monetary and fina.nèial matters.

The Chapter provides, in :part, for the establishment of a "Committee of West African Banks of the Member States or such ether persans as may be

. 2/

designated by Member States".- The main purpose of the Committee ~s to supervise the system of payments within the community.

It was clear~y established in the preceding chapter that the very weak ·. infrastructural links between the countries of West Africa have made co- operation :practically impossible. This means that any co-operation effort should take the problem of communications very seriously into account. It is in this regard that the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy

Commission of the Community will be required, under Cha:pter VIII, to criti- cally assess the existing infrastructural base of the sub-region with the view to correcting the present anomaly. The Treaty maltes provisions for a

.. f . . . 1" 3 '

systematl.c deve~opment o . a common tran9port and coromunJ.catJ.ons po J.cy.- It is anticipated that a comprehensive all~weather road network will be

established. As of now,

..

~here are problems in railway networks, for example, '· because different gauges are used in different countries. To overcome.this and ether like problens, a lot of harmonization and rationalization are en- visaged in the Treaty, pa.rticularly in the fields of shipping e.nd air transpot:t. '

_!/ECOWAS Treaty, Chapter VI

~/ECOWAS

Treaty, Chapt er VII, Article 38

]./ECGrlAS Treaty, Chapt er VIII, 'Article 40

ii

•

TC(76)6o

Page 19

A first step is the standardization of the equipment used at present and,

. 1 f f . l/

at a later stage, a poss~b e merger o some o these serv~ces.-

Owing to the uneven distribution of energy and mineral resources, the Treaty provides for a joint approach in their exploitation and utilization, particularly_in the case of hydro-electric

power.~/

In the main, these are the provisions of the Treaty which are designed to overcome the problems of .- the pest, and set the West African sub-region on the road -to integration.

There are other provisions which are not of ~ediate relevance to this essay.

They are those which deal vri th the settlement of disputes, the sharing of the Community's budget, and other general provisions.

Even· though the Communi ty has not become operational at this particular moment, despite the fact that it has been ratified by all the fifteen member -

state_f?, .a tentative effo;r:t will be made in the. following chapter to assess the chances of ECOWAS in the years ahead.

VI. WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS OF ECO\>! AS?

Undoubtedly, to nssess the chances of an establishment which has not even begun to operate, is a tall order. This is particularly so in fluid regions like West Africa. It is in this wise that all forecasts that will be made here should be taken as purely tentative.

Given the keen desire on the part of the international community in general, and West Africans in particular, to forge closer links with each

other, it is risky for any commentntor to condemn ECOI-TAS to an imminent failure.

However, if recent events connote anything at all, one is compelled to predict that the road to a successful integration of the sub-region is fraught with immense difficulties.

Almost six months after the Treaty was ratified by a.ll the c'?ntracting rarties, _an ECOWAS secretariat remains to be established. The difficulties

l/ECOWAS 2/I . - . bl:d. i

Treaty, Chapter VIII,·Articles 41, 42, 43 Artic.le

48

TC(76)60 Page 20

have centred around two key issues:

(a) the site, and

(b) the appointment of the first Executive Secr~tary.

The Francophone countries which bave the benefit of their experience 1n the erstwhile Afrique occidentale f;r-ançaise, are aware of what direct and

indirect benefits can accrue to the country wbich will host the secretariat.

This is why as many as three countries (Togo, Mauritania and Liberia) aré said to be lobbying for the Headquarters. In.the case of the Executive

Secretary, tbere are technical as well as sectional problems. The incumbent · must, of necessity, be bilingual - speaking both English and French - and must naturally be someone of proven integrity as an administrator. Again, it is rumoured that many of the countries are bidding for the post.

This apart7 the old problems which have plagued past integration efforts are as alive today as they were five or ten years ago, and one only hopes that the new generation of West African leaders is temperamentally different from the older generation.

Border disputes continue to cause considerable .friction among the member

. . .

states of ECOWAS. Ironically, a few weeks after the signing ceremony in Lagos, Upper Volta and Mali had an exchange of arros over a stretch of land wbich each was claiming.

In recent months, the. activities of a movement whose declared aim is to liberate Western Togoland (presently Ghana's Volta Region), and wbich

apparently enjoys t~e blessing of the Togolese Government, bave compelled the Ghana Government to issue a decree prescribing severe penalties for those found to be connected with t.he movement in Ghana. · The posture of the Togo Government bas done little to ease the situation.

A recent official·statement issued in Accra on the issue, among others, stated: ^il

'

^~·

.

but historical considerations aside, it seems too absurd to speculate tbat Togo, which is a full member of the ECOWAS, would seek or

support any move to obtain any part of th~ ~erritory of Ghana, a country which under the ECOWAS Treaty, signed by botb Ghana and Togo, and since ratified

•

TC(76)60 Page 21

by both, is destined to have the closest economie, social and political ti es in thë ne.e.r future. nl/

Nigeria which, with Togo, initiated the moves which produced the most direct bearing on the creation of ECOWAS, seems to have lest much of its. enthusiasm since the overthrow of General Yakubu Gowon.

In October 1975, Dahoney closed its border with Togo on the grounds that Togo had had a hand in an abortive coup d'état earlier in the month. This naturally irritated Togo which retaliated by holding up Dahomean travellers when Dahomey¹s emergency ended officially.

These are but a few of the minor cases which have led many to speculate whether there are any chances for ECOWAS to mature. The inescapable conclusion one draws in the circuostances is tbat even thougb ECOWAS may, in the long run, survive, it has a lot of short-term problems which will have tc be overcome.

VII. CONCLUSION

Economie co-operation, as has been advanced in the first chapter, bas become a practical necessity in the present circumstances of the world economy.

There is even a stronger case for co-operation among the developing countries of the world, the majority of which can hardly stand on their feet alone. In the West African sub-region, it has been seen that, apart from Nigeria, none of the countries have a population of nore than 10 million. This situation has compelled them to look for integration formulee since their attainment of independence in the early 1960s. However, there have been a lot of problems which have frustrated these efforts in the .past.

It is in view of these past failures that a treaty,whose main objeétive is tc integrate the econonies of all the countries of the sub-region, was signed in Lagos on 28 May 1975· The articles of the treaty are designed to overcome the problems which made co-operation impracticable in the past.

l/ ^,NEVJ GH!üUI., ·Information Services Dept., Accra, 11 March 1976, page 5.

TC(76)60

Page 22

However, even bèfore thè treaty gets off.the drawing board, 6ertain problems have crept up which make one wonder whether ECOWAS has a brighter future than the pe.st associations .•

In the final analysis·~ it is· the will to slirmount these problems that will count most; e.nd judgl.ng from public statements made by the leaders of the various countries at different times, one tends to have the. hope that ECOWAS will overcome the Se. ihitiel set-backs.

•

r·

BIBLIOGRAPHY

TC(76)60 Page 23

GATT~ Basic Instruments and Selected Documents~ vol. ^IV~ Part III.

Kwame NKRW..AH, "Africa Must Unite".

Kwame NKRUMAH, "Neo-colonialism~ The Last Stage of Imperialism:'.

William J. FOLTZ, ¹¹From French 1-Test Africa to the Mali Federation ^11• Yale University Press, 1964.

M. Y. ASO}IIANING, i!The Economie Community of West African States 1n a Historical. Perspective^11• Daily Graphie, Accra~ 22 July 1975·

UNCTAD/TE/67, GE. 73-45663.

Peter ENAHORO, "The Post-Colonial Era 1n Africa."~AFRICA, vol. 5, March 1975.

Philip KJELD, ¹¹Intra-African Economie Co-operation and Africa' s Relations with the EEC", ECA publication, 1972.

ECOWAS Treaty.

NEW GHANA, Information Services Department, Accra, March 11, 1976.