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When should I stop? Dysphoria leads to impaired task persistence via negative mood

BRINKMANN, Kerstin, GENDOLLA, Guido

Abstract

Based on reported motivational deficits in depression—and on persistence deficits in particular—the present study examined whether dysphoric individuals benefit from task contexts that favor longer task persistence. Undergraduates worked on an item generation task with different stop rules: “Is this a good time to stop?” (enough rule), “Do I feel like continuing?” (enjoy rule), or no specific rule. Results revealed that, independent of the stop rule, participants with high depression scores stopped earlier and generated fewer items than participants with low depression scores—an effect that was mediated by current mood state.

Thus, contrary to experimentally induced negative mood, the enough rule intervention was not effective in eliminating dysphoric individuals' persistence deficits. Implications for task disengagement and performance outcomes are discussed.

BRINKMANN, Kerstin, GENDOLLA, Guido. When should I stop? Dysphoria leads to impaired task persistence via negative mood. Swiss Journal of Psychology, 2020, vol. 79, no. 2, p.

55-61

DOI : 10.1024/1421-0185/a000235

Available at:

http://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:147561

Disclaimer: layout of this document may differ from the published version.

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When Should I Stop? Dysphoria Leads to Impaired Task Persistence via Negative Mood

Kerstin Brinkmann & Guido H. E. Gendolla University of Geneva, Switzerland

Swiss Journal of Psychology (2020), 79(2), 55-61 https://doi.org/10.1024/1421-0185/a000235

Author Note

Kerstin Brinkmann & Guido H. E. Gendolla, Geneva Motivation Lab, University of Geneva, Switzerland.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Kerstin Brinkmann, Geneva Motivation Lab, Department of Psychology, University of Geneva, Boulevard du Pont d’Arve 40, 1205 Geneva, Switzerland. E-mail: kerstin.brinkmann@unige.ch

Abstract

Based on reported motivational deficits in depression—and on persistence deficits in particular—the present study examined whether dysphoric individuals benefit from task contexts that favor longer task persistence. Undergraduates worked on an item generation task with different stop rules: “Is this a good time to stop?” (enough rule), “Do I feel like

continuing?” (enjoy rule), or no specific rule. Results revealed that, independent of the stop rule, participants with high depression scores stopped earlier and generated fewer items than participants with low depression scores—an effect that was mediated by current mood state.

Thus, contrary to experimentally induced negative mood, the enough rule intervention was not effective in eliminating dysphoric individuals’ persistence deficits. Implications for task disengagement and performance outcomes are discussed.

Keywords: depression, dysphoria, task persistence, mood-as-input, stop rule

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When Should I Stop? Dysphoria Leads to Impaired Task Persistence via Negative Mood Depressed and dysphoric individuals suffer from important deficits in motivation and cognition (see Brinkmann & Franzen, 2015, for a review). Depressed mood has been

associated with decreased task interest and pleasure, effort withdrawal, and reduced approach motivation. Moreover, congruency effects of depressed mood on evaluative judgments, attention, and memory are frequently observed (Gotlib, Roberts, & Gilboa, 1996). However, research on the impact of depressed mood on the motivational dimension of task persistence is rather scarce. There is some evidence that an induced positive mood leads to longer task persistence and better performance outcomes than an induced negative mood (e.g., Erez &

Isen, 2002; Sarason, Potter, & Sarason, 1986). Moreover, naturally occurring positive mood has been shown to predict higher self-reported task persistence (Tsai, Liu, & Chen, 2007).

Likewise, the few studies that have investigated depressive symptoms in sub-clinical samples revealed that students with high depression scores persist less long on frustrating or insoluble laboratory tasks than students with low depression scores (Ellis, Fischer, & Beevers, 2010;

Hahn-Smith & Agostinelli, 1993). Given this scarce literature on depressed mood’s effect on persistence, it remains unclear whether a relatively simple stop rule intervention may

eliminate the persistence deficit in depression. The present research further examined the influence and mediating mechanisms of dysphoria (i.e., sub-clinical depression) on task persistence and tested a possibility to enhance task persistence in dysphoric individuals.

Only few studies have investigated the impact of stable depressed mood on task persistence to date. In contrast, the impact of experimentally manipulated mood states on task persistence has been extensively studied in the framework of the mood-as-input model (e.g., Martin, 2001). According to this approach, mood’s impact on task persistence is not stable but modified by contextual factors like stop rules (e.g., Martin, Ward, Achee, & Wyer, 1993). The basic assumption is that individuals in a positive mood should persist longer when asking themselves questions like “Am I enjoying this task?” or “Do I feel like continuing?”, putting an emphasis on the task itself, because positive affect signals an enjoyable task that should be continued. In contrast, individuals in a negative mood should persist longer when asking themselves questions like “Have I done enough?” or “Is this a good time to stop?”,

emphasizing performance outcomes, because negative affect signals insufficient goal progress and the necessity to continue. The former condition is termed enjoy rule or feel-like-

continuing rule, whereas the latter condition is termed enough rule or as-many-as-can rule.

Several experiments manipulating moods and stop rules have corroborated these hypotheses for task persistence and related performance outcomes (e.g., Martin et al., 1993). These findings even hold when the stop rules framing is reversed (Hirt, McDonald, Levine, Melton,

& Martin, 1999) and when discrete emotions instead of global moods are induced (Meeten &

Davey, 2012).

In the context of perseverative psychopathologies, a couple of studies support the predictions of the mood-as-input model for pathological worrying, perseverative checking, and depressive rumination (see Meeten & Davey, 2011, for a review). Most relevant for the present research are four published studies on depressive rumination. These studies have confirmed the expected interaction pattern between mood and stop rule for a rumination

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interview in a non-clinical sample (Hawksley & Davey, 2010), especially if the content of the interview was mood-congruent (Fisak, Kissinger-Knox, & Cibrian, 2018). Furthermore, it was found that high ruminators continued longer in the enough and control conditions compared to the enjoy condition and compared to low ruminators in either condition (Watkins & Mason, 2002). Moreover, clinically depressed patients persisted longer in a rumination interview with an enough rule context (Chan, Davey, & Brewin, 2013). Importantly, these and similar studies have focused on the explanation of pathological task perseveration by a mood-as-input

mechanism, and the frequently administered rumination interview consists of an externally structured situation with the experimenter as interlocutor.

The Present Study

The present study aims to translate the results from experimentally manipulated mood states (e.g., Martin et al., 1993) to naturally occurring depressed mood. It aims at the same time to investigate task persistence in an ecologically valid, self-structured situation that differs from the study contexts of depressive rumination. Based on the mood-as-input model, we assume that an enough rule intervention may elicit longer persistence on an affectively neutral, non-rumination task in individuals with high depression scores who otherwise show deficits persisting in everyday cognitive tasks. Finally, based on negative mood being one of the two core symptoms of depression and on current mood states leading to different

interpretations of stop rules (Martin, 2001), we hypothesize that the effects of depression score on task persistence would be mediated by current mood state.

We randomly assigned undergraduate students to one of three experimental conditions of an item generation task: enough rule, enjoy rule, or no rule. Moreover, we assessed

dispositional depression scores and current mood states as continuous predictor variables. If the stop rule manipulation is effective in a naturally occurring depressed mood, we can expect to find an interaction effect of stop rule and depression score on task persistence. In line with previous research on manipulated mood we can predict that in the enough condition

participants with high depression scores persist longer than participants with low depression scores. In contrast, we can hypothesize that in the enjoy condition participants with low depression scores persist longer than participants with high depression scores. A special case is the “default” control condition where participants are simply asked to stop “whenever you feel like stopping”. Opinions diverge whether the enough or the enjoy rule is the default one (see Hirt, Melton, McDonald, & Harackiewicz, 1996; Martin et al., 1993). In the present study on sub-clinical depression, we base our hypotheses on the previous research cited at the outset, where no specific stop rules were applied. Accordingly, we can expect that participants with high depression scores stop earlier and generate fewer items, thus mirroring the pattern expected for the enjoy condition. However, as there is no relevant previous research on sub- clinical depression and task context, it is also conceivable that the stop rule manipulation is not effective in a dispositional depressed mood. In this latter case, we can expect to find no effect of the stop rule and no interaction, but only a depression score main effect with dysphoric individuals persisting less long than nondysphoric individuals.

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Taken together, we expect that individuals with high depression scores show reduced task persistence—in general (i.e., in the control condition) as well as in the context of an enjoy rule. Moreover, if the stop rule intervention can be translated from experimentally manipulated mood to dispositional depressed mood, we hypothesize that dysphoric

individuals benefit from the enough rule in terms of longer task persistence. However, if the intervention is not effective, dysphoric individuals should persist less long also under the enough rule instructions. Finally, current mood state should mediate the effect of depression scores on task persistence.

Method Participants and Design

Undergraduate students (120 women, 29 men; mean age = 23.15, SD = 5.41)

participated in this experiment in exchange for partial course credit. We ran the experiment in groups of up to 6 participants who were randomly assigned to one of 3 between-persons conditions (i.e., stop rules): 50 in the enjoy condition, 50 in the enough condition, and 49 in the control condition. Participants’ self-reported depression and mood scores were used as continuous predictor variables.

Self-report Measures

Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS). We administered the French version of the short DASS (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995), a scale which was developed amongst others for use in non-clinical samples. It consists of three subscales with 7 items each, measuring states of depression, anxiety, and stress over the past week on 4-point scales ranging from 0 (did not apply to me at all) to 3 (applied to me very much, or most of the time). We calculated a sum score for the depression subscale (Cronbach’s α = .87), with higher scores reflecting more depressive symptoms (example: “I felt that I had nothing to look forward to”).

UWIST Mood Adjective Checklist. We administered a French version of the positive and negative hedonic tone scales of the UWIST mood measure (Matthews, Jones, &

Chamberlain, 1990). It consists of 4 positive (“contented”, “joyful”, “cheerful”, “happy”) and 4 negative (“dissatisfied”, “depressed“, “sad”, “frustrated”) adjectives reflecting participants’

momentary feeling state on 7-point scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). We calculated positive and negative mood sum scores (αs = .95 and .85) as well as a global mood sum score of positive and reverse-coded negative items (α = .90).

Item Generation Task

We used an item generation task similar to the one used by Martin et al. (1993, Experiment 2) in that we asked participants to generate a list of “important cities in Europe”.

We chose this category to avoid disadvantaging non-native French speaking students—city names are universal. Depending on condition, participants then read one of the three

instructions for when to stop the task, which were identical to those used by Martin et al.:

Enough condition: “As you are making your list, keep asking yourself ‘Do I think this is a good time to stop?’ If the answer is ‘yes’, then stop. If the answer is ‘no’, then keep listing.

There is no right or wrong time to stop. Stop when you feel it is a good time to stop.” Enjoy condition: “As you are making your list, keep asking yourself ‘Do I feel like continuing with the task?’ As long as the answer is ‘yes’, then continue making the list. When the answer

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becomes ‘no’, then stop. There is no right or wrong time to stop. List the items until you no longer enjoy it. We are interested in people’s enjoyment of different tasks.” Control

condition: “There are no right or wrong answers and we are not concerned with how many of these things you can come up with. We just want to see which ones come to your mind. You can stop listing them whenever you feel like stopping.” Following the instructions participants started making their list and continued as long as they wanted. The two main dependent variables—the total time spent on the task and the number of named cities—were recorded by the computer software.

Procedure

The experiment was presented as a study on mental processes, which would last 25 minutes for everybody, independent of the time spent on the different parts of the experiment.

After having provided written informed consent, each participant worked individually in one of 6 experimental cubicles that prevented interference between the participants. All

instructions, stimuli, and questionnaires were prompted and presented via experimental software (E-Prime 2.0, Psychology Software Tools Inc., Pittsburgh, PA). The experiment started with instructions, the UWIST scale, and demographic questions. Then, general instructions for the item generation task were presented, followed by one of the three stop rules. Afterwards, participants were free to work on the task as long as they wished. In pretests, no participant took more than 25 minutes to complete all parts of the experiment.

Following the task, participants completed the DASS scale. To ensure that all participants finished at the same time and to avoid time pressure, a filler task was presented for the individual remaining time. Finally, participants were thanked, debriefed, and received course credit.

Data Analysis

All analyses were performed using PROCESS for SPSS 3.2.01 by Hayes (2012). We first tested our main interaction hypothesis (PROCESS model 1) regarding the joint impact of depression score as predictor and stop rule as moderator on the two dependent variables, that is, number of generated items and time spent on the task. The depression score was mean- centered and the three conditions dummy-coded with the control condition as the reference.

We then repeated the two analyses with momentary mood instead of depression score as predictor. Finally, we conducted mediation analyses (PROCESS model 4) to test whether the impact of depression scores on performance outcomes was mediated by momentary mood state. A sensitivity analysis conducted with G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) indicated a required population effect size of f2 = .066, corresponding to a small to medium effect (input parameters for a linear multiple regression, fixed model, R2 increase: α = .05, power = .80, N = 149, predictors tested = 2, total predictors = 5).

Results Preliminary Analyses

Means, standard deviations, and correlations of all study variables can be found in Table 1. The two dependent variables—number of cities and time spent on listing—were not normally distributed according to visual inspection and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. We therefore rank-order transformed them to run nonparametric tests (Conover, 2012). Thus, all

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reported analyses are performed on the rank-order transformed dependent variables. However, for facilitating readability, persistence in minutes and raw number of items are presented when reporting descriptive values. Results were quite similar when these raw measures instead of the transformed measures were used.

The positive and negative mood scores were negatively correlated with each other, and both highly correlated with the global mood score (see Table 1). Analyses for the separate mood scores showed virtually the same results as for the global mood score. Therefore, only results of the global mood score are reported in order to avoid losing statistical power by multiple testing. Preliminary independent-samples t-tests revealed no significant gender differences with respect to number of cities or time spent on listing (ts < 1, ps > .44).

*** Insert Table 1 about here ***

Moderation Analyses

The first two analyses using depression scores as predictor variables, stop rules

(dummy coded) as moderator variables, as well as their interaction terms (PROCESS model 1, number of bootstrap resamples = 10,000), revealed significant full models for number of items, R2 = .14, F(5, 143) = 4.62, p < .001, and time spent on listing, R2 = .15, F(5, 143) = 5.17, p < .001. However, the R2 increase due to the interactions was neither significant for number of items, ΔR2 = .03, F(2, 143) = 2.19, p = .12, nor for time spent on listing, ΔR2 = .01, F(2, 143) = 1.01, p = .37. For both models, consistent main effects of depression score

emerged, whereas other effects were not consistent (see Table 2). When using momentary mood instead of depression score as predictor variable, results were virtually identical. The full models were significant, R2s > .13, F(5, 143)s > 4.27, ps < .01, whereas the R2 increases due to the interactions were not, R2s < .01, F(2, 143)s < 1, ps > .63. Again, consistent main effects of momentary mood emerged, whereas other effects were not consistent (see Table 2).

Taken together, our main hypothesis about the joint impact of depression score and stop rule on task persistence was not confirmed (see Figure 1).

*** Insert Table 2 and Figure 1 about here ***

Mediation Analyses

Finally, we tested whether the impact of depression scores on both performance outcomes was mediated by momentary mood state (PROCESS model 4, number of bootstrap resamples = 10,000). The total effect models were significant for both, number of items, R2 = .06, F(1, 147), = 10.04, p < .01, and time spent on listing, R2 = .08, F(1, 147), = 12.63, p <

.001. The two indirect effects confirmed reliable indirect paths (indirect effect for number of items = -1.14, CI.95 = -2.39, -0.03; indirect effect for time spent on listing = -1.49; CI.95 = - 2.78, -0.39). These results, together with the non-significant direct effects (direct effects = - 1.23 and -1.14; CI.95 = -3.04, 0.58 and -2.92, 0.63), indicate that the impact of depression scores on performance outcomes was entirely mediated by participants’ momentary mood state (see Figure 2).

*** Insert Figure 2 about here ***

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Discussion

The present study examined the impact of dysphoria on task persistence and tested a possibility to overcome dysphoric individuals’ persistence deficit by means of a specific task context (i.e., enough rule). Results did not corroborate our interaction hypothesis but revealed instead a depression score main effect. In particular, participants with high depression scores stopped earlier and listed fewer cities than participants with low depression scores,

independent of stop rule. This association of depression score and task persistence was entirely mediated by participants’ momentary mood state.

The depression score main effect in the enjoy and control conditions is in line with our hypothesis and with previous research in that students with high depression scores showed less task persistence and worse performance outcomes than students with low depression score (Ellis et al., 2010; Hahn-Smith & Agostinelli, 1993). Dysphoric individuals were thus more inclined to negate the enjoy and control questions at an earlier point in time. Contrary to our hypothesis and to previous research on induced mood, however, students with high depression scores in the enough condition did not negate the enough question and thus did not benefit from this stop rule in terms of enhanced task persistence.

These findings are at odds with the idea that mood effects are moderated by contextual factors (Martin, 2001). First of all, it has to be considered that a sensitivity analysis revealed that our study was sufficiently powered to detect a small to medium effect. It is thus

conceivable that our study was not adequately powered to detect a potentially very small interaction effect. Our findings also diverge from similar studies on rumination. However, it is of note that these previous studies aimed at investigating possible mechanisms for depressive rumination in a rumination interview (Chan et al., 2013; Hawksley & Davey, 2010) and at demonstrating the beneficial effect of the enjoy rule as a means of reducing the number of rumination steps in an affectively toned interview (Watkins & Mason, 2002). In contrast, we aimed at testing a possibility to enhance task persistence and related performance outcomes in a neutral task by means of the enough rule.

Moreover, whereas we used a literal translation of the instructions by Martin et al.

(1993), participants in the enough conditions of the abovementioned studies were instructed to

“take part in the interview until they had reached the goal of sufficiently exploring their depression” (Watkins & Mason, 2002, p. 580). It is important to note that, under the umbrella labels of the different stop rules, the specific instructions varied in previous research. It is very likely that even slight differences in wording have important effects on the framing of a task context. Therefore, the specific instructions should be considered when interpreting and comparing results of different studies. This caveat also applies to our control condition, which was syntactically similar to the enjoy condition by using the “feel-like” expression, even though the content was different.

On the other hand, similar studies in the context of physical pain have revealed mood and stop rule main effects in absence of significant interactions (e.g., Ceulemans, Karsdorp, &

Vlaeyen, 2013). Stop rule main effects have also been observed when the affective content of

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a rumination interview was incongruent with the mood induction (Fisak et al., 2018).

Importantly, our findings are in accordance with several lines of research on motivational deficits in depression and dysphoria regarding approach motivation and task engagement (Brinkmann & Franzen, 2015). For instance, research has demonstrated that dysphoric students withdraw effort from tasks that are perceived as too difficult or of minor importance (Brinkmann & Franzen, 2017; Brinkmann & Gendolla, 2008). Thus, the present findings suggest that naturally occurring depressed mood differs from experimentally induced negative mood in that individuals with higher depression scores disengage earlier from a task when confronted with the enough rule. One interpretation would be that this context creates the subjective impression of a highly difficult, unattainable goal. Following this line of thought, it is conceivable that dispositional depressed mood is more informative for evaluative

judgments than induced negative mood because it is trait consistent. In the context of trait anxiety, Gasper and Clore (1998) have demonstrated that high trait-anxious individuals more strongly rely on their trait consistent anxious affect, because it is assumed to be more

informative for judgments. In a similar vein, the effects of dispositional depressed mood on task persistence might be more difficult to change by contextual factors.

Taken together, the present research suggests that dysphoria is associated with reduced task persistence, independent of task context. Moreover, momentary mood state seems to be the critical, responsible variable for this disengagement. These findings have important implications for possible origins of cognitive impairments in depression and dysphoria: Our participants with high depression scores not only stopped sooner but also generated fewer items. Thus, the positive association between task persistence and performance suggests that cognitive impairments might sometimes be due to less task engagement and persistence and not necessarily to cognitive impairments with respect to the task per se. As we chose a task that permits the generation of an almost infinite list of items one can exclude the reverse interpretation—that students with high depression scores stopped listing because they could not find more new items. Obviously, further research using refined enough-rule instructions and different types of tasks is needed. Moreover, as our study was cross-sectional, future research might want to use prospective designs or to compare never depressed, previously depressed, and currently depressed individuals. Nevertheless, the present findings suggest that a dispositional depressed mood differs from experimentally induced negative mood regarding its interaction with contextual factors on task persistence. The present study makes an

important point for taking depressed mood’s impact on task persistence into account when interpreting performance impairments in depression and dysphoria.

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Table 1.

Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of Depression and Mood Scores, Number of Items, and Time Spent on Listing

Measure 2 3 4 5 6 M SD

1. DASS Depression -.40** .65** -.59** -.16* -.18* 5.66 4.60

2. UWIST positive -.54** .89** .28** .28** 17.66 5.22

3. UWIST negative -.86** -.18* -.19* 8.63 4.69

4. UWIST global .26** .27** 41.03 8.71

5. Number of items .82** 14.30 9.10

6. Time spent on listing 2.59 1.97

Note. Raw values of items and time in minutes are presented. N = 149. * p < .05, ** p < .01.

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Table 2.

Hierarchical Regression of Number of Items and Time on Depression Score, Conditions, and their Interactions (upper part) and on Mood Score, Conditions, and their Interactions (lower part)

Items (Depression) Time (Depression)

B SE B t CI95 B SE B t CI95

Constant 73.69 5.81 12.68*** 62.20, 85.17 77.57 5.77 13.43*** 66.15, 88.98

Depression -5.12 1.42 -3.60*** -7.93, -2.31 -4.65 1.41 -3.29** -7.45, -1.86

Enjoy vs. Neutral 13.33 8.21 1.62 -2.89, 29.55 8.91 8.16 1.09 -7.22, 25.03

Enough vs. Neutral -8.56 8.22 -1.04 -24.81, 7.69 -16.29 8.17 -1.99* -32.44, -0.14

Depr. x Enjoy vs. Neutral 3.08 1.86 1.65 -0.61, 6.76 2.34 1.85 1.26 -1.32, 6.00

Depr. x Enough vs. Neutral 3.75 1.87 2.01* 0.06, 7.43 2.35 1.86 1.27 -1.32, 6.01

R2 = .14, F(5, 143) = 4.62, p < .001 R2 = .15, F(5, 143) = 5.17, p < .001

Items (Mood) Time (Mood)

B SE B t CI95 B SE B t CI95

Constant 70.22 5.97 11.76*** 58.42, 82.02 74.51 5.85 12.73*** 62.94, 86.08

Mood 1.72 0.75 2.29* 0.23, 3.21 1.51 0.74 2.05* 0.05, 2.97

Enjoy vs. Neutral 17.65 8.34 2.12* 1.16, 34.14 12.66 8.18 1.55 -3.50, 28.82

Enough vs. Neutral -3.69 8.31 -0.44 -20.12, 12.74 -10.73 8.15 -1.32 -26.84, 5.37

Mood x Enjoy vs. Neutral 0.03 0.97 0.03 -1.88, 1.94 0.24 0.95 0.26 -1.63, 2.12

Mood x Enough vs. Neutral -0.78 1.02 -0.77 -2.80, 1.24 0.42 1.00 0.42 -1.56, 2.40

R2 = .13, F(5, 143) = 4.28, p < .01 R2 = .17, F(5, 143) = 5.77, p < .001

Note. DASS Depression Subscale (upper part); UWIST Mood Scale (lower part); Dependent variables are rank-order transformed. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

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Figure 1. Predicted number of generated items (A) and task persistence in minutes (B) as a function of stop rule and low (-1 SD) versus high (+1 SD) scores on the DASS – Depression Subscale.

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Figure 2. Direct, indirect, and total effects for number of items (outside the triangle) and for time spent on listing (inside the triangle). Coefficients are standardized. * p < .05, **

p < .01, *** p < .001

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