Slide 0
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Tolerant or intolerant character of interacting criteria in aggregation by the
Choquet integral
Jean-Luc Marichal HCP’2003
Slide 1
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Aggregation in multicriteria decision aid
• Alternatives A = {a, b, c, . . .}
• Criteria N = {1, 2, . . . , n}
• Profile a ∈ A −→ (x
a1, . . . , x
an| {z }
same interval scale
) ∈ R
nor [0, 1]
n• Aggregation function
M : R
n→ R M : [0, 1]
n→ [0, 1]
(x
1, . . . , x
n) 7→ M (x
1, . . . , x
n)
Slide 2
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Choquet integral
Capacity on N :
v : 2
N→ [0, 1], monotone, v (∅) = 0, and v(N ) = 1 F
n:= {capacities on N }
Choquet integral of x ∈ R
nw.r.t. v:
C
v(x) :=
X
ni=1
x
(i)h
v £
(i), . . . , (n) ¤
− v £
(i + 1), . . . , (n) ¤i with the convention that x
(1)6 · · · 6 x
(n).
Slide 3
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Examples
If x
36 x
16 x
2, we have
C
v(x
1, x
2, x
3) = x
3[v(3, 1, 2) − v(1, 2)]
+ x
1[v (1, 2) − v(2)]
+ x
2v(2) If x
26 x
36 x
1, we have
C
v(x
1, x
2, x
3) = x
2[v(2, 3, 1) − v(3, 1)]
+ x
3[v (3, 1) − v(1)]
+ x
1v(1)
Slide 4
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Properties of the Choquet integral
• Linearity w.r.t. the capacity
∃ f
T: R
n→ R (T ⊆ N ) s.t.
C
v= X
T⊆N
v(T )f
T(v ∈ F
n)
• Monotonicity
For any x, x
0∈ R
nand any v ∈ F
nx 6 x
0⇒ C
v(x) 6 C
v(x
0)
Slide 5
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• Affine invariance
For any x ∈ R
n, v ∈ F
n, r > 0 and s ∈ R,
C
v(rx
1+ s, . . . , rx
n+ s) = r C
v(x
1, . . . , x
n) + s
⇒ The partial scores may be embedded in [0, 1]
• Meaningfulness of weights
v(S ) = C
v(1
S) (S ⊆ N, v ∈ F
n) Example : N = {1, 2, 3, 4}
v (2, 3, 4) = C
v(0, 1, 1, 1)
Slide 6
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Axiomatization
Consider a family of n-variable aggregation functions {M
v: R
n→ R | v ∈ F
n}
This family satisfies the four properties above if and only if M
v= C
v(v ∈ F
n)
(Marichal, 2000)
Slide 7
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Evaluation of students
Student St Pr Al
a 19 15 18
b 19 18 15
c 11 15 18
d 11 18 15
←→
St Pr Al
0.95 0.75 0.90 0.95 0.90 0.75 0.55 0.75 0.90 0.55 0.90 0.75
on [0, 20] on [0, 1]
x
0i= rx
i+ s
r = 1/20, s = 0
Slide 8
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Assumptions
• St and Pr more important than Al
• St and Pr are somewhat substitutive
• a  b and d  c (⇒ nonadditive Choquet integral)
v (∅) = 0 v (St, Pr) = 0.50 v (St) = 0.35 v (St, Al) = 0.80 v (Pr) = 0.35 v (Pr, Al) = 0.80 v (Al) = 0.30 v (St, Pr, Al) = 1
Slide 9
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Results
Student St Pr Al Global evaluation
a 19 15 18 17.75
b 19 18 15 16.85
c 11 15 18 15.10
d 11 18 15 15.25
Ranking
¤
£
¡
a  b  d  c ¢
Slide 10
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Special types of interaction:
veto and favor effects
A criterion k ∈ N is
• a veto for C
vif
C
v(x) 6 x
k(x ∈ [0, 1]
n)
• a favor for C
vif
C
v(x) > x
k(x ∈ [0, 1]
n) (Grabisch, 1997)
If k is both a veto and a favor then k is a dictator
Slide 11
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Surprising behavior of C
vExample of rule
“ x
k6 18/20 ⇒ C
v(x) 6 18/20 ”
⇓ k is a veto Proposition
1) k is a veto for C
vif and only if ∃ λ ∈ [0, 1[ s.t. ∀x ∈ [0, 1]
nx
k6 λ ⇒ C
v(x) 6 λ
2) k is a favor for C
viff ∃ λ ∈ ]0, 1] s.t. ∀x ∈ [0, 1]
nx
k> λ ⇒ C
v(x) > λ
Slide 12
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More surprising...
One can show that
k is a veto ⇔ ∃ x < y : C
v(y, . . . , y,
(k)x , y . . . , y) = x k is a favor ⇔ ∃ x > y : C
v(y, . . . , y,
(k)x , y . . . , y) = x Example
C
v(10, 11, 11) = 10 ⇒ k = 1 is a veto
⇒ C
v(10, 20, 20) = 10 !!
C
v(19, 18, 18) = 19 ⇒ k = 1 is a favor
⇒ C
v(19, 0, 0) = 19 !!
Slide 13
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Analysis
• Veto and favor criteria are rarely encountered
• Some criteria might behave nearly like a veto or a favor
• How can we measure the degree of veto (or favor)
of criteria ?
Slide 14
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Average value of C
vover [0, 1]
n: E(C
v) :=
Z
[0,1]n
C
v(x) dx ∈ [0, 1]
Examples
• E(min) =
n+11(most intolerant)
• E(max) =
n+1n(most tolerant)
• E(OS
k) =
n+1k• E(WAM
ω) = E(median) =
12E(min) 6 E(C
v) 6 E(max)
Slide 15
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Conjunction and disjunction degrees
Position of E(C
v) within the interval [E(min), E (max)]:
orness(C
v) := E(C
v) − E(min) E(max) − E(min) andness(C
v) := E(max) − E(C
v)
E(max) − E(min) (Dujmovi´c, 1974)
andness(C
v) + orness(C
v) = 1
Slide 16
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Examples
• orness(min) = 0 (most intolerant)
• orness(max) = 1 (most tolerant)
• orness(WAM
ω) = orness(median) =
12k is a veto for C
v⇒ orness(C
v) 6 1/2 (not tolerant) Proof:
C
v(x) 6 x
k⇓ E(C
v) =
Z
[0,1]n
C
v(x) dx 6 Z
[0,1]n
x
kdx = 1/2
Slide 17
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Veto and favor degrees
veto(C
v, k) := 1 −
n−11P
T⊆N\{k}
(n−t−1)!t!
(n−1)!
v(T ) favor(C
v, k) :=
n−11P
T⊆N\{k}
(n−t−1)!t!
(n−1)!
v(T ∪ {k}) −
n−11Why these ugly definitions ?
Slide 18
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Properties of veto(C
v, k)
• Linearity w.r.t. the capacity
∃ p
kT∈ R (T ⊆ N ) s.t.
veto(C
v, k) = X
T⊆N
v(T )p
kT(k ∈ N, v ∈ F
n)
• Symmetry
For any permutation π on N
veto(C
v, k) = veto(C
πv, π(k)) (k ∈ N, v ∈ F
n) where πv(π(S)) = v(S ) for all S ⊆ N .
Slide 19
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• Boundary conditions For any ∅ 6= T ⊆ N we have
veto(min
T
, k) = 1 ∀k ∈ T (min
i∈Tx
i6 x
k∀k ∈ T )
• Normalization Given v ∈ F
nveto(C
v, 1) = veto(C
v, 2) = · · · = veto(C
v, n)
⇓
veto(C
v, i) = andness(C
v)
Slide 20
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Axiomatization
Consider a family of real numbers
{ψ(C
v, k) ∈ R | k ∈ N, v ∈ F
n}
This family satisfies the four properties above if and only if ψ(C
v, k) = veto(C
v, k) (k ∈ N, v ∈ F
n)
Slide 21
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Evaluation of students
orness(C
v) = 0.517
St Pr Al
veto(C
v, k) 0.437 0.437 0.575 favor(C
v, k) 0.500 0.500 0.550 φ
k(v ) 0.292 0.292 0.417 Shapley coefficients:
φ
k(v) := X
T⊆N\{k}
(n − t − 1)! t!
n! [v (T ∪ {k}) − v(T )]
Slide 22
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1 n
X
nk=1
veto(C
v, k) = andness(C
v) 1
n X
nk=1
favor(C
v, k) = orness(C
v) 1
n X
nk=1