Ideas as Domestic Factors in the Formation of China’s Multilateralist Foreign Policies Case of WTO, ASEAN+3 and SCO

Table of Contents

1.2 WHY MULTILATERALISM MATTERS IN THIS RESEARCH? ... 15

1.2.1 The Definition of Multilateralism ... 16

1.3 THE RESEARCH PLAN ... 18

1.3.1 Role of Ideas as Cutting point ... 18 1.3.2 Thesis structure ... 19 1.3.2.1 Theoretical Part ... 19 1.3.2.2 Historical Review ... 20 1.3.2.3 Case Studies ... 21 1.3.2.4 Summary and Conclusion ... 23 1.3.3 Literature ... 23 1.3.4 Chinese Context of Literature ... 24 1.3.4.1 “The West” ... 25 1.3.4.2 “Chinese Characteristics” ... 25 1.3.4.3 The Value Issue ... 26 1.4 ORIGINALITY OF THE RESEARCH ... 27 1.4.1 The Role of Ideas ... 27 1.4.2 The Evolution of China’s foreign policy in global context ... 29 1.4.3 Linking Domestic Politics and Foreign Politics ... 30 1.4.4 Common language ... 30 1.4.5 Limits of the Research ... 31 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ... 33

2.1 WHY DO CHINA’S DISTINCTIVE POLITICAL CULTURE AND THE SEARCH FOR A COMMON LANGUAGE MATTER? ... 33

2.1.1 The Puzzle: How is China’s understanding of multilateralism different from that of US and EU? 33 2.1.2 Alternative World Views in Post-Cold War Era ... 37

2.1.2.1 New Regionalism: a new factor that shapes post-hegemonic world order ... 38

2.1.2.2 China’s Self-Perception ... 40

2.2 INTRODUCTION TO IDEATIONAL APPROACH ... 42

2.2.1 Importance of Ideas in China’s Foreign Policy Making ... 42 2.2.2 Ideas in Chinese Political Philosophy and Context ... 43 2.2.2.1 Ideational Level Ideas of China Traditional Philosophy ... 45 2.2.2.2 Paradigm Level Ideas of Confucianism ... 46 2.2.2.3 The Influence of Contemporary History ... 48 2.2.3 Differentiating “Ideas” and “Ideologies” ... 50 2.2.3.1 Definition of Ideas Adopted in this Thesis ... 52 2.2.4 Ideational Approach ... 53

2.3 HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND DISCURSIVE INSTITUTIONALISM ... 55

2.3.2 How Institutions are studied ... 57 2.3.3 Historical Institutionalism ... 58 2.3.3.1.1 Key Concepts in HI: Path Dependence and Historical Juncture ... 58 2.3.3.1.2 The Ideational Turn of Historical Institutionalism ... 62 2.3.3.1.3 Critics of HI’s Ideational Turn ... 62 2.3.4 Discursive institutionalism and Role of Ideas ... 63 2.3.4.1 The definition of DI ... 63 2.3.4.2 Classifications of Ideas in DI ... 64 2.3.4.3 Three Levels of Generality ... 64 2.3.4.4 Two Types of Ideas ... 66 2.3.4.5 Discourse in DI ... 67 2.3.4.6 Different types of discourses ... 68 2.4 THE COMBINATION OF INSTITUTIONALISMS ... 69

2.4.1 Why Historical Institutionalism and Discursive Institutionalism should be combined ... 69

2.4.2 HI and DI’s values in Research Concerning China ... 70 2.4.2.1 The Value of HI in Research Concerning China ... 70 2.4.2.2 The Value of DI in Research Concerning China ... 71 2.4.3 Going Beyond of Rational Choice Institutionalism ... 72 2.4.3.1.1 The Ideational Turn of Rational Choice Institutionalism ... 73 2.4.3.1.2 Critics to RI’s Ideational Turn ... 74

2.5 THE MODULE OF ANALYSIS ... 75

2.6 THE THREE CASES CHOSEN ... 78

2.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY ... 79

3 HISTORICAL REVIEW ... 81

3.1 TIME SPAN DIVISIONS BASED ON HISTORICAL JUNCTURE ... 82

3.2 ANALYSIS OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY IDEAS ... 83

3.3 THE FIRST PHASE : FROM 1949 UNTIL THE OPENING UP AND REFORM IN CHINA (1949-1978) ... 84

3.3.1 Ideational Level Ideas ... 84 3.3.2 Paradigm Level Ideas ... 85 3.3.3 Policy Level ... 88 3.3.4 China’s Passive Engagement with Multilateralism ... 88 3.3.4.1 China’s Unpleasant Experience with US-Led Multilateralism ... 89 3.3.4.2 Refusal to Communist Block Multilateral Institutions ... 90 3.3.4.3 The Birth of Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence ... 90 3.3.4.4 A Negative Attitude towards the UN and the Promotion of China’s Own Value ... 92 3.3.5 Summary of the First Phase ... 93

3.4 THE SECOND PHASE: FROM THE OPENING UP TO THE END OF COLD WAR (1978-1992) ... 95

3.4.1 Ideational Level ... 97 3.4.2 Paradigm Level ... 98 3.4.3 Policy Level ... 99 3.4.4 China’s Participation in Multilateral Institutions in the Second Phase ... 99 3.4.4.1 The Non-alignment policy ... 100 3.4.4.2 In the UN: Disarmament, the Peace Keeping Missions and the Promotion of a New International Economic Order ... 101 3.4.4.2.1 Disarmament ... 101 3.4.4.2.2 The Peace Keeping Mission ... 102 3.4.4.2.3 The Promotion of the New International Economic Order ... 103 3.4.4.3 China’s involvement in the IMF, World Bank and Application to Access to GATT ... 104 3.4.5 Summary of the Second Phase ... 105

3.5 THE THIRD PHASE: FROM THE END OF COLD WAR TO 2002 (1992-2002) ... 108

3.5.2 Paradigm Level Ideas ... 110 3.5.2.1 Concept of “A Major Responsible Country” ... 111 3.5.2.2 China’s Relation with other Powers ... 112 3.5.3 Policy Level ... 114 3.5.3.1 Great Powers are Key Factors ... 115 3.5.3.1.1 Sino-US Relationship ... 115 3.5.3.1.2 Sino-Russia Relationship ... 116 3.5.3.1.3 Sino-EU Relationship ... 117 3.5.3.2 Neighbouring Countries are the Priority ... 118 3.5.3.3 Developing Countries are fundamental ... 119 3.5.3.4 Multilateral Institutions are Stages ... 120 3.5.4 China’s Involvement in Multilateral Institutions in the Third Phase ... 120 3.5.4.1 China’s Participation in Global Multilateral Institutions ... 121 3.5.4.2 China’s Participation in Regional Multilateral Institutions ... 122 3.5.4.2.1 China and ASEAN ... 123 3.5.4.2.2 The Creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization ... 123 3.5.4.2.3 China’s Cooperation with African Union ... 124 3.5.4.2.4 China’s Cooperation with Latin American Multilateral Institutions ... 125 3.5.5 Summary of the Third Phase ... 126

3.6 THE FOURTH PHASE: 2002-2012 ... 129

3.6.1 Ideational Level ... 130 3.6.1.1 Analysis of Harmonious World ... 132 3.6.2 Paradigm Level ... 133 3.6.2.1 A Major Responsible Country ... 133 3.6.2.2 Debate about New Directions in China’s Foreign Policy Strategy ... 134 3.6.2.3 Peaceful Development ... 136 3.6.2.3.1 Promotion of Harmonious World ... 136 3.6.2.3.2 Non-alignment ... 136 3.6.2.3.3 New Security Concept ... 137 3.6.2.3.4 International Responsibility with active participation and achievement ... 137 3.6.2.3.5 Regional Collaboration under Good Neighbourhood Principles ... 138 3.6.2.4 Soft power construction ... 138 3.6.3 Policy Level ... 139 3.6.3.1 Partnership Network ... 140 3.6.3.2 Economic Aspect: Economic Diplomacy ... 143 3.6.3.3 Cultural Aspect: Public Diplomacy ... 144 3.6.4 China’s Involvement in Multilateralism in the Fourth Phase ... 145 3.6.4.1 WTO ... 146 3.6.4.2 Shanghai Cooperation Organization ... 146 3.6.4.3 The Six Party Talks ... 146 3.6.4.4 Inter-Region Cooperation ... 151 3.6.5 Summary of the Fourth Phase ... 152

3.7 THE FIFTH PHASE: AFTER 2012 ... 154

3.8.3 Multilateral Diplomacy: A Way of Discourse ... 172 3.8.4 Framework of China’s Value System: From the Beijing Consensus to the China Mode ... 173 3.8.5 New Regionalism: A New Platform for China ... 176 3.9 CONCLUSION ... 177 PART TWO ... 182 4 WTO ... 184

4.1 A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO WTO ... 184

4.1.1 A Brief History of the WTO/GATT ... 185

4.1.2 Dispute Settlement Body ... 190

4.2 CHINA AND ACCESSION TO GATT/WTO: THREE PHASES ... 193

4.2.1 First Phase: Long Negotiation from 1986 to 2001 ... 193 4.2.1.1 Key Issues in Debate ... 195 4.2.1.1.1 The Relationship between Domestic Reform and Opening Up ... 195 4.2.1.1.2 WTO and China’s Ideology ... 197 4.2.1.2 China’s WTO Accession Negotiation and China’s Foreign Relations ... 197 4.2.1.2.1 Sino-US negotiation ... 198 4.2.1.2.2 Sino-EU Negotiation ... 201 4.2.2 Second Phase: From 2001 to 2007, Time of Adaption, Reforms and Key Issues for Post-WTO Time from China’s Perspective ... 202 4.2.2.1 China’s Domestic Legislation’s Reform ... 203 4.2.2.2 Sovereignty Issue ... 207 4.2.2.3 Customs territory of areas ... 207 4.2.2.4 Power Asymmetry: Developed Countries and Developing Countries ... 208 4.2.2.4.1 China’s Developing Country Status ... 208 4.2.2.4.2 China’s Developing Country Status and the WTO ... 209 4.2.2.5 WTO-Plus Obligations ... 211 4.2.2.6 China in the WTO as Respondent and Complainant ... 212 4.2.3 Non-Marketing Economy Status (NME) ... 216 4.2.4 Third Phase: From 2007 until Present: China’s accession to WTO and China’s participation in Regional Trade Agreement ... 217 4.2.4.1 Northeast Asia ... 219 4.2.4.2 Southeast Asia ... 219 4.2.4.3 Central Asia ... 220 4.2.4.4 Regional Trade Agreements: Reshaping Trade Rules ... 221 4.2.5 The Rare Earth Export Constraint Case ... 223 4.2.5.1 The Background of Rare Earths Export Constraint Case ... 223 4.2.5.2 The Rare Earth Case from the Chinese Perspective ... 224 4.2.5.2.1 Pricing Power ... 225 4.2.5.2.2 Negotiation Power in International Relations ... 225 4.2.5.2.3 Environmental Concern ... 226 4.2.5.3 Rare Earth Conflict according to the WTO Rule ... 226 4.2.5.4 China’s Rare Earth Policy after the DSB Decision ... 228 4.3 SECTION SUMMARY ... 232 5 ASEAN+3 ... 239 5.1 INTRODUCTION ... 239

5.2 GENERAL CONTEXT OF ASEAN+3 ... 240

5.2.1 East Asia’s Multilateralism: Growing from a Westphalian Soil ... 240

5.2.2 A Brief Review of the Relationship between China and ASEAN ... 243

5.2.2.1 The hostility (1967-1991) ... 243

5.2.2.3 The starting of regionalization (1997-2012) ... 245

5.2.2.4 Starting of a More Active Regionalization Strategy (2012 until Present) ... 246

5.3 ASEAN+3: ITS FORMATION AND MECHANISM ... 247

5.3.1 Chiang Mai Initiative: A Starting Point ... 248 5.3.2 Structure of ASEAN+3 ... 250 5.3.3 East Asian Community as the vision of East Asia Regionalism ... 252 5.3.3.1 ASEAN Way ... 253 5.3.3.1.1 China and ASEAN+3: A Successful Step to Multilateral Diplomacy ... 254 5.3.4 Key Issues in ASEAN+3 ... 255 5.3.4.1 Who Leads ... 255 5.3.4.1.1 APEC and East Asia ... 256 5.3.4.1.2 Leading Role Dispute of ASEAN+3 ... 257 5.3.4.2 Economic Order ... 257 5.3.4.2.1 A Unified Currency for East Asia? ... 258 5.3.4.2.2 ASEAN-China FTA ... 259 5.3.4.2.3 China’s FTA Strategy ... 261 5.3.4.3 Who provide(s) Public Goods ... 262 5.3.4.4 Norms ... 264 5.3.4.4.1 The non-interference in Internal Affairs Dilemma ... 265 5.3.4.4.2 Sovereignty Transfer ... 266 5.3.5 ASEAN Regional Forum: An Attempt in Security Issues ... 268 5.3.5.1 ARF and China ... 270 5.3.6 East Asian Identity: China’s Perspectives of Understanding ... 273 5.3.6.1 Diverse Visions of East Asian Identity ... 273 5.3.6.2 How China understands East Asia ... 274 5.3.6.3 Reflections on China’s three perspectives on East Asia ... 276

5.4 IMPACT OF THE MARITIME SILK ROAD AND THE ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK (AIIB) ... 278

6.2.1 Constructing Multilateralism: A New set of Ideas as Generalized Principles of Conducts ... 309

6.2.1.1 Charter of Shanghai Cooperation Organization ... 310

6.2.1.2 Treaty of Long-Term Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation between the Member States of the SCO 311 6.3 COOPERATION, ENLARGEMENT, AND REGIONALIZATION ... 313

6.3.1 Security Cooperation ... 313 6.3.2 Economic Cooperation ... 316 6.3.3 People to People Cooperation ... 319 6.3.4 Membership Issues and Enlargement of Shanghai Cooperation Organization ... 323 6.3.5 Regionalization in Act ... 325 6.3.5.1 Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a Regional Public Goods Provider ... 326 6.3.5.1.1 Security Public Goods ... 327 6.3.5.1.2 Economic Public Goods ... 328 6.3.5.1.3 Cultural Public Goods ... 329 6.3.5.1.4 Difficulty in Providing Public Goods via SCO ... 329 6.3.5.2 The Clash of Institutions ... 329 6.3.5.2.1 Shanghai Cooperation Organization vs. Eurasian Union ... 331 6.3.5.2.2 SCO and Eurasian Union’s Relation. ... 334

6.4 PROBLEMS IN THE SCO’S COLLABORATION ... 336

6.4.1 Divergence in Visions of the SCO between Russia and China ... 336

6.4.2 Conflicts between sovereignty and multilateralism ... 338

6.4.3 Low institutionalization and weak economic cooperation ... 341

6.4.4 From bilateralism to multilateralism ... 342

6.4.5 Competition in Institutions ... 343

6.5 SILK ROAD ECONOMIC BELT, MARITIME SILK ROAD PROJECT AND ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK: AN ATTEMPT TO DEEPEN THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION’S FUNCTIONS ... 346

6.5.1 Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road Project ... 346

6.6 REFLECTIONS ON THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION ... 352

6.6.1 The Role of China’s Ideas ... 352 6.6.2 Same Neighbours, Different Goals ... 353 6.6.3 Challenge: How to Transfer Top Down to Bottom Up ... 355 6.7 CHAPTER CONCLUSION ... 357 PART THREE ... 362 7 CONCLUSION ... 364

7.1 SYNTHESIS OF RESEARCH INSIGHTS ... 364

7.1.1 First Guiding Thread ... 365 7.1.1.1 China’s Ideal of the World: Instrumentalism and Beyond ... 365 7.1.2 Second Guiding Thread ... 367 7.1.2.1 The Changing of China’s Self Perception ... 367 7.1.3 Third Guiding Thread ... 368 7.1.3.1 From Cold War to Multipolarity ... 368 7.1.4 The Rebuilding of Identity and China’s Engagement in Multilateralism ... 370 7.1.5 China’s Engagement of Multilateralism and the Change of Priorities in National Interests ... 371 7.1.6 Competitive Regionalism ... 372 7.1.7 Coming Back to the Research Question ... 374

7.2 CHINA’S COMPETITIVE MULTILATERALISM IN FORMATION? ... 375

7.2.1 First, it is basically instrumental ... 375

7.2.2 Second, it is linked with the rise of regionalism ... 376

7.2.4 Fourth, the competitive multilateralism is based on different norms than US led multilateralism

378

7.2.5 Fifth, it is less “ideology-oriented” than previous US-led multilateralism ... 379

7.2.6 Sixth, associated with the rise of regionalism, a multi-layer multilateralism under China’s coordination is in formation, with diffuse reciprocity as working principle ... 380

Thanks

My gratitutde goes to my supervisor, my counselor, and my good friend, Prof. Jean-Michel De Waele. Without whom I would not have come to ULB, nor got enrolled in GEM program. His support, his enlightenment and his care are warming sunshines in the process of finishing this long thesis. To put it simply, he hans changed my life.

I can never imagine myself finishing such a doctoral thesis without the help of my co-supervisor, Prof. Mario Telò. A good supervisor is like a lighthouse on the gloomy sea, which tells you where to go and brings you the courage to procede. The precious guidence Prof. Telò has given to me is the key to the completion of this thesis. Beyond this thesis, his profound understanding of this world has shaped and deepenend my own understanding of this world, and has introduced me new perspectives.

The caring and encouragement from Prof. Leonardo Morlino is like the warming sunshine of Italy. It is my great honor to have him as my supervisor. It has been such a joy to attend his lectures, filled with his incomparable knowledge and enlightening questions. What I learned from him reached beyond classroom: I also got to know how the academic world turns and how a young researcher should find his or her own way in nowadays academic world.

Doing a PhD in a place not of one’s own is certainly not easy. I cannot have survived this without support and encouragement from my friends here. I will never forget Mme. Anne Lentiez’s help and friendship in the past four years: she is my dearest friend who has lit up the long dark winter days. She is a person filled with positive attitudes, which is actually more important than anything at the deciding moments.

My gratitude also goes to my colleagues of CEVIPOL and GEM community. These brilliant people are resources of great ideas and lights of my life. I would like to thank especially Megan Foster from LUISS, who has helped me to revise my thesis.

PART ONE

The purpose of this part is to clarify the contexts that are necessary to understand clearly this research.

It includes the introduction part, the theoretical framework part and the historical review part. The introduction part discusses the research question, why it is relevant to research on China’s understanding of multilateralism and how China’s multilateralism diplomacy has developed. It also introduces the global and domestic context of the whole research. The theoretical framework introduces the theoretical constructure and the theoretical tools that this research will engage. It introduces the theoretical tools and explains the reasons why they are selected. A module of analysis will be established in order to conduct the analysis.

1 Introduction

1.1 Context of the Thesis

On 29th of June 2015, representatives from 57 countries attended the ceremonies for the agreement that established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). 50 countries signed the agreement on that day, and the remaining 7 countriesfinished the agreement process by the end of 2015. As a recently established multilateral institution that has both great economic and political impacts, the AIIB has attracted much attention as its creation has partially resulted from China’s divergent opinions with the IMF and the Asian Development Bank. The world has seen a China that is playing an increasingly active role in international affairs and seems to be confident to present “Chinese way”. Within the context that after China’s participation in the Chiang Mai Initiative and ASEAN+3 and then its initiation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the coming of AIIB has raised the question about whether China is forming its own rules? To be more specific, is China forming its own type of multilateralism. If the answer is positive, will it be compatible with the existing multilateral institutions (WTO, IMF, World Bank etc)? If not, what kind of new world order will China bring with this new type of multilateralism?On 4th of February, the US president Obama has congratulated the signature of Trans Pacific Partnership trade deal in Auckland by saying: “TPP allows America—and not countries like China – to write the rules of the road in the 21st Century, which is especially important in a region as dynamic as the Asia-Pacific” (BBC News 2016). This has interested me into thinking: what is China as a country? What rules would China write, that would be different from those written by America? Obama’s words imply that the US and China are two very different countries, so how China is different and how this difference will lead to diversities in rules?

1.1.1 First, how does China understand multilateralism?

China’s understanding of multilateralism is not solely an academic notion, but is also related to many different aspects. Since the world “multilateralism” finishes in “ism”, suggesting “a belief or ideology rather than a straightforward state of affairs” (Caporaso 1993:53); and Ruggie has pointed out that the most distinguishing character of multilateral form is that it coordinates based on “generalized principles of conduct” (Ruggie 1993:14), the understanding of multilateralism is therefore highly related to ideational factors of countries that practice it. In this way, how China understands the multilateralism is decided by the following aspects: a) how China understands international society; b) how China understands the principles upon which international society is organized; c) how China understands the dispute resolution of international issues; and d) how China understands its role in this society and its relations with other countries. The reason why ideational factors were chosen as the main approach for this research is that ideas play an important role in both China’s philosophical tradition and foreign policy development. Qin Yaqing, one of the most important international relation theorists in China and also the rector of China Foreign Affairs University, has pointed out that in Chinese context, the ideas of CPC leaders play a major role in understanding China’s foreign policy (Y. Qin 2012b:163). Certainly, CPC leaders’ foreign policy ideas are based on the real world and are about the real world, but the way that they interpret the reality and what China should do is the most charming and unique factor to achieve to a better understanding of China. This point will be elaborated in later paragraphs that explain our theoretical frameworks.

1.1.2 Second, how is China’s rise related to its engagement in multilateralism?

reached among Chinese scholars that China needs to pursue a peaceful way of rise1 _(Peaceful

Rise “和平崛起” in Chinese), but the question lies in how to realize the peaceful rise. What the Chinese scholars are trying to prove is that China’s rise will not necessarily lead to regional instability or military conflicts, thus there is no need to neither worry about it nor contain it. For China’s engagement in multilateralism, as China has become the second largest economy in the world2_{, it increasingly engages multilateralism to manage its foreign relations and to}

construct institutions that facilitate China’s involvement in regional and global affairs. This has presented a distinct change from China’s foreign relations since 1949: China had been very negative towards multilateral institutions. This attitude softened in 1971, when China joined the United Nations, and gradually the country has become very active in initiating multilateral institutions after the Cold War, the most recent examples being the AIIB.

As the rise of China and its engagement in multilateralism exist respectively as a very important foreign policy input (idea) and a main foreign policy output (practice), the relationship between the two has attracted attention from both Chinese and non-Chinese scholars. China’s participation in multilateral institutions has been studied as an indication of how a rising China might manage its relationship with the international society, and of how optimistic attitudes can co-exist with pessimistic ones. In earlier years, China’s accession to the WTO has been seen as a signal that China accepts the international rules and becomes integrated into international society (Johnston 2008; Lampton 2008). Later, China’s active participation in regional multilateral institutions such as ASEAN+3 and ASEAN Regional Forum, in combination with its increasing territorial conflicts with neighbouring countries, has caused worries among its neighbours in its neighbouring countries that China might be only using multilateral institutions to cover its ambition of becoming a dominant power in Asia Pacific (Acharya 2000, 2003;

1_{The notion of “Peaceful Rise” has been proposed first by Zheng Bijian, a think tank to Chinese government.}

Zheng’s original starting point lies in a) the cultural perspective that China doesn’t have the cultural tradition to invade or colonize, so its rise can only be peaceful; b) the economic perspective that China needs a peaceful development environment to continue its domestic growth, so it is not beneficial for China to engage in military rise. Different Chinese scholars have supported this notion by elaborating the necessity of peaceful rise from different perspectives. For example Qin Yaqing has argued that the rise of China cannot be realized through material or military power’s growth because the essential dilemma of China’s relation with international system has always been its identity instead of power relations. Thus it has to be resolved from China’s identity construction (Qin 2006). Guo Shuyong emphasizes the importance of soft power, rather than hard power in a major country’s sustainable rise (Guo 2006). Feng Yongping elaborated this point by arguing that the rising state should and could positively construct new ideas concerning their rise to replace the hostility (Feng 2009:14). Yu Zhengliang and Yang Yuan argue that the international relations in nowadays have entered an era of “zero death of sovereignties”, thus stating that in present day, strong powers or military advantages are no longer the necessity of a country’s rise (Y. Yang 2011:13; Z. Yu 2000).

McClatchy, Gatbonton 2014; Rohrabacher 2010) and might threaten the existing world order by rewriting the rules of the game (Bloomberg 2015). The doubts about China’s successful integration into existing institutions are usually linked with suspicions on China’s peaceful rise. At the same time, many Chinese and non-Chinese scholars agree that institution making will be where the new competition between the US and China will appear (Bergsten et al. 2008; Yu 2013). This might sending the signals of new way of competition between the two most important countries in the world, and arise interests in the strategic significance of multilateral institutions initiated by China.

1.1.3 Third, how will China’s engagement in multilateralism influence the future world order?

Vis-à-vis the uncertainty of the world order after the Cold War, many possible scenarios have been discussed. For example Andrew Gamble has imagined four possible future world orders: a) the world goes back to the US’ hegemony, b) the world develops into the US and China’s bipolar order, c) the world develops into global governance and d) the world might be fragmented by certain regionalisms3_{(Gamble 2012). Zhang Guangsheng from Renmin}

University, has taken another perspective and, imagines that the world order might a) go back to the Westphalia model which is based on the nation state, b) develop into a homogenous society due to the deepening globalization, or c) develop into a new world order constituted by civilization groups, which redefine their relations according to recognition or distinguishing (G. Zhang 2008). Whatever the future scenario will be, it is evident that China plays an important role in shaping it. Chinese scholars have diverse opinions on China’s role in the future world order. China’s official rhetoric champions a multipolar world, and Chinese scholars including Pan Xingming, Pan Zhongqi, Ding Chun and Chen Zhimin believe that multipolarity is the future direction (Chen and Pan 2013; Pan 2008). While Yan Xuetong believes that the most likely world order, and also the most beneficial one for China, is the bipolar order with China and the US acting as two poles (Yan 2013).

Moreover, China is developing its own idea of future world order that is claimed to be independent from contemporary international relations theories and conceptions. For example, Zhao Tingyang, one of the most famous Chinese philosophers of CASS, has championed the

3_{Emmanuelle Todd, who supports this vision for the future world order, believes that neo-protectionism will create}

“Tian Xia” system over the so called unipolar, bipolar or multipolar ones(Zhao 2006, 2011). “Tian Xia”, which literally means “all under the heaven”, originates from traditional Chinese philosophy and East Asian order, which claims to go beyond the fragmentation of the nation-state, and sees the world as a whole entity4_{. The rise of interest among Chinese researchers in}

finding solutions from traditional Chinese philosophies and cultures are derived from the logic that as China is becoming an economically strong nation, it also needs to become a culturally strong nation.as well, China should stop importing ideas and knowledge from foreign countries and start exporting them instead (Zhao 2011). Also, as China’s issues would certainly influence the world, the Chinese perspective and Chinese solutions to these issues should be expanded to resolve world issues (Callahan 2008a:758–759). At the same time, this seeking of a “Chinese World System” also reflects China’s need of redefining its role in the future world order (Wang 1999a; Y. Wang 2006; Z. Zhang 2012).

The importance of researching China’s engagement in multilateralism lies precisely in the fact that China adopts it in this historical process of re-imagining and redefining the world order and China’s role in it. As China rises, its attempts to influence and shape the future world order are largely realized through multilateral cooperation. This fact is especially important within the context of a declining US dominance.China therefore needs to respond to the question: what role does China want to play? Even though there hasn’t been a clear answer to this question, engagement in multilateralism has become the most important method China uses in this process of reshaping the world order and seeking its own identity.

1.2 Why Multilateralism Matters in this Research?

One essential issue that is easily taken for granted and ignored is why multilateralism is discussed in this thesis instead of bilateral relations or other foreign policies? I find it necessary to clarify this issue by point out why multilateralism matters.

First, as John Ruggie has oberserved as early as in 1993, institutions are “in demand” because they are “robust and adaptive”, both in economic and security affairs, and “a core feature of the current international institutional order is its multilateral form”, which “appears to have characteristics that enhance its durability and ability to adapt to change” (Ruggie 1983:ix). Multilateralism has been “increasingly accepted as the modus operandi in world politics”

4 _{According to Zhao, Tian Xia system suggests an all-inclusive world system, which distinguishes not “self” and}

(Powell 2003:3), as nations have gradually realized that many issues pose challenges to several nations at the same time, thus demand a multilateral cooperation to deal with them; and there are also many issues that have linkages with different aspects of human’s activities5_{, requiring}

multilateral cooperation to provide a comprehensive solution.

Second, as introduced precedently, China’s rise and China’s engagement in multilateralism are developing hand in hand. This means China has chosen multilateralism has the way to integrate into international affairs. In historical review section, the historical study shows that China’s involvement in multilateral institutions has increased greatly and strategically as China’s economy develops. China’s foreign policy ideas are also conveyed through its engagement in multilateralism in the form of norms. Thus, multilateralism is examined in this thesis as the most important Chinese foreign policy.

1.2.1 The Definition of Multilateralism

So it is important to discuss the definition of multilateralism as it is one of the fundamental concepts in this research. Keohane defines multilateralism as an “institutionalized collective action by an inclusively determined set of independent States” and “persistent sets of rules that constrain activity, shape expectations and prescribe roles” (Keohane 2005), while Ruggie defines multilateralism as “ an institutional form that coordinates relations among three or more States on the basis of generalized principles of conduct” (Ruggie 1993). Multilateralism has developed through three different epochs: the 19th century arrangements and conferences within the context of the evolving Multipolar Concert of the “Great Powers”; the institutionalized multilateral system set up at the political and economic levels under the hegemony of the US after the Second World War; and the heterogeneous and uncertain development of multilateral cooperation after the end of the Cold War and within the multipolar world of the 21st _century

(Telò 2014d:35). It has been believed that hegemony is a decisive factor in the formation of multilateral cooperation, as it shoulders the responsibility of providing public goods. Yet in After Hegemony, Keohane has predicted that it is possible to have multilateral cooperation without the coordination of a hegemonic power: “international institutions help to realize common interests in world politics” as the “complementary interests” make “certain forms of cooperation potentially beneficial” (Keohane 2005:243–245). It seems that the emerging

5 _{For example, Kevin C. Kennedy has used the case of trade-environment disputes to point out that the}

multilateral institutions, which are rising with new regionalism, confirm Keohane’s statement. According to Telò’s observation, multilateralism is developing into pluralistic multilateralism with the following characteristics: a) a decentralized multipolarity has proven to be compatible with multilateral cooperation, provided that balance of power and alliance for security are no longer the priority. Hegemony is not necessary for multilateral cooperation, but leadership (either an individual or collective driving force) would be needed; b) a shift from the specific to diffuse reciprocity (where any exchange takes place in the context of an issue-linkage and where gains are expected within a larger time-spanthrough enhanced trust) occurs. Multilateral agreements historically started with a single policy field and adjusted themselves to the nature of issues according to their political relevance. In this way, multilateralism becomes deeper and stronger; c) the development of pluralistic multilateralism presents the paradox that on the one hand human rights, rule of law, democracy and global justice are increasingly founded on shared values as pluralistic multilateralism comes into formation, while on the other hand instrumental cooperation, contingent multilateral practices, and exclusive military alliances also occur; d) pluralistic multilateralism interacts with the rise of new multilateralism. Another important phenomenon is the rise of regionalism. Primarily since the focus of China’s foreign relations lies on its neighboring countries, the development of regionalism, especially when joined with multilateralism, is an important issue to discuss (X. Wang 2002:7). This new round of regionalism after the Cold War has become an important phenomon for research in international relations: new regionalism has developed in the form of multilateralism in order to oppose unilateralism, limiting the old fashioned logics of balance of power and preventing local conflicts and fragmentation. The balance between the regional and global dimensions of multilateral cooperation is an important source for the development of multilateralism (Telò 2014d:62–65).

1.3 The Research Plan

1.3.1 Role of Ideas as Cutting point

As mentioned in previous paragraphs, ideas have been chosen as the main variable for this research: how ideas, as an important domestic factor, have contributed to the evolution of China’s engagement in multilateralism during the time span from 1949 to 2015. This choice is made due to the fact that ideation factors are important in the Chinese context. This point will be elaborated here under.

First, this change in China’s engagement in multilateralism provides a clue to research on China’s foreign policy. From 1949 to 2015, China has developed from an underdeveloped country to the second largest economy in the world, and its relation with the world has evolved constantly and now faces new challenges. China’s foreign policyhas inevitably been making several major adjustments to serve China’s new role (Zhong 2012), and provides important indicators for China’s vision of the world. For example, as China’s economic power grows, it looks forward to more participation in global governance, and the world also expects China to shoulder more responsibilities. The question lies in how would China participate in global governance, and how does China define its “responsibilities”?

Second, from 1949 to 2015, the world order has undergone a huge change. The end of the Cold War marks the disappearance of bipolarism, but the new world order hasn’t become clear. At the same time, the slowly diminishing US hegemony and the rise of new regionalism have both had an impact on China’s engagement in multilateralism. Thus, the development of China’s multilateralism provides a different perspective from which to understand how these new changes in the world order have exerted their impacts on this new emerging power’s foreign policy.

1.3.2 Thesis structure

This thesis is constituted of four main parts: the theoretical framework, a historical review, a selection of case studies and a conclusion.

1.3.2.1 Theoretical Part

In the theoretical framework segment we will introduce the theories, which will be applied in this thesis.

First, the theoretical context of uncertainty about the world order will be addressed. This is the starting point of the research on China’s engagement in multilateralism.

Second, we will introduce thoroughly the main theory that we adopt: discursive institutionalism and historical institutionalism. The reason that we have chosen these theories is that it provides an important analysis of why ideas are important and how they become independent variables in the analysis of institutions. How ideas are considered in Chinese philosophy and contemporary politics is analyzed in order to provide contexts within which China’s foreign policy ideas may be understood. Historical institutionalism is employed to provide a more comprehensive analysis of China’s foreign policy ideas: historical factors are presented as contexts for the generation and evolution of ideas. Institutionalism was chosen because it provides the best theoretical tools to conduct our research in an innovative and original way. Many researches concerning China’s foreign relationship or foreign policy have already been done within realist theories, making it more difficult to find an innovative cutting point; constructivism is a very popular theory in contemporary China’s academics, but it focuses more on identity building (which is also an important subject in contemporary China’s international relations) than the role of ideas in policy making Even though institutionalism was adopted as the main theory for conducting the research for this thesis, the importance of realism and constructivism schools cannot be denied and they are a source of inspiration in many different aspects.

initiating international institutions of its own. This transformation is an important context of China’s engagement in multilateralism.

Fourth, two key concepts, multilateralism and new regionalism are introduced in this part in order to clarify the basic concepts that would be useful for the thesis. The definitions of these two concepts serve as reference objects, presenting how China’s understanding of multilateralism has evolved and transformed. Similarly, as China performs multilateralism mainly among its neighbouring countries, regionalism is the basic context of China’s multilateral diplomacy. At the same time, China’s practice of multilateralism in this area influences the regionalization process as well. Thus, regionalism is an unavoidable issue in this research, and will be fully discussed, especially in the case of ASEAN+3 and Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

1.3.2.2 Historical Review

In the historical review part, the evolution of China’s foreign policy ideas from 1949 to 2015 will be thoroughly introduced. This vast time span has been divided into five periods according to different historical junctures. This part is very important as it is inspired both by historical institutionalism and discursive institutionalism, and it aims to go beyond rationalism in theoretical framework. It provides the historical context for the evolution of China’s foreign policy ideas, and at the same time the evolution process itself provides important findings. By combining the two institutionalism, ideas are studies in temporal context, meanwhile the temporal context is interactive with political ideas’s development and formation. China’s participation in many multilateral institutions is also presented in this part in order to provide a more global and comprehensive vision of the evolution of ideas and the evolution of participation as the result of ideational changes.

different periods in order to illustrate the actual practice of these foreign policy ideas. These introductions also complement the part dedicated to case studies, where China’s participation in the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, Six Party Talk and its relation with the African Union are presented.

1.3.2.3 Case Studies

The case studies part illustrates how China’s foreign policy ideas are put into practice in actual engagement in multilateralism. We will introduce three cases to present China’s involvement in multilateral institutions: the WTO, ASEAN+3 and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. These three institutions are all important and typical in China’s multilateralism practice. First, they cover three different levels of multilateral institutions: WTO at global level, ASEAN+3 at regional level, and SCO at an even smaller level. The WTO is so far the most complete and complicated multilateral institution that is truly global. Its member states include almost all the countries in the world and its rules govern the world trade. More importantly, its dispute settlement mechanism is unique in imposing decisions on nation states. China’s accession to the WTO is of significant importance in its engagement in multilateralism. It is important both to China and to the world, as it has undergone 15 years of long negotiation and it signifies that China has accepted the game rule, in other words that it accepts to cede a part of its sovereignty to an institution that is external to it. ASEAN+3 is the first regional multilateral institution in which China actively participates. It is significant in many aspects: a) it is the first regional multilateral arrangement that accommodates both China and Japan; b) it is a regional multilateral institution in which China actively participates as a regional major country; c) it developed within the context of the rise of new regionalism, and China’s presence in this region has hugely influenced its development. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a relatively new case and is less known,but its importance is as prominent as the previous two cases. It is the first multilateral institution imitated by China, and it reveals the complicated bilateral relation between China and Russia. Put it differently, it vividly illustrates how China uses multilateralism to digest problems in bilateral relations.

trade conflicts concerning anti-dumping and export restriction of rare earths reflect the difference between China’s understanding of multilateral institutions and that ofthe West. Despite China’s efforts to internalize WTO law, it finds that: a) China’s efforts are not recognized nor appreciated due to its authoritarian regime pattern; b) global multilateral institutions such as the WTO are unable to fulfil neither the needs of regional economic development nor those of developing countries. These have become an important reason and context for China’s participation in ASEAN+3 and the initiation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The case of ASEAN+3 marks the time when China’s economy was soaring, and the country was beginning to construct its relationships with neighbouring countries strategically (from late 1990s until now). It is the early period just after the end of the Cold War and China’s foreign relations with its neighbouring countries are gradually developing out of the melting ice of the Cold War. It is also the time when US-led multilateralism has gradually shown its weakening influences on East Asia’s financial crisis and the China started to rise as a regional major country. The establishment of SCO has also originated directly from the end of the Cold War, when the territorial issue between China and Russia was inherited by the newly independent Central Asian countries. The development and enlargement of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization matches the timing of China’s intention to institutionalize the regional cooperation (from 2001 until now).

Third, each case study has its own context. The WTO has developed from an US-led multilateralism to a post-hegemony multilateral institution after the end of the Cold War, and China’s years-long accession negotiation began after China’s Opening Up and Reform, when China actually abandoned the idea of an ideology oriented foreign policy. ASEAN+3 has its global context as new regionalism arises after the bipolar world order ends, and at the same time China needs to get involved in regional governance after becoming a regional major country, starting with the development of a new identity as “an Asian country”. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is an unavoidable case study for research on China’s multilateralism, as it is the first multilateral institution initiated by China and it represents not only the rise of China’s economic and military power, but also an attempt that China seeks to provide an alternative to political ideas based on Western civilization by trying to develop ideas, even theories of international relations based on its own culture6_{. The three cases are also relevant to}

Xi Jinping’s new global strategies of the “One Road and One Belt” project and the Asian

6_{A very distinct point here is that China’s worldview justifies and legitimizes the existence of non-democratic}

Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) designed to finance it, as China’s new round of institution making is in certain ways posing challenges and requiring reforms of the existing global institutions (the WTO, the UN and the IMF) while relying on the regional ones (ASEAN+3 and SCO).

Fourth, China has different approaches to participating in these three multilateral institutions. In the case of the WTO, China has started with a very low profile, undergone a time-consuming negotiation process and finally gained access by accepting many unfair WTO Plus terms. China’s participation in the WTO was at first designed to be purely economic, but it gradually turned to a mixture between political and economic issues, especially since China has become the second largest economy in the world. The rare earths dispute that we will discuss in this case study is a typical example to illustrate this trend.

China’s involvement in ASEAN+3 started with economic issues, and gradually expanded to security and cultural issues. China is very careful to reassure ASEAN that it respects ASEAN’s leading role in East Asian cooperation affairs, and that China is the supporter, participator and contributor instead of the leader in ASEAN+3. The ASEAN Regional Forum is a meaningful attempt to regulate regional security issues with limited success, yet its existence is critically important in a region where political mutual trust is highly scarce.

China’s active initiating of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, contrary to ASEAN+3, starts from the security issue and then reaches economic collaboration. The economic collaboration among SCO members is designed to reinforce the bottom up base for multilateral collaboration in order to avoid SCO becoming merely a military alliance. Moreover, Central Asian countries, whose economies are not as strong as that of China and Russia would not be motivated to continue the collaboration without actual economic interests.

1.3.2.4 Summary and Conclusion

In the summary and conclusion part we will summarize the analysis done in previous chapters and synthesize the results acquired through the research and conclude.

1.3.3 Literature

First, the documentary files and books of the Communist Party of China are widely introduced. As China is an authoritarian country under the rule of the Communist Party of China (CPC), the party leader is also the leader of the state. The party leader’s foreign policy ideas are the most influential and decisive ideas. Thus, documents concerning Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao’s foreign policy ideas are analyzed and cited in this thesis.

Second, Chinese articles published in academic journals recognized by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) are presented. CASS is the most important research institution in China. Being organized and managed by the Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China, it serves both as an academic unit and as a think tank to the CPC. Accordingly, academic articles published within the CASS system reflect both the top academic research results in China and the mainstream ideas of the CPC. Similarly, news reports from the CPC news centre, from the Xinhua News Agency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China are also cited. The Xinhua News Agency is the official press agency of P.R.China. It is a ministry level institution led by the Chinese central government and its president is a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

Third, academic works of international researchers on China are introduced and cited in order to provide diverse and balanced perspectives. Articles, books and reports from Japanese, Korean, Russian, German and French researchers and media reports are included according to the context of different case studies. The inclusion of the works of researchers from different regions in the thesis, especially those of the Japanese researchers, provides a more enriching understanding of China’s foreign policy’s impact on its neighbouring countries.

Fourth, discussion and interview with Chinese scholars, think tanks and government officials are introduced. Interviews and personal discussions usually provide first-hand information and personalized opinions. Due to the author’s previous professions, the access to some top academic figures, government officials and think tanks is possible. The discussions usually took place in a relatively private setting, thus allowing a free exchange of ideas. Names, titles, dates and places of discussions are provided in the thesis.

1.3.4 Chinese Context of Literature

Chinese documents or certain parlance in order to avoid misunderstanding or confusion. At the same time, the explanation of contexts is also important for a better understanding of these literatures.

1.3.4.1 “The West”

The conception of “The West” very often appears in Chinese academic articles as the object of reference for many Chinese researchers. However, there is no clear definition of “The West”. The term is even more confusing for non-Chinese researchers as “The West” covers not only many geographically different countries, but also culturally different origins and also politically different regime types. Chinese researchers rarely distinguish the differences in culture and politics between American and European countries in articles concerning China’s foreign relations with the outside world, following the same routine whereby hamburgers and French cuisines are both named as “western food” (西餐). It is necessary to explain here that “The West” or “The Western cultures, The Western political systems” or “The Western democracy” are all generalized concepts that indicate ideas, cultures or political systems that are: a) non-Chinese nor Asian, for Japan and Korea are not considered as “The West”; b) ideas and political culture that favour liberal democracy, human rights, rule of law and market economy; c) the idea of considering the concepts listed in b) as universally correct and trying to impose these concepts as norms on any country that does not accept them or is still on the way to developing them. This concept is very often used to emphasize Chinese society’s differences (“The West” is an assembled concept of all that are non-Chinese and share different values). Its usage is also very often tainted with the feeling and implication of enforcement or coercion: “The West” promotes the domination of all the concepts listed in b), and tries to coerce all the countries to comply with the same values. The absolute distinction between a “moral China” and “an immoral West whose individualist thought system and Westphalian world system” has become the starting point of many Chinese scholars’ research (Callahan 2008a, 2008b:53). In a word, “the West” or “the Western” when used as an adjective, is a highly ideology-oriented usage in the Chinese academic world.

1.3.4.2 “Chinese Characteristics”

Communist Party of China in 1982, and the concept was preserved in the rhetoric of the CPC and developed into the “communist route with Chinese characteristics”, “communist cause with Chinese characteristics”, “communist theories with Chinese characteristics” and “communist system with Chinese characteristics”(Guang Ming Ri Bao 2013). Ever since its invention, it has always served to justify China’s domestic policy making. In the period between China’s Opening Up and Reform and the end of the Cold War, this concept implied that a) China’s practice of communism is unique as it is developed from China’s actual situation, so it is acceptable to be different from other communist countries’ pathology (S. Zhang 2012); b] as the political system is designed to serve the country’s economic development, it allows the assimilation of Western, or foreign ideas into China’s cultural and political contexts, producing new theories that serve to govern the country. After the end of Cold War, it was introduced to justify the uniqueness of China’s political system, implying that “Western values” are not necessarily the universal values to lead to good governance. When explored more deeply, “Chinese characteristics” include following aspects: a) multi-party cooperation and a political consultation system (多党合作和政治协商制度); b) the combination of a communist system and market economy; c) the leadership of the CPC guaranteed by the constitution.

It is necessary to explain this concept because it is a cutting point to understanding the relation between China’s domestic politics and its role in international relations. Many international conflicts and debates about China’s influences revolve around China’s characteristics: what will the rise of a non-democratic major country bring to the world? This will be an issue that will be discussed throughout the research.

1.3.4.3 The Value Issue

cover the three levels of state, society and citizen. At state level, the key words are “prosperity, democracy, civility, harmony”; at society level they are “freedom, equality, justice, rule of law” and at citizen level, they are “patriotism, dedication, integrity, friendship” (People’s Daily 2013). The fact that the CPC tries to develop the so-called “Core Socialism Value System” and define the “Core Socialism Value” has significant influences on both domestic and foreign policy making. The influences on domestic policies and focus on foreign policy will be briefly introduced. For the domestic policies, it is an attempt to establish a new ideology that is able to generate social cohesion and strengthen the legitimacy of the CPC’s rule (Chunying Li 2010:21; Mo and Tan 2010). For the foreign policy part, it concerns whether China can offer a value system that is on one hand attractive enough for other countries in order to create its soft power, on the other hand China needs a value system that can be competitive with “Western ideas” as China is assuming a more important role in the international society, and it is increasingly exposed to the globalized world (Qiu 2008). As China is constructing its own multilateral institutions, a fundamental question is the following: what norms should China follow, and why? Why would China construct an institution that has different rules from the Western ones?

1.4 Originality of the Research

Here we would like to spend a few paragraphs to present the originality and the contribution of our thesis to the academic world, in order to better explain the necessity of this research. 1.4.1 The Role of Ideas

The main theory adopted in this thesis is Vivian Schmidt’s discursive institutionalism. It focuses on the role of ideas as domestic factors in the change of institutions. The most important point in discursive institutionalism lies in that a) it considers ideas as independent variables; b) it considers institutions as in constant change, instead of static. A more thorough introduction to discursive institutionalism will be done in the theoretical part. Here we would like to discuss why engaging discursive institutionalism in the study of China’s multilateralism brings out originality.

fathers of P.R.China, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, are considered as the cornerstones and guiding torches of China’s foreign policy and thus enjoy far reaching influence and legitimacy in subsequent generations’ foreign policies (Fu 2000). These foreign policy ideas are not only strategic thinking about foreign relations, but they are also strongly connected with beliefs and values (Su 2015:28). Idea as an independent variable is thus supported by both the theoretical aspect and the academic resources in China.

Second, though there are many studies done by Chinese researchers on China’s foreign policy ideas, they are not combined with the research on its role of forming institutions. For example, China’s accession to the UN and WTO, its participation in ASEAN+3 and its initiative to found the Shanghai Cooperation Organization have been usually analyzed from the perspective of China’s relationship with major powers7 _{and/or the strategic arrangement of China}8_{. To put it}

differently, the change in China’s foreign policies is more often analyzed at the strategic or policy level, without assessing the changes further at ideational level. The strategic or policy level analysis is certainly necessary. However, they alone are pale and insufficient to observe China’s change in engaging multilateralism, especially when China’s rise concerns the future world order. If ideas are not invited and examined, the rise of China seems to become a mechanical and passive process, and the analysis does not reveal how China actually perceives its rise: why it should rise, how it should rise and what it can offer as it rises9_.

Third, there is also abundant research on China’s foreign policy and China’s international relations, but very few studies touch upon the causal relation between domestic factors and China’s foreign policies, let alone the role of ideas in these changes. As Song Wei from Peking University has pointed out, China’s domestic politics has huge impacts on its foreign policy; sometimes it may direct the foreign policy to surmount the restrictions of the international system, and this is a point that is often neglected by Western researchers (Song 2010:82). Zhang Baijia and Zhang Qingmin have also pointed out that the interaction between domestic politics

7_{The US, Russia, Japan and the EU are certainly the most important major powers in China’s perspective. This}

issue will be introduced more thoroughly in the historical review part.

8_{For example, China’s accession to the UN and to the WTO has been only interpreted as the need for peaceful}

development environment; and China’s initiation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is only deciphered as China’s geopolitical strategy or energy strategy.

9_{Many leading Chinese researchers have already pointed out the importance of ideational factors in Chinese rise.}

and foreign relations is one of the most important characteristics of China’s foreign policy development (B. Zhang 2002; Q. Zhang 2009, 2013). As China has a great population, economic quantity and increasing international impact, its domestic policy will have more sophisticated interactions with its foreign policy (Chu 2006; Q. Zhang 2013). Without a better understanding of China’s domestic politics, the understanding of China’s foreign policy and its role in international relations might be misguided. The originality of this thesis is to fill this gap by adopting discursive institutionalism to explain the change in China’s foreign policy. Truly, as any other country, China’s foreign policies, and its decision to engage with multilateralism in particular, are the results of many complicated factors and the intrinsic interrelations between them. We do not intend to insist that ideas are the only factor that decides China’s foreign policy, but we would like to discuss how ideas, as a domestic factor, have caused the change in China’s foreign policies, especially in its engagement in multilateralism. 1.4.2 The Evolution of China’s foreign policy in global context

Another originality of this thesis is that it puts the evolution of China’s foreign policy within a global context, which is also constantly changing. By examining China’s foreign policy in this manner, we agree with Vivien Schmidt that institutions are constantly changing instead of remaining static: especially in the case of China’s engagement in multilateralism, both domestic and external factors are causing changes, and institutions both inside and outside China have changed. The role of ideas in this series of evolution provides an active and profound perspective to observe and analyze this interactive change.

Yan and Xu 2005); c) the need to better explain China in order to build mutual trust and to establish China’s soft power (Q. Zhang 2006; K. Zhao 2011a). As Wang Gungwu has pointed out, after 150 years of contact with the West, China has integrated its understanding of “external world” with “internal world” and is ready to contribute to the future world order (Gungwu Wang 2008:30).

1.4.3 Linking Domestic Politics and Foreign Politics

The ideas being examined in this thesis have different types and different levels of generality, as will be shown in the Theoretical Part. There are policy level ideas that are directly transformed into actual foreign policies; meanwhile there are also ideas that shape the foundation of domestic politics, such as the ideas about China’s future development direction. These are ideas that concern the domestic policies. As introduced in earlier paragraphs, via ideas, domestic policies and foreign policies are examined together, which is very necessary but rarely done both among Chinese and non-Chinese academic researches (Yan and Lu 2005). It reveals, at least from an inside-out perspective, why China makes certain foreign policies and where the contingencies and turning points of ideas may lie. More importantly, it provides a reference to inner logic of the development of China’s foreign policy ideas: the contingency lies in the ideas. This perspective is especially important as China is confronted with the question of what role it would play in the future: Xi Jinping, the new Chinese leader, has already adopted many new ideas that can be seen as quite different from those of precedent generations, but they still remain their spiritual heir.

1.4.4 Common language

the international order in China’s imagination and the actual international order, and finally, what China expects the international order to become (Zheng 2009:52–53). For example, China prefers to name all American unilateralism or dominance as “hegemony”, which might cause confusion in the European academic context, as the US has gradually lost its hegemon status since the 1970s. Chinese scholars also deem necessary to introduce the “Chinese school” of thinking about international relations to the academic world, because it is believed that China is greatly misunderstood in foreign relation theories that are founded on Western ideas (He, Gao, and Feng 2013:18). Throughout the whole thesis, Chinese traditional philosophy and political ideas are introduced and discussed as they play an increasingly important role in forming China’s domestic and foreign policy. This has become a prominent tendency after the end of the bipolar world order and China has begun to reconstruct its identity through its traditional philosophy. At the same time, traditional Chinese philosophy is also invited in the argument of proving the fundamental difference between China and “the West” (Yinghua Li 2010; Y. Zhang 2007:5), thus legitimizing the necessity of the CPC’s one party rule.

1.4.5 Limits of the Research

Given the complexity of China’s political science, history and decision making processes, and due to the limits of the knowledge, time and capability of the author, this research cannot describe the decision making process of P.R. China in its entirety. It focuses on the engagement with multilateralism in China’s foreign policy, which is very important, but doesn’t cover all of China’s foreign policy activities. There are many interesting points, perspectives and angles to research on China’s foreign relations, and there is already abundant literature, both Chinese and non-Chinese, that has contributed to our understanding of this vast country.

Also, due to the limit of volume and time, this research has focused only on role of the leaders’ ideas in forming China’s multilateralism. However, it doesn’t mean we ignore or deny the function of other factors in this formation process. For example, the geopolitical considerations that include national security, natural resource strategy and the presence of the US are all important factors in forming China’s foreign policies. Some of them are mentioned in certain paragraphs but they are not fully discussed as the most important factors, as this research focuses on the ideational ones.

the understanding of this increasingly complicated world. The end of the bipolar world has left much uncertainty regarding the future world order that is yet to form. The complicated world affairs require more inter-disciplinary research. The complexity of society and real politics has decided that each theory has grasped a part of truth and one cannot fully understand the facts without consulting different theories and accumulating a large quantity of information.

2 Theoretical Framework

In the theoretical part of the project the theoretical framework within which the project is conducted will be presented. It will introduce the relevance and importance of the research subject, the theoretical foundations that support the research and how to conduct the research according to the chosen theoretical framework. In this chapter, the theoretical framework will be explained in detail. Conceptions will be clarified, and their relevance with this project will be presented. This chapter includes four parts: first, why analysis of China’s multilateralism ideas is important; second, an introduction to the ideational approach; third, an introduction to new institutionalisms and discursive institutionalism; four, putting China into the jar: analysis of China’s multilateral foreign policy according to the theoretical framework.

2.1 Why Do China’s Distinctive Political Culture and the Search for a Common Language Matter?

To prove that research about China’s multilateralism ideas is relevant and necessary, we first need to answer why China’s ideas of multilateralism matter. It involves two aspects that require elaboration: the importance of China’s understanding of multilateralism, and the importance of ideas. In the first partwe will focus on China’s importance, especially in the context of an unknown world structure. This part will provide a sufficient discussion about the uncertainty of the current world, and what role does China, one of the emerging powers play in it.

2.1.1 The Puzzle: How is China’s understanding of multilateralism different from that of US and EU?