Implications: between conflict and cooperation

As the examples of development aid ^and environmental policies have shown, social movements do not only challenge powerholders, but enter ^a cooperative relationship

with

state actors and structures. This calls

for

systematic research on this new and increasingly important aspect of movements. Although recent developments point to the beginning of the institutionalization of procedures of consultation and planning of projects in the case of the solidarity movement - leading to the integration of SMOs in the state structures -, cooperation between social movements ^and the state in France remains strongly ^based on the provision

of

financial resources to SMOs and sporadic consultation. In contrast, the Swiss model

of

cooperation is characterized by ^the

joint

action

of

state agencies and social movements in several policy domains ^and by the importance of the operational level, that is the delegation

of

tasks from the state to the SMOs, especially in the case of the solidarity movement. This difference is partly a result of divergent state structures and prevailing strategies of the authorities towards social movements ^and towards the so-called third sector, that is the area between market, state, ^and community (Evers 1993). Switzerland is ^a paradigmatic case

for

the opportunities offered to all organized expressions of the society to influence the ^state

(Kriesi

1995; Lembruch 1993; Schmitter 1981).

A

strongly decentralized and open state, coupled with neo-corporatist arrangements of interest intermediation, which allow for

political

agreements negotiated between organized actors in the

civil

society and the state, facilitate the cooperative behavior of social movements. France is also a paradigmatic case, but in the opposite sense. The strength of the state and the prevailing strategies make cooperation with the organized segments of the French society more

difficult (Kriesi

1994). Although the intensity, quality, and duration of cooperation are substantially different in France and

Switzerland, the mobilization of the solidarity and ecology movements shows that movements in general include cooperative actions in their action repertoire, in addition to contentious ones.

Regardless of its scope and intensity, cooperation between social movements and the state has a series of implications for both of these collective actors, ^as

well

as for research on social movements. Repercussions for social movements are located at three different levels.

First, concerning the organizational structure of movements, cooperation presupposes the existence of

well

structured and competent SMOs, but in turn

it

induces the concentration and conglomeration of movement resources. To engage in cooperative interactions with the state is very demanding in terms of resources (Bûtschi and Cattacin 1994). Social movements that enter a cooperative relationship with the state tend to become bigger in size, more

professional ized, and more bureaucratized.

Second, regarding the nature of movements, cooperation means the social recognition of SMOs by the state, but one that can also change the characteristics and role of movements.

On the one hand, in order to enter ^a cooperative relationship

with

the state, SMOs need to moderate their actions and goals, for the state tend not to collaborate

with

radical SMOs.

Cooperation, in turn, tends to ^increase moderation. Cooperation means that a compromise must be reached. This implies that the actors need to moderate their goals. The distribution

of

power among the various actors

will

determine who has to grant more concessions. Social movements, of course, even when they are integrated in the structures of the state, have less power than the state. This does not mean that the latter

will

not grant concessions, but

it will

do so to a lesser extentl2. Thus, SMOs tend to moderate their goals when they are in a relationship of collaboration. On the other hand, the fact of being integrated within the state

12 We should note, however, that the state is not equally strong in all policy areas. For example, the state is generally weaker in the economic domain than in the areas of development aid and environmental protection.

This is particularly true for Switzerland, where the state takes on a role of mediator between employers and unions and has little power to impose his views (Kriesi 1995).

challenges the identity of social movements. Even when they are in a cooperative relationship with the state, SMOs are critical towards

official

policies. They try to promote their goals and

find

new opportunities to influence such policies, but the ^state makes the rules of cooperation.

This provokes not only a moderation of movement goals, but also the shifting away from a

critical role towards the action of the ^state. SMOs bring a critique of the action (or inaction)

of

the state in given areas and carry ^a social conflict which they help to politicize; once they begin to cooperate with the state, their identity as social movements changes. The search

for

^a compromise becomes the underlying logic of movements that look

for

cooperation

with

state agencies and bureaucracies. Two options are available ^at this stage. SMOs can adapt to their new function and alter their identity, thus becoming semi-state organizations or, alternatively, they can keep their movement identity and take part in a form of collaboration with the state that Evers (1990) calls conflictual cooperation.

Finally, cooperation with the state affects the levels of mobilization of social movements.

If

cooperation opens up new institutional channels to SMOs,

it

also have a negative impact on the amount of protest events produced by movements ^and the volume

of

participation to those events. On the ^one hand, SMOs tend to shift from mobilization to interest representation. In other words, they focus their resources and energy to reach their goals

within

institutional arenas, thus neglecting their typical means (street demonstrations, political campaigns, etc.). In doing ^so, they lose public

visibility

and the potential

for

recruiting new members, who provide them

with

legitimacy and negotiation power to be ^used in cooperative interactions with the state. In the worst situation, this can lead them to ^be cut from their social support. On ^the other hand, cooperation with the state deepens the

fragmentation

within

the movement. The integration of the moderate

wing

increases the conflicts

with

its radical wing. In fact, integration is often ^used by

political

authorities ^{as a} strategy

for

weakening a social movement (Karstedt-Henke 1989). The moderates become more moderate by their integration within the conventional arena, while the other wing radicalizes further on. This worsens the internal conflicts and ^leads to the demobilization

of

the movement.

Cooperation also ^{has a series} of implications for the state.

A first

^set of repercussions have to do

with

the internal organization of the state. To begin with, cooperation affects the efficacy of the state in two opposed ways. On the one hand, negotiations with social

movements slow down the decision-making process. Consultation and the ^search

for

compromise

with

external actors makes the decisional ^process longer and more complex.

l

Therefore, the latter becomes less effective. Switzerland provides a good example. (Linder 1987). On the other hand, however, the efficacy of policy implementation increases, especially in states that have a weak administrative body. When states delegate the implementation

of

programs to external actors, administrative costs diminish and the effectiveness

of

implementation done by actors with more competencies than the state increases. The

delegation of the implementation of development projects by the Swiss state to the solidarity movement provides an illustration of this process. In the domain of development aid, often state actors are less competent than the SMOs of the movement, which had projects in the

Third-World

long before the creation of the DDC. Therefore, they have developed valuable skills and competencies, experience in the field, and structures in

Third-World

countries allowing for a better implementation of programs. The Swiss state

still

does not have these capabilities. Therefore, the delegation of tasks represents an important advantage in terms

of

efficacy.

Second, cooperation affects the legitimacy of the state. Following the communitarian approach to democracy, according to which citizens are ^<< ideal citizens ^>>, that is we-thinkers (Barber ₁₉₈₄₎ naturally oriented to the production of the public good, cooperation between organized citizens and the state can be seen as leading to a more legitimate democracy. In this perspective, states that have created structures (relational programs, in

Wilke's

terminology) to promote or facilitate cooperation with external actors, such as SMOs, add to their

legitimacy by

inciting

to participative democracy. In contrast,

following

the liberal approach to democracy, according to which citizens have their own definition of the public good, are free agents making free choices (Gould _1988), and are not naturally oriented toward the

public

good, an increase in the number of external actors raises the problem of the balance between private or particular interests within the state and the definition of the public good. In this perspective, states ground their legitimacy on neutrality and on the existence of institutional procedures that allow

for

the regulation of private interests (Gianni _1994). With the intrusion of various private actors who pursue their own interests within the state, this raises the problem of the redefinition of institutional procedures in democratic states in order to define the public good.

If,

in theory, democracies must warrant universal access

(Wilke

1991), we know that, in reality, access is not the same for everybody. Certain organized actors have more resources and much better access than others. Moreover, the distribution of power of these actors when they are in a relationship of collaboration with the state varies. Swiss democracy provides a good illustration, to the extent that neo-corporatist arrangements not only exclude

t

certain actors, but are also unbalanced with regard to the actors who participate. The access problem raises the question of the legitimacy of decisions taken by state actors. The state no longer is the defender of the public good. Furthermore, with the intrusion of private actors, the state runs the risk of fragmentation. Due to the penetration of the complex society into the state, aimed at pursuing sectoral interests through organized actors, the ^state risks to become more fragmented, to loose a global view of the society, and to

modify

its action accordingly.

Third, cooperation

with

social movements entails some organizational adaptations

for

the state. The political authorities develop several structures in order to control the

implementation of programs and public policies and to institutionalize the cooperation

with

external actors. As we have ^seen, both the French ^and the Swiss administrations have coordination structures in the domains of development aid ^and environmental protection.

Thus, the state develops a series of administrative structures aimed at stabilizing and institutionalizing their cooperation

with

social movements.

Finally, and perhaps most important, cooperation relates to the transformation of the role of the state. Modern democratic societies ^are increasingly complex and differentiated and the state is always less capable of warranting the governability of such complex democracies.

As

Wilke

(1991) has pointed out, the

civil

society includes many organized actors who

compete

for

the piloting of society. Social movements participate in this competition. In order to face the increasing complexity and differentiation of society, states rely on these actors. The integration and cooperation among them improve the

flexibility

and adaptability of the

responses to the complexity of society

(Wilke

1991), but also change the role and nature of the state. The traditional role, in which the state has the upper hand over the piloting of society, is transforming and become shared with other actors. In complex societies, where nobody can foresee the long-run consequences of most decisions, the state no longer has the authority

for

autonomous decisions. The state establishes structures of linkage with the

civil

society ^as

well

as processes of intermediation. The cooperation with organized actors of the society becomes crucial to face the new ^and complex problems of modern societies. The cooperation with social movements is part of this process. In addition, the cooperation between the state and organized actors of society - that is, an increasing interpenetration between the state and the

civil

society

-

^helps to stabilize the conflictual relations between them (Evers 1990). This implies ^a different way of ruling the power and a different type

of

state, which becomes a regulating state in search for compromises, or even consensus, in order to

pilot

a complex society.

The existence of a cooperative relationship between social movements and the state has also several implications

for

research on social movements. First, we need

to

analyze movements in their whole complexity. Authors such as Melucci (1996) and Touraine (1984) have stressed the complexity of social movements by looking at their invisible side, that is the construction

of

identity and cultural schemata allowing the movements to emerge in the

political

sphere. However, there is another invisible part of social movements that calls

for

careful analyses: their interactions with public actors within state structures. Thus,

if

we want to reach ^a better understanding, we need to acknowledge and study these processes in their complexity.

The second implication

for

rcsearch stems from the observation that cooperation between social movements and the state is conflictual rather than consensual. As we have said above,

it

is the state that make the rules of cooperation and this is an important source

of conflict for

social movements. Similarly, to promote collaboration the state has to adapt to new actors that generally have other programs and interests. In other words,

conflict

is

intrinsically

linked to cooperation (Bûtschi and Cattacin ^19941' Evers 1990). So, in spite of the increasing importance of cooperation, both the solidarity and the ecology movements continue to perform contentious actions addressed to the state. SMOs do not hesitate to criticize the

political

authorities when they disagree or when they think their decisions or actions are not adequate, though only rarely confrontational actions are staged. Their criticisms most often take the form of public statements. The case of Greenpeace, who sometime carries out spectacular forms of protest, is an important exception. Thus, analysts of social movements should look at the chains of interactions with powerholders and other parties.

If

in the past social scientists have focused on the chains of interactions outside the conventional political arenas, now we need to get ^a closer look at the chains of interactions inside the conventional

political

arenas. More precisely, in order to grasp the complexity of social movements and to examine their conflictual as

well

as their cooperative aspects, research should now turn to the analysis of both chains of interaction (Kriesi and

Giugni

1996) and try to grasp the dynamics between them.

Finally, research should examine the evolution of the cooperative relationship with the state and try to determine whether the new social movements

family

is

following

a typical process

of

institutionalization, such as the one previously followed by labor movements in Western Europe, or whether we are witnessing a new form of integration and cooperation with the state. In other words, future research

will

^need to examine the long-term evolution and

forms of cooperation, but also the transformations of the state. In doing so, we should be able to determine whether there is a new form of collaboration between the ^state and the

civil

society, such as the one described by Wilke, or whether the kind of cooperation,

involving

certain new social movements, that we have underscored follows the traditional patterns

of

institutionalization of contentious actors.

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