Article
Reference
Experimental Philosophy and the Compatibility of Free Will and Determinism : A Survey
COVA, Florian, KITANO, Yasuko
Abstract
The debate over whether free will and determinism are compatible is controversial, and produces wide scholarly discussion. This paper argues that recent studies in experimental philosophy suggest that people are in fact "natural compatibilists". To support this claim, it surveys the experimental literature bearing directly (section 1) or indirectly (section 2) upon this issue, before pointing to three possible limitations of this claim (section 3). However, notwithstanding these limitations, the investigation concludes that the existing empirical evidence seems to support the view that most people have compatibilist intuitions.
COVA, Florian, KITANO, Yasuko. Experimental Philosophy and the Compatibility of Free Will and Determinism : A Survey. Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science , 2014, vol. 22, p. 17-37
DOI : 10.4288/jafpos.22.0_17
Available at:
http://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:109413
Annals
of theJapan Association for PhNosoph,y
ofScience Vol,22(2014) 17-37 17
ExperimentalPhilosophy and the Compatibility of Iib7ee Will
and Determinism: A Survey
Florian CovA'
andYasuko KITANo"'
Abstract
The debate
over whetherfree
will anddeterminism
are compatibleis
con-troversial,
andproduces
wide scholarlydiscussion. This paper
arguesthat
recent studiesin
experimentalphilosophy
suggestthat people
arein fact
C`natural cem-patibilists". [[b
supportthis
claim,it
surveysthe
experimentalliterature bearing directly (section 1)
orindirectly (section 2)
uponthis issue, before point・ing to
three possible limitations
ofthis
claim(section 3). However,
notwithstandingthese limitations, the investigation
concludesthat the
existing empirical evidence seemsto
supportthe
viewthat
mostpeople have
compatibilistintuitions.
Key
words: experimentalphilosophy; free
will; moral responsibility;determin- ism
Introduction
The
recentlydeveloped field
ef experimentalphilosophy
advocates a methodolog-ical
shifttoward the
use ofan experimental methodology, in order to
makeprogress
on
problems in philosophy (Knobeand Nichols, 2008), On
a narrow view, experimen-
tal philosophy is
an experimentalinvestigation
of ourintuitions
aboutphilosophical
issues;
on alaryer
view,it
encompasses alltentative
attemptsto
makeprogress
enphilosophical questions
usingexperimental
methods(Cova, 2012).
Recently,
agrowing
number of studiesin
experimentalphilosophy
are addressingthe
relationshipbetween free
will and moral responsibility.Most
ofthese
aim(i)
attesting
whetherpeople have the intuition that
an agentin
adeterministic
universecannot
have free
will andbe
morally responsiblefor his
orher
actionsby (ii) probing
their intuitions
on small vignettesi.In this paper,
we address(i), i.e. the
compatibilityauestion:
whetherpeople
reallyhave incompatibilist intuitions
onthe
compatibility offree
will withdeterminism2,
*-*12
Swiss Centre for Affective Sciences, University
ofGeneva Graduate School
ofArts
andSciences, The University
ofTokyo Sommers (2010)
criticizesboth (i)
and(ii),
However,
we shall notgo into
methodologicaldiscussions
about(ii) in this paper.
-l7-
18 Florian CovA
andYasuko KITANo Vbl.22
Whether they do is
animportant
matter,in terms
ofboth theory
andpractice.
In
regardsto practice, Greene and Cohen (2004)
arguethat
neurosciences,because
they promote
adeterministic
view ofhuman decision
making,they
willlead people
to abandon their beliefs in free
willand
moral responsibility, andthus to
abandon a retribution-based conception oflegal punishment in
exchangefor
a more consequentialist perspective. However, this prediction
rests onthe premise that people
are "natural
incompatibilists", i,e, that they pre-theoretically
andin
absent of anyphilosophical training will consider free
willto be incompatible
withdeterminism.
If it
were shownthat,
onthe
contrary,people pre-theoretically believe free
willto be
compatible withdeterminism
and,thus,
were "natural compatibilists",this
wholeargument
would collapse3,More broadly, these
experimentalfindings
canimpact the perception
ofthe free
will
problem, particularly
outside ofthe
circle offree
will specialists,Non-specialists
could assume
that it is
obviousthat determinism
andfree
willare incompatible
andthus fail to
appreciate specialists' effbrtsto
solvethis problem, Fbr
example, scientistsIike Sam Harris (2012)
andJerry Coyne (on his blog)
claimthat
currentscientific
evidence show
that
wehave
nofree
will,But their
arguments rely on a very specificincompatibilist
conception offree
will and moral responsibility, whichthey
nonethe-less
assume representsthe
"commonview"
of society. In this situation,
showingthat people do
not unanimouslybelieve that free
will requiresindeterministic
choice would contributeto bridging the gap between scientists
andphilosophers,
asit
woulddemonstrate to the former that questions
regardingthe
common conception offree
will are
far from
obvious, andthus
stillworthinvestigating,
In terrns
oftheory,
somehave
arguedthat folk intuitions give
adialectical
advan-tage to the philosophical position that is
closerto
common sense, andhelp determine
who
has te
carrythe burden
ofproof (e.g. Nahmias
et al.2006). However,
we willnot explicitly address such meta-philosophical
issues. Instead,
we remainfocused
upon
the possibility
of synthesizingthe
available experimental resultsin order to give
an answer
to the purely descriptive question known
asthe
compatibilityguestion.
After
surveying experimentsbearing directly (section 1) or indirectly (section 2)
onthis issue4,
we will concludethat
current results supportthe
conclusionthat people We'd like to thank
an anonymous refereefor pointing
outthat
readers who are notfamiliar
with experimental approachesin philosophy
mighthave trouble identifying the precise question
we addressin this paper.
3
See Cova (2011).
4
The present paper intends to be
a survey ofthe
experimental studiesbearing
onthe
compatibilityquestion,
some of which mainlyfocus
upon moral responsibilitybut yet have implication to free
will ascription, and not a meta-analysis ofthose (an im-
possible
exercise, sincethese
studiesdiffer
widelyin
methods and objectives).Fbr
a metaranalysis of some of
the
studiespresented in this paper,
seeFeltz
andCova
(submitted).
-18-
Experimental Philosephy
and theCompatibility
ofFree Will
andDeterrninism: A Survey 19
are "naturalcompatibilists",
but also address three possible limitations to this
claim(section 3).
1. Iblk intuitions
aboutthe
compatibility offree
will anddeterminism
The
`NaturalCompatibilist' Hypothesis
In
one ofthe first
studiesin
experimentalphilosophy
offree
will,Nahmias
andhis
colleagues(2005, 2006) gcrve to 395 participants the fo11owing
storythat describes
an agent
living in
a world ruledby
aLaplacean determinism (i.e. in a
worldin
which each state of
the
world couldbe deduced from the
coajunction ofthe
cempletedescription of the
worldat an anterior state and the la:ws of nature}:
imagine that in the
nemt century wedzscover
alZthe laws ofnature,
and webuild
a super=ornputer which can
deduce Jhom these laws of
nature andfrom the
cur-Tent state of everything
in the
world emactly what wiltbe happening in the
worldat any
fature time, ft
canlook
at everything aboutthe
waythe
worldis
andpredict
everything abouthow it
willbe
with100%
accurzzcy.Simppose that
such asuper=omputer emisted, and
it looks
atthe
stateof the
universe at a certaintime
on
March 25, 2150 AD, 20 years befbre Jeremy Hagl is born, [I'7}e
computerthen deduces fhom this ioformation
andthe laws
of naturethat Jererny
willdofinitely
robFidelity Bank
at6:OO pm
onJanuary 26, 2195, As
always,the
super=om-puter's prediction is
correctiJeremy
robsFidelity Bank
at6:OO pm
onJanuary
26, 2f95.
Some participants
werethen
asked:imagine
such a supercomputer actuallydid
emist and actually couldpredict the future, including Jeremy's
robbingthe bank (and
assurneJeremy does
noticnow
about
the prediction?:
Do you think that,
whenJeremy
robsthe bank, he
actsof his
ownfree
will?While
others were asked:Do yeu think that
whenJeremy
robsthe bank, he
's moTullyblameworthy for it9
[[b the first question, 76%
of21 participants
answeredthat Jeremy
acted ofhis
ownfree
will.ZIb the
second,83%
of18 participants
answeredthat Jeremy
was morallyS
When possible,
we reportthe
sample size, sinceit is
animportant data to judge the
generalizability
of a study's results,However, this is
not alwayspossible. Overall,
sample sizehave tended to increase
withtime,
as experimentalphilosophy becarne
more methodologicallydemanding. Participants in these
studies aregenerally
eitherundergraduate students or
participants
recruited enline(for
example,through Ama-
zon
Mechanical Turk), though
they are notable exceptions,that
we willpoint
out,
-19-
20 Florian CovA
and1lasuko KITANo Vbl,22 blameworthy. In
another versionJeremy did
not rob abank but
saved a childfrom
a
burning building. [[b this
scenario,68%
of22 participants
answeredthat Jeremy
saved
the
child ofhis
ownfree
will and88%
of18 participants judged that Jererny
was
praiseworthy for having
savedthe
child.Finally, in
athird
version ofthe
story,Jeremy decided to go jogging. In this
case,79%
of19 participants
answeredthat
Jeremy
wentjogging
ofhis
ownfree
will,In
additionto this
version(the SupERcoMpuTER
case),they have
obtained simi-lar
results withtwo
otherkinds
of scenarios.First, they gave 69 participants
scenariosabout
two IDENTIcAL [I]wlNs
who were supposedto live in
a worldin
whieh one'sbeliefs
and values are caused completelyby the
combinationof her or his genes and
the
environment she orhe is in. As they have been
separated atbirth, the first twin
(FYed) israi$ed in family that teaches to
value money above allelse while the
second
(Barney) is
raisedin
afamily that tcaches him to
valuehonesty
above all,Then the
fbllowing happens:
One dazr Fbfed
andBarney
eachhappen to finci
a wallet containing$1000
andthe identijZcation of the
owner(neither
7nanknows the
owneTV.Each
manis
sure
there is
nobody else around.After deliberation, foed Jerkson, because of
his beliof3
and values,keeps the
money.A.fter delibeTution, Barney Kinderson, because of his beZiefS
and values, returnsthe
walletto its
owner.Civen that,
in this
world, one'sgenes
and environment completely cause one'sbeliefS
andvalues,
it is true that of 1b7ed had been
adoptedby the Kindersons, he
woutdhave had the beZiojls
and valuesthat
wouldhave
causedhim to
returnthe walleti
andof Barney had been
adoptedby the Jerksons, he
wouldhave had the beliqf3
andvalues
that
woutdhave
causedhirn to keep the
wallet,Having
readthis
seenario,76% of 34 participants judged both that Fbred kept the
wallet of
his
ownfree
will andBarney
returnedit
ofhis
ownfree
will.Moreover, 60%
of
35 participantsjudged that fted
wasblameworthy
and6496 judged that Barney
was
praiseworthy.
Finally,
athird kind
of scenariosdescribed
aRE-cREATING UNIVERSE that is
identically
recreated again and again sothat
everything musttake place the
exact same way,In this
casethe participants
were askedboth to judge
whetherJill (a per-
son
living in this
world)decided to
steal a necklace ofher
ownfree
will alld whether`Cit would
be fair to hold her
morally responsible(that is, blame her) for her deci-
sion
to
stealthe
necklace."Most participants
offered consistentjudgmentsi
overall,66% judged that Jill
acted ofher
ownfree
will, and77% judged her to be
morallyresponsible.
[[letken together,
such results strongly suggestthat people tend
notto
considerfree
will anddeterminism to be incompatible, Let?s
callthis possibility the
`tNaturalCompatibilist Hypothesis" (hereafter NCH): people
are, mostly, "natural compati--20-
Experimental Philosophy
and theCompatibility
ofFYee WM
andDeterminism: A Survey 21 bilists". Though NCH
explainthe data
wejust
surveyedin
a straightforward way,the data
wepresent in the fo11owing
section are not so easily accommodated,Etraming
effects and confiictingintuitions
The trouble for NCH
comesfrom two
experimentsby Nichols
andKnobe (2007;
see
alsoNichols, 2006), In both
experiments,participants
werepresented
withthe
fo11owing description
oftwo different
universes:imagine
a universe(Ulrbiverse A? inwhich everything that happens is
completety
caused
by
whateverhappened bofbTe it, This is tmLe from the
verybepinning
of the
universe, so whathappened in the beginning of the universe caused
whath{rppened
next, and so on riyht 2rp unttlthe present. za)r
example oneday John decided to have lib,ench Pbqies
atlunch. Like
everything else,this decision
tvasco7npletely caused
by
whathappened bofbre it. So, of
everythingin this
universewas exactly
the same
irp untiZJohn
madehis decision, then it had to hcrppen that
John
woulddecide to have JJbeench IJb"ies.
IVbw imagine
a universe(Uitiverse ew in which almost everything that hqppens
is
completeiy causedby whatever hoppened bofbre it. Tlhe
one exceptionis hu-
mandecision
making. ]Fbr example, oneday Mar!t decided to have foench liV"ies
at
lunch, Since
aperson's decision in this
universeis
not compZetely causedby
whathappened befbre it,
evenof
everythingin the
universe was exactlythe
sa7neup until
Mary
madeher decision, it did
nothave to hoppen that Mary would
decide to have Rrench Fries. She
couldhave decided to have
somethingdttrerent.
7he key dlfference, then, is that in Uiziverse A
everydeeision is
completelycaused
by
whathappened bofbre the decision- given the past, each decision has
to hoppen the
waythat it does. By
contrast,in Uhiverse B, decisions
are notcompleteZy caused
by the past,
and eachhuman decision does
nothave to hoppen
the
waythat it does.
In the first
experiment,participants
werethen
asked which one ofthese two
universes was morelike
ours.Nearly
allparticipants (90%)
answered `UniverseB'. Then, par-
ticipants in the CoNcRETE CoNDITIoN
receivedthe fo11owing
scenario:in Universe A,
a man namedBitt has become
attractedto his
secretarzt, andhe decides that the
onZy wayto be
withher is to kilt his
wije and3
children.He knows that it is impossible to
escapefro7n his house in the
eventofafire. Befbre
he leaves
on abusiness trip, he
setsup a device in his basement that burns down the house
andkitls his fomily.
fs Billy jully
7norally responsiblefbr kilting his
wofe and children?In this
eondition,most subjects (72%) gave the
compatibilist answer accordingto
-21-
22 Florian CovA
andYasuko KITANO Vbl.22
which
the agent
wasfully
morally responsible.These
results are consistent withthose
obtainedby Nahmias
andhis
colleagues,But, let;s
consider nowthe AB-
sTRAcT CoNDmoN, Participants in this
conditionhad
no scenarioto
readbut just
received
the fo11owing question:
in Uhiverse A, is it possible for
aperson to be
morally responsiblefor their
actions9
In this
condition, most subjects(86%) gave the incompatibilist answer. How is it possible that participants'
answers areso inconsistent? A first
solution couldbe that the
concrete condition scenariois too long
and complexfor participants to keep track
of
the
relevantfact, Nichols
andKnobe garve to participallts
a shorter version ofthe CONcRETE CoNDITIoN: 50% gave the
compatibilistanswer,
whichis
stillhigher
than in the ABsTRAcT CoNDITIoN. Thus,
another solution mustbe
advanced.Three
accounts of cenflictingintuit'ions
Many
accounts ofthis phenomenon have been
advanced,center of
discussions
and subjectto
experimentaltesting6:Three
have been
atthe
(1) The `Abstract vs. Concrete' hypothesis
According to Sinnott-Armstrong (2008), differenees in participants' answer
couldstem
from the fact that processing
abstract and eoncretestimuli
engagedifferent
cog- nitive mechanisms.Drawing
onthe Construal Level Theory,
apsychological theory
according
to
whichdistant phenomena (along
any efthese four dimensions:
spa-tialltemporal/social/hypothetical) are
construed at ahigher,
more abstractlevel,
Weigel (2011)
asked142 participants to
readthe fo11owing
scenario:Scientists harve discovered that
everythingthat happens is
completely causcdby
whateverhappened before it, This is and has
alwaysbeen true:
all events,including human
choices anddecisions, happen beeause
of somethingthat com-
pletely
causedit. Fbr
example, whenI
ateFlrench fries for lunch,
mydec2sion
caused me
to
eatthe Fteench Fries, but the decision
was also complete!ycaused
by
whathappened before it. Prior
events caused mydecision to
eatthe Erellch
Eries,
and mydecision determined
whatI ate. Keep that in
mind asI tell you
whathappened
withBill.
Bill became
attractedto his secretary, and he decided that the
only wayto be
with
her
wouldbe to kill his
wife andthree
children.Knowing that it would be
impossible to
escapefrom his house in the
event of afire, he
set up adevice in
6
Fbr
afourth
accountthat has
notbeen discussed
sefar,
seeMandelbaum
andRipley
(2012).
-22-
Experimental Philosophy
andthe Compatibility
ofEree Will
andDeterminism: A Survey fable 1 Results from Nichols & Knobe (2007)
23
Agentinindeterministic,unlverseAgentindeterministicuniverse
HighAffectcase 95% 64%
LowAffectcase 89% 23%
his basement that burned down the house
andkilled his family.
In the NEAR CoNDITIoN, before
readingthe
scenario subjects were askedto imagine that they
weregoing to hear the lecture in
a.fewdays
andthen to predict how they '
would answerthe questions in
afow days. In the DIsTANT CoNDITIoN,
[`in afew
days"
was replacedby in
afew years. Weigel fbund that participants
were morelikely to give incompatibilist answers (i,e, to answer that Bill did
not makehis decision
freely) in the DIsTANT CoNDmoN -
alikely
explanationbeing that distance led participants to think in
a more abstract wayand that
abstractthought promotes incompatibilist intuitions.
(2) The
`PerformanceError Model'
[[b
explaintheir
own results,Nichols
andKnobe (2007)
advance whatthey
calledthe
`PerfbrmanceError Model; (hereafter, PEM): it
mightbe that
compatibilist an-swers are emotionally
driven
andthat people are
morecompatibilist in the
concrete casebecause the
situationdescribed (a
murder)is
emotionallyloaded, [[b test this
hypothesis, Nichols
andKnobe designed two
new conditions,The Low AFFEcT
condition was the fo11owing:
As he has done
mangytimes in the past, Mark
arrangesto
cheat onhis taxes. ls it possible that Mark is fully
morally responsiblefor
cheating onhis taxes?
While the HIGH AFFEcT condition was the fbllowing:
As he has done
Tnanytirnes in the past, BiZl
stalks andmpes
a stTangeT,ls it
possible that Bill is fully
rnoralty responsiblefor
ropingthe stranger?
In
each condition,fbr half
ofthe
subjects,the question
stipulatedthat the
agent wasin (deterministic) Universe A
while,fbr the
otherhalf, the question
stipulatedthat
the
agent wasin (indeterministic) Universe B. Table 1 describes, fbr
each combina-tion, the proportion
ofparticipants
who answered Cyes'to
whetherthe
agent couldbe fully
morally responsiblefor his
action,Contrary to
whatNCH
wouldhave predicted,
and aspredicted by PEM, partic-
ipants in the Low AFFEcT
conditiontended to judge that the
agent situatedin
adeterministic
universe could notbe
responsiblefbr
cheating onhis taxes. For Nichols
and Knobe, these
results supportPEM
overNCH by
showingthat participants have
-23-
24 Florian CovA
andYasuko KITANo Vbl. 22
compatibilist
intuitions
when affective reactionsare kept low
enough not-to bias their
judgments. Additionally, these
results alsopose
aproblem for the
`Abstract vs.Con-
crete'
hypothesis,
sinceboth the
`high aflect' alld Llow afR]ct' conditions seemsto be
concrete cases.
However, PEM faces
a number ofproblems. First, this
accountis incompati-
ble
withthe fact that, in Nahmias' SupERcoMpuTER (JOGGING)
case,people
werecompatibilists about
Jeremy going jogging,
whilethis is
clearly alow
aflect case.Second, Nichols and Knobe's
resultshave
notbeen fu11y
replicated,If their
results
fbr the ABsTRAcT CoNDiTioN have been
replicated cross-culturally7,the dif- ference between the HIGH AFFEcT
andthe Low AFFEcT
case$has
not,The
onlypublished paper to directly
attempt at such a replicationfailed twice
andfbund both times that participants gave
mostlyincompatibilist
answersin both
cases(Feltz
etal.,
2009). Thus, it
seemsthat PEM does
not reston a firm ground8,
Finally, in a
recent study,Cova, Bertoux
andtheir
eolleagues(2012) have given
Nichols
andKnobeis CoNcRETE CoNDITION
andNahmias
et al.'sSupERcoMpuTER
(BANK)
caseto 12 patients
sufferingfrom
abehaviourai
variant offrontoternporal de-
mentia, a neurodegenerative
disease
accompaniedby
adeficit in
emotional responses.Contrary to
whatPEM
wouldhave predicted given their Iack
of emotional reactions,these patients
were no moreincompatibilist than
controlparticipants and gave
mostlycompatibilist answers9.
Thus, it seems that there is
a certain number of empiricaldata PEM cannot
ac- countfor. Let's however
netethat the first problem-the fact that Nahmias
andhis
colleagues
fbund mostly compatibilist answers fbr a
neutral casein the SupERcoM-
puTER
(JOGGING)
casorcanbe
addressedby
adding a supplementaryhypothesis:
the JoGGING
scenariois
setin
our actual world, whileNicho]s
andKnobe's
cases areset
in imagina] y
universes.So, it
mightbe that this difference in design
can accountfor the difference in
results.And indeed, Roskies
andNichols (2008) found that,
ceteris
paTibus, people
were moreprone to judge
agents morally responsiblefbr their
actions when
the
scenetook place in our
world ratherthan in
an alternate universe.However, this auxiliary hypothesis does
not solve allthe problems PEM has to face.
(3) An Error-Theory for Incompatibilist Intuitions
How then
are weto
reconcilethese
conflicting results?Nahmias andMurray
7
See Sarkissian
et al,(2010), The
studygathered 231
undergraduate studentsfrom
fbur
countries:United States, India, Hong Kong,
andColumbia.
8
A
recent meta-anaysis of30 published
and unpublished studies showsthat if
aEiect has
an effect on ascriptions of
free
will,this
effectis far too
smallto
explainthe diflerenee
between the
abstract and concrete cases(feItz
anclCova,
submitted).9
Control groups
were10 healthy participants
and10 patients
sufferingfrom Alzheimer's
disease. '
-24-
Experimental Philosophy
and theCompatibility
ofEree WilL
andDeterminism: A SuTvey25
(2010; see
alsoMurray
andNahmias, in press) have
recentlyproposed
a solution.But to
understandthis
solution, we mustfirst describe
anotherpuzzling pair of cases.
Nahmias (2006)used a pair
of scenarios describing two different kinds
of determin-
ism. The first
scenario(PsycHOLOGICAL DETERMiNisM) described a planet similar
to
ours(Erta) inhabited by peoplecalled the Ertans. On this planet, Ertan psycholo- gist have discovered that the Ertan's thoughts, desires,
and plans
occurring in her
or
his
mind completely cause allthe decision the Ertan
makes.The psychologists
alsohaye discovered that these thoughts, desires
andplans
arecompletely caused by the
Ertan's
current situation andthe
antecedent events she orhe has been through. In
the
second scenario(NEuRoLoGIcAL DETERMINIsM), the
sameplanet
wasdescribed but, this time, the
neuroscientistshave discovered that the decision the Ertan
makesis
completely caused
by the
specific neuralprocesses occurring in his or her brain; these
neural
processes
are complete]y causedby the Ertan's
currentand the antecedent
events she orhe has been through, R)r both
scenarios,participants
were askedif Ertans
could act oftheir
ownfree
willand
whetherthey deserved to be given
creditor
blame fbr their
actions.In the PSyCHOLOGICAL DETERMINISM
condition,72%
of25 participants
answeredpositively to the first question
and77%
of22 participants
answered
positively to the
secondquestion. In the NEuROLOGIcAL DETERMINISM
condition, only
18%
of22 participants
answeredpositively to the first question and 19%
of21 to the
secondquestion!O, Otherwise
said:people give
mostly compatibilist answersin the first
case and mostlyincompatibilist
answersin the
second case,How are
wegoing to
makesense
ofthese
results?Nahmias
suggeststhat this
asymmetry arises
because people take
neurologicaldeterminism, contrary to psycho-
logical determinism, to imply that people's
mental statesdo
nothave
a roleto play in
the generation
oftheir action and are `bypassedi.This is, he
argues, whythe presence
of
determinism in the PSyCHoLoGIcAL DETERMINISM
casedoes
notprevent partici- pants
ofgiving
mostly compatibilist answers,In the NEuROLOGICAL DETERMINIsM
case,
though, the
neurologicaldescription leads them to believe that the
agents' men-tal
statesdo
notplay any
rolein the generation of their
actions.In this
case,it
seemsnatural
to
withhold attributions offree
will and moral responsibility,Applying this
explanationto Nichols
andKnobe's
cases,Nahmias
andMurray
made
the fo11owing predictions:
i, Ceteris paribus, Nichols
andKnobe's description
ofdeterminism leads to
moreconfusion
ofdeterminism (the thesis that
everyhuman
actionis fully
causedby
prior
events) with 'bypassing'(the thesis that human beings'
mental statesdo
not
play
a causal rolein the generation of human action
and arethus
`bypassedi)than the three descriptions
usedby Nahmias
et al.(hence the greater
numberiO
These
results were replicated on alarger
sample(1,124
undergraduate students)in Nahmias
et al,(2007).
-25-
26 Florian
CovA
andfesuko KiTANo V61.22
ofincompatibilist
answersin Nichols
andKnobe's
study).ii. People
areless likely to
conflatedeterminism
with Cbypassing'in
concretethan
in
abstract cases(hence the difference between the two kinds
of cases).This
difrerence
mightbe due to the fact that the concrete descriptions of agents and
actions
prime people to think
aboutthe
effectiveness of agent's mental states,[[b test these predictions, Nahmias
andMurracy gave to 249 participants
a scenarioamong a set constituted
by Nichols
andKnobe's ABsTRAcT CONDITION
andCON-
CRETE CONDITIoN (in Universe A)
as wellas an
abstract and a concrete version ofthe RE-cREATING UNIvERsE
ease.Participants
were not only askedif
agentsin these
scenarios
deserved praise
orblame
and actedfrom their
ownfree
will,but they
were also askedquestions designed to probe their
understanding ofdeterminism,
Nahmias
andMurray's
results matchedtheir predictions. First, they found that
compatibilist
intuitions
werehighly
correlatedto a good
understanding ofdetermin- ism (that is:
an underst・anding ofdeterminism that doesn't
conflate'it
with "bypass-ing")
andthat peeple
whogave incompatibilist
answer werefar
more suseeptibleto
believe that the determinism
entailed [`bypassing;'.Second, they found that Nichols
and
Knobe's description
ofUniverse A
scenarioled
agreat
number ofparticipants to
think that
mental states were "bypassed"than Nahmias
et al'sdescription
ofthe RE-
CREATING UNIVERsE, Finally, they
observedthat people in the
"abst・ract"condition were more
prone to adopt the
"bypassing"interpretation
ofdeterminism. They
con- cludethat
mostincompatibilist
answers are only apparentincompatibilist
answers,because
most ofthem
werethe product of a bad
understanding ofdeterminism.
This Error-Theory
ofincompatibilist
answers(ET)
seemsto be
currentlythe best
explanation available.
It
explains(i) the difik]rence between Nichols
andKnobe's
andNahmias
et al.'s results and(ii) the difference between
abstract and concrete cases.It
can also explain(iii)
whypeople
are moreIikely to give incompatibilist answers
whenthe scenario is set in our aetual world: since (most) people do
notbelieve that
our world
is
a worldin
which our mental states arepowerless, they
a[reless likely to take determinism
as entailing `bypassingi.However, De Brlgard
andhis
colleagues(2009)
madethe fbllowing
objectionto
ET: having systematically
varied whetherthe
agent's action wereproduced by psy-
chological or neurological causes,
they
neverfbund
adifierence between those two
conditions.
Fbr
exarnple,in their
second study(on 60
undergraduate students),the
PSyCHOLOGIcAL CoNDmoN
was setin the following
way:Dennis
andJohn have been friends for thirty years
who always meetfor
a week}ywalk,
Dennis has been
away on vacationfor
a month and sothe friends have
not
been
ableto go
ontheir
walk untillast
week.On their
walkIast
weekthey
passed
ajogger
ontheir
normaltrai1. Seemingly
unproveked,Dennis
ran upto
-26-
Experimental Philosophy
andthe Compatibility
ofF\ee Will
andDeterminisrn: A Survey27 the jogger
andpunched him in the
stomach multipletimes. Shortly
afterthis incident Dennis
wasdiagnosed
witha psychological illness that
causeshim to
manifest uncontrollably aggressivebehavior
whichin turn
causedhim to hit the .
JOgger,
On
a scale of1-7 how
responsibleis Dennis for hitting the jogger?
In the NEuRoLoGIcAL CoNDmoN, the
word ・psychological'was replaced
by the
word `neurological'.
R)r both
condition,the
mean answer was3,8, Thus, there
were no
difierence.
However, in De Brigard
et al.'s case,the psychological
stateis
anillness
andis
stated as `tuncontrollable":
it is then likely that people
willtend to consider this kind
a psychological state
as no morepart
ofthe
agent'strue desires than
a neurological state(both
explanationare
"mechanistic"explanations, rather
than
explanationsin terms
ef reasons),Thus,
wedon't think that these
experimentsprovide
a counter-example
to ET,
aslong
as we understandNahmias
as sa(yingthat
stemmingfrom the
agent's mental states
is
necessarybut clearly not suficient for moral responsibility,
Still,
one might arguethat
we missthe point:
not onlyDe Brigard
et al,did
not
find
adifference between the PsycHoLoGIcAL CONDITION
andthe NEuRoLOG-
ICAL CoNDiTioN - they
alsofbund high
attributions of responsibilityin both
cases.How
canit be if people
considerthe psychological
and neurologicalillness
as aliento the
agent'strue
motivations?Our answer
willbe that
mostpeople
can stillhold the
agent's responsible
for
not resistingthis
alienimpulse i.e. for
alack
of controlthey
attributeto the
agentistrue
motivational statesii,Thus,
allthe
results obtainedby
De Brigard
canbe
explainedin the framework
ofET by
rnakingthe two fbllowing
reasonable assumptions:
(i) people consider that
certain mental states(as illnesses)
are not really
part
ofthe
agent's motivation and(ii)
even when agents aredriven by
alien
sources, they can still be judged
responsibleif they
areperceived
asfailing to
refrain
this impulse
whenthey
could.Thus
we concludethis
sectionby
claimingthat ET is the best
currently available.As
suggestedby
ourdiscussion, it is
not afull theory
ofthe folk
¢onception offree
will and moral responsibility and must
be
refinedto
accountfor
allthe data (rather
than being just
compatible withthem), but it fu11y fu1fiIls its
aimto
accountfor foIk
iiEven if the irnpulse is described
as "uncontrollable",one should
keep in
mindthat
participants
constantly addto
vignettes assumptionsdrawn frem their background beliefs. R)r
example,it
ceuldbe that participants
refuse toimagine that
one cannotrefrain
to hit
aperson. Also, there is
an ambiguityin the
expression `[uncontrollablyaggressive
behavior":
one could understandthis
expression as meaningthat this be- havior is
uncontrollable oncetriggered, but that it is
still upto the
agentto
preventthe
manifestation ofthis behavior, For
exarnple,if I
saythat, fbr Dennis, drinking
al-cohol causes uncontrollably aggressive
behavior, it does
not rneanthat Dennis
cannotprevent this
aggressivebehavior (for
example,by
avoiding alcohol).
-27-
28
intuitions
Florian CovA
andYasuko KITANo
about
the
compatibility offree
will anddeterminism.
Vbl, 22
2. Testing the premises
ofthephilesophical
argumentsfor
incompatibilism
The
experiments we surveyed sofar tested folk intuition
aboutthe
compatibilityquestion. However,
mostphilosophical
argumentsfor the incompatibility
offree
will withdeterminism do
not usethis kind of direct intuitions. Instead, most arguments start from intuitive premises they show to
ultimately conflict withthe
compatibility offree
will withdeterminism. Thus, it
couldbe that
common senseis incempatibilist
in the
sensethat folk intuitions
aboutthese premises
ultirnately conflict withtheir
direct intuitions about the
compatibility offree
will withdeterminism. This is
why,in this
section, we survey experiments onfolk intuitions
about suchpremises.
The Principle
ofAlternate Possibilities
One
ofthe
mostfamous principles
usedin
support ofincompatibilism is the
Principle
ofAlternate Possibilities (PAP),
accordingto
which no oneis
responsible of what onehas done if
one could nothave done otherwise. On
a certaininterpretation
of [Ccould
have done
otherwise" , accordingto
whichdeterminism is incompatible
withthe
abilityto do
otherwise, endorsingthis principle leads quite directly to
endorseincompatibilism about free
willand
moral responsibility,Nevertheles$, there
aretwo
ways of rebutting
this kind
of argumentsin favor
ofincompatibilism:
.
The inteupretation question:
one can arguethat the
meaning of [`couldhave done
otherwise"that is
relevantfor free
will andfor moral responsibilityis perfectly
compatible withdeterminism.
.
The truth guestion: one
canalso argue that the PAP is just false. The
mostfamous
argumentsfor the falsity
ofPAP
arethe F}rankfurt
cases,in
which weare supposed
to have the intuition that an agent is
morally responsiblefor his
action evenif he
could nothave done
otherwise.There
are afew data
relevantto the interpretation question. In their
experiments onthe SupERcoMpuTER
cases,Nahmias and his
colleagues(2005)
also askedpar-
ticipants
whetherthe
agent couldhave
chosen notto
actthe
wacyhe did, Results
varied
along the nature of the action: for the
negative action(robbing the bank),
6796
of21 participants
answeredpositively, but
only38%
out ef21 in the positive
action condition
(sewing the
child), and only43%
out of14 in the
neutral actioncondition
(going jogging), Also, fbr the IDENTIcAL TwlNs
case,they
asked whetherthe twins
couldhave done
otherwise, and76% of 31 participants
an6weredthat both F\ed
andBarney
couldhave done
otherwise.[I]hese
resultsindicate that there is
a significantproportion
ofparticipants
willingto
attributethe
abilityto
choose anddo