Contentious politics in complex societies: New social movements between conflict and cooperation

Book Chapter

Reference

Contentious politics in complex societies: New social movements between conflict and cooperation

GIUGNI, Marco, PASSY, Florence

GIUGNI, Marco, PASSY, Florence. Contentious politics in complex societies: New social movements between conflict and cooperation. In: Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly. From contention to democracy . Lanham [etc. : Rowman & Littlefield, 1998. p. 81-107

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http://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:112895

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1 / 1

4

Contentious _Politics in Complex

S ocretres

New Social Movemenrs berween Conflict and

Cooperation

Marco G. Giwgni and

Florence pa;sy

As

several observers have pointed

out

(e.g., Luhmann 19g2; Merucci 1996a;

\(illke

1991), complexity is a fundaÀentar fearure

of

"orrt"-p*-

rary societies. social complexity stems both internally

from

a

gro*irg

functional differentiatio' _attd .*ternally from

,h. .-Jrg.n""

"ri *aa

tyr::T

transcending national states

(villke

1991.). As a'result, unlike in traditional societies, the modern srate has to act upon

th. ,o"i"i rfri.*

ro regulate the society. This intervenrion raises

imiortant probl#r, ,'or,

notably.that of governability: _the state is

"l*aysi.ss

^{ablË to}

*"rr"rr,

,t

.

governa_biliry

of

complex_ democracies (Croziér, Huntington,

"rrJ

\f"r"_

naki,1975) and to

pilot

the society arone. This

rre* sitùion

is a major challenge for the modern state. The classical regulatory media, such as the law, rnoney, and the legitimate use

of violenè,

"r.

,ro lorrg.. sufficient f9r

$e

regulation of complex societies griilke'1992).To

f;;:;;h

"r--

plexity, the state needs.new _sources of legitimacy, fo, ir,

.o*pto ,*i.ri.,

lo gl"

^can anticipate the long run consequencei of most decisions, which implies that the state does not have the authority ror

""r"ioÀorrs

^deci-

sions (\x/illke r991,).rnaddition, information and knowledg.

u."o*"

"*-

cial resources

for

social regulation (papadopoulos 1995f

n C'i.f,

trr.

modern srate has lost its hé-gemony o-râr thË pilotage

of ,o"i"ty

"rrd

i,

now engaging in a-process of coregulation

(Vilike tflt).

As students of the so-called third secror have pointed out (e.g., Btitschi and

cattacin

1,994; Evers 1990, 1993;

villke

^1.99L), certain orsanized groups of the civil society play animportant role in ,hir io;nr

,"gil"rory

Process. Yet, few social movernent theorists have e*"mirred the- role of

81

82

Marco G. Giugni and Florence ^Passy

movements therein, alack ofattention that stems from the very definition of social movements. Most recent research on social movements is based

on rhe assumprion that they ^challenge the political authorities ^{and the}

stare. According to this view, movements and their ^allies form a conflict

sysrem opposing political authorities. To be sure, this view of social move-

*.nr, ,r'r tp..Ifi.

form of contentious politics must not be abandoned, quite on thJ contrary. Nevertheless, we must acknowledge that various contemporary movements also engage in a series of activities that do not

,r...rr"iily

entail

a

conflicting relationship

with

powerholders..Apart from activities aimed at reproducing the sense of belonging and collective identity of participant,

oràt

raisingcitizens' consciousness about specific political isrires,

*àu"*.rrt,

^{also cooperate with} the state' In complex

soci

àti"s, where the solution

of

public problems ^as well as the elaboration and, above all, implementation of policies ^are particularly difficult ^tasks, certain movements tend to become integrated into the decisional, regula-

tory,

or implementation ^phases of the political process. These activities are'increasiirgly importanl

,nd

supplement,

for

certain movements, the range of activiiies that characterize them ^{as a specific} form of contentious poli"tics.

In

particular, the new social movements undergo ^{a process} of irrcorporation in state srrucrures and procedures. Thus, new social move-

menr; intervene in ^the political process in two ways: by challenging exist-

ing or

proposed

poliiies

"trd by

helping

to

^elaborate

^and

^enforce

government policies.

The inregration of social movemenrs aimed at the coregulation of com- plex societi-es is the result both of a bottom-up ^{and a} top-down ^process.

b1 th.

one hand, movemenrs

try

to ^{expand the channels} of access to the stare

in

order

to

increase the chances

to

reach their political ^{aims. One} way for ^movements to do so is to become integrated into state structures

"rrà to address their ^claims from inside.

At

least in western democracies' social movements ^have constantly ^been knocking at the ^state's door in order to obtain, at a minimum, procedural impacts ^and, preferably, sub- standal impacts. \flomen',s movements are a good ^example. since their early days,^women's groups have looked for institutional ^channels to in- fl.ren".

ih. ,rrt. froÀ

wiihin. \romen's organizations are nowadays in- vited

to

collaborate

with

the state

to find

^solutions

to

inequality ^and discrimination. Thus, most ^western states have created stnrctures (minis- tries, offices, etc.)

jointly with

the movements

in

order

to

improve ^the condition of women.

on

the other hand, srates are also working to inte- grate social movements and

their

organizations.

In

various oolicy ^areas, Ihey

fr"e

an information ^{gap and} lack the knowledge ^needed

for

appro- priate problem solving.

Àr^, ..rnlt,

they

look for

collaboration with à"tor, ârrd organizatiois in ^the civil society that possess such. knowledge and may helplhem in the regulation of society. An area that is subject to

Contentious politics in Complex

Societies

^g3

this kind of coregulation between the state and social movements roday concerns the AIDS epidemic. _several wesrern governmenrs have asked gay movement organizations

ro "lend"

them knowledge and experience in order to respond ro rhis plea in a more effective

*"rirr.r.

As we shall see below, certain institutional fearures of the state provide favorable opportunities

for

the crearion

of

cooperation betweei social movemenrs and the state. Although all western sr;res are confronted with the complexity of society, not all of them share the same willingness to

shar_e their power with sectors of the civil society in the regularor"y p.o"-

ess. \(-ith respecr to AIDS, Switzerland is a "schàol case,"

fîr th.

_io-r.rrr- ment has incorporated several movement organizations that have

Ë..o*.

real parrners

in

the search

for

solutionr to

ihi,

social problem (Britschi and Cattacin 1.994).

Irr this chapter, we focus on the cooperation between social movements and the state-. \Ûe argue that certain

"o.rt.-po."ry

^{movements are follow-}

iîg." p*!

of inc-orporation in srare

srrucrui*

_th"t is nevertheless qualita- tively differenr from the traditional path of institution _alization

follo*.d

by labor movemenrs.

\fe

address tÉis new

kind of

incorporatio' bott theoreticauy.and empirically. First, we define cooperation ànd single out the main differences with three traditional models of interest-medïation:

the pluralist, rhe-corporatist, _{and the} policy-nerwork models. Second, we examine the condirions that make

"oop.r"tiott ^more likely. Third, we pro- videan empirical illustration of this

pio".r,

drawn

fro*'r*o

poli"y

"r."r,

development aid

to

Third-\x/orld counrries (targeted

by tË. ,oiid"rity

movement) and environmental protection (targetù by the ecology move_

melt).

Finally, we discuss several implications

of

cooperationîoth for social movements and the state.

It

is importarra to ,rotJ that the focus of this essay is on the national level. r[9

oiy

marginally deal with coopera- tion taking place in the international arenas,

*hi"h

yet is a crucial aspecr

of the cooperative behavior.of movements (passy

ills; s-irh

and Èag-, nucco 1995; smith, chatfield, and Pagnucco 1.997).It is also important to remark that, although we argue that what we are witnessing is Ëonflictual cooperation, in this chapter we

will

stress its cooperarive sàe rather than its conflicting side.

Vhat

Is

Cooperation?

According

to

rhe definition given

in

the introduction

to

rhis volume, a social movemenr is a sustained series of challenges to powerholders

(Tiily

1,994; see also

'Iarrow

1994a, 1996;

Tilty

I98+).r This definition ciearly sees movements as the expression of ^an existing social conflict.

virtually

^.

all scholars who are inrerested in the political aJpect of movements follow

84 Marco G. Giugni and Florence Passy

this line of reasoning (e.g., McAdam 1.982; McAdam, McCarthy, andZald 1,996;Tarrow 1994a;Tilly 1995a).In addition, some include in the deûni- tion the use of unconventional and/or disruptive actions (e.g., della Porta

L996;Tarcow 1.994a,1996). Also scholars working

within

" diff.r".rt

,o-

'

ciological tradition, although they strongly criticize what they see as po-

litical

reductionism

in the

above

definition, view the

essence of movements in the underlying conflict of which they are the carriers (e.g.,

Melucci 1.996a; Touraine 1984). They argue that a definition in terms of overt protest activities ignores a whole range

of

activities aimed at the construction and reproduction

of

individual and collective identities, which are seen as a fundamental dimension of social movements. How-

ever, they do not point to the fact that movements may not only challenge the powerholders, but also establish a cooperative relationship with them.

Even an author like Melucci (1996a,28), who has made a useful attempt to plotting social movements in the context of a broader variety of forms

of

collective action, including cooperation,

still

sees movements as the overt expression

of

alatent social conflict. Yet, even a cursory look at the relation between several contemporâry movements and the state suggests that

it

is made both of conflict and cooperation.

Generally speaking,

by

cooperation we mean a relationship between two pârties based on an agreement over the ends

of

a given action and involving an active collaboration aimed at reaching such ends. In our case,

the two parties involved are the state and a social movement or parts of it, such as an organization or a group

of

organizations. Cooperation must be distinguished from three other broad types of activity carried out by movements, as shown in figure 4.1. Protest actions ^represent the typical means that movements have at their disposal

to

reach their goals. But movements can also voice their opposition to state policies in a discursive manner,

for

example, through proclamations, resolutions, and the like.

Although the

kind of

involvement differs, both types

of

activity stem from a disagreement

with

government priorities, decisions, and policies.

On the other hand, interactions between social movements and the state can also take place on the basis of an agreement over the ends of a given action. This type

of

interaction takes

two

different forms.

\ilhen

the agreement is located at the level of discourse instead of that of action, we speak of consensus.

\[hen

the agreement is a matter of action, we define the interaction as cooperative.

Thus far, we have spoken

of

cooperation

to

define the latter type of interaction between social movements and the state. Flowever, there is seldom

full

cooperation. The distribution of power between actors

in

a

cooperative relationship

is

uneven:

social

movement organizations (SMOs) have much less power than the state. This leads SMOs to use an

Contentious Politics in Complex Societies

FIGURE 4.1

A Typology of Social Movement Activities Type

of

involvement

Discourse

85

Action Agreement

CONSENSUS CONFLICTUAL

COOPERATION

OPPOSITION PROTEST

Stand over goals

Disagreement

ambivalent strategy made

of

a combination of conflict and cooperation.

Following Evers (1990), we call

it

conflictwal cooperdtion.

conflictual cooperation between social movements and the state occurs at different poinrs in the political process. First,

it

takes place in the legis- lative arena and in the decision-making process. sMos

b."o-.

^integrated

in

the legislative process,

for

example, when a parliament"ry

.o*Àitt..

needs spssific comperencies possessed by SMOs before an issue goes to the floor

to

be discussed and voted. Second, conflictual cooperatLn oc- curs in the administrarive arena and in the regulatory process. Regulation refers

to

those state activities aimed at

*"i"girrg

"rrd

p.obl.-iol-ring

through means that do not imply the adopdon of new laws or the amendl ment of existing ones. This task is usually accomplished by state agencies.

For example, the Environmental Protection Agency, created

in

i920, is charged

with the

regulation

of

environmenral matrers

in

the United states. New opportunities stemming from the creation of agencies at the local, regional, national, and inrernational level

(in partiiular, on

rhe

European

Union

level), coupled

with the

need

on

rhe

part of

these agencies of specific knowledge about complex problems, have facilhaæd the integration of movemenr actors in the regulatory process. Third, we can observe conflictual cooperation still

in

the administrative arena, but with regard to policy implementation. FIere the role of movemenr acrors is particularly imporranr, for the complexity of problems and tasks faced

86

^{Marco G' Giwgni and' Florence Passy}

by the government is especially--high in the implementation ^{stages of} _.the

oô[ti."l

^process.

^In

^{various policy areas, the state resorts}

^to

nonlnstrtu-

it;;;ilo'o; i;;rJ"r

^to

i-pî.*.r,t

^{the decisions taken} onlegislative ^and

,.*"i"rir.

^{levels. Ofren the}

^iate

^{delegates certain tasks to these actors.}

--"Si*ii"Ay

ro what happens in the

c[nflict

system, social movements in-

,.rï"".

in'the collaborâr'io' ^{sysrem in} varioui ^ways. Three broad types of cooperation ^{can be} distinguished in this ^{resPect' To begm}

wlth'

the state can resort to nonlnstltutional ^actors in ordei to ^get information ^{that may} hdp

;;;i;.ri"i"

J.ririons or ^realize them. Here collaboration ^{takes the}

for'*

of consuçation.

In

this case, the movement ^has mainly an advisory

;;Ë];; ih.

,r"r".

A

deeper collaboration-occurs when ^the movement ^be-

;;;;; p;;;

^of

^.h.

*r,r"i.rres in ^charge of taking or implementing ^a deci- sion.

In

this ^case, we observe the întegration-of mo"ements

in

panels'

.o-*irr..r, ^*orÉng

^{grouPs' or} government agenc-ies' Su.ch integration is

usually ^aimed at

,rrrrif.rrirrg

iniormation

from

the

civil

society

to

^the

;àï'ï;;; ;;

help the

.Ëbor"tion of

^{public policies. Finally, a still}

â."o.,

cooperation

iàp[es

^a delegation ofiertainlasks, ^{that is, a transfer}

;il;;;;tt'bit;f;"; ^ih. ,r"r"

to"th"

*o"t*ents

^{on the} operational ^level'

firir-|.."r,

"b'o""

"ll ⁱⁿ

^{the phase}

^of

policy implementation,.which in certain areas is becoming incrËasingly

"à-pll*

^and difficult to ^{be carried} bv

"';;;;;ï;h;r"

state structures alone.

rhrà. rvp"r of

cooperative interaction ^{berween social}

*o,r"À"rr.,

^{and the}

,r"r.'àr,

^{be carried at the} individwal or ^at the collec-

ï;"r1"""1. xliho"gh in

this essay we focus on the collective level,

it

is

i"r"rrr*r ^to -"k".

this distinction.

In

the

first

situation'

for

example,

;tôi;;;;L^

^{of SfurOr are hired by the state} to work-in specific.policy

"r"î, o'

rhe movement's agenda. A cômmon ^insmnce of the second situa-

ii." ir rfi.

integration of"certain SMOs

in

a committee ^created

by

the

i;n|hr"r.

^or by"the aJministration. In addition, within ^each type, regard-

l!3,"àîil t;ài"ia""r.r..llective

^{narure, there can be different degrees of}

"lfi"U"t"ri"", ^which

^may

^be

^{measured according to^} various criteria'

Â;;ù

^{these, the}

^,ru*b.i

^{of actors involved and that of contacts are cer-}

tainly împortant ^ones

for

assessing the intensity of cooperation ^between social movements and the state.

- ôr,

th" empirical level, we may say that collaboration ^becomes stronger

* *. g;-ft.rit .orrrrrlt"rio'

to ittt"gtation to delegation, ^{as we} shift from

tù.

n8i-riarral to ^the group ^level,

Àd

"t

^{we ge! higher values on various} irrdi""ro., of intensity'(rr.rirrb". of actors, n

t-b.t

^of contacts' regularity ol "onr""ar, ^etc.). Figurà 4'2 gives an overview of ^{the types.} of.cooperative

ù.tt""io.

"".orjirrg

io th"

thi".

critetiawe ^{have just described'}

Interest Intermediation

^and

conflictual cooperation If

^{we go} through ^the history of social movements' we can easily ^see that ,tt" i"Jotpo."tiËr, ^irrto institutional structures and procedures is not a new

Contentious Politics in Complex Societies

FIGURE 4.2

Types and Degrees ofCooperation Individwal _Level

87

Collectioe Leoel Consultation

Integrarion Delegation

+

a

+

+ + +

phenomenor. In particular, labor movements _have followed a process of institutionalization

in

the polities of wesrern countries.

In p"ri,

also the new social movemenrs, which apparently are less willing to

b."oâ.

incor- porated in state srrucrures, havenonerhéress institutionilized (Giugni _and Passy 1'997; Kriesi 1996; Melucci 1,996a;Roth _1992). Thepoliiicalicience literature offers a number of studies that deal witÉthe

,yr* oiirrr"r"r,

mediation and, indirectly,

with

the institutio nalization

of

social move- ments. The study of the processes of interest mediation involving interest groups (employers'associations _and labor unions) gives us some"clues for analyzingthe cooperative relationship between social movements and the state.

In

this respect, we cân distinguish between three distinct models

of

interesr intermediadon. The pluialist model srresses

,t.

".foi"rio"

between a plurality

of

.interest

g.orp, within

the political

,yË.*

"rra mainains that even the less

rtrrrt.rr.d

and powerful grorrps .".r i.rfl,r.rr".

the political decisions (Daht tgzt; polsby

irss;.

R.Jorai"g to

thi, ,ri.*,

the role of the _state is to balance and recâncile ionflicting

iir.r.rÀ

ir, ,t

"

society'

In

contrast, the neo-corporarisr model maintaiis that only the most powerful groups are able to influence the political decisions through

p.eak agreements (cawson 1986; Lembruch i993; schmitter 19g1). In tÈis elitist perspecrive, rhe shre.plays a role of

..g,rl"to.

of opfori.rg

irrr...rr,

in a strongly strucrured and-closed sysrem of"irrt"r.rt inteïmedia"tion, rhus offering _an opportunity to the most powerful actors ro negotiare. Finally,

a policy-network _{model has recently been} brought to th"

fi."

^(Marsh and Rhodes _1992; smith 1993), which

it.".r",

the àxistence of a

"ommunity of actors organrzed argun-d specific policy areas and trying

to i.rflo.rr".

the political decisions. Each nètworkis relatively closed,

û"tïigh;"i""g.

over time through the inclusion

of

new

acto^

and the excluJio'

of

oid ones.

..

\(e

argue that conflictual cooperation invorving new social movements differs from these three models

àf irrt...rt

intermidiation (and o]

i"rrir,r-

tionalization) in at least.five-respects. First, as regards

thi

content of tbe

ycbayg!,

cooperation implies -that

organized

iroups

possess spËcific knowledge. needed by the

it"t. to

,egrrl-"t. the sàciety.

À, *. h"à

pr._

viously pointed out,

in

complex sociàties information _{becomes a crucial}

ji

I i

88

^{Marco G. Giugni and' Florence Passy}

resoufce and the state has to rely upon organized groups that cantransfer their ^knowledge

to

the ^state

for

a more efficient regulation

of

society.

Several SMOs,Jor ^{example, are} knowledgeable about ^the AIDS ^epidemic or other health-care, .n rlirorrrrr"rrtal, or development-aid ^matters' The na- ture of the exchange between these organi zed actots and the state is differ-

enr from the one Jescribed in the three models of interest intermediation.

pluralist _and neo-corporarisr models focus on the exchange between labor movements and the s?ate aimed at preserving abalance between conflict- ing interests and avoiding ^class cônflicts. Conflictual cooperation with

neï

social movements, ott

th.

other hand, involves an exchange of compe- tencies and a transfer of knowledge aimed at problem solving'

Second,

in

conflictual

.oop.."tion

nonstate actors and the state work rogerher on a cornnxon

goal,te it

the prorection of the environment, ^the

"ii ^to

Third-\World

"ùrrt.ies,

the improvemenr

of

the conditions of women, or orher goals.

unlike

the pluralisr and neo-corporatist ^models, here we are not

iria

^{situation of} interest intermediation. SMOs ^{and state} acrors rry to find ^solutions to shared problems. Indeed,- here lies. the core of cooperative interaction. However, it still ^is conflictual interaction inso- far "s, àlrhorrgh the goals are in common, there often is disagreement over the means

foi

re"chittg such goals as well as over the extent of ^the pro- posed solutions. For

ù"*p1",

labor unions ^{cannot be said}

to

act on the

t"sis

of an agreement

*ith

^the state over rhe goal of a given policy. ^The asymmetry oi

po*.,

^between employers' associations and unions reflects

"

âiff"r.rr".

of goals berween the iabor movemenr and the state

(offe

and Viesenthal 1980).

Third,

conflictual cooperation ^has a dialogical ^{natwre. Social_ move-}

*.rrt,

irrt"r"ct directly *^ith

,tat"

^actors.

In

contrast, in the pluralist and neo-corpofatist models, the state takes on ^a role

of

mediator, balancing and recânciling conflicting interests. In the area of industrial conflict, for example,

.-pËy".r'

assoiiations and labor unions negotiate

in

order to

trrd Ëo-pro*;r",

"rrd ^{the state} regulates the negotiations. ^{To_be. sure, the} srare is far from being a neutral regulator

of

conflicts ^(e'g., Kriesi ^1980;

offe

^and

\fliesenthalllso;

"nd

generally facilitates the entrance

of

em- ployers, associarions, to which it provides more freedom of action. In the

irré

of new social movemenrs,

*l ,r.

^{in the presence of an unmediated}

interaction between ^organized groups of the society and the-state. How- ever, somerimes

nons;t"

""roi, ^with

^divergent

interests-for

^examgle,

,oppo.r.r,

of the economy ^versus those of ^the ecology--are involved in ,r.gàti"tiotts, whereby the ^state intervenes not as a mediator but ^as an

acàr directly ^involved. In ^such situation, negotiâtions form a policy net- work.

A fourth important difference between conflictual cooperation and the three tradirionàl models of interest intermediation ^{concerns the concept}

Contentious politics in Cornplex

Societies

^g9

of agency. The space for action of sociar movemenrs is greater in the for- mer than in the latter. This is mainly due to the knowiedge that certain movements _have in comparison to state actors, knowledge-that is a valu- able resource and provides rhem with some power in the"negotiations.

If

we accepr the foucaultian argument that knowledge is

po*"r]

in complex societies this is all rhe more rrue. Thus, knowledfe opirr,

" ,pr". foi

""-

tion that is much broader for new social movemJrrr, ,h"rr, say, for labor movements.

Finally, conflictual cooperation is typical of a serf-reflexhte society. The modern state is conscious

of its

own^limits

to pilot""o*pl.*

,oci.tier.

According to

villke

(1992), the state

-ust

reguraie the sociàty with more flexibility and adopt an ironic attitude

to

sJrvive

in

complex societies.

The,consciousness by the srate of its own limits repres.rrr,

" qr"iit"rirr.

break that leads to a new attitude toward the organized _sectors of the civil society.

In

this contexr, we âre witnessing a shift toward. _a reflexive state

(villke

1991) or even a propulsive state (ùIoran d, 19gl).This new kind of state has emerged in reaction to both the "authori tarian" way of piloting complex societies, promoted by the socialist tradition, arrd the

"rtâr.grrl"I

tion promoted by the.liberal.tradition

(\Tillke

1991).The resulting new way of piloting the society relies upon organi z"d

^"tirs

^{of the civil}

,lri.ty

who possess specific skills, knowlôdge, and comperencies rhar can be used

in the coregulation of the complexity of modern societies.

. ^{The five aspecrs} just mentioned clearly distinguish conflictual coopera- tion from the pluralist and neo-corpor"iirt moà.k. However, differences with the policy-nerwork _model

"r. l"r,

obvious.

In

fact, sometimes col- laboration between new social movements and the ,r"rÉ

fo.-,

^a policy network, that is to say, a colnmunity of st"te and nonstate

""tors

,r.iotiat-

ing.in a given policy area.The difference between conflictual

"oopi"tio.,

and the policy-network model is analytical rather than empirical.ïhe lat- ter focuses on the form of negotiations, whereas the forme. looks at the nature

of

negodations, which

it

defines as a combination

of

conflicting and cooperative strategies.

i I

:

:

i

g ':

I

I i

!

l

i I

,

:

i

1:

É, I I

F,

T

f

Conditions of Cooperation

A,number of hypotheses can be formulated about the conditions under which cooperation between social movements and the state is more likely to occur. To begin with, the narure and outcome of a relationship _based on collaboration depends on the characteristics and attitudes of

ih" t*o

parties involved. According ro our first hypothesis, rhe type and intensity of cooperatio n vary as a function of the forLal ,trrr"trrr"

tf

rhe srate. Flere

90

^{Marco G'} Giugni and Florence ^Passy

we cân refer to the opposition ^between strong an{

we{i

states (Atkinson and

ôole*an

1989;'Blrrrb",'- ^1988; Kriesi,

èt

al' ^{1995; \Taarden L992)'}

a;r;"g

states have concentrated ^(versus fragmented) structures of power' a coherent

"rrd

.ff."ti-r"

p"Éftt

àd*i"i"'"-'ion'

^and offer few points of

access to ^{external acrors.}

ih.r.

.h"r"cteristics ^make them more ^effective

i""_ïf.i"g ""à

implernenting public policies than ^{weak states.} Therefore,

;';-*J *"* ,i

^{U. les,}

^fiËiy

^to

^rÂort.to

external acrors. For example,

i"

"^i"""riy

^{such as} France--the ideal-typical ^case of

,contemporary strong state-coope."alon

b.r*.en

^social

Ino-r.*.rrrt

^{and the state should}

ill;t: pt""o""."a

^{than in a} weak state such ^as Switzerland'

A

similar ârgument;;r,

bt

"d""""td

^{for the} prevailingstrategies of the authorities to

i"rl *ir6

ltt"tt."gers. Like ^the institutional structures, this

* *r;*."

^of

tt. poti.i""l

oppo"tt""ity stïucture' but ^referred to its infor-

*"i-tià'" if.iesi,

^{et al'}

199sj'bur

sectnd.hypothesis.is ^th.at' in ^countries

;h",;;. ,h^r^rtlri"rd

by

"*.lt"i""

prevailing strategies of powerholders'

;;p;;;ri;;*ith ,o"i"1'*o"t*tn"

^{is less} likely to occur' The ^rationale

i"t iftrt

is quite obtio,rr, *ltho"gh cooperation

ii

not identical to ^an inclu-

ri". tit"r.gy

^{of the} authorities, ^a cooperative relationship can only emerge

to the extent that the latter accept movements ^{as a} legitimate ^and trustful Dartner. Thus, cooperæio,, ,hot'ld ^{be stronger} in countries with ^inclusive

i""ô;;;i,;, i;;;;;i",,à ^,rd

the NethËrlands, than in countries with

.""luJ,r.

strategies, such ^as France and

Germany.'

_,

.

ⁱ

In addition

tI

^{these two structur al} characteristics, there is ^a third' ^more conjunctural asPect of ,t

" ti""

that partly influences the possibilities of cooperation

b"t*".n-po*.rhoiders à"d to"ial

movements: the ^specific

;;#il;n ^of

^{alliances ar a given}

^time

^(Kriesi,

^et

al. t995;'Iarrow

1ôs+il

\flhen the main ally

of

a social movement is in the government' ah.

.i"rr".,

^{of this movement to engage ln} cooPeration with.state ^actors should be ^greater.

F;; il;", -hirr"th.

^Sociàfist

^Party-the

^principal

allv of the

iew

social movements-leads ^the government, this movement

;;îJ; ^,hr;iJ r;;Jio-"ott"uo.ute

with the sàte

to

^a sreater extent ^than when right-wing parties rule the government' ^Thus'

-depending on ^the

presence of

*orr.*"rr, ,iti", i"

^{the ixecutive power'} the.closedness of the state rnaY become

, ."i"ii"t

^{openness' This} hypothesis ^w,as verified ⁱⁿ France when the

So"i"lirt, ,"iàd

^{the power} _"nd, ^{despite the closedness}

;i-;il

^{state, several} organizations beionging

to

the new ^{social move-}

;;rt-i;

p,articular,",,ii-t""i't

SMos-sidJenly

^became partners of the eovernmenr.

o.r"" ,tr.-ieft

^{lost the} elections and was replaced

by

the

ftj;h;;;;ô.r"tion

^{bet*een these SMos and the state} faded awav'

-

-ïVnit.

tË. firrt

^three conditions ^refer

to

the state, the remaining ^ones

,"g

ràsocial movemenrs, the other party ^involved. In particular,,we ^stress four relevant asPects in

ti,i,

"o"'"*ti

^{the type of issue} raised,by the move- ments, their

organiz;;i

structure'

thtii

'tt"t"gies'

^{and the knowledge}

Contenti.ous politics in Complex

Societies

91

they,possess' To b-egin with, cooperation _depends on rhe type of issue at hand. On the one hand, certain pàti.y

"re",

".. -or.

"orrrple* th"., others because they imply the consideiation

of

avariety of technicar irrrr.r.

ro,

instance, the area

of

environmental protecdon is

p"rti.rl"riy .o_pl.*,

due to.the.multiplicity of problems

.r."t.d

uy

p"il,ïri"";; Ji"

o-r".- lap of local, regional, narional, and irrt.rrr"tiorr"l

f.".f,

àf

fo".irrî..rt

^irr_

tervenrion' In addition, the increasingly globar chara*er orirrrr;.orrrrr.rrt"t problems _makes their manage-.rrt

"ià

^Ësolution

*rr*"a/àrn.,rtr. o'

the other hand, certain issue-s are more threatening for

th.

"rrtt

oriu.,

,lr"r, others (Duyvendak _1995; Kriesi et al.

ne\

be.".,"s. they pose ,r,

.i..ror"l

threat.to powerholders

or

because they st.ike

th. .o..'i.rt.r.rr, of tlr.

s.tate' As they are a maû.er of strong disagreement, such issues are arso less

likely to become the object of ,ooip.."tion. Thus, our fourth fruoorfr"ri, is that co.operative interactions beiwer,

,o"i"l -o-r.-;;;;;;';. ^,r";.

are more likely to occur when the issues at hand do not

por.

" rrrrrà"-.rr- tal threat to the political authorities.

In

this respecr,

.riri.orr-"rrtal

_pro- tection and the aid to Third-\xbrld counrries are certainly two domains that present a potential for collaboration. In

th"r.

dor.r"irrt, arr.*

i,

" rrigl, degree of consensus,

lTottq

^political elites and

"-.;;;i;;;;;i ^prbli.,

about the need to find fe-asibîe solutions to given

pro6l.*J---^'

A further condition of cooperatiorr

r.f"rr"to

thà organizationar charac- teristics of social

*on.-.trtr.ïhe

srâre often looks

r"i"r["ur.-ilo" *irr,

sectors

of

the civil society. However,

it

does not do so at random, but

it

selects carefully its pariners

"..orii.rg ^to

^their

.h".".rl.irii.r. a, ,n.

institutional approach to. organiz.atiorr,

,igg.rr,

(Meyer and,Rowan 1.977;

zucker 1987), organizations-with formariiid,

""à p1"r.rrio""i;r.î^r,r,r.-

tures have gre.ateï access.ro rhe stare, for governm"nts and public adminis- trations

prefer to

deal.

with.groups 'that

h"r. *orkiig prr..a"r",

reflecdng their own routines-_Th"us, according ro our fifrh

hiô;i.rir, *.

expect cooperation to b,e facilitated by the iniernar rtr.r"rr.rrirr! of sMos, in particular, when the,latter display

"

Ugt

degree

"f fo:r;;li;^rfi,

p.o_

fessionalizat The.emergence ion, centralizatiorr,

of

a cooperative àd"bu relationship is r

rïurr^ïir^ti""

arso

iil;i;;;;;.

facirit"æJ'cy the strategic _1988). and tactical choices made

by

sociar

move*""tr lsi"g;.rrro.g

SMOs

that

_{make use}

of

radical

or

violent

""tior* trlrril.*,

chances

to

become part of a cooperation sysrem than those that opr for moderare and conventional forms of action.

rn

fact, strongly

formiized

aad-professionalized

sMos

prefer

to

adopt instituiionar

ir."r* l.""rrr.

the latter are more compatible with a formar srructure and with the rou- tines.of a professional siaff. Hence, our sixth hypothesis

i,

rt

"i-.oop.r"-

tion is more.likely to take place with

.r,od.r"rÉ^*;;.;;r-ii; iJir, _"f

lorms of action) than with radica] movemenrs.

Finally, as we have hinted above, cooperation depends on the knowl_

92

^{Marco G' Giugni and' Florence Passy}

".loe ^nossessed bv social movements and their organizations' Public ^ad-

i,i;rffi;;iilâ;;;ir;Jt;,

external acro,s (often in their ^capacitv

as experts) to ^manage

Lia1"g9f"*.public

policies' Flowever' in order to

;;;;ï;JÉt"d

^{by th"e}

""tt'ot#itt, 'l'"" ^"'àtt

^{must have specific comPe-}

tencies in the

domai"; ;hi;h ihty ""

^asked

^to

intervene' Knowledge

;;-b; ;h;;..ti.rl _"t *"[

"1 nt ^{ac.ti'cal and gives} SMos ^the capabilitv to

find

solution, ir,

" ,p"tifi"-dJ-"i"'

^{For inJtance' several} errvironmental

"rà*ï"ri""r ^h"ld ,h;;;;ical

^knowledge

^on

specific ecological ^issues'

ï:h';ï;'Ë';;;";ir;^ài *i"i",.r'r, ih. i*p^""t of

pollution .on ^the chanse of the

climat.,it Jâittfp""ting'of

^animâl and vegetal sp'ecies' and

ïïh.'iii;;.,i*i'il;i;d;: "'*i ^f'o*

their own ^research or from scientific ^studies ,t

".

ii'"y ptl;?'"i"by

interacting with the state' In ^addi- tion, SMos ^{also have}

lil'i'""tk"o*lldge

^coming from their experiences

;;;;ù

_"rrd

^fro*

^tËe elaboration of ^concrete projects' Movements may

;h;; b.;;;; _f"rt

^of

"" .pi'Ài"

^communitv

(Holznel,aldMatx

^teTe)' that is, a community

;TJ;;;;;ho

^share _"

gi"t"

set of beliefs and values over poiicies to

u. "piii.JiH;*

19s9)' TtrerË{ore' our seventh hypothesis maintains that cooper^at-io"

u"i*."

social movements and the state is a

function

of

the

"-t;;;;i t"o*l"dgt

^possessed

^by

the latter

in

^given policy ^{areas and on given issues'}

Conflictual Cooperation in

S-olidarity and

Ecology

MovËments:

An Illustration

The hypotheses proposed above rePresent several ^avenues

for

research

i";;

;É.' ^causes

*a '*.À"risms

_of

ih.

.orrflictual coop-eration between social movem.n.,

".,J the state' In order to provide ^a

P.reliminll

^{test' we}

have conducted an

.*prri""f

investigation à.,

th.

baiis

of

official ^docu-

;;; ;i ^;.".. rg.r,"i"'l i"tt'-'i"*''

"lttd."

""t"t"red

questionnaire ^{s ent} to

" ,"*pf" ^of

^SMlos

;i';h;

ecology and solidarity ^movements

in

France and Switzerland' two important ^{new socral} movéments'' The goal of ^the ouestionnair.

*",

^,o

^p'oiidt ' pittt""

^of conflictual cooperation by com-

:Ï;,*"::ff;;";;;"".rr,.*, ⁱⁿ

two different political ^{contexts over}

i'#. i, ;il;;J ;;;';;

^of questions about cooperation.with sovernment institutions

i""ri"""i, t"sioTli, tt ^ftcal)'

^{such às} its origins' nature' ^and form (consult".ion,

p"iftip"tiot'

in committees' etc')' changes in ^{the co-} operative relationshi!, ^and the margin for.action of SMOt' The empirical material we have

i*i;^h"rd, ^{i, io,}

sufficient

for

^a strong test

of

our

;;;;rh;t;t

^b,r,

gi"" ;; ;;*"

interesting insights

t",t'n"-11-1,1:l-t:T::

movement lnteractlon ^{we focus} on in this ^chapter'

In

partrcular' ^{1t sug-}

;;trt;;; ."nflictual

cooperation between certain new social movements and the state is

b.";;;;;;""1 ft""""

^of western societies and that

it

varies accordi"g

r.iitt ^tlpe

^{of state as well as to the type of movement'}

Contentious politics in Complex

Societies

93

The Solidarity Movemenr

As of today, the solidariry movemenr _has reached perhaps the strongest degree

.of cooperation

with ,trt"

i.rrtitrriions. This holds less

for

issues pertaining to the national conrexr, such as immigration

"na

fàur;""t

"ry-

lum, than for matters related ,o

,É

irrr"rrr",iorr"l

"orrr."t, paiticularly de_

velopment aid. T?aditionalry, nonco.rt"rrtià,r, interactions _{between the} state and social movements.have taken the

fr;.;;;lril.rî."i"a _,"

some SMOs.

In

France, this type of interaction _became irrrtitrr.tlorrrlir"d

in

L95.9,.at the. peak

of

the deàlonization process,

with

the crearion of

i::::llt^t:Lot,cooperarion

and the aid and cooperation fund (FAC). _The latrer was armed ar funding the deveropment of

io.m.,

colonies ;r,

arri.r.

The entire public aid. to -develop*"rr,

"-orrrrt.a to

42

billion

French francs

in

1995 (including _large

,t".., f-*

othe,

minist.*rj"""i _ra.

France the second highest

coitributor

_{to public}

";a i,,

ti. ioJà. rrr*-

evel only a small part of this budget is derroted to the fundins of non_

prohr

organlzarlons. rn

-1994 SMos received 49 milrion

F."rrih fr"o.,

from th^e_FAC (that is,

{o, û:

"on""".i"g ^àf ,p."in" p.rp".j.r^Er""".

:,*i-|f,f:l T:"*'|: ^: qt:""

o,s,,ï,2^ti

i

^{nf o, eËo,}

â*i.

c oop.._

::'::-.1î:_:f]f1m.nt

^{(OECD) counrries as}

^to

^{the share of public aid}

::^1:Yl-enr.generared

by SMOs. Furrhermore, as table 4.1 sïows, the snare

ot

hnancrar resources

of

organizations dealing

with

international solidarity issues coming froln pubïi"

flrrd, il",

increased steadily in the nineties, both

in

relative and absorute rerms,

"r*r-"-l."ri"" t'trr. r",.

eighties.a

TABLE 4.1

Financial Resources of French SMOs Internationai Solidarity Issues Year

o/o resources froftt, public funds

28 28 27 22 22 n.a.

34 35 37 40 Tbtal

Resowrces

Resources from public funds

376 379 434 402 462 n.â.

773 887 1019 1279

1

i {

I

I I I

II

198s 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991, 1992 1993 1994

1,342 1,355 1607 1828 2101 n.a.

2274 2534 2753 3197

Nores; Absolute figures _are in miljions of French _francs.

Jo u rce : Commission Coopération Déveioppement ^Figures for 1 990 are not available.

i

i i I {

i II

T

I

94

^{Marco G'} Giugni and Florence ^Passy

Already ^at this stage, which ^is not ^an indicator of cooperation per ^se' stâte agencie,

.nd b,]tl*;r; ;ttf;t ^to

^deal

^with

relatively formal ^and -'^f"qsional SMOs

ttt"i ^h",,. *orki"g

procedures similar

to

their own

i*"}'mi ^{R;;;; 'iîirt} z""u"t

^tss:ti'

^For

^{example' s/e can.read}

ⁱⁿ

^a

[ïi;;;;;;;i.h" -i*"'v ^for

foreign affairs ^and the ministrv of cooperation

in

^France

it'"', in

order ^to. be eligible

for

^{obtaining state}

funds, an associatiot,

;;;; tirt"t àtg'"i'ationi'

^{must have been created}

ar least rhree years

b.f;;;';i;

^i;àta

git'.r"t

assemblies as well as regular reunions.

^"î;rti;

the ^rise in ^{funds granted} by the French ^state ro various

sMos

of the solidarity movementlin recent years the cooperation letween ^the two ^parties

h", ,rrrrr.J'"*"ta _" g'o*i"g co""'1t"tii'"

^{role of SMOs and} toward their integranon

in tht

tË"

""'"1' 't*"tt're'

^{Several bodies have}

been created

in ordetî;;"ili'";;

^the dialogue and

coliabor*l:l ti'*:

;;il"; "t". ^of

development aid' The most important

t:

th."

*iT]:t::

:;;;Ë.;ilî.".1of"i'"t,

^{created bv the}

*iii":I I::l::,:]-*:^:Ï"^ '"

1ôâ5,

^"

institution within which.government rePresentatlves and orga-

;i;;à ;;;pt _"i "i"il

societv participate

* tqt"i

^terms'

^In

^{general' the}

ratte r ^p arti cip ate as

J;;;: ^Ji;;;'iP:

^of .srvr ô ^s G

",!t

: :1! :'^:: :*..u*"'h

jargon), which

tft.

""" tt*gtrizit

^as legitimate _Partners in various advi-

'r.î

_U'.al.r.

ifr. "o*iri-*" ioop.r",ioi

d"n.'op

-.nt

^{has a} consultative role on

irru., p.rr.,,,it';;;;";;"'ional

solidariiy; in ^addition to ^gather- ine and diffusing

infori"tion

^{about and} sensitizing toward Third-world

't:'ri.rjË;;:;;ù;r

";d

interventions to ^the

à*p.t."t

^{state bodies,}

|"j;ili6,,iî., ^àr.iyiit.

,,ri,rirr.y for foreign ^{affairs and the} ministrv of cooperation'

Theintegrationolthesolidaritymovementisfurtherfacilitatedbysev- eral institutiorr,

,tt", îl'"t 1""" '"tt"'"a _with

_{the aim}

_of

facilitating

'the linksandcoordinationwithstateagencies-'Theofficeofassociativelife' which ^has recently

ttpftttJ " "t",ribt' ^of

^{previous bodies'}

is '1he

most important ^{one. This}

oi'nl. i,

linked both to ^the ministry for ^{foreign affairs} and to the

ministry;il;;;;- ^k

^{is in charge of managing the rela-}

tions with SMos

,rrriiJïirh

development isr',r.s and functions ^{as the} interface ^between

tfttt" iùOt

^{and the state' in} particular ^the two ^afore- menrioned

*l"irrri"s.

irr""aair1""

i"

^{the office of} associati-re life, the other bodies further

f".ih;;;h;

i"terfa"e ^{between the SMOs} of the solidarity movement ^and the

;i;;y ^for

^{foreign affairs}

^with

^regard

^to

issues re- lated to develoPment aid'

The commitr""

"oopt"'ion

development itself has promoted other ^op-

p";;;;i;;;ior

^rl,"

"î5à*"i-"

u"t*àen sMos and gôvernmentagencies' For example, a number of thematic networks ^have teen ^created

in

¹⁹⁸³ with ^{the aim} of

i"r;;;;;'i; ^r.-r.rrl

,."ro."1 policies the reflection ^of a series of other

""àîi"^iftt ^ntta

^of development' SMos ^{among others'}

Contentious politics in Complex

Societies

95 Here we have a clear indication of thesignificance of knowledge possessed by social movements for them to

.rt"blirh

a cooperarive relationship with the state. The-goal of these nerworks is precisely to take

"drrarrt"e. of the know-how of nonsrare acrors for the elàborati;"

il i;;1.-"îi"r;o"

_or

policies in rhe domain of development aid.

A

similar function is fulfilled

by

the two existing_solidarity

irog."*r, ^,fr. ,"iiJ-Ç;;;;;;; ***,

created

in

1984, and the soiidarity"program habitat,

r""".rriJ i"

rsss.

I^o-î.-".r: ^{these programs are, in} principie, open ro a wider range of col_

tec-tr-ve acrors, both public and private.

The_process of incorporation _{sp_ed} up during the nineties.

In

1.991.,

for trlTnl.,

a discussion _began, aimeà at cieating a new conrractual relation*

ship _between the state anâ the

sMos

and. atrJachi"g

"

u.ri.r."oàination

of activities, as well as a

_simpliûcation of the existirg

p.o."drrr"* At

the beginning-of 1'995,in addition, the joint

programmini.o--itt."

_{was cre-}

ated

in

which both sides

"r" ,.pi.r"ni.d l"

equal terms. As the term indicates, this deviceprovides

foia

joint prograrnming of interventions in

rhe nongovernmenral secror and helps the integration of SMos beginning in the conceptual _phase of cooperation

policiei.r

^{- -}

-

^-

_-

"

-'b

The situation in Switzerland _disprays both similarities with and differ-

ences from that of France. As in Fiance, in the

""rly y*r,

ti-r.

loil"uo."- tion

between the state and the

SMos of

the

,"[â;i;t ;orr.ri"rr, *",

based mostly on the provision of financial resources. From the point of view of rhe srate, the swiss governmenr, unrike ,t

"i .ie.""*,i5,

".".,

had a strong and well-definù foreign pÉn"y. The smalr

siz, oiri.

"o.r.r- try, the internal fragmenration of

pJ*à,

thé

"bsenc" of coronial o"a;riorr, and, above all, the neutrality principre _have prevented the formulation of

a clear.policy

in

this

do-airr.

As a result, d.,r"lop*"rrr_"ia

fotiJ.,

^Aro

had.a slow start. But, at the same time, they were carried out almost exclu- sively by private institutions (schild, _n.d.)

in

rhis context, tlr.

r"i.r"."rio"

of the state was mostly limited to providing financiar h.rp to

pri,rri.

_i.ri,i*-

trves and organizations. This situation _has changed rt"riirrg fro.n the six- ties' The Swiss agency

for

developrnenr

,"a

""oop"r"riJrr

-idôëj,

governmenral agency in charge of pôficy eraborarion and imprementation,rr.

rn thrs domain, was formed

in

1961. Since then, the role

oi

the state in development aid has sensibly increased. _Tod,ay, cooperation between the Swiss state and SMOs de.al,1ng with

Third-Voria irrl., il;;;;;;;;g."

all dimensions, but especiallyion the operational _levei.

As far

as financial resources given

to SMos

are concerned, at first

glance Switzerland _seems ro be le"ss generous than France.

lr *..oÀp"r"

the total financial resources given

to"sMos

_by the SDC

in

1995,

Jown

in table 4.2, withthe share of"public funds of Fr.n"h sMos

i'

Dde 1t"ut.

4.1), we see that the latter

".. *or.

than six times larger th"r,

th. fàà....

If we subtract international pubric funds in

th.

^p..rr?h

."rl r"f.î, ^,rr*.