General presentation of the Swiss social security system

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Article

Reference

General presentation of the Swiss social security system

GREBER, Pierre-Yves

GREBER, Pierre-Yves. General presentation of the Swiss social security system. Cahiers genevois de sécurité sociale , 1990, no. 7, p. 35-52

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http://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:43489

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CAHIERS GENEVOIS DE SECURITE SOCIALE 1990 / 7 35

PIERRE-YVES GREBER GENERAL PRESENTATION

GENERAL PRESENTATION OF THE SWISS SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

by

Pierre-Yves Greber

Professor ih the Faculty of Law, University of Geneva Board member, Geneva Cantonal .Equalisation Fund,

Old-Age, lnvalidity and Survivors lnsurance

1 . BIBLIOGRAPHY

1 . 1 General books and articles

1.2 Sickness insurance scheme (LAMA) and accident insurance scheme (LAA) 1 .3 Basic and supplementary pensions schemes

1.4 Unemployment insurance scheme 1.5 Family allowances schemes

2. ABSENCE OF AN OVERALL CONCEPTION OF SOCIAL SECURITY IN SWITZERLAND

2.1 The absence of an overall conception 2.2 The reasons for this situation

2.2.1 Federalism yesterday and today

2.2.2 Direct democracy makes social planning difficult

2.2.2.1 The direct effects of the popular initiative and of the referendum

2.2.2.2 The indirect effects of the popular initiative and of the referendum

2.2.3 The influence of liberalism 2.3 The consequences of this situation

2.3.1 The legislation is very diverse

2.3.1,1 The absence of a system as such

2.3.1.2 Sorne illustrations of the diversity of the Swiss legislation 2.3.2 The corrective to diversity

2.3.2.1 The existence of major specific principles

2.3.2.2 Application of the general principles of public law

2.3.2.3 Achievements in coordinating and harmonising the schemes

3. THE GENERAL TABLE. THE VARIOUS TYPES OF CONSTRUCTION

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36

PIERRE-YVES GRESER

BIBUOGRAPHY1

1 . 1 General books and articles

CAHIERS GENEVOIS DE SECURITE SOCIALE 1990 / 7 GENERAL PRESENTATION

BERENSTEIN, Alexandre : Etudes de droit social 1936-1977. Hommage de la Faculté de Droit.

Mémoires publiés par la Faculté de Droit de Genève, No 62. Georg. Geneve 1979.

BERENSTEIN, Alexandre : La suisse et le développement international de la sécurité sociale.

Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Sozialversicherung 1981 161.

Mélanges A. BERENSTEIN. Le droit social à l'aube du XXlème siècle. Collection juridique romande.

Payot. Lausanne 1989.

BOIS, Philippe : Spécificités de la politique sociale en Suisse. ln : Droit et politique sociale. Travaux réunis par P. de LAUBIER et J.-P. FRAGNIERE. Delta. Vevey 1980.

BRANDLI, Herbert : Sozialversicherung in der Schweiz. 2ème édition. Handelskammer Deutschland-Schweiz (Diffusion par Schulthess). Zürich 1987.

CHARLES, Jean-François : Notre sécurité sociale à l'horizon 2000. Revue suisse des assurances sociales et de la prévoyance professionnelle (Berne) 1989 233.

FRAGNIERE, Jean-Pierre (dossier réuni par) : Dix ans de politique sociale en Suisse, 1975-1985.

Réalités sociales. Lausanne 1986.

FRAGNIERE, Jean-Pierre I CHRISTEN Gioia : Securité sociale en Suisse. Introduction. Réalités sociales. Lausanne 1988.

GILLIAND, Pierre : Politique sociale en Suisse. Introduction. Réalités sociales. Lausanne 1988.

GRESER, Pierre-Yves : Droit suisse de la sécurite sociale. Avec un aperçu de théorie genérale et de droit international de la sécurité sociale. Réalités sociales. Lausanne 1982.

GRESER, Pierre-Yves : Les principes fondamentaux du droit international et du droit suisse de la sécurité sociale. Réalités sociales. Lausanne 1984.

GRESER, Pierre-Yves : Diritto della sicurezza sociale (Svizzera). ln : Digesto italiano, IV edizione.

Unione Tipografico - Editrice Torinese. Torino 1990.

HUG, Walther : Die Merkmale der Sozialversicherung nach schweizerischem Recht. ln : Ausgewahlte Abhandlungen zum Arbeits-und Wirtschaftsrecht. Berne 1978. Band 1, pp. 129 sv.

MAHON, Pascal : Institutions de sécurité sociale. Presses polytechniques romandes. Lausanne 1983.

MAURER, Alfred : Schweizerisches Sozialversicherungsrecht. Band 1 : Allgemeiner Teil. Band Il : Besonderer Teil. Stampfli. Berne 1979/1981.

MAURER, Alfred : Geschichte des schweizerischen Sozialversicherungsrechts, Schriftenreihe für Internationales und Vergleichendes Sozialrecht, Band 6c. Duncker & Humblot. Berlin 1981.

Rapport sur les aspects actuariels, financiers et économiques de la sécurité sociale en Suisse.

Office fédéral des assurances sociales. Berne 1982.

Il convient d'ajouter à cette bibliographie les études publiées dans le présent Cahier.

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CAHIERS GENEVOIS DE SECURITE SOCIALE 1990 / 7 PIERRE-YVES GRESER

37 GENERAL PRESENTATION

Rapport sur une partie générale du droit suisse des assurances sociales et projet de loi.

Constitution d'un groupe de travail de la Société suisse de droit des assurances en vue d'améliorer la coordination en matière d'assurances sociales. Stampfli. Berne 1984 (auch auf deutsch erhaltlich).

SAXER, Arnold : Die soziale Sicherheit in der Schweiz. 4ème-édition allemande. Paul Haupt, Berne/Schweizerischer Kaufmannischer Verein, Zürich 1977.

SCHAER, Roland : Grundzüge des Zusammenwirkens von Schadenausgleichsystemen. Helbing - Lichtenhahn. Basel/Frankfurt am Main 1984.

SCHWEINGRUBER, Edwin : Sozialgesetzgebung der Schweiz. Ein Grundriss. 2ème édition.

Schulthess Polygraphischer Verlag. Zürich 1977.

SOMMER, Jürg : Das Ringen um soziale Sieherheit in der Schweiz. Thèse de St.-Gall. Reihe Arbeits- und Sozialwissenschaft, Band 1. Rüegger. Lausanne 1982.

SPIRA, Raymond : L'application du droit international de la séeurité soeiale par le juge. ln : Mélanges Alexandre BERENSTEIN. Le droit social à l'aube du XXlème siècle. Collection juridique romande. Payot. Lausanne 1989.

TSCHUDI, Hans Peter : Die verlassungsrechtlichen Grundlagen der Sozialversicherung.

Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Sozialversicherung 1979, pp. 81 sv.

TSCHUDI, Hans Peter: La Constitution sociale de la Suisse (L'Etat social). Documents de l'Union syndicale suisse. Berne 1987 I Die Sozialverlassung der Schweiz (Der Sozialstaat). Schriftenreihe des Schweizerischen Gewerkschaftsbundes. Berne 1986.

TSCHUDI, Hans Peter : Vereinheitlichung des Sozialversicherungsrechts. Revue suisse des assurances sociales et de la prévoyance professionnelle 1985 1.

TSCHUDI, Hans Peter : Entstehung und Entwicklung der schweizerischen Sozialversicherungen.

Helbing & Lichtenhahn. Basel/Frankfurt am Main 1989.

VIRET, Bernard : la participation des assureurs privés à l'assurance sociale en Suisse. Revue à l'intention des caisses de compensation (Berne) 1976 428.

1. 2 Sickness insurance scheme (LAMA) and accident insu rance scheme (LAA)

BERENSTEIN, Alexandre : De l'assurance sociale

à

la sécurité sociale : la réforme de l'assurance- accidents. Semaine judiciaire 1979, no 7, pp. 105 sv.

BONER, Kilian I HOLZHERR, Werner : L'assurance-maladie selon la loi fédérale sur l'assurance en cas de maladie et d'accidents. Fiches juridiques suisses. Genève 1969.

Les défis de la santé. (Vol 1 : Les couts et l'assurance. Vol. 2 : Les professionnels. Vol. 3 : Pratiques et innovations). Travaux réunis par P. GILLIAND et J.-P. FRAGNIERE. Réalités sociales.

Lausanne 1986.

DUC, Jean-Louis: Assurance-maladie sociale. Jurisprudence fédérale à fin 1976. Hochdorf 1979 (+

supplément).

GILLIAND, Pierre (travaux réunis par) : Assurance-maladie. Quelle révision ? Réalités sociales.

Lausanne 1990.

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38 CAHIERS GENEVOIS DE SECURITE SOCIALE 1990 / 7

PIERRE-YVES GRESER PRESENTATION GENERALE

GHELEW, André I CLERC, Jacques : Assurance-accidents. Fiches juridiques suisses. Genève 1984.

MAURER, Alfred : Schweizerisches Unfallversicherungsrecht. Stampfli. Berne 1985.

MAURER, Alfred : Schweizerisches Unfallversicherungsrecht. Erganzungsband. Stampfli. Berne 1989.

VILLARS, Charles : L'assurance-maladie et maternité suisse. Revue internationale de sécurité sociale 1977, pp. 180 sv.

1 . 3 Basic and supplementary pensions schemes

BEAUSOLEIL, Jean-Pierre : Les prestations de la prévoyance professionnelle. Quelques aspects.

Aspects de la sécurite sociale, bulletin de la FEAS, 1990/1 19.

BENDEL, Felix : Die Rechtsstellung des auslandischen Grenzgangers in der schweizerischen Alters-, Hinterlassenen- und lnvalidenversicherung. Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Sozialversicherung 1980, pp. 1, 81 sv.

BERENSTEIN, Alexandre : L'assurance-vieillesse suisse. Son élaboration et son évolution.

Réalités sociales. Lausanne 1986.

BINSWANGER, Peter : Geschichte der AHV - Schweizerische Alters- und Hinterlassenen- versicherung. Pro Senectute Schriftenreihe, Band 3. Zürich 1986.

BRÜHWILER, Jürg : Die betriebliche Personalvorsorge in der Schweiz. Stampfli. Berne 1989.

GHELEW, André : Quelques aspects des prestations complémentaires à l'assurance-vieillesse, survivants et invalidité. Aspects de la sécurité sociale, bulletin de la FEAS, 1989/2 24.

GRESER, Pierre-Yves : Le régime de base de pensions suisse a quarante ans : points de repère pour son évaluation. Revue internationale de sécurité sociale 1988, no 2, 202 (rappel : cette revue parait en français, anglais, allemand et espagnol).

HELBLING, Carl: Personalvorsorge und BVG. 3ème édition. Paul Haupt. Berne 1987.

KÂSER, Hanspeter : Unterstellung und Beitragswesen in der obligatorischen AHV. Stampfli. Berne 1989.

LUSENTI, Graziano : Les institutions de prévoyance en Suisse, au Royaume-Uni et en Allemagne fédérale. Placements financiers et politique sociale. Georg. Geneve 19 8 9 .

MAURER, Alfred : Schweizerische Alters- und Hinterlassenenversicherung. Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Sozialversicherung 1980, pp. 196 sv.

OFFICE FEDERAL DES ASSURANCES SOCIALES : Un demi-siècle de politique AVS. RCC - Revue à l'intention des caisses de compensation 1974 197.

OFFICE FEDERAL DES ASSURANCES SOCIALES: L'assuranceinvalidite de 1960 à 1980. RCC - Revue à l'intention des caisses de compensation 1981 214, 289.

OFFICE FEDERAL DES ASSURANCES SOCIALES : Principales règles concernant les rentes AVS et Al dans les conventions internationales conclues par la Suisse. RCC Revue à l'intention des caisses de compensation 1982, pp. 334-342.

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RIEMER, Hans Michael : Das Recht der beruflichen Vorsorge in der Schweiz. Stampfli. Berne 1985.

SCHWEIZER, Kurt / MANHART, Thomas : Die berufliche Vorsorge nach BVG und Ausführungsverordnungen. Revue suisse des assurances sociales et de la prévoyance professionnelle 1984 177.

TORR 1, Edoardo : Les étrangers et l'AVS/ Al : Cahiers genevois de sécurité sociale, no 1, juillet 1986, pp. 25-32

TSCHUDI, Hans Peter : Das Drei-Saulen-Prinzip (la conception des régimes de pensions). Revue suisse des assurances sociales et de la prévoyance professionnelle 1987 1.

VAL TERIO, Michel : Droit et pratique de l'assuranceinvalidité. Les prestations. Réalités sociales.

Lausanne 1985.

VAL TERIO, Michel : Commentaire de la loi sur l'assurancevieillesse et survivants. Tome Il - Les prestations (Art. 18 à 48 sexies LAVS). Réalités sociales. Lausanne 1988.

VILLARS, Charles : L'assurance-vieillesse, survivants et invalidité en Suisse. Revue internationale de sécurité sociale 1979 510.

1 . 4 Unemployment Insu rance scheme

GERHARDS, Gerhard : Kommentar zum Arbeitslosenversicherungsgesetz (AVIG). Band 1 & Il.

Haupt. Berne 1987.

SPÜHLER, Karl : Grundriss des Arbeitsversicherungsrechts. Starnpfli. Berne 1985.

STAUFFER, Hans-Ulrich : Die Arbeitslosenversicherung. Schulthess Polygraphischer Verlag.

Zürich 1984.

1 . 5 Family allowances schemes

BOUVERAT, Germain: Innovations et tendances dans les révisions des allocations familiales. RCC - Revue à l'intention des caisses de compensation 1980 528.

BOUVERAT, Germain: Les allocations familiales en Suisse: un bastion du fédéralisme. Aspects de la sécurité sociale, bulletin de la FEAS, 1988/3 99.

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PIERRE-YVES GRESER GENERAL PRESENTATION

2 . ABSENCE OF AN OVERAll CONCEPTION OF SOCIAL SECURITY IN SWITZERLAND

2 . 1 The absence of an overall conception

1 . The legislators have not deyeloped an oyerall conception of social security in Switzerland, but have proceeded scheme by scheme, using a pragmatic approach. On four occasions, the idea of having a true social security system has been turned down.

2. This happened first of all at the yer:y outset, in 1890, at the time of adoption of the first constitutional instrument transferring power to the Confederation (the central government)²ln its Message³to Parliament, the Federal Government voluntarily requested that its powers be limited to sickness and accident insurance and stated: "lt is not appropriate to consider taking on other branches of insurance before being absolutely confident on the financial aspects of this undertaking and also before knowing if it has been successful ... 4 ". Here one discerns two characteristic features of the Swiss approach: a cautious attitude and a concern for solid financing.

3. Next, at the time when the famous Beveridge Plan. "Social lnsurance and Allied Services", a basic document which contributed to the emergence of social security, was published in the United Kingdom. The Plan aroused great interest in Switzerland; it evoked approval on the left and opposition among the liberal majority^5:6.This major call for a rationalised approach did not have any practical effects in Switzerland.

4. The draft of a new federal constitution - both in the report of the WAHLEN Working Group⁷and in the draft prepared by the FURGLER Commission(1977)8 - devoted a modest and limited place to

consideration of social security. Although it was later revised - particularly in the light of TSCHUDl's entirely justified criticisms9 -the draft did not in fact contribute either to defining the place of social security in the next century or to developing an overall conception1°.

5. Finally, after examining French and German experience, the authors of a report and a draft law on a general part of Swiss social insurance Law (1984) 11 turned down the idea of drawing up a codified text: "If we were to do so, the legislator would also have to take decisions on each doubtful

2

3

4

5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Switzerland is, of course, a federal State. Article 3 of the Federal Constitution lays down that:"The cantons are sovereign except to the extent that their sovereignty is limited by the Federal Constitution and they thus exercise ail the rights that are not delegated to the federal authorities". ln its original form, the Federal Constitution contained no provisions relating to social security.

When the Federal Council - i.e. the Government - submits to Parliament a proposai to amend the Constitution, a draft law or a draft amendment to a law, it accompanies it with an explanation which is called a messa9e. These messages constitute a valuable source of information in the field of social security. They are published in the

"Feuille fédérale", which is the official journal of the Confederation.

Message from the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly concerning the legislative powers to be accorded Io the Conlederation in respect of insurance against accidents and sickness, dated 28 November 1889. Feuille fédérale î890 1309.

MILHAUD, Edgard: Le Plan Beveridge. Les Annales de !'Economie collective. Geneva, 1943. Cf.pp. 233-234.

SOMMER, Jürg: Das Ringen um soziale Sicherheit in der Schweiz, cited in the bibliography, pp.678-679.

The final report was published in: Commission d'experts pour une révision totale de la Constitution fédérale (Committee of experts on the preparation of a total revision of the Federal Constitution): Working clocuments.1974.

Commission d'experts pour une révision totale de la Constitution fédérale: Draft Constitution. Berne, 1977.

TSCHUDI, Hans Peter: Die verfassungsrechtlichen Grundlagen der Sozialversicherung, cited in the bibliography, pp.100-104.

For these aspects, cf. also GRESER, Pierre-Yves: Les principes fondamentaux du droit international et du droit suisse de la sécurité sociale, cited in the bibliography, pp.116ff., 120-121, 179-182.

Rapport sur une partie genérale du droit suisse des assauranœs sociales et projet de loi, cited in the bibliography, pp.23-24.

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CAHIERS GENEVOIS DE SECURITE SOCIALE 1990 / 7 PIERRE-YVES GREBER

whether Parliament would be satisfied with a limited practical reform; in any case, such a limitation could not be imposed on it. Furthermore, it would be possible to launch a referendum against a particular part of the proposai and any negative decision by the people would destroy the proposai as a whole. ln any event, such a general codification could be justified only if it were accompanied by structural changes; the priority objectives of harmonisation and co-ordination of social insurance legislation can also be achieved ... more simply. For these reasons the working group has concluded that one should not aim at an overall codification12". TSCHUDI reached a similar conclusion13, especially in the light of historical considerations and of the involvement of both the cantons and the occupational bodies with the administration of the social security schemes. The authors of the general part thus pursued a more modest objective, namely the introduction of a law which would render some of the basic concepts and rules of procedure more uniform and would lay down standards for coordination14 . Under this approach, the existing social security laws would become special laws. This draft is under discussion in Parliament; it has been the subject of two consultation procedures1s.

2. 2 The reasons for this situation¹⁶

6. One should recall the reasons for this situation - the absence of an overall conception and consequently the fact that the legislation is very diverse.

2 . 2 1 Federalism yesterday and today

7. The first factor results from the influence of federalism17. To the extent that powers have not been transferred to the Confederation, the cantons remain sovereign. But on the one hand the Federal Constitution of 29 May 1874, which is still in force, originally contained no provisions regarding social insurance, and on the other hand the transfer of powers that took place in 189018 related only to sickness and accident insurance. Subsequently, the people and the cantons¹⁹have progressively agreed to give the central government more powers in the social security field. The most recent such transfer was accepted by vote in 1976 (article 34 novies of the Constitution concerning protection against unemployment, which replaced a very limited provision dating from

12 13 14

15

16 17

18

19

Idem, p.24.

SCHUDI, Hans Peter : Vereinheitlichung des Sozialversicherungsrechts, cited in the bibliography, pp. 6-11.

Illi1 proposed structure is the following:

- Chapter 1 : Scope.

- Chapter 2 : Definition of general concepts. Section 1 :Benefits. Section 2: lnsurance and contributions.

- Chapter 3 : General provisions on benefits and contributions. Section 1: Benefits in kind. Section 2: Cash benefits. Section 3: Contributions. Section 4: Various legal relationships.

- Chapter 4 : General provisions on procedure. Section 1: Information, administrataive assistance, confidentiality.

Section 2: The procedure in social insurance matters. Section 3: Disputes.

- Chapter 5 : Coordination rules. Section 1: Coordination of benefits. Section 2: Subrogation. Section 3: Daily allowances and wages.

- Chapter 6 : Miscellaneous provisions - Chapter 7 : Entry into force and implementation.

- Amendments to federal laws.

Rapport sur une partie générale du droit suisse des assurances et projet de loi, cited in the bibliography, pp.63ff.

t seems to be difficult to achieve a consensus in the Council of States (the chamber in which the cantons are represented) on two proposais relating Io the General Part : the inclusion under this General Part of the supplementary pensions scheme LPP (occupational pensions) and the creation of a Federal Social lnsurance Commission (cf. articles 1 and 85 of the 1984 draft). Refusai to adopt these two elements, both essential, would deprive the whole enterprise of a substantial part of its value.

Cf.GRESER, Pierre-Yves: Les principes fondamentaux du droit international et du droit suisse de la sécurite sociale, cited in the bibliography, pp.121ff.and references cited therein.

Cf. footnote (2) above.

(A partial amendment of the federal Constitution requires a majority of the popular vote and approval by voters in a majority of the cantons.

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1947). At the present time, the Confederation has general powers in this field, the only areas excepted being health and social assistance.

8. Does this mean that federalism nowadays no longer affects social security matters, apart from health and social assistance? Where federal law does not regulate matters in all their details, the cantons can themselves legislate20. ln four sectors, therefore, the cantons can act:

a) federal legislation on sickness insurance is not exhaustive, even though it was carried a good deal further by the partial revision of 1964. Consequently, the cantons can adopt provisions which improve on the federal standards21: introduction of general or sectoral compulsory membership, obligation on the sickness funds to cover accidents, and subsidiarily, equality of contributions as between men and women insured ;

b) the basic pension scheme does not yet achieve its full objective, which is to provide a guarantee of essential needs. Consequently, the legislation on benefits supplementing those of the old-age, survivors and invalidity insurance continues to apply22 ; based on the Federal Law of 19 ^March1965, it consists of both federal and cantonal laws23. Also, the cantons can - as does Geneva - provide for purely cantonal supplementary benefits, which improve on the above legislation;

c) whilst the Confederation has general powers in relation to family allowances, it has limited its use of these powers to the agricultural sector and its own employees. Thus the essential part of this branch of social security is regulated by the cantons24 ; and

d) the area of unemployment insurance is covered quite fully by federal law; however, the period for which benefits are provided is limited and this does not meet the needs of the long-term unemployed25. So the cantons can (as has, for example, Geneva) supplement the federal protection as regards both cash benefits (daily allowances) and retraining for work.

9. Historically, federalism has acted as a brake on the development of social security and it has certainiy contributed to the diversity of the legislation.

2. 2. 2 Direct democracy makes social planning difficu1t2s

1 O. If Switzerland does not yet have a true social security system, planned in such a way as to avoid both.gaps in protection and unnecessary overlapping and designed for rational and economical administration, this is largely due to the second of the two instruments of direct democracy,which consists of the people's right to demand a referendum (popular initiative) and the legislative referendum itself; these can have both direct and indirect effects. ln his study of social policy in Switzerland, TSCHUDI - atter recalling some fields of labour law in which the country has played a pioneer role - notes that: "If, on the other hand, we have long been behind in the field of social insurance, this is due mainly to our system of direct democracy. One may recall the failure of

20 21 22 23 24 25 26

KNAPP, Blaise : Le fédéralisme. Rapports et communications. Société suisse des juristes. vol.3/1984, pp.301- 307.

Cf. subsection 3 below.

GHELEW, Andre : Quelques aspects des prestations complementaires à l'assurance-vieillesse, survivants et invalidite, cited in the bibliography.

Idem, p.26.

BOUVERAT, Germain: Les allocations familiales en Suisse: un bastion de fédéralisme, cited in the bibliography.

Cf. the works of GERHARDS, SPÜHLER and STAUFFER cited in the bibliography.

Cf. GRE BER, op.cit. in footnote 10, pp.128 ff.

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the referenda on the generous Forrer Law on sickness and accident insurance in 1900 and on the Schulthess Law on old-age and survivors insurance in 193127".

2. 2. 2. 1 The direct effects of the popular initiative and of the referendum

11. The popular initiative enables 100,000 Swiss citizens to ask for an amendment of the Federal Constitution (the legislator cannot do this ) provided that the 100,000 valid signatures are collected within a period of 18 months. if this is done, the people and the cantons are required to vote and if there is a double majority in favour, the Constitution is amended accordingly. Up to now, this has never been done in the field of social security; in other words, there has been no direct effect such as could have altered or hindered an overall conception.

12. Any federal law adopted by the Parliament is subject to an optional referendum: if 50,000 citizens request it during the 90 days following publication of its text, the law approved by the Federal Assembly must be voted on by the people. If the people reject it, it is null and void. The referendum has had direct oegatiye effects: the first law on sickness and accident insuraoce was rejected in a refereodum on 20 May 1900. Io place of the co-ordioation which was eovisaged for these two social iosurance schemes, this failure led to very differeot developments. The first law on old-age and survivors insuraoce was also rejected, on 6 December 1931, and it was oot uotil 1948 that legislatioo on this came ioto effect. Recently, in December 1987, a substaotial partial revisioo of sickness and maternity iosuraoce came up against popular opposition. The method of refereodum has also had some positive effects : very broad acceptaoce (80% in favour) of the law on old-age and survivors insuraoce in 194728 , and also a favourable vote on the nioth revisioo of that law in 1978.

2. 2. 2. 2 The indirect effects of the popular initiative and of the referendum

1 J. The popular initiative has had a prooouoced effect on legislation. lt cao have the followiog indirect effects:

a)

b)

27

28

The Federal Assembly, while opposiog a proposai put forward in a refereodum, cao itself adopt a counter-proposal ameoding the Federal Constitution. If the authors of the initiative coosider that the Parliameot has taken up eoough of their proposais, they will probably withdraw their proposai, as it is prohibited to vote 'yes' twice. This happeoed in 1945, at the time of adoption of article 34 quinquies of the Constitution: the Popular Conservative Party had submitted an initiative "for the family" designed to permit the Coofederatioo to legislate in that field. Followiog the adoption of a couoter-proposal by the houses of Parliameot, the initiative was withdrawo and ooly the couoter-proposal was put to the vote of the people and the cantons, with a positive result. On the other haod, the authors cao maiotain their proposais. Thus on 3 December 1972, the people and the cantons accepted Parliament's counter-proposal for a oew article 34 quater of the Constitution (old-age, iovalidity and survivors iosuraoce) and rejected the initiative of the Party of Labour "for a real people's pension".

The Federal Assembly, in decidiog to oppose proposais put forward in a popular initiative, cao adopt a new law. This is Provided that the proposais in question cao be carried

TSCHUDI, Hans Peter: La politique sociale suisse depuis 1950, in La politique sociale dans les pays occidentaux.

Diagnostics 1945-1980.

Assembled by A.GIROD and P.de LAUBIER. Réalités sociales. Lausanne 1982.Cf.p.69.

AUBERT, Jean-François : Exposé des institutions politiques de la Suisse, à partir de quelques affaires controversées. Payot. Lausanne, 1978. PCf.p.96.

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PIERRE-YVES GRESER

through without amending the Constitution. This is what happened when invalidity insurance was introduced: the Confederation had been given the powers in 1925, but had not enacted a law; two popular initiatives had been submitted in 1955, asking for such a scheme to be brought in. The Govemment then put a dratt law before Parliament, which acted on it (Law of 19 June 1959). The same process took place in connection with the Federal Law on Supplementary Benefits to the Old-Age, Survivors and lnvalidity lnsurance^{29 .}

c) Finally, the reply of the Federal Assembly - in opposition to an initiative - can consist of amending a law. This is the most frequent indirect effect. lt has occurred several times in the field of old-age, survivors and invalidity insurance (basic pensions scheme) : in connection with the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth revisions.

14. The indirect affects of the popular initiative have not - at least up to now - been

"troublesome", in the sense of preventing or making difficult the effort to find search for a true conception of social security in Switzerland. On the contrary, they have undeniably contributed to ïmproving the legislation; in this respect the process which has incorporated into the system a new function - a guarantee of essential needs under the pensions scheme - has been of particular significance.

15. What about the indirect effects of the legislative referendum? As BOIS, BRATSCHI, MAURER and SOMMER explain30, they are in practice much more important than the direct affects.

The threat, whether actually expressed or not, of a referendum initiative by a group or a party capable of collecting 50,000 signatures in 90 days encourages the different political and economic interests to seek a compromise. ln tact, social security has a number of technical aspects which it is not easy to make fully understood during the campaign leading up to a vote; and there is thus a great risk of finding various objections coming together, even though the reasons for them may be completely different, and combining to result in a negative vote by the electors. Thus BOIS observes that: "The existence of the referendum makes it difficult to create an overall system of social insurance (and indeed the same applies to the other areas of law). On a simple question of principle the opponents generally all vote no for the same reason. When one has to do with a more complex system, involving a larger number of choices, there are more reasons to vote no. This leads to the famous "no cartels" consisting of different groups which reject the law for different reasons, but which all combine to forma majority. If one adds to this the de facto alliance between the conservative right, which believes that the state is going too far, and the extrema left, which considers it to be too timid (which occurred in 1900 for the LAMA and in 1931 for the AVS (old-age, survivors and invalidity insurance), one can easily see why it is almost impossible to achieve a more coherent system of social security^{31 ".}Thus the shadow of the referendum is present at all the stages in the preparation of a law or of a change in legislation: the need for balance when an expert committee is appointed, the work of such a committee, preparation of a first dratt by the faderai govemment department concemed (Ministry of the lnterior or Public Economy), procedure of consultation of all interested groups, message from the Faderai Council to the Federal Assembly, discussions and vote by the latter. At all these stages there is a search for a compromise which will avoid a demand for a referendum. ln his study already referred to, BOIS notes that "in these conditions, it is rare for something really innovative to appear. The small-step approach is imposed by the institutions" (p.43), whilst MAURER observes that the legislative referendum has acted strongly as a brake on both the introduction and the development of social security in Switzerland³²•

29 30

31 32

(Cf. paragraph 8(b) above.

(BOIS, Philippe : Specificités de la politique sociale en Suisse, cited in the bibliography, pp.40-42. BRATSCHI, Peter Joachim : Die Bedeutung der Verfassungsinitiative in der Sozialgesetzgebung der Schweiz. Thesis, Berne, 1969. ln: Europaische Hochschulschriften, Series 2 : Rechtswissenschaft Ourisprudence), 15. Herbert Lang, Berne. MAURER, Alfred : Geschichte des schweizerischen Sozialversicherungsrechts, cited in the bibliography, pp.824-825. SOMMER, Jürg: Das Ringen um soziale Sicherheit in der Schweiz, cited in the bibliography, pp.677- 678.

BOIS, Philippe: Specificités de la politique sociale en Suisse, citèd in the bibliography, pp.43-44.

MAURER, Alfred : Geschichte des schweizerischen Sozialversicherungsrechts, cited ln the bibliography, p.823.

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2.2.3 The Influence of liberallsm

16. ln his study on the specific features of social policy in Switzerland, already mentioned, BOIS makes a contribution which is original and certainly crucial to understanding the state of Swiss legislation on social security. To the classical criteria of federalism and direct democracy he adds that of liberalism, "an important current of thought in Switzerland, (which) clearly has an influence in the field of social insurance33". This author sees this influence as showing itself in two areas:

a) the opposition to compulsory membership: this resistance was strong at the outset and still has an important effect on the sickness insurance. lt needed a major economic recession, which hit Switzerland in 197 4 and led to a drop of about 1 O per cent in the level of employment before unemployment insurance was made compulsory at the federal level; and

b) the resistance to centralised organisation: this has led to the tact that a multitude of institutions participate in running the various schemes. Thus,sickness insurance is operated by around 400 funds (the trend is towards concentration), the old-age, survivors and invalidity insurance works through 116 equalisation funds, plus some bodies which are specific to the invalidity insurance, the LAA accident insurance scheme is managed not only by the National Accident lnsurance Fund but also by private insurance companies that wish to participate, and some 15,000 institutions handle occupational insurance schemes.

17. BOIS is correct in pointing out the influence of liberalism, which in tact leaves its mark on the entire structure of social securjty jn Swjtzerland. As this approach lays stress on individual responsibility and freedom, it tends to favour a restrained and cautious attitude towards the socialisation of risks.

2.3 The consequences of this situation 2. 3 .1 The legislation is very diverse 2. 3. 1 . 1 The absence of a system as such

18. The logical consequence of an approach which is purely pragmatic and which has explicitly or implicitly set aside any search for an overall conception is diversity, which increases along with the development of different schemes of protection34 . So at present there is no true social security system or social security code in Switzerland. The diversity is apparent in ail the basic features of the schemes: the concept of protection, the scope of persons covered, the material scope, benefits, administrative and financial organisation and disputes procedures. Laws and decrees are not drafted in line with a single plan, which could have covered the component elements of a scheme mentioned above. This undoubtedly leads to complexities: for the legislator himself, when adopting or revising a law (is he sure that he has an overall view?), for the executive authority, when issuing or revising a decree (the same question arises, even more sharply), for judges, for employers and for anyone who as an individual is within the scope of protection (absence of a social security institution which is, for example, responsible for all questions of membership and contributions), for practitioners. The same applies to all citizens or users of schemes. A more concrete approach enables us to better define this diversity. But before giving 33

34

BOIS, Philippe, op.cit., p.34.

Cf.op.cit. in footnote 10, pp.135-158.

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some illustrations, one should nevertheless emphasise that this diversity - which, as we shall see below, has been partially corrected has very probably not led to a greater degree of complexity than exists in most countries where social security is relatively highly developed. Let us take the example of France. Within the general scheme, the machinery is more simple than in Switzerland, for both the persons protected and the employers. However, numerous special schemes continue to operate in France, and social security as a whole (general, special and supplementary schemes) appears to be more complex than in Switzerland: in the former country the legislator has made, but failed to complete, an effort at rationalisation, whilst in the latter he has moved step by step - with, it is true, certain corrective measures.

2. 3. 1 . 2 Some illustrations of the diversity of the Swiss legislafüm

19. We will now examine more concretely what this diversity means, resulting as it does from the lack of willingness on the part of the legislator to head towards a true social security system. The examples given relate to the scope of persons covered, the material scope and the benefits. One could choose many more.

20. First example: the diversity of the scope in terms of persons covered. ln this respect Swiss social security shows a wide degree of variance.

Starting from the broadest scope, one may suggest the following classification:

a)

b)

c)

d)

e)

35

almost universal scope : only the basic old-age, survivors and invalidity pensions scheme has reached this stage, and this from the very beginning (1948/1960); the supplementary benefits attaching to this scheme have the same scope, but are means- tested;

a scope which has become almost universal : the health care element in the sickness and maternity insurance is very close to universality. Only about a third of the population are insured compulsorily; but almost all of the remaining two-thirds have voluntarily joined a sickness fund (a small minority are under private sickness insurance, run by the commercial companies);

on the other hand, a completely general persona! scope, with compulsory coverage of all employees and self-employed persons, has not been adopted for any Swiss scheme;

a general scope covering employees has been chosen by the legislator for several schemes: the accident insurance (since the total revision which took effect on 1 January 1984); the family allowances, if one takes into account both the federal legislation and the cantonal rights; and finally the unemployment insurance (since the transitional scheme of 8 October 1976, replaced from 1 January 1984 by the Federal Law on compulsory unemployment insurance and compensation in the event of bankruptcy). ln addition, the accident insurance is available on an optional basis to the self-employed, as this is allowed for in the federal Constitution (art.34 novies, para.2, third sentence) but has not been implemented for the unemployment insurance35 , self-employed persons in agriculture and in some cantons those in other economic sectors are also covered, but only provided that their income does not exceed a certain limit;

a partially general scope for employees : this applies under the LPP supplementary pensions scheme, which is compulsory and came into force on 1 January 1985. This

Cf. The Federal Council's message to the Federal Assembly concerning an amendment to the Federal Constitution in order Io provide for unemployment insuranœ in accordanœ with a new conception (3 September 1975). Feuille fédérale 1975 Il 1573. BONNY, Jean-Pierre: A propos d'une conception nouvelle de l'assurance-chômage (translation).ACC 1976 252.

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obligation takes effect only if the employee receives from a single employer at least the prescribed annual earnings (adjusted periodically by ordinances)36 ; and

f) a special scope (which does not corne within this classification) : the military insurance scheme and the allowances for loss of earnings due to military or civil defence service corne under this heading37.

21 . Second example : 1he djversity of the material scope. Swiss law covers the nine branches of social security, in accordance with the standard classification set out in ILO Convention No. 102 on Minimum Standards of Social Security38 . But there are several special features: it does not include a medical care scheme operating irrespective of the reasons for the need for medical care, the sector of cash sickness benefit is hardly mentioned in the legislation; maternity is covered only partially, under the sickness insurance; the accident insurance scheme includes non-employment accidents; the unemployment insurance scheme also covers bankruptcy of the employer. As regards the guarantee of medical care. which in Switzerland is provided on an indirect basis39 , several schemes may be involved: sickness and maternity insurance, accident insurance, invalidity insurance⁴⁰, supplementary benefits under the old-age , survivors and invalidity insurance, military insurance, social assistance. Rules for coordination define the priorities (e.g.the intervention of sickness insurance is subsidiary to that of accident insurance); combinations are possible (e.g.payment of the cost of treatment in the public ward of a hospital guarantied by the accident insurance, the balance paid by a sickness insurance scheme over and above the statutory normal level). The risk of invalidity can be covered by the invalidity insurance, by benefits supplementary to those of the old-age, survivors and invalidity scheme,by the accident insurance, by the LPP supplementary pensions scheme, by the optional occupational insurance scheme, by the military insurance, by social assistance, not to mention individual insurance, encouraged (or tied). The pension can be in the form of benefits from the old-age and survivors insurance, supplemented if necessary on a means-tested basis by the supplementary benefits under that scheme, from the LPP supplementary pensions scheme, trom optional occupational insurance, from assisted individual insurance or from social assistance.

22. Third example. which is related to the previous one : the diversity in the field of benefits.

Several schemes provide short-term cash benefits (daily allowances): sickness and maternity insurance, accident insurance, invalidity insurance (linked to rehabilitation), unemployment insurance, military insurance, allowances for loss of earnings due to military or civil defence service.

The same is true for long-term cash benefits : the list given above in relation to retirement pensions applies here, together with accident insurance, invalidity insurance and family allowances. Finally, whilst rehabilitation is a key element in the invalidity insurance, it can also be covered by the sickness insurance, the accident insurance, the military insurance and the unemployment insurance.

2. 3. 2 The correctives to diversity

23. This also is a subject which could in itself well justify a substantial study; here, however, we can mention only a few points, which affect certain principles and certain achievements.

36

37 38 39

40

Since 1 January 1990: 19,200 Swiss francs.

ln view of its close coordination with the basic old-age, survivors and invalidity pensions scheme, the second of these could also corne under the first category.

ILO Convention No.102 covers the following nine branches: medicai care, sickness benefit, unemployment benefit, old-age benefit, employment injury benefit, family benefit, maternity benefit, invalidity benefit and survivors' benefit.

The option of direct care along the lines of a national health service has never been envisaged, in view of the wide availability of public and private health care.

The old-age and survivors insurance (AVS) and the invalidity insurance(AI) together constitute the basic pensions scheme AVS/AI.

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48

PIERRE-YVES GRESER

2.3.2.1 The existence of major specific principles

24. One should first recall that Swiss social security legislation rests on specific fundamental principles, with a general tendency to corne into line with international law⁴¹^•ln this context one may mention the following:

a) the progressive implementation of the functions of social security :

Switzerland made a late start in developing a social security system, but since the war the development has been sustained, even since the economic situation became more uncertain42. Thus it has caught up to a considerable extent;

b) the ouarantee of medical caœ and health protection : the risks of sickness and accidents are defined in the same way - by case law or by ordinance -in the schemes that may be involved in this field; and their definitions are themselves coordinated - by the Federal lnsurance Tribunal43 -in order to avoid a situation in which a health impairment is classified neither as a sickness nor as the result of an accident44 • The 1964 partial revision of sickness insurance has clearly improved legal protection in this field, with a not insignificant role being left to arrangements for supplementary protection⁴⁵^;

c) The guarantee of a social compensation income : this represents a generally accepted objective. However, federal legislation covers it practically only under the basic pensions scheme and leaves some gaps 46 ; this area is therefore mainly the responsibility of the cantons (for both the guarantee of a minimum income and the award of family allowances);

d) the guarantee of a social replacement incarne : this supplements the social insurance provisions for the risks of loss of income due to sickness⁴⁷,accidents, retirement, invalidity, death of breadwinner and unemployment. Here there is a clear tendency to provide a guarantee at a level linked with the previous income; and

e) the protection against unemployment and assistance with training was entirely revised with effect from 1 January 1984, as regards unemployment. The operations of the scheme cover three aspects: prevention, compensation, rehabilitation for work. They are aimed at unemployment, reduction in working hours, loss of earnings due to bad weather, as well as bankruptcy of the employer. Assistance with training is the responsibility of the cantons which, in areas that corne under the Federal Law on Vocational Training, have to follow standards laid down by the Confederation.

25. thus there exist principles corresponding to the four constituent functions of social security, developed theoretically, put forward to replace the classical conception of social security

41 42 43 44

45

46

47

Cf. the work referred to in footnote 10 and the referenœs cited.

Cf. the study by H.P.TSCHUDI, op.cil.

The Federal lnsurance Tribunal is the supreme arbiter in matters of federal social security law. ln spite of its tille it is not competent Io deal with matters of private insurance.

This does not, however, mean that anvone who suffers a health impairment wlll receive benefits under the sickness lnsurance or the accident insurance; there are still gaps and the Federal lnsurance Tribunal has not taken the next step, viz. to eliminate these. Cf.decision in the case ofBessire, 31 May 1985. ATF 111(1985)V138 (in French).

The rules applying to payment of the cost of medical care under the various schemes that may be involved are net identical. Ier example, dental care does net in general corne under the statutory sickness insurance, but is covered by the accident insurance. Another example: prevention is practically ignored by the former, whereas it occupies an important place in the latter.

When an elderly or disabled person has to live in a residential home, the daily tees payable are often higher !han the income assured under the basic pensions scheme (including supplementary benefits) and under other schemes (in particular pension funds), so that social assistance always has to intervene.

This is basically provided for outside the statutory framework, which is extremely limited.

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CAHIERS GENEVOIS DE SECURITE SOCIALE 1990 I 7 PIERRE-YVES GRESER

founded on ILO Convention No. 102 on Minimum Standards of Social Security by a functional conception⁴⁸And, to back up these functions of social security, a series of other principles - to which we can refer only briefly here - have been introduced: the principles of compulsory membership, insurance, solidarity, prevention, adaptation and rehabilitation, state intervention and participation49 . Analysis of these guiding features makes it possible, starting from a highly diversified overall picture, to discem a certain coherence in both the legislation itself and its evolution.

2. 3. 2. 2 Application of the general Principles of public law

26. The partial coherence to which we have referred finds its extension in the application of the general principles of public law. A brief survey shows that:

a)

b)

c)

d)

e)

f)

48

49 50 51 52 53 54

the prjnciple of legality. which is present in all the schemes, is completed by that of contractual freedom in the sickness insurance, the accident insurance and the occupational pensions scheme⁵⁰as an improvement on the statutory standard;

the principle of eguality requires a revision of the legislation when it does not treat men and women in the same way (matemity protection being considered apart). This is the case in particular for the basic and supplementary pensions schemes;

the principle of proportionality is of special importance in the case of sanctions under sickness insurance (optional) - the exclusion of a member from a fund being conceivable only as a last resort - and in cases of reduction and refusai of benefits51 ;

the principle of good faith should permeate the relations between the social security institutions and their partners and users, to protect the confidence placed in the former;

the institutions may - in certain specified circumstances52 -be obliged to treat one of their members in a manner which deviates from the relevant legal provisions, to his advantage;

the prjnciple that œasons must be given for decisjons is a general principle applying in a state governed by law53 , but it is not easy to apply, given the complexity of social security law and the number of cases that have to be dealt with; and

the principle of reconsideration and review is useful in that it permits, in certain conditions, a review of the administrative decisions that have corne into effect and on the substance of which there has been no ruling by a judicial authority54 •

PERRIN, Guy: Rationalisation et humanisation, deux objectifs prioritaires pour une réforme de la sécurité sociale.

ln Emploi et politique sociale. Compiled by Ph. BOIS and P.-Y.GREBER. Réalités sociales. Lausanne, 1982. Also published in Travail et société, Vol.6, No.4, October-December 1981, pp.409 ff. Cf. also the approach of ACKERMANN, Walter: Soziale Sicherung in der lndustriegesellschaft. Tendenzen und Konsequenzen. IVW Series, Vol.5. Institut für Versicherungswirtschaft an der Hochschule St.Galien. Peter Lang. Berne/Frankfurt am Main, 1980, pp.243-244. Cf. also the work referred to in footnote 10, pp.86-94.

Cf. the work referred to in footnote 10, pp.317 ff.

This applies already under the (compulsory) LPP occupational pensions scheme, owing to the autonomy granted by the legislator to the pension funds; and to a very great extent under the optional occupational insurance.

This applies all the more when the scheme is constitutionally required to guarantee essential needs, as is the case for the AVS/AI basic pensions scheme.

Cf. for example decree of the Federal lnsurance Tribunal in the case of C.K.SA, of 3 September 1980. RCC 1981 194.

Decree of the Federal lnsurance Tribunal in the Leonardelli case, 3 July 1978. ATF 104(1978) V 153.

Cf. for example decree of the Faderai lnsurance Tribunal in the case of SVRSM vs. Kaufmann, 4 March 1985.

Semaine judiciaire 1985 304.

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50 CAHIERS GENEVOIS DE SECURITE SOCIALE 1990 I 7

2. 3. 2. 3 Achlevements ln coordlnatlng and harmonlslng the schemes

27. The legislature, the supreme judicial authority in social security matters, the government and the administration have achieved a certain degree of coordination ("bridges") and a partial harmonisation (common elements) in the schemes which constitute Swiss social security⁵⁵.

28. Very briefly, one can mention as regards coordination 56 : the definition of the sickness and accident risks (cf. above in para.24(b) and footnote (44)), the payment of costs resulting from accidents by sickness insurance (depending on the rules of the fund), the rules of priority for payment of the cost of medical care, the introduction into the old-age and survivors insurance scheme of allowances for incapacity and auxiliary aids (to create a certain parallelism with the invalidity insurance), the rules aimed at preventing over-compensation, the central position occupied by the AVS equalisation funds, which are the bodies principally responsible for administering the basic pensions scheme; and the very broad competence of the Federal lnsurance Tribunal in social security matters.

29. As regards harmonisation, one may mention: the scope in terms of persons covered is the same for the old-age and survivors insurance and for the invalidity insurance (cf. footnote (40)), the common definition of invalidity, the definitions of the risks covered by the basic scheme are also used by the occupational pensions scheme, the equivalence of pension levels as between the old- age and survivors insurance and the invalidity insurance, the method of calculating them being the same, and the common organisation of the two social insurance schemes which form the basic pensions scheme.

55

56

GYSIN, Arnold: Mannigfaltigkeit und Koordination in der schweizerischen Sozialversicherung. Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Sozialversicherung 1985 1. MAURER, Alfred: Schweizerisches Sozialversicherungsrecht, Vol.I, cited in the bibliography, pp.380 ff. Also the work cited in footnote (10), pp.159-178 (and the references cited therein).

Cf. in the present series, the study by B.DESPLAND.

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CAHIERS GENEVOIS DE SECURITE SOCIALE 1990 J 7 51

3. THE GENERAL TABLE. THE VARIOUS TYPES OF CONSTRUCTION 30. Swiss social security comprises the following schemes57;5a;59

Sickness and maternity insu rance

Accident insurance PENSIONS

LAMA LAA

3

lndividual insurance (59)

2 b. Optional occupation al insu rance

2 ---

2 a. Occupational pensions scheme

LPP

Unemployement insurance Family allowances (essentially cantonal laws)

Basic pensions scheme

31.

a)

57 58 59

LACI

Military insu rance Allowance for loss of earnings due to military service

APG

This table shows that Switzerland:

1

AVS/ Al (including supplementar) benefits

Social assistance (cantonal laws)

does not have a real system as such, but rather a series of social security schemes. As a general rule, membership of each scheme is necessary; however, membership of the AVS/AI basic pension scheme includes membership of the unemployment insurance (for employees) and of the APG scheme (as the institutions responsible for membership and collection of contributions are the AVS/AI equalisation funds); and

Supplementary protection can improve some of these schemes.

lndividual insurance is included in the present table, as it is referred to in the Faderai Constitution, in article 34 quater, which deals with pensions schemes.

ln the present Series, J.-L.DUC deals with sickness insurance, A.MAURER with accident insurance, A.BERENSTEIN with the basic pensions scheme and with unemployment insurance, J.BRUHWILER with the occupational pensions scheme and G.BOUVERATwith the family allowances schemes.

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52 CAHIERS GENEVOIS DE SECURITE SOCIALE 1990 I 7

b)

32.

a)

b)

c)

d)

e)

60 61 62 63 64

does not have a general scheme either, as in France, covering a whole category of the population (e.g. employees and their dependants) for a series of risks or for all risks.

Several types of construction co-exist:

A single federal scheme, comprehensive; this applies to unemployment insurance⁶⁰,

rnilitary insurance and the APG allowances scherne;

a federal scheme, which can be improved on at the cantonal level, but more especially by rneans of supplementary protection, provided by the relevant funds; this is the case for sickness insurance;

a federal scheme, which can be added to by supplementary protection provided by the responsible institutions; this is the case for the accident insurance61 :62 ;

a series of schemes ("horizontal construction") provided for under federal legislation (for a given sector) but more particularly by cantonal laws: this applies to family allowances and social assistance; and

several federal schemes covering the same risks, superimposed on one another in order to improve the protection ("vertical construction"); this is the system adopted for pensions: (1) the basic AVS/AI scheme is universal in conception and guarantees a first level of protection the coverage of essential needs; (2) the LPP occupational pensions scheme is partially general in scope for employees⁶³and, taking account of the benefits under (1), airns to ensure maintenance of their previous living standard for the middle- income group; (3) the optional occupational insurance extends the level of protection under the above schemes to cover the higher middle-level and higher-level incomes; and (4) finally, the Constitution has aimed to include individual insurance coverage in this construction, as a third stage, encouraged within certain limits by tax concessions⁶⁴.

See however paragraph S(d) above (protection under cantonal law).

With, however, a small special scheme for shipping. Also, the accident risk can be covered subsidiarily under the sickness insurance.

The legislator has not given the National Accident lnsurance Fund authority to administer supplementary protection.

See paragraph 20(e) above.

GREBER, Pierre-Yves: Les régimes des pensions dans la sécurité sociale suisse: réalisation d'une construction par étages. ln Mélanges Alexandre BERENSTEIN, cited in the bibliography, pp.409-435.