The cooperation between social movements and the state: Dimensions, conditions, and implications

Working Paper

Reference

The cooperation between social movements and the state:

Dimensions, conditions, and implications

GIUGNI, Marco, PASSY, Florence

Abstract

Social movements can have an impact on institutions by aiming explicitly at institutional change or by pursuing policy goals. In the former situation, their chances of success depends on factors internal and external to the movements. In the latter situation, the contribution of policy-oriented movements to institutional reform can be seen as a by-product of their action.

A process of pressure by social movements and adaptation by the political authorities who grant the movements formal concessions makes such impact possible. The latter is usually minor in scope and consists of procedural-administrative changes. The examples of the women's movement, which addresses both the institutions and the public policies, and of the antinuclear movement, which usually challenges the public policies, suggests the existence of a process of pressure and adaptation for both types of movements.

GIUGNI, Marco, PASSY, Florence. The cooperation between social movements and the state: Dimensions, conditions, and implications . Genève : Département de science politique, Université de Genève, 1997

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Social Movements and the State:

Dimensions, Conditions, and Implications Marco Guigni, Florence Passy

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Dimensions, Conditions, and Implications

Marco

Giugni

^{Florence Passy}

Paper for the Third European Conference of the European Sociological Association, University of Essex, Colchester (United Kingdom), August 27-30,1997

i )

movements challenge authorities and the state. Thus, three among the most prominent scholars in the resource mobilization and political process traditions speak of challengers (Gamson 1990), contentious gatherings

(Tilly

1995), or protest events

(Tarrow

1994).

According to this view, movements and their allies form a conflict system opposing political authorities, in particular at the national level. Antinuclear movements, for example, aim to impede the construction of nuclear power plants, a project launched and supported by national governments in most western countries, both by directly addressing the powerholders and sensitizing the general public. Similarly, women's movements asks for policies that improve the situation of women in society.

While this contentious view of social movements

still

holds, contemporary movements engage in a range of activities that do not entail a conflict with powerholders. On the one hand, they take on internal activities aimed at reproducing the sense of belonging and the collective identity of participants. On the other hand, they

cary

on external actions other than challenges to the authorities. Consciousness raising is one of them. Here we

will

focus on another kind of external activity, one that has been

virtually

ignored by scholars: the cooperation between social movements, or parts of them, and the state. In other words, we need to pay much more attention to the ways movements collaborate

with

the state and their representatives in order to reach ^a common goal related to certain policy areas. This kind

of

activity becomes increasingly important and supplement the range of activities that can be put under the label of contentious politics.

To look at the cooperative side of movements is important for at least two reasons.

First, certain movements, such as ecology, solidarity, and women's movements, are clearly more inclined to cooperate with the state than others. As a consequence, we cannot analyze them the same way we analyze more contentious movements which challenge the central interests of the state.

If

we neglect their cooperative, and usually less visible, side, we run the risk

of

misstating their role and impact. Second, contemporary movements are the more and more inclined to cooperate with the state, leading to the process of institutionalization observed by several authors (Giugni and Passy 1997; Roth 1994).In a complex society, in which the solution of public problems and the elaboration and, above all, implementation

of

policies become increasingly

difficult,

certain movements tend to become increasingly

integrated into decisional, regulative, and implementation processes. Social movements, then,

become involved in the political process in two ways: by challenging existing or proposed policies and by helping to elaborate and enforce policies.

In the remainder of this paper, we would like to make ^{a case} for the need to study more thoroughly the cooperation between social movements and the state. We

will

do so both theoretically and empirically. In the next section, we

will

single out the various dimensions

of

the cooperation. Second, we

will

proposo several hypotheses on the conditions under which cooperation is more

likely

to occur. Third, we shall illustrate empirically the process through which movements become involved in a cooperative relation with the state. We

will

do so by means of the example of two policy areas, development aid to Third-World countries and, more briefly, the protection of the environment, which are targeted, respectively, by the solidarity and the ecology movement. Fourth, we

will

stress some implications of this alternative view of social movements for the state, for the movements themselves, and

for

social movement research. Given the preliminary stage of the study of cooperation between movements and the state, our goal is conceptual rather than analytical; we propose ^{a series}

of

categories and classifications that

will

hopefully help set up an agenda for future research.

It

is important to note that the focus of this paper is on the national level. We

will

only marginally deal with cooperation that takes place in the international arenas, which yet is ^a crucial aspect of the cooperative behavior of social movements ^(see Passy 1995; Smith and Pagnucco 1995;

'Smith

et

al. L997). Here, however, we want to focus on the national level in order to look at changes in the relation between the national state and certain social movements.

Dimensions: towards a

broader

defTnition of social movements

According to a well-known definition, a social movement is a sustained series of organized and conscious challenges to the authorities on behalf of ^a group

within

the population

(Tilly

1984:304; ^see also Tarrow lgg4,1996)1. This definition clearly equate movements with the expression of an existing social conflict.

Virtually

all scholars who are interested in the political aspect of movements

follow

this line of reasoning (e.g., Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam

1982; McAdam et al. 1996:

Tarrow

1994).In addition, some include in the definition the use of unconventional and/or disruptive actions (Della Porta 1996;

Tarrow

1994, 1996). Authors working within a different perspective as well, through they strongly criticize the so-called political reductionism of the above definition, view the essence of movements in the

underlying conflict of which they are the carriers (e.g.,

Melucci

1996; Touraine 1984). These

D

scholars argue that a definition in terms of protest actions ignores a whole range of activities aimed at the construction and reproduction of individual and collective identities which are a

fundamental component of social movements. However, they do not point to the fact that movements can arise that do not challenge powerholders, but instead establish a cooperative relationship

with

them. Even an author like Melucci (1996:28), who has made a useful attempt at plotting social movements in the context

of

a broader variety of forms of collective action, including cooperation,

still

defines movements as an analytical category which, among other, makes manifest a conflict. Yet, even a cursory look at the relation between several contemporary movements and the state suggests us that this relation is made both of conflict and cooperation. Social movements engage in two series of activities vis-à-vis the state: a contentious chain of events and a cooperative chain of events.

Generally speaking, by cooperation we mean a relationship between two parties based on an agreement over the ends of a given action and involving an active collaboration aimed at reaching such ends. In our case, the two parties involved are the state and a social

movement or parts of

it,

such an organization or a group of organizations. Thus, cooperation must be distinguished from three other broad types of activity carried out by movements, as

represented in

figure

1. Protest actions represent the typical means movements have at their disposal in order to reach their goals. But movements can also manifest themselves by asserting their opposition to state policies in a discursive manner, for examples through proclamations, resolutions, and the like. Although the kind of involvement

differ,

both these two types of activity stem from a disagreement

with

state priorities, decisions, and policies.

On the other hand, similarly to cooperation, what we may call consensus is based on ^an agreement on the part of the movement of what the state is doing or plans to do. However, unlike cooperation, consensus is only a matter of discourse and not of action.

Figure 1

Cooperation between social movements and the state occurs at different points in the

political

process. First, there can be collaboration in the legislative arena, that is in the decision making. Social movement organizations (SMOs) are integrated in the legislative process insofar ^{as a} committee needs specific competencies possessed by SMOs before an issue goes to the

floor

to be discussed an voted. Second, movements are often a state's partner in the administrative arena, specifically when they intervene in the regulative process.

Regulation refer to those state activities aimed at managing and problem solving through

I For a similar definition, see Tarrow (1994).

means that do not

imply

the adoption of new laws or the amendment of existing ones. This task is usually accomplished by state agencies. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency, created

in

1970, is charged with the regulation of environmental matters in the USA.

New opportunities stemming from the creation of agencies at the local, regional, national, and international level (in particular, at European Community level), eoupled with the need on the part of these agencies of specific competencies over complex problems, have facilitated the integration of movement actors in ^the regulatory process and, hence, in a cooperation system.

Third, social movements intervene, always with respect to the administrative arena, in the implementation of policies. Here the role of movement actors ^is particularly important, for the complexity of problems and tasks faced by the government is especially high in the

implementation ^phases. In various policy areas, the state resorts to non-institutional actors in order to implement the decisions taken ^at the legislative and regulative level. Often the ^state delegates parts

of

or an entire task to non-institutional actors.

Much like they display various forms of action when they oppose ^state policies - that is, in the

conflict

system -, social movements intervene in the cooperation system in different ways. Three broad types of cooperation can be distinguished in this respect. To begin with, the state can resort to non-institutional actors in order to get information that may help reaching certain decisions or realizing them. Here cooperation ^takes the form of consultation. In this case, the movement has mainly an advisory role for the state.

A

stronger collaboration occurs when components of a movement become part of the structures in charge of taking or

implementing ^a decision. In this case, there is an integration of movements in panels, committees, working groups, or government agencies. Such integration is usually aimed at transferring information from sectors of the

civil

society to the state in order to help the making of public policies. Finally, a

still

stronger degree of cooperation implies a delegation of certain tasks from the state to the movements. This occurs above all in the phase of policy implementation, which in certain ^areas is becoming increasingly complex and

difficult

to be carried only by state structures.

Each of these three types of cooperative relation between social movements and the state can be carried at the individual or at the collective level. Although in this paper we

will

focus on the collective level, it is important to note this distinction.

In

the

first

situation,

for

example, single members of SMOs are hired by the state to work in specific

policy

areas

which are on the movement's agenda. A common instance of the second situation is the integration of certain SMOs in a committee created by the parliament or by the administration

a

In addition,

within

each type, regardless whether

it

is individual or collective, there can be different degrees of cooperation, which may be measured according to various criteria.

Among these, the number of actors involved and that of contacts are certainly important ones to judge of the intensity of cooperation between social movements and the state.

In a way, we may say that cooperation becomes stronger as we go from consultation to integration and to delegation, as we shift from the individual to the group level, and as we get higher values on the indicators of intensity mentioned above (number of actors, number

of

contacts, regularity of contacts, etc.). Figure 2 gives an overview of the types of cooperative behavior according to the three criteria we have just _described.

Figure 2

Conditions:

some hypotheses

As recent studies have shown, the mobilization by social movements and their action

repertoires vary across countries ^as

well

as across movements (Kriesi et al. 1995; Rucht 1994, 1996). For example, the wave of peace activism that took place in several European countries at the beginning of the eighties was stronger in Germany and the Netherlands than in France or Italy.

Similarly,

the degree of radicalization of student protest was much higher in France than in Switzerland.*On the other hand, both levels of mobilization and the forms

of

actions differ depending on the movement. For example, in general ecology movement mobilize less and in a more moderate manner than antinuclear movements. But cross-national and cross- movement variations characterize the cooperation system,

in

addition to the

conflict

system.

As a consequence, we must ask about the conditions under which cooperation is more

likely

to occur. We can do so by formulating a number of hypotheses.

The nature and outcome of a relationship based on collaboration depends on the attitude and characteristics of the two parties involved. In our case, the state is one of the two parties. According to our first hypothesis, the type and intensity of cooperation vary as a

function of the type

of

state. The opposition between strong and weak states seems particularly relevant in this context. Strong states have concentrated (versus fragmented) structures of power, a coherent and effective public administration, and offer few points

of

access to external actors. These characteristics make them more effective in making and implementing public policies than weak states. Therefore, we expect them to be less

likely

to resort to external actors. For example, in a country such as France, which has is the ideal-

typical case of contemporary strong state, cooperation between social movements ^and the state should be less spread and profound than in a weak state such as Switzerland.

A

similar reasoning applies to the prevailing strategies of the authorities to deal with movements.

Like

the institutional structures, this is an aspect of the political opportunity structure, but refers to its informal side. Our second hypothesis is that in countries that ^are

characterized by exclusive prevailing strategies of powerholders cooperation

with

social movements is less

likely

to occur. The rationale for that is quite obvious: though cooperation is not identical to an inclusive strategy of the authorities, a cooperative relationship can only emerge to the extent that the latter accept movements ^{as a} legitimate and trustful partner.

Thus, cooperation should be stronger in countries such ^as Switzerland ^and the Netherlands, as opposed to France and Germany.

If

the two

first

hypotheses refer to the state, the following ones concern the other party involved in a cooperative relation: social movements. In particular, we think

four

aspects are relevant in this context: the type of issue raised by the movements, their organizational structure, their strategies, and the knowledge they ^possess. To begin with, cooperation depends on the type of issue at hand. On the one hand, certain policy areas are more complex than others, for they imply technical issues or ^a large amount of aspects to be considered. For instance, the ecology domain is particularly complex, due to the

multiplicity

of problems posed by pollution and to the overlap of local, regional, national, and international levels

of

government intervention. In addition, the increasingly global character of environmental problems makes their management ^and resolution extremely

difficult.

On the other hand, certain issues are more threatening for the authorities than others (Duyvendak 1995; Kriesi et al. 1995). They can be ^so by posing an electoral threat to powerholders or by striking the core interests of the state. Therefore, such issues are less

likely

to be the object of cooperation,

for

they are a matter

of

strong disagreement. Thus, our third hypothesis is that a cooperative relation between social movements ^and the state is more

likely

to occur when the issue ^at hand does not pose a threat to the political authorities. Environmental protection ^and the aid to Third-world countries ^are certainly two domains that present ^a potential for cooperation to take place. In these domains, there exists ^a high degree of consensus, among political elites and among the general public, about the need of finding feasible solution to given problems.

Another condition of cooperation refers to the organizational characteristics of social movements. The state often looks for collaboration with sectors of the

civil

society. However, it does not so at random. On the contrary,

it

selects carefully its partners according to their

t

characteristics. As the institutional approach to organizations suggests (Meyer and Rowan 1977;Zucker 1987), organizations that possess formalized and professionalized structures have greater access to the state, for governments and public administrations prefer to deal with groups that have working procedures that are similar to their own routines. Thus, according to our fourth hypothesis, we expect cooperation to be facilitated by the internal structuring

of

SMOs, in particular when the latter display a high degree of formalization, profes s i o n al i zati on, centr alization, ^an d bu reaucrati zation.

The emergence of a cooperative relationship is also facilitated by the strategic and tactical choices made by social movements (Staggenborg 1988). Movements or SMO that carry radical or violent actions have much less chances to become part of a cooperation system than movements or SMOs that generally raise their demands through moderate and conventional forms of action. In fact, strongly formalized and professionalized SMOs prefer to adopt institutional means because the latter are more compatible with a formal structure and

with

the routines of a professional staff. Our

fifth

hypothesis, thus, is that cooperation is more

likely

to take place with moderate movements (in terms of forms of action) than with radical ones.

Finally, cooperation depends on the knowledge possessed by social movements and their organizations. Public administrations increasingly rely on external actors (often in their capacity of experts) to manage and regulate public policies. However, in order to be

considered by the authorities, these actors need to have specific skills and competencies in the domain in which they are asked to intervene. Once they

fulfill

this requirement, movements can become part of an epistemic community (Holzner and

Marx

1919), that is a community

of

experts who share a given set of beliefs and values over policies to be applied (Haas 1989).

Thus, our sixth hypothesis maintains that cooperation between social movements and the state is a function of the amount of knowledge possessed by the latter

in

given domains and on given issues.

Cooperation

in

the ecology and

solidarity

movements: an

illustration

The six hypotheses proposed above represent several avenues

for

research in the causes and mechanisms of the cooperation between social movements and the state. We are currently conducting a small empirical investigation on the basis of interviews and a structured

questionnaire that we have sent to a sample of SMOs of the ecology and solidarity movements in France and Switzerland. The goal of the questionnaire is to provide a picture of the

cooperative behavior of the movements by comparing two different movements in two different political contexts over time. To do so, we asked the SMOs

with

which governmental institutions (national, regional, or local) they have established a cooperative relationship, since when, what is the nature ^and form of the relationship (consultation, participation to

committees, etc.), how this relationship has changed over time, what is the margin of action

of

the SMOs, who asked for cooperation to take place, and whether they receive funds from the state. In addition to the questionnaire, we are conducting ^{a series} of interviews with

representatives of the state agencies that are cooperating with SMOs and

with

leaders of those SMOs in order to grasp the mechanisms of cooperation in more details. Unfortunately, at this stage wo are not in a position of providing a test of our hypotheses. Only a few questionnaires have been returned and few interviews have been made so far. Therefore, we

will

only offer here very sketchy and incomplete empirical information with the aim of illustrating our hypotheses.

The

solidarity

movement

The solidarity movement ^{has perhaps} reached the strongest degree of cooperation

with

state institutions. This holds for the issues pertaining to the national context, such as immigration and asylum policies, but especially for matters related to the international context, such ^as development aid. Traditionally, the non-contentious relations between the ^state and social movements have taken the form of subsides granted to some SMOs. In France, this type

of

relationship became institutionalized

in

1959, at the peak of the decolonization process, with the creation of the

Ministry

of cooperation and the

Aid

and cooperation fund (Fonds d'aide et de

coopération,F\C).

The latter was aimed ^at funding the development of former colonies in Africa. The entire public aid to development amountedto 42

billions

Francs

in

¹⁹⁹⁵

(including large shares from other ministries) and made France the second contributor to public aid in the world. However, only ^a small part of this budget is devoted to the funding

of

non-profit organizations.

In

1994, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have received 49

million

French Francs from the FAC, that is for the co-financing of specific projects2. Indeed,

in

1990 France ranked 15th among the ¹⁸ OECD countries ^as to the ^share of public aids to development generated by NGOs. As Table 1 shows, the share of financial resources of SMOs

2 The entire financial help by the French state to NGOs on matters of international cooperation, however,

amounted to more than 300 million Francs in 1992. This figure includes support to associations of volunteers, co- financing of projects, and information activities.

dealing

with

international solidarity issues coming from public funds has increased steadily in the nineties, both in relative and absolute terms, after adecline in the late eighties3.

Table ¹

Already at this stage of non-contentious relationship, which is not an indicator

of

cooperation per se, state agencies and bureaucrats prefer to deal with relatively formal and professional SMOs that have working procedures similar to their own (Meyer and Rowan

1987; Zucker 1977). For example, we can read in a

joint

document of the

Ministry

of foreign affairs and the

Ministry

of cooperation in France that, in order to be eligible to obtaining state funds, an association must, among other things, exist since at least three years, hold general assemblies and regular reunions.

Beside the rise of funds granted by the French state to various SMOs of the solidarity movement, in recent years the cooperation between the two parties has turned towards an increase of the consultative role of SMOs and towards their integration in the structures of the state. Several bodies have been created in order to facilitate the dialogue and collaboration in the

policy

area of development aid. The most important is the Committee cooperation

development, created

in

1983 by the

Ministry

of foreign affairs.

It

is an institution in which

of

the government representatives and NGOs participate on equal terms. In general, the latter participate as members of groups of SMOs (collectifs) which the state recognizes as legitimate partners in the various advisory bodies. The Committee cooperation development has a consultative role

with

respect to issues pertaining to the international solidarity; in addition to gathering and diffusion information and sensitizing towards

Third-World

issues,

it

^suggests policies and interventions to the competent state bodies, mainly (but not solely) the

Ministry

of foreign affairs, and the

Ministry

of cooperation.

The integration of the movement is further facilitated by several institutions that has been created

with

the aim of facilitating the links and coordination

with

state agencies. The most important of these institutions is the Office of associative

life

(Bureau de la vie associative), which has recently replaced a number of other bodies. This office is linked to both the

Ministry

of foreign affairs and the

Ministry

of cooperation and is in charge

of

managing the relations with the NGOs that deal with development issues. Its general task is to be an interface between those NGOs and the state, in particular the two aforementioned

I It should be noted, however, that these figures include both national and international public funds. Public funds at the international level come above all from the European Community (75 Vo) and, in 1994, were76 Vo of the total public _funds.

ministries. In addition to the Office of associative life, the

Link

mission to the NGOs (Mission de liaison auprès des

ONG,MLONG)

further facilitates the interface between the SMOs

of

the solidarity movement and the

Ministry

of foreign affairs with regard to issues related to the aid of development.

The Committee cooperation development itself has created other occasions

of

coordination between SMOs and governmental ^agencies. The so-called thematic networks are particularly relevant to our present purpose.

A

number of thematic networks have been created

in

1983 with the aim of integrating into several sectoral policies the reflection of a series

of

other actors in the

field

of development, the NGOs among others. Here we ^{see a} clear example of the importance of the skills and competencies that social movements must ^possess in order to enter a cooperative relationship

with

the state. The goal of these networks is precisely to take advantage of the know-how of non-state actors for the elaboration and implementation

of

policies in the domain of development aid.

A

similar function is

fulfilled

by the two existing solidarity programs: the Solidarity program water, created

in

1984, and the Solidarity program habitat, launched

in

1988. However, they are in principle open to ^a wider range of collective actors, both private ^and public.

The process of integration ^sped up during the nineties.

In

1991, for example, a discussion has been started in order to establish ^a new contractual relationship between the state and the NGOs, with the aim of reaching a better coordination of activities and a

simplification of procedures.

At

the beginning

of

^1995,

in

addition, a programming committee has been created, in which both sides are represented on equal terms (Comité

paritaire

de programmation).This device provides

for

^a

joint

programming of interventions in the non-

governmental sector and helps the integration of NGOs since the conception ^phase of the cooperation policya.

The situation in Switzerland shares both similarities ^and differences with that

of

France. As in France, in the early years, the collaboration between the state and the SMOs

of

the solidarity movement was based mostly on the provision of financial resources. From the

a Despite our focus here on the national level, SMOs dealing with Third-World issues have established a dense network of lelationships with international institutions. In the case of the solidarity movement, the European Community, the United Nations, and the World Bank are three crucial points of intervention for SMOs. Each of

them has specific bodies for the exchanges between SMOs ^as well as between these and the official institutions:

the Link Committee of NGOs to the European Communities (Comité de liaison des ONG auprès des contmunautés européennes, CLONG), the Non-governmental link service (Service de liaison non

gouvernernenral, SLNG) to the United Nations in Geneva, and the working group "NGO" of the World Bank. In addition to putting pressure on the international administrative bodies in order to increase and improve

point of view of the state, the Swiss government, unlike France, has never had a strong and well defined foreign policy. The small size of the country, the internal fragmentation of power and, above all, the neutrality principle have prevented the formulation of ^a clear policy in this domain. As a result, also development aid

policy

had a slow start. But, at the same time, it was carried out almost exclusively through private institutions (Schild n.d.) and the state was practically absent in this respect. In this context, the intervention of the state was mostly limited to the subsidization of private initiatives and organizations. This situation changed starting from the sixties.

In

1961, the Directorate of development and cooperation (Directiort du développement et de la coopération, DDC), the governmental agency in charge of policy elaboration and implementation in this domain5. Since the creation of the DDC, the role of the state in development aid has sensibly increased. Today cooperation between the Swiss state and SMOs dealing with Third-World issues is very strong on all dimensions, but especially on the operational level.

First, concerning the financial resources given to NGOs, at first glance Switzerland seems to be less generous than France.

If

we compare the financial resources given to SMOs by the DDC, shown in Table

2,with

the share of public funds of French SMOs (Table 1), we see that the

in

1994-95 the latter ^are about ten times bigger than the former6. However,

if

we subtract international public funds in the French case, the funds of internal origin are less than double of those provided by the DDC.

If

we further take into account the different size of the two countries and the consequent bigger state revenue in France, we can see that Switzerland does not seem to invest less than France to support SMOs in the domain of development aid.

Furthermore, the figures

for

Switzerland do not include all contributions to SMOs.

In

1995, for example, the DDC has given 187

million

Swiss Francs to the private organizations

of

developmentT. According to this figure, hence, the Swiss government has supported SMOs to alarger extent than France. On the other hand, the contributions by the French government display a steady increase in recent years, while those by the Swiss government are expected not to rise

in

^a dramatic way. Finally, according to a recent survey, the share of public funds

development aid, SMOs acting at the international level operate as consultants and help the implementation of specific policies.

t Th"

fot*".

^{name of} this agency was Directorate of cooperation to development and of humanitarian aid (Direction _de la coopération au développement et de I'aide hum.anitaire, DDA).

6 To make a gross comparison of the two tables, the figure for the French case must be divided by a factor four, which is more or less the exchange rate between the French Franc and the Swiss Franc.

7 Reported in

In

^{Suisse +} Ie Monde, n. 3, 1996.

amounted to 47 7o of the total budget of private institutions of development

in

^{1994 (42} Vo

from the central government)8.

Table2

Second, regarding consultative procedures, the cooperation between NGOs and the state in the development ^area is noteworthy. The SMOs of the Swiss solidarity movernent - specifically, those devoted to the mutual aid

-

take part to policy formation in this domain.

The DDC provides for a number of channels for the institutional dialogue with the NGOs:

dialogue on the significance in terms of development policy

of

various political issues as

well

as on specific ^issues of development policy on the operational plan, mutual information, and negotiations regarding the financial contributions to NGOs. Such institutionalized dialogue has sped up in the nineties, in particular after the United Nations Conference on environment and development held in Rio de Janeiro in June ^1992, which has given a decisive boost to the cooperation between governments ^and NGOs in various countries. Several SMOs have today access to the Swiss state in extraparliamentary Committees, both temporary ^and permanent, created by the government, such ^as the Committee for development aid (Commission

pour

I' aide au développement).

Although this integration in the consultative procedures, unlike France, is a typical feature of the Swiss political system in general, much like in France

it

is facilitated by the gathering of SMOs in peak organizations. Thus, the so-called Working community (Communauté de travail), which ^gathers five among the major SMOs that ^deals

with

humanitarian ^and development ^issuese, is the privileged interlocutor of the government and the DDC for matters related to development aid. SMOs ^are often consulted by the government as experts on development matters. In this ^respect, the case of Intercooperation is particularly instructive. Largely supported by the government (39

million

Swiss Francs

in

1995),

it

was created

in

1982 with the aim of providing the government

with

a tool for the implementation of projects in the area of development.

It

^gathers seven among the major SMOsl0 ^and plays ^a role of interface between the various SMOs ^and the state institutions, similar to the role played by the nine collectives in France.

If

a dialogue between ^the NGOs ^and the state exist in Switzerland in connected but distinct policy domains such ^as development aid, the humanitarian aid, human rights, the aid

8 Reported in

In

^Suisse + le Monde, n.3, 1996.

e Action de carême, Caritas (who joined only recently) , Helvetas, Pain pour le prochain, and Swissaid.

t0 Caritas, Entraide protestante suisse, Helvetas, Oeuvre suisse d'entraide ouvrière, Croix rouge suisse,

Sw is s aid, and Sw is s co ntact.

to refugees, and, as we

will

see below, the environment, cooperation on the operational level is particularly strong in the

first

ofthese areas.

It

is here that a real cooperation takes place.

The traditional policy, based on the provision of funds to SMOs so that they carry out specific projects in

Third-World

countries or educational initiatives in Switzerland, has been

complemented

with

a

policy

of operational collaboration, in particular starting from the early eighties. Indeed, development aid is the policy _domain in which sectors of the

civil

society actively intervene in the enactment of political decision, not only in the elaboration

of

those decisions. This cooperation occurs in two basic ways. On the one hand, the government, by means of the DDC, contribute financially on an institutional basis to projects developed by the SMOs themselves. The share of funds thus granted usually covers between 30 and 5O Vo

of

the costs (59

millions

Swiss Francs

in

1995). On the other hand, the Swiss government can also delegate the execution of projects or programs, or parts thereof, elaborated at the state level to one or more SMOs, through the so-called mandats de régie (65

million

Swiss Francs in

1995)tl. In this case, the government keeps the control over operations. In this division

of

tasks, the SMOs are responsible for the operational planning, the execution, and the

monitoring of the project. In addition they often intervene in the conceptual phase. The

DDC

is responsible for the general policy, the general planning of the project (although, as we have seen, SMOs are consulted at this level ^as well), and the evaluation of the project.

With

the mandats de régie, cooperation between social movements and the state reaches its peak. SMOs that are seen as being of public

utility

become an arrn of the state in order to reach its goals in a given policy domain. The SMOs are chosen according to their specific competencies and skill, they get funds, and are responsible for the implementation

of

the planned projects. In fact, some private organizations were active in development aid before the Swiss government became involved in this domain. Afterwards, development aid has become increasingly centered around the state and under its control. But, as opposed to the French situation, which is mostly based on ^a subsidizing state, the Swiss case reflects the model of the

inciting

state (Bûtschi and Cattacin 1994), whereby the latter asks and stimulate the intervention of sectors of the

civil

society, in particular social movements. In the case

of

development aid policy, this relationship is becoming so close that we ask whether certain SMOs of the solidarity movement ^are not becoming part of the state institutions.

lr Four SMOs currently receive the nwndats de régie: Helvetas,the Institut universitaire d'études du

dév e lopp emenr (IUED), I ntercooperation, and Swis scontact.

The ecology movement

The complexity of environmental problems in the contemporary society pushes the state towards the search for forms of cooperation with the ecology movement. SMOs such as the

Worldfundfor

nature (WWF), both in France and Switzerland, or the Ligue suisse pour la protection de la nature (LSPN) in Switzerland have long established collaborations

of

various

kinds with the

political

authorities ^at different administrative levels. However, in comparison to the solidarity movement, the cooperative relationship of the ecology movement is not only

less pronounced, but also more decentralized, concerning the regional and local levels, in addition to the national one (although these administrative levels ^are not completely absent from the development aid policies, both in France and Switzerland). As the few questionnaires we have received thus far show, various environmental SMOs collaborate since several years with the local authorities (municipalities, local councils, communal committees, etc.). This cooperation can consist of occasional or regular consultation and expertise, participation to local committees, or intervention in specific projects (planning, monitoring, evaluation, etc.).

For example, tbe Mouvement défense de la byciclette (MDB), in France, is regularly consulted by the city of Paris since 1986 and take part to a local committee ^as

well

^as to a working group since 1996. In Switzerland, the Fondation ^suisse pour Ia protection et l'aménagement du paysage (FSPAP) is

officially

consulted on environmental ^issues by the government since its creation

in

1970 and collaborates at the cantonal and communal level as

well.

Similarly,

the Societé suisse pour la protection de I'environnement (SPE) is occasionally consulted by local authorities, such as in Geneva, and collaborates with cities such ^as Lausanne and Neuchâtel. In addition to national SMOs, various local SMOs enter ^a cooperative relationship with the

political

authorities at the communal level.

Most typically, however, certain SMOs intervene ^at different levels. Thus, the French Mouvement national de lutte pour I'environnement

(MNLE)

has established different forms

of

cooperation with the

Ministry

of the environment, as well as with several regions, department, and communes since 1981. The forms of cooperation range from the regular consultation to the participation to committees and working groups. Similarly, the SPE in Switzerland cooperate with the Federal office of the environment, the forests and the landscape (Office Fédéral de l'environnement, des forêts ^et du paysage) and with the Federal office of the energy (Office

fédéral

de I'energie), with the canton of Geneva, and

with

several cities. Some SMOs, however, tend to concantrate on the national level. This ^seems to the case of Pro natura, an old organization of the Swiss ecology movement, whose collaboration with the

Federal office of the environment, the forests and the landscape goes back to the mid sixties, when it was charged with managing a national park. Later on, the relationship with this regulatory agency came to include several consultative tasks and, most important, the

delegation of specific project to the SMO. In addition, during the eighties and nineties,

it

has established some kind of cooperation with other governmental bodies that deals with

environmental or energy issues and even with the DDC. The cooperation with the latter also include the delegation of project to the SMOs.

With

this regard, a second difference between the ecology and the solidarity movements lies precisely in the kinds of activities undertaken by SMOs in a cooperative relationship. Less involved in the operational aspects

of

specific projects, environmental NGOs often intervene in the political process as consultants. Thus, their function is rather to provide information and expertise to state actors.

At

the beginning, they were occasionally consulted. Later on, the consultative procedures on a regular basis were established. Finally, participation to extra-parliamentary committees has become the more and more common. This integration of SMOs of the ecology movement in the decisional and regulative processes stems from two distinct factors. On the one hand, the increasing complexity and global character of environmental problems pushes the authorities to look for the support of SMOs that have specific skills and competencies on these and related matters. The emerging concept of "durable development", which the 1992 conference in Rio de Janeiro has brought to the fore, clearly calls for the collaboration of various state and non-state actors at both the national and international level. On the other hand, environmental are increasingly dealt

with

through a

problem-solving _behavior based on the cooperation among the various actors

(Amy

1990;

Wâlti

1993; Weidner 1993). This holds in particular

for

a country such as Switzerland, where the search for consensus is ^a general feature of the political process. This would explain, at least in part, why cooperation between the ecology movement and the state is more

pronounced in Switzerland than in France.

However, the clearest examples of cooperation between environmental SMOs and the Swiss state can be seen on the international level. One the one hand, the scope and complexity of international problems requires the intervention of external actors that have specific skills and competencies in the domain. On the other hand,

it

is in this domain that the ecology movement has pushed the most towards the collaboration

with

state agencies and

bureaucracies in order to put into practice the concept

of

"durable development". Some SMOs acting in the international arena work so closely

with

state powers that can hardly be seen as

part of a social movement. One of the most important is the World union for the nature (UICN), whose members are states, public bodies, and NGOs that work in partnership to protect the nature and its resources.

Similar to the ^area of development aid, cooperation between the ecology movement and international administrative ^and regulatory bodies has increased after the 1992 United Nations Conference on environment ^and development. Indeed, the Declaration of Rio includes explicit references to the participation of the

civil

society in the management of environmental problems. In addition, the so-called Agenda 21, also ^a result of the conference, calls for the partnership between NGOs ^{and the} political authorities for its execution, not only at the international level, but also at the national level. Thus, in the nineties the cooperation between the ecology movement ^and the state has become stronger in various countries, included France and Switzerland. In the latter country, for example, a publication by the Federal department

of

foreign affairs, mentions ¹⁸ SMOs that cooperate with the Swiss government on matters related to the environment, including several SMOs of the solidarity movement. This also shows the increasing interconnection between environmental and development ^issues on the world scale.

Implications:

between

conflict

and cooperation

As the examples of development aid ^and environmental policies have shown, social movements do not only challenge powerholders, but enter ^a cooperative relationship

with

state actors and structures. This calls

for

systematic research on this new and increasingly important aspect of movements. Although recent developments point to the beginning of the institutionalization of procedures of consultation and planning of projects in the case of the solidarity movement - leading to the integration of SMOs in the state structures -, cooperation between social movements ^and the state in France remains strongly ^based on the provision

of

financial resources to SMOs and sporadic consultation. In contrast, the Swiss model

of

cooperation is characterized by ^the

joint

action

of

state agencies and social movements in several policy domains ^and by the importance of the operational level, that is the delegation

of

tasks from the state to the SMOs, especially in the case of the solidarity movement. This difference is partly a result of divergent state structures and prevailing strategies of the authorities towards social movements ^and towards the so-called third sector, that is the area between market, state, ^and community (Evers 1993). Switzerland is ^a paradigmatic case

for

the opportunities offered to all organized expressions of the society to influence the ^state

(Kriesi

1995; Lembruch 1993; Schmitter 1981).

A

strongly decentralized and open state, coupled with neo-corporatist arrangements of interest intermediation, which allow for

political

agreements negotiated between organized actors in the

civil

society and the state, facilitate the cooperative behavior of social movements. France is also a paradigmatic case, but in the opposite sense. The strength of the state and the prevailing strategies make cooperation with the organized segments of the French society more

difficult (Kriesi

1994). Although the intensity, quality, and duration of cooperation are substantially different in France and

Switzerland, the mobilization of the solidarity and ecology movements shows that movements in general include cooperative actions in their action repertoire, in addition to contentious ones.

Regardless of its scope and intensity, cooperation between social movements and the state has a series of implications for both of these collective actors, ^as

well

as for research on social movements. Repercussions for social movements are located at three different levels.

First, concerning the organizational structure of movements, cooperation presupposes the existence of

well

structured and competent SMOs, but in turn

it

induces the concentration and conglomeration of movement resources. To engage in cooperative interactions with the state is very demanding in terms of resources (Bûtschi and Cattacin 1994). Social movements that enter a cooperative relationship with the state tend to become bigger in size, more

professional ized, and more bureaucratized.

Second, regarding the nature of movements, cooperation means the social recognition of SMOs by the state, but one that can also change the characteristics and role of movements.

On the one hand, in order to enter ^a cooperative relationship

with

the state, SMOs need to moderate their actions and goals, for the state tend not to collaborate

with

radical SMOs.

Cooperation, in turn, tends to ^increase moderation. Cooperation means that a compromise must be reached. This implies that the actors need to moderate their goals. The distribution

of

power among the various actors

will

determine who has to grant more concessions. Social movements, of course, even when they are integrated in the structures of the state, have less power than the state. This does not mean that the latter

will

not grant concessions, but

it will

do so to a lesser extentl2. Thus, SMOs tend to moderate their goals when they are in a relationship of collaboration. On the other hand, the fact of being integrated within the state

12 We should note, however, that the state is not equally strong in all policy areas. For example, the state is generally weaker in the economic domain than in the areas of development aid and environmental protection.

This is particularly true for Switzerland, where the state takes on a role of mediator between employers and unions and has little power to impose his views (Kriesi 1995).

challenges the identity of social movements. Even when they are in a cooperative relationship with the state, SMOs are critical towards

official

policies. They try to promote their goals and

find

new opportunities to influence such policies, but the ^state makes the rules of cooperation.

This provokes not only a moderation of movement goals, but also the shifting away from a

critical role towards the action of the ^state. SMOs bring a critique of the action (or inaction)

of

the state in given areas and carry ^a social conflict which they help to politicize; once they begin to cooperate with the state, their identity as social movements changes. The search

for

^a compromise becomes the underlying logic of movements that look

for

cooperation

with

state agencies and bureaucracies. Two options are available ^at this stage. SMOs can adapt to their new function and alter their identity, thus becoming semi-state organizations or, alternatively, they can keep their movement identity and take part in a form of collaboration with the state that Evers (1990) calls conflictual cooperation.

Finally, cooperation with the state affects the levels of mobilization of social movements.

If

cooperation opens up new institutional channels to SMOs,

it

also have a negative impact on the amount of protest events produced by movements ^and the volume

of

participation to those events. On the ^one hand, SMOs tend to shift from mobilization to interest representation. In other words, they focus their resources and energy to reach their goals

within

institutional arenas, thus neglecting their typical means (street demonstrations, political campaigns, etc.). In doing ^so, they lose public

visibility

and the potential

for

recruiting new members, who provide them

with

legitimacy and negotiation power to be ^used in cooperative interactions with the state. In the worst situation, this can lead them to ^be cut from their social support. On ^the other hand, cooperation with the state deepens the

fragmentation

within

the movement. The integration of the moderate

wing

increases the conflicts

with

its radical wing. In fact, integration is often ^used by

political

authorities ^{as a} strategy

for

weakening a social movement (Karstedt-Henke 1989). The moderates become more moderate by their integration within the conventional arena, while the other wing radicalizes further on. This worsens the internal conflicts and ^leads to the demobilization

of

the movement.

Cooperation also ^{has a series} of implications for the state.

A first

^set of repercussions have to do

with

the internal organization of the state. To begin with, cooperation affects the efficacy of the state in two opposed ways. On the one hand, negotiations with social

movements slow down the decision-making process. Consultation and the ^search

for

compromise

with

external actors makes the decisional ^process longer and more complex.

l

Therefore, the latter becomes less effective. Switzerland provides a good example. (Linder 1987). On the other hand, however, the efficacy of policy implementation increases, especially in states that have a weak administrative body. When states delegate the implementation

of

programs to external actors, administrative costs diminish and the effectiveness

of

implementation done by actors with more competencies than the state increases. The

delegation of the implementation of development projects by the Swiss state to the solidarity movement provides an illustration of this process. In the domain of development aid, often state actors are less competent than the SMOs of the movement, which had projects in the

Third-World

long before the creation of the DDC. Therefore, they have developed valuable skills and competencies, experience in the field, and structures in

Third-World

countries allowing for a better implementation of programs. The Swiss state

still

does not have these capabilities. Therefore, the delegation of tasks represents an important advantage in terms

of

efficacy.

Second, cooperation affects the legitimacy of the state. Following the communitarian approach to democracy, according to which citizens are ^<< ideal citizens ^>>, that is we-thinkers (Barber ₁₉₈₄₎ naturally oriented to the production of the public good, cooperation between organized citizens and the state can be seen as leading to a more legitimate democracy. In this perspective, states that have created structures (relational programs, in

Wilke's

terminology) to promote or facilitate cooperation with external actors, such as SMOs, add to their

legitimacy by

inciting

to participative democracy. In contrast,

following

the liberal approach to democracy, according to which citizens have their own definition of the public good, are free agents making free choices (Gould _1988), and are not naturally oriented toward the

public

good, an increase in the number of external actors raises the problem of the balance between private or particular interests within the state and the definition of the public good. In this perspective, states ground their legitimacy on neutrality and on the existence of institutional procedures that allow

for

the regulation of private interests (Gianni _1994). With the intrusion of various private actors who pursue their own interests within the state, this raises the problem of the redefinition of institutional procedures in democratic states in order to define the public good.

If,

in theory, democracies must warrant universal access

(Wilke

1991), we know that, in reality, access is not the same for everybody. Certain organized actors have more resources and much better access than others. Moreover, the distribution of power of these actors when they are in a relationship of collaboration with the state varies. Swiss democracy provides a good illustration, to the extent that neo-corporatist arrangements not only exclude

t

certain actors, but are also unbalanced with regard to the actors who participate. The access problem raises the question of the legitimacy of decisions taken by state actors. The state no longer is the defender of the public good. Furthermore, with the intrusion of private actors, the state runs the risk of fragmentation. Due to the penetration of the complex society into the state, aimed at pursuing sectoral interests through organized actors, the ^state risks to become more fragmented, to loose a global view of the society, and to

modify

its action accordingly.

Third, cooperation

with

social movements entails some organizational adaptations

for

the state. The political authorities develop several structures in order to control the

implementation of programs and public policies and to institutionalize the cooperation

with

external actors. As we have ^seen, both the French ^and the Swiss administrations have coordination structures in the domains of development aid ^and environmental protection.

Thus, the state develops a series of administrative structures aimed at stabilizing and institutionalizing their cooperation

with

social movements.

Finally, and perhaps most important, cooperation relates to the transformation of the role of the state. Modern democratic societies ^are increasingly complex and differentiated and the state is always less capable of warranting the governability of such complex democracies.

As

Wilke

(1991) has pointed out, the

civil

society includes many organized actors who

compete

for

the piloting of society. Social movements participate in this competition. In order to face the increasing complexity and differentiation of society, states rely on these actors. The integration and cooperation among them improve the

flexibility

and adaptability of the

responses to the complexity of society

(Wilke

1991), but also change the role and nature of the state. The traditional role, in which the state has the upper hand over the piloting of society, is transforming and become shared with other actors. In complex societies, where nobody can foresee the long-run consequences of most decisions, the state no longer has the authority

for

autonomous decisions. The state establishes structures of linkage with the

civil

society ^as

well

as processes of intermediation. The cooperation with organized actors of the society becomes crucial to face the new ^and complex problems of modern societies. The cooperation with social movements is part of this process. In addition, the cooperation between the state and organized actors of society - that is, an increasing interpenetration between the state and the

civil

society

-

^helps to stabilize the conflictual relations between them (Evers 1990). This implies ^a different way of ruling the power and a different type

of

state, which becomes a regulating state in search for compromises, or even consensus, in order to

pilot

a complex society.