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City Improvement Districts (CIDs) in Johannesburg:
Assessing the political and socio-spatial implications of private-led urban regeneration
Elisabeth Peyroux
To cite this version:
Elisabeth Peyroux. City Improvement Districts (CIDs) in Johannesburg: Assessing the political and socio-spatial implications of private-led urban regeneration. TRIALOG, 2006, 2, pp.9-14. �hal- 00284371�
CityImprovementDistricts(CIDs)in
Johannesburg
Assessingthepoliticalandsocio-spatialimplications
ofprivate-ledurbanregeneration
ElisabethPeyroux
CityImprovementDistricts(CIDs)veranschaulichendenwachsendenEinflusslokalerGeschäftsleuteundGrundbesitzerinder
Stadtentwicklung.DiesePublicPrivatePartnershipswerdeninSelbsthilfeorganisiertundfinanziert.Klardefinierteöffentliche
RäumesollensovorallemdurchdieVerbesserungöffentlicherDienstleistungenbewirtschaftetundentwickeltwerden.In
JohannesburgwurdedasvonmächtigenGeschäftsinteresseneingeführtenordamerikanischeCID-Modelleininzwischenhäufig
angewandtesMittelfürdieAufwertungderverfallendenInnenstadtsowiederreichenVorortzentren.DerArtikelanalysiertdas
AufkommenderCIDsundbeschreibtdieZusammenhängedieserEntwicklungimKontextdessüdafrikanischenÜbergangszur
DemokratieundderVeränderungennachdemEndederApartheid.ÜberdieWirkungderCIDsfürdieInnenstadtentwicklung
hinauswirderklärt,wiesichdieBalancevondenöffentlichenInteressenzurwachsendenMachtprivaterAkteureverschiebt
undwelcheKonsequenzendasfürdieVeränderungderinnerstädtischeRaumstrukturenhat.DarüberhinauslenktderArtikel
dieAufmerksamkeitaufdieneuenFormenlokalerPartizipation,diedurchdieOrganisationvonCIDsunterstütztwird.Das
führtzuderFrage,wieundinwelchemAusmaßdadurchderWegfüreinestädtischeUmstrukturierungimSinnederEliten
freiwird.
Introduction
Private-ledurbanregenerationhasbeenpromotedin
manycitiesworldwideinacontextofgrowingscarcity
ofpublicfunds,increasingdevolutionofresponsibili- tiesandfunctionstothelocallevelandrisingpublic
privatepartnershipsinLocalEconomicDevelopment
(LED).BusinessImprovementDistricts(BIDs)orCity
ImprovementDistricts(CIDs)inparticularhavedevel- oped as an international model for revitalising com- mercialareasindecliningdowntownaswellasinhigh- ertolower-incomeneighbourhoodsinbothsouthern
andnortherncities.1Whilstthereisnostandarddefi- nitionofCIDs,theseorganisationsaremostlydefined
asself-taxing,self-helppublicprivatepartnershipor- ganisationssetupbybusinessandpropertyowners
tomaintain,promoteanddeveloppublicareaswithin
aperimeter,specificallythroughtheenhancementof
publicservices.2Theirspreadinghasbeenlinkedto
the upcoming of an “urban entrepreneurialism” and
theriseofneo-liberalformsofgovernanceascompe- titionbetweencitiesintheglobaleconomybecomes
greaterthanever.3
CIDsillustratethetrendstowardspublicinfrastructure
andurbanstreetsbeinghandedovertocommercial
andprofit-seekingorganisations.4However,research
on CIDs has mainly considered them as a tool of
LEDandurbanrevitalisation,emphasisingtheirform,
functionsandoperatingpractices.Theyhaveprima- rily been analysed as a new mechanism for munici- pal services delivery thus missing implications such
astheleadershipmanyoftheseprivateorganisations
exerciseinshapingpublicpolicyandtheiremerging
role in the management and governing of the city.5 Followingthediscussiononthetrendstowards“pri- vatecities”6(ofwhichgatedcommunities,shopping
mallsandentertainmentcentresrepresentmajorex- pressions),thispaperarguesthatCIDsarepartofthe
significantshiftsweobservetodayinthewayspublic
urbanspaceisbeingregulatedandcontrolled.These
publicly sanctioned yet privately directed organisa- tionshavemuchfartherreachingpoliticalandsocio- spatialimplications.Bycombininglocaleconomicde- velopmenttools,urbanmanagementinstrumentsand
policing strategies, not only do they reshape urban
formsandredefinethedecision-makingstructureof
thecitybutalsochallengetheconceptionsofpublic
interest.ThispaperanalysestheemergenceofCIDs
in Johannesburg and highlights some of the key is- suesthattheyposeintheparticularcontextofpost- apartheidSouthAfrica.7
CityImprovementDistricts:Pullingout
privateresourcestoupgradepublic
areas
Urban regeneration in Johannesburg rests on eco- nomic and social problems which share similarities
with both northern and southern cities: a declining
innercityaffectedbydeindustrialisation,thedevelop- mentofsuburbanshoppingmalls,thedecentralisation
ofofficeparks,andthe“whiteflight”outoftheinner
residentialareaslinkedtorisingratesofcrime;high
levelsofunemploymentandpoverty;andthegrowth
ofeconomicinformality.8ButJohannesburg,ahighly
unequalcity,shapedbythelegacyofapartheid,has
tosteerandmanagecomplexandspecificsocialand
politicalchange.Inter-racialpatternsofinequalityand
strongspatialdisparitieshavebeendrivenbydecades
of“racialFordism”whilethetransitiontopost-Ford- ism suggests increasing intra-racial inequalities and
growing urban social polarisation.9 One of the main
challengesofLEDistoenhancetheeconomicbasisof
thecitywhileovercomingspatialbiases,socialexclu- sionandnewformsofclass-basedinequalities.The
redistributionofrevenueandexpenditureafteryears
ofcolonialandsegregationmodelsofurbanfinance
1
Hoyt2003,Wiezorek
2004.
2
Gross2005,Houstoun
1997.
3
Harvey1992,Halland
Hubbard1996.
4
Graham2001:367.
5 Levy2001.
6
Glaszeetal.2005.
7
Thispaperisbased
onexploratoryfield
researchconductedin
2005withinthe frame- workoftheresearch
programmeon“Priva- tisationofsecurityin
Sub-SaharanAfrican
cities:Urbandynamics
andnewformsofgov- ernance(CapeTown,
Johannesburg,Durban,
Lagos,Ibadan,Kano,
Nairobi,Maputo,Wind- hoek)”sponsoredby
theFrenchInstituteof
SouthAfrica(IFAS)and
thetwoFrench Institutes
forResearchinAfrica
(IFRA)basedinIbadan
andNairobi.
8
Bealletal.2002,
Beavon2004.
9
Bealletal.2002:46,62.
Photo1:Streetseatsin
GhandiSquare,Johan- nesburgCBD.Pictureby
LucilleDavie,
www.joburg.org.za,2006.
Photo2:Thepedestria- nisationofMainStreet,Jo- hannesburgCBD.Picture
byLucilleDavie,
www.joburg.org.za.2006.
Figure1:Thetriangle
diagram
remains a highly debated issue. It was at the heart
ofthestructuralreformofthegovernmentintroduced
after the 1994 transition. The relationships between
publicandprivatestakeholdersandcommunitiesare
being renegotiated in light of the political expecta- tion-andfrustration-withregardtothepromotionof
democraticandgrass-rootsparticipation.10
CIDshavebeenimplementedasapromisingtoolof
urbanregenerationinspiredbythesuccessfulNorth
AmericanexamplesaswasthecaseinCapeTown.11 TheforerunnerofSouthAfricanCIDswasestablished
in the inner city of Johannesburg by business and
propertyownersassoonas1993onavoluntaryand
pilotbasisanditissaidtohavebeenverysuccessful
initsimpactoncrimelevels.12Followingthisexperi- ment,theseprivateorganisations13havespreadtothe
CBD,theadjacentmixedareasandtothedecentral- isednodeslocatedinthenorthernsuburbsoverthe
pastdecade.In2006,therewere10legislatedCIDs,6
“informal”voluntaryimprovementdistrictsand4pre- cinctprojectsalsofallingunderthecategory.14
The services provided by the CIDs are supplemen- tarytothoseprovidedbythelocalauthorityandop-
erate exclusively within the boundaries of each of
the CID. They usually include security, cleaning and
maintenance of public spaces, marketing, physical
improvements and special programmes to address
aspectssuchastransportation,accessandparking.
SomeCIDsalsoincludesocialprogrammessuchas
in Rosebank (creation of a Homeless Association,
development of income-generating activities and a
carguardschemeemployingthehomeless).Thepro- vision of services is based on a hierarchy of needs
establishedafteraspecificapproachdevisedbythe
CentralJohannesburgPartnership(CJP)15knownas
thetrianglediagram“creatingtheurbanexperience”
or“creatingadowntownexperience”(Figure1).
The inner city CIDs’ services are more confined to
crimeandgrime.Securityandcleanliness,marketing
and development of business are meant to change
negative perceptions of the downtown area and re- verse business decay. Public spaces have received
specificattentionthroughlandscapingandrefurbish- ing: creation of new or upgrading of existing public
openspace(GandhiSquare,MaryFitzgeraldSquare),
interconnectionbetweenthemthroughwalkways(be- tweenGandhiSquareandtheCarltonCentre),pedes- trianisation(MainStreet)(photos1and2).
The northern suburbs (Rosebank, Sandton, Illovo,
Randburg)arelessaffectedbyseriouscrimeandur- bandegradation.Branding,landscapingandpromot- ingculturalentertainmentareamongthemaincom- plementaryservicesprovidedbytheCIDsalongwith
securityandmaintenanceassuburbannodesseekto
becomeprominentbusiness,serviceortourismcen- tresandcompetebetweeneachother.16Theirterrito- rialstrategiesareintimatelyconnectedtothevarious
ways of ‘place-making’ and ‘place-promoting’ that
featuresintheurbanpolicydiscoursesinEuropeto- day.17Strategieshavebeendevelopedtoturnasatel- litecitybusinessdistrictintoacosmopolitan‘village’
(the Rosebank Management District); rezoning has
beenimplementedinaresidentialareatodevelopa
predominantly high profile corporate business node
(IllovoBoulevard)(figure2,photo3);anedgecityand
10
Tomlinsonetal.2003.
11
SeeDidierandMorangein
thisissue.
12
Interviewwiththeformer
directoroftheCJP,March
2005.
13
ImprovementDistrictsare
constitutedasnon-profit
(Section21)companies
withaBoardofDirec- torselectedamongthe
contributors.Itcomprises
propertyowners,business
owners,andrepre- sentativesofresidents’
organizations(ifrelevant)
andarepresentativeofthe
localauthority.Thelevy
isbasedonthecalcula- tionsonratableproperty
values(costsareborne
inproportiontothevalue
oftheproperty).Through
legislation,thecostof
provisionofCIDservices
Photo3:Streetlifein
RosebankManagement
District,Johannesburg.
Source:KUM,2006.
Photo4:RosebankMall,
RosebankCityImprove- mentDistrict,Johannes- burg.Source:KUM,2006.
a secluded sub-urban node is the object of efforts
toturnitintoasophisticatedandopen“Enterprising
GlobalHub”(SandtonCentral)18.
Urbanregenerationandtheneo-liberal
turninJohannesburg
CIDs embody and even anticipated the neo-liberal
turn of the African National Congress’ (ANC) poli- tics that occurred in the mid-1990s. As indicated,
thetranspositionoftheCIDmodelinJohannesburg
istheresultofanefficientlobbyingbybusinessand
propertyownersoftheinnercitybelongingtotheCJP
that started before the 1994 transition. These pow- erfuleconomicelitetooktheleadininitiatingvolun- tary CIDs, encouraging public authorities to engage
in partnerships for regeneration and set up legisla- tionforCID.ThestudytourconductedbytheCJPin
theUKandUSAin1996withseniorsofficialsofthe
cityandoftheprovincialgovernment,businessand
community representatives brought up international
experience.ThelegislationonCIDwasdraftedusing
CJP legal resources and went through a process of
revisionatthelegaldepartmentofProvincialGovern- ment.Itwasapprovedbyprovinciallegislatureatthe
end of 1997 (City Improvement District Act n°12 of
1997)andbecameeffectiveinNovember1999.
CIDshavefoundasupportivepoliticalcontextdriven
bythemajorconstraintsfacingthecentralstatewith
regardtopost-apartheidrestructuring.Thecontinuous
fiscalcrisisofthelocalgovernment-whichbecame
acute in 1997 - and the need to reform the racially
basedadministrativefragmentationinheritedfromthe
apartheidregimepromptedthepoliticalreorientation
oftheANC.Thebudgetarycrisiswastheinheritance
ofthelong-termunpaiddebtsderivingfromtherents
andservicesboycottsduringtheapartheidstruggle.
Itwasalsotheresultofratesboycottsintheformer
“whiteonly”suburbofSandtonwhoseresidentsre-
sistedthedecisionmadebythenewlyelectedlocal
councillorstostandardisetheratesacrossthemet- ropolitan area during the 1995-2001 interim phase
wherethedesignoflocalgovernmentwasbeingne- gotiated.19 The controversial “iGoli 2002”, a policy
andplanningprocessdrawingoncost-recoveryand
business principles, was said to symbolise the rise
of neo-liberal tendencies within the council.20 It laid
thefoundationfortheadoptionofthesingleunitary
metropolitanstructureandtheshifttowardsthepri- vatisation and the outsourcing of public services.21 At the national scale, the crisis is also said to have
beenusedasapretextforashiftawayfromtheam- bitious state-centred and equity-driven Reconstruc- tionandDevelopmentProgramme(RDP)towardsthe
Growth,EmploymentandRedistributionprogramme
(GEAR),amoreefficiency-drivenprocessofdevelop- mentbasedonpublicprivatepartnership,theroleof
thestatebeingreducedtothatofafacilitator.22This
shiftwaslaterreflectedintheJoburg2030strategy
initiatedbytheCityofJohannesburgwhoseaimisto
transformJohannesburgintoa“world-classcity”with
astronglyoutward-orientedeconomy,specialisedin
theservicesector.23
Thealliancesbetweenbusinessandpropertyowners
and the metropolitan council can be explained by a
convergenceofinterestsasfarasthemaintenance,
improvement and control of urban space are con- cerned.CIDscontributetoenhancingthecity’seco- nomic value through the strengthening of the prop- ertymarket:theappreciationofpropertyvaluesand
business activities in the nodes generates more tax
revenuesforthelocalgovernment.24Theregulationof
informalstreettraderepresentsanadditionalareaof
agreement.Thecouncil,incooperationwithbusiness,
hadtheby-lawschangedin2001inordertoprevent
unregulatedstreet-vendingorremovestreetvendors
incircumscribedmarkets.Thiswasalsothecasein
CIDsintheCBDandRosebankwhereanAfricancraft
isspreadonanequitable,
pre-agreedbasisamong
allpropertyownerswithin
thegeographicalarea.
14
KagisoUrbanManage- ment2006:http://www.
kum.co.za/managed_kum.
php.
15
TheCJPisaprivate,non- profitSection21company
whichmanagestheinner
cityCIDs.
16
CIDsinthesuburbsare
managedbytheblack- owned,equalopportunity
KagisoGroupthroughKa- gisoUrbanManagement
(KUM).TheCJPoperates
withintheframeworkof
KUM.
17
Jensen1997.
18
Peyroux2005.
19
Atthattime,theformer
boundariesdividing
“black”and“white”local
authoritieswereerased
andthegovernment
ofJohannesburgwas
dividedbetweenGreater
JohannesburgTransitional
Metropolitancounciland
fourmunicipalsub-struc- tures.Thecouncilandthe
sub-municipalitieswere
mergedintoasinglemet- ropolitanareain2000.
20
Bealletal.2003:87.
21 Mabin2006.
22
Bealletal.2002:94.
23
Rogerson2005.
24
SpiropoulosandFraser
2003:9.
Figure2:MapofIllovo
BoulevardManagement
District.Source:
www.illovoboulevard.co.za.
market has been financed by business as a way of
controllingstreettradeandformalisingtherespective
relationships.Thisillustratesthe“porousboundaries”
betweenthelocalauthorityandformalbusinesswhile
demonstrating the exclusionary tendencies of finan- cial,retailandpropertyinterestswhodonottolerate
competition25orattempttoregulateitandthelocal
statewhichagreesuponsuchmeasures.Surveillance
andcontrolofcrimealsoinvolvethecooperationof
thepoliceandprivatesecurityforceswithinCIDswith
weeklymeetingsbeingorganisedbetweentheSouth
African Police Service (SAPS), the managing bodies
oftheCIDsandthesecurityorganisationsoperating
inthedistrict(Photo4).Thegrowingroleofprivateac- torsincontrollingandregulatingpublicspacesraises
acertainnumberofcontroversialissuesthathavea
particularresonanceinthecontextofSouthAfrica.
RisksandimplicationofCIDsinthe
contextofJohannesburg
The risks and implications of CIDs as pointed out
in the northern cities in terms of “fiscal exclusivity”
and “splintering” management and privatisation of
streets26haveahighlypoliticalsignificationinSouth
Africa. By creating distinctive fiscal and service en-
claves, CIDs give birth to concerns about the risk
of reinforcing spatial inequalities like those between
thewealthysuburbswherebusinessesandproperty
ownershavetheabilitytopayforadditionaltaxesand
the low-income townships whose commercial and
economicbasisremainspoor.Thefactthatatrans- position of the CID concept in low-income areas is
currentlybeingexploredbytheCityofJohannesburg
shows that this potential shortcoming has already
beentakenintoconsideration.27Ontheotherhand,
proponents of CIDs see them as a way to provide
opportunities for upgrading and enhancing public
spaceswithoutburdeningthestate.Bydoingso,they
alsoseeabenefitforthepublicauthority.Asstated
bytheformerCJPdirector,inanurbancontextchar- acterisedbystrongstructuralinequalities,“CIDareas
shouldmaximisetheincomethatacitycouncilpro- ducesinthatareainordertoprovidetheexcesstobe
spentinpreviouslydisadvantagedareas”.28Whether
this form of cross-subsidising will become effective
remainstoberesearched.
Theriskof“protectionforprofit”and“sanitarisation”
of public places29 within CIDs – highlighted in the
northerncities30-alsoraiseconcernsinSouthAfrica.
WhilethecrimepreventioncomponentofCIDsmight
work towards a safer environment more conducive
tosociallife,enforcingmorecontrolandsurveillance
ofpublicspaceaccordingtoprofit-drivenstrategies
is seen as a potential source of discrimination and
exclusion for certain segments of the population, in
particular marginal social groups – street vendors,
sexworkers,thehomeless-whorelyonpublicspace
fortheirmaterialmaintenance.31Theissueofaccess
to public space is highly sensitive in Johannesburg
wheresocialandracialmixingwithinpublicspacesis
oneofthemainchallenges.Scholarsworkingonpri- vatepolicingandgatedcommunitiesalreadypointed
outtheriskofanewurbanapartheidbasedonsocio- economiclines.32
Finally,asCIDsareimplementedtodefendtheinter- ests of property owners and corporate businesses,
the main question revolves around the way private
andpublicinterestsarebalancedintheissuesraised
and dealt with by these organisations.33 As pointed
outintheanalysisofUrbanDevelopmentProjectsin
Europe,onemightquestionhowandtowhatextent
thesenewformsofprivategovernancearecharacter- isedby“lessdemocraticandmoreelite-drivenpriori- ties”.34Thiscanbelinkedtothedebateonthedecline
of the public sphere raised in the current American
systemwhichsuggeststhatissuesareinventedand
definedbyorganisedinterestgroupsandthattherole
ofordinarycitizensisreduced.35InSouthAfrica,CIDs
foster new forms of local participation and commu- nityempowerment-twomajorissuesinthepolitical
agendaassociatedwithcommunitydevelopment.But
thisformof“shareholdersdemocracy”36mightnotbe
the best option to fulfil these political expectations.
Scholars have suggested that CIDs might lead to a
perversionoftheconceptofcommunitydevelopment
as interests of owners, tenants and users are not
identical,andpropertyownersandbusinessmenwho
detainvotepowersmightnotbefromthecommunity
themselves.37
25
Bealletal.2002:116.
26
Graham2001.
27
Peyroux2005.
28
Personalcorrespondence,
July2005.
29 Zukin1995.
30
DingesandSack2000,
Eick2006.
31
Gulik1998,Eick2006.
32
ShearingandKempa
2001,Landman2002.
33
Briffault1999.
Photo5:Overviewof
theIllovoBoulevardMan- agementDistrict.Source:
www.illovoboulevard.co.za.
Photo6:Streetlifein
RosebankManagement
District,Johannesburg.
Source:KUM,2006.
Conclusion
CIDs illustrate the increasing involvement of local
businessandpropertyownersinthemanagementof
thecity.Bydoingso,theyredefinetheboundariesbe- tweenpublicandprivateinterventions.Theseprivate
organisationshavebeenproventogainleadershipin
shapingpublicpolicyandsettingupstandardsforthe
rest of the city. Examples of BIDs in the USA show
thatsomeofthemarenowtakingonchallengessuch
asrevisingoutdatedregulationsandcostsinthefield
ofhousing,managingdowntowndevelopmentasan
administrator for the city’s tax increment financing
programmewhilesomemayorsencourageoutsourc- ingofservicestoBIDs.38CorporateBIDsmayalsodi- rectlyshapecommercialgrowthbydirectlyinvesting
incapitalimprovements.39Theuseofprivatepolice
forceswithinthedistrict,whichreferstothegrowth
ofcitizen-ledpolicing,alsoquestionstowhatextent
the state monopoly of policing has been broken.40 AnalysesofpolicyissuesraisedbyCIDsquestionthe
capacityofelectedmunicipalofficialstowatchover
themandtheeffectivenesswithwhichcitiesmonitor
theCIDswithintheirjurisdiction.41Withtheimplemen-
tationofCIDs,theabilitytodefineandcontrolpublic
placesalongwithprofit-orienteddecision-makinghas
become the critical process through which the bal- anceofpowerbetweenpublicandcorporateinterests
isbeingplayed.
In Johannesburg, the North American CID model
broughtupbyapowerfulcoalitionofbusinessinter- estshasbeenwellacknowledgedandhasbecomea
widespreadtoolofurbanregenerationinthedeclin- ing inner city and in the high income decentralised
nodes.Inthatregard,Johannesburgfollowsthetrend
towardsneo-liberalformsofgovernanceandthe“en- trepreneurial city” which has been widely analysed
anddebatedinthecontextofWesternneo-liberalur- banisation.However,withregardtothepoliticalsup- port enjoyed by CIDs, it appears that little attention
has been paid to their potential negative outcomes
intermsofgrowingspatialinequalitiesandtheriskof
politicalandfiscalfragmentationwhichhaveapartic- ularresonanceinapost-apartheidcontext.Butoneof
thekeyneglectedissuesrevolvesaroundhowandto
whatextentthequestionofthepossibilityofapublic
interest is being challenged by these new organisa- 34
Swyngedouwetal.2002:
542.
35
LightandSmith1998.
36
Glazse2003.
37 Gross2005.
38 Levy2001.
39 Gross2005.
40
Newburn2001.
41
Briffault1999.
Photo7:Aprivatesecu- rityguardemployedbythe
IllovoBoulevardManage- mentDistrict.Source:
www.illovoboulevard.co.za.
PolicingJohannesburg’swealthyneighbourhoods:
theuncertain‘partnerships’betweenpolice,communities
andprivatesecuritycompanies
tions,42 in particular through promoting corporate
intereststothedetrimentofaddressingsocialissues.
TheformoflocaldemocracythatisfosteredbyBIDs
isalsoputintoquestion,43inparticularthetrendsto- wardsanelite-drivenurbanredevelopment.
_________
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Dr.ElisabethPeyroux ___
urbangeographerand
socialanthropologist,is
aresearchassociateat
theLaboratoireGecko
attheUniversityofParis
X-Nanterre.Herresearch
concentratesonurban
governance,urbanpoli- ciesandsecurityissues
insouthernAfricancities
(Johannesburg,Wind- hoek).Sheiscurrently
coordinatinganinternati- onalresearchprogramme
on“Privatisationof
securityinSub-Saharan
Africancities:Urbandyna- micsandnewformsof
governance(CapeTown,
Johannesburg,Durban,
Lagos,Ibadan,Kano,Nai- robi,Maputo,Windhoek)”
sponsoredbytheFrench
InstituteofSouthAfrica
(IFAS)andthetwoFrench
InstitutesforResearchin
Africa(IFRA)basedinIba- danandNairobi.
Kontakt:
elisabeth.peyroux@t- online.de
42
Wardundated:18.
43
Briffaut1999.