The temporal dynamics of emotion-antecedent appraisal and the nature of two-component synchronization

Thesis

Reference

The temporal dynamics of emotion-antecedent appraisal and the nature of two-component synchronization

GENTSCH, Kornelia

Abstract

Scherer's Component Process Model proposes a comprehensive architecture of the underlying mechanisms of emotion elicitation and differentiation. This thesis examined the plausibility of the following predictions: (a) the appraisal process is sequential, (b) appraisal results drive facial expressions, (c) the appraisal and the facial expression components become synchronized during the response unfolding, and (d) self-beliefs bias the appraisal process. In two experiments, the appraisal of goal conduciveness (motivational valence appraisal), control (general control appraisal), and power (personal ability appraisal) were manipulated in a gambling task. Participants' brain activity (event-related potentials, ERPs) and facial muscle activity (electromyography, EMG, brow and cheek regions) were concurrently recorded. The findings are largely consistent with the predictions: (a) sequential appraisal check effects were repeatedly found in the ERPs. (b) The findings suggest that appraisal results drove facial expressions, which indirectly supports (c) the prediction of emotion component synchronization, and (d) biased [...]

GENTSCH, Kornelia. The temporal dynamics of emotion-antecedent appraisal and the nature of two-component synchronization. Thèse de doctorat : Univ. Genève, 2013, no.

FPSE 542

URN : urn:nbn:ch:unige-309651

DOI : 10.13097/archive-ouverte/unige:30965

Available at:

http://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:30965

Disclaimer: layout of this document may differ from the published version.

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Section de Psychologie Sous la direction de Professeur Klaus R. Scherer et Professeur Didier Grandjean

THE TEMPORAL DYNAMICS OF EMOTION-ANTECEDENT APPRAISAL AND THE NATURE OF TWO-COMPONENT SYNCHRONIZATION

THESE

Présentée à la

Faculté de psychologie et des sciences de l’éducation de l’Université de Genève

pour obtenir le grade de Docteur en Psychologie

par Kornelia GENTSCH

d’Erfurt, Allemagne Thèse No 542

GENEVE, juillet 2013

Numéro d’étudiant : 09-347-642

Acknowledgments

It is a great pleasure to thank those who made this thesis possible. I would like to thank my PhD supervisors Klaus R. Scherer and Didier Grandjean. Klaus Scherer’s confidence in my work, his visionary attitude, enthusiasm for emotion research, and

interdisciplinary expertise in this field have significantly influenced the present thesis. Didier Grandjean’s outstanding proficiency in both fields of emotion theory and cognitive

neuroscience provided valuable input. Furthermore, I am most appreciative for the intellectual freedom that I had in elaborating the present work.

I would also like to thank Annekathrin Schacht and David Sander for accepting to be a member of the thesis jury. Their interest in the conducted research is very much appreciated.

I am very grateful for having had the opportunity to work in the interdisciplinary and international environment of the Swiss Center for Affective Sciences. This center is an attraction pole for one of the most brilliant emotion researchers. I wish to thank particularly some of my colleagues for their support. Jacobien van Peer had always had an open ear for and answers to my questions; she would ask me the right questions to help me find the answers myself. Sylvain Delplanque has provided tireless help during the set-up of the experiments, the mastering of the pre-processing and the analysis of the psychophysiological data, and also in the report of the findings. Here, I would also like to thank Sophie Jarlier, Christophe Mermoud, and Sebastian Rieger for their efforts in managing the facilities of the Behavioral Brain and Cognition lab. Vera Shuman and Cristina Soriano gave me much constructive advice during the writing process.

Very special thanks go to my colleagues for their guidance and support in the course of this PhD. In particular, I want to thank Katja Schlegel for the many moments of support and laughter. By listing the names in alphabetical order of all the people whose valuable contributions inspired many parts of this thesis—directly or indirectly—is meant to express my earnest thanks: Tatjana Aue, Benoit Bediou, Tobias Brosch, Sezen Cekic, Elisabeth Clark Polner, Geraldine Coppin, Sascha Frühholz, Christelle Gillioz, Georg Hosoya, Dajana

Kapusova Leconte, Leonie Koban, Sebastian Korb, Eva Krumhuber, Carolina Labbe,

Caroline Lehr, Camille Lemaitre, Ines and Marc Mehu, Marcel Meyer, Valerie Milesi Sterck, Ben Meuleman, Agnes Moors, Marcello Mortillaro, Sona Patel, Eva Pool, Irene Rotondi, Daniela Sauge, Eda Tipura, Kim Torres-Eliard, and Wiebke Trost. There are many more people who work or have worked in the Swiss Center for Affective Sciences, the

Neuroscience of Emotion and Affective Dynamics Lab, the Psychology Department, and the

Medical Center of the University of Geneva that I wish to thank for the valuable shared moments.

I remain grateful to each of my friends for their constant heartily and moral side- support in the last years: Elisa, Heidrun, Julia, Katharina, Christin, Annette, and Nadine.

My deepest thanks are dedicated to my parents for their selfless support seemingly independent of the matter, distance, and time. Last and certainly not least, I thank my partner David for his support, trust, and love.

Abstract

Appraisal theories claim that emotions are elicited and differentiated by evaluations (appraisals) of events. Based on these evaluations, different emotions manifest in the different response systems (emotion components) such as facial expression, action tendencies, and subjective feeling. One theory in this tradition—Scherer’s Component Process Model—

proposes a detailed architecture of the emotion process and the underlying appraisal process.

It proposes that appraisal is organized in a fixed sequence of appraisal checks (i.e., relevance, goal conduciveness, coping potential, and normative significance). The sequence hypothesis implies that the appraisal checks discriminate the features of an event in a logical sequence, although they are processed in parallel. For example, only relevant events are further evaluated in terms of whether they block or facilitate the attainment of a current goal; based on these appraisal results, coping potential determination estimates the available actions that will be successful in maintaining or achieving a current goal. Specifically, the result of each appraisal check differentially and cumulatively influences the state of all emotion components. Furthermore, the model defines emotion as an episode of interrelated, synchronized changes in the states of emotion components in response to the evaluation of events as relevant to major goals. Moreover, the model proposes individual difference variables that can bias the appraisal in a particular way, and thus account for individual differences in the emotion process. However, these predictions have been experimentally tested only to a limited extent.

The goal of the present thesis was to experimentally test the sequence hypothesis, the claim that facial expressions are predominantly driven by appraisal results, the proposal that individual differences in self-beliefs can bias the appraisal process, and that the appraisal and the facial expression components become synchronized during the response unfolding.

Therefore, in two experiments I tested, whether the appraisal of goal conduciveness (i.e., motivational valence) achieves conclusive results before the appraisal of coping potential (i.e., estimation of the controllability of and one’s ability to act on an event). In the context of a gambling task these appraisal checks were simultaneously manipulated in feedback stimuli.

Participants’ brain activity (by using electroencephalography) and facial muscle activity (by using electromyography) were recorded. Furthermore, participants’ self-beliefs concerning the causes of events (i.e., locus of control, self-esteem, and self-efficacy) were assessed by using psychometric scales. Synchronization processes between the recorded brain activity and facial muscle activity was examined.

Overall, the findings of this thesis contribute to the existing literature in four important ways:

(1) the brain activity results (mean amplitudes of event-related potentials) suggest two- to three-evaluative stages of event discrimination: relevance and goal obstruction appraisal (~230-300 ms after event onset), and event categorization and resource investment (goal conduciveness appraisal, and coping potential appraisal, ~350-600 ms after event onset).

Moreover, the frequency of events seems to be a potent cue affecting the relevance appraisal.

(2) The facial muscle activity results showed that coping potential appraisal drove response changes over the brow (frowns) and the cheek regions (mouth stretch, lip corner retraction).

Furthermore, coping potential appraisal cumulatively modified the results of the goal conduciveness appraisal. (3) The self-belief variables could be organized along a two- dimensional structure of an internal and an external belief of what causes events. These beliefs had a major impact on the appraisal process than on the facial expressions. (4) The synchronization patterns differed between the two experiments, which suggest that the degree of synchronization might be highly context-dependent. Additionally, the appraisal and the facial expression components showed distinct appraisal check effects: In brain activity, appraisal check main effects were predominantly found, whereas in facial muscle activity, cumulative appraisal check effects emerged.

The present findings encourage further testing of the predictions of the Component Process Model. For example, testing of the sequence hypothesis should be extended to the normative significance check, and ultimately, involve a manipulation of all appraisal checks. In general, the appraisal check signatures in the emotion components should be identified, whether and to what degree they are event- and context-dependent as well as individual specific.

Additionally, the impact of self-beliefs on emotion elicitation and differentiation needs to be investigated in more detail given that these beliefs affected the appraisal process.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. G

... 1

1.1. Appraisal processes in emotion ... 2

1.1.1. Scherer’s Component Process Model ... 4

1.1.2. Empirical evidence ... 9

1.2. Level of analysis ... 12

1.3. The aims of the thesis research ... 13

1.4. Outline of the thesis structure ... 14

1.5. References ... 16

2. T

... 21

2.1. The estimated situational aspects of coping potential appraisal ... 21

2.1.1. Abstract ... 21

2.1.2. Introduction ... 22

2.1.3. Conceptualizations of coping potential appraisals ... 23

2.1.4. Characteristics of coping appraisal ... 31

2.1.5. Conclusions... 33

2.1.6. References ... 38

3. E

... 41

3.1. Temporal dynamics of event-related potentials related to goal conduciveness and power appraisals ... 41

3.1.1. Abstract ... 41

3.1.2. Article reprint ... 42

3.2. Temporal dynamics of neural evaluative processes: Event-related potentials related to the processing of goal conduciveness, control, and power appraisals .... 55

3.2.1. Abstract ... 55

3.2.2. Introduction ... 56

3.2.3. Materials and Methods ... 66

3.2.4. Results... 73

3.2.5. Discussion ... 84

3.2.6. References ... 94

3.3. Facial responses to gambling outcomes suggest patterning of appraisals than prototypic patterning of basic emotions: Evidence from facial electromyography 99

3.3.1. Abstract ... 99

3.3.2. Introduction ... 100

3.3.3. Experiment 1 ... 111

3.3.4. Experiment 2 ... 127

3.3.5. General discussion ... 143

3.3.6. References ... 149

3.4. Exploring the impact of locus of control, self-efficacy, and self-esteem on emotion-antecedent appraisals of control and power ... 155

3.4.1. Abstract ... 155

3.4.2. Introduction ... 156

3.4.3. Materials and Methods ... 160

3.4.4. Results and Discussion ... 163

3.4.5. General Discussion ... 173

3.4.6. References ... 177

3.4.7. Supplementary material ... 182

3.5. Temporal dynamics of synchronization pattern between two emotion components ... 197

3.5.1. Abstract ... 197

3.5.2. Introduction ... 198

3.5.3. Methods ... 209

3.5.4. Results... 212

3.5.5. General Discussion ... 229

3.5.6. References ... 238

3.5.7. Supplementary material ... 247

4. G

D

... 254

4.1. Possible limitations ... 254

4.2. Discussion of the findings with respect to the research questions ... 257

4.3. Integration of the ERP findings with similar phenomena investigated in other fields and future research ... 276

4.3.1. The need to identify ‘universal’ appraisal signatures ... 281

4.3.2. Specification of the impact of individual differences on the appraisal process ... 282

4.3.3. Specification of coping potential conceptualization ... 283

4.3.4. Challenges of linking appraisal theory with cognitive neuroscience ... 284

4.4. Conclusions ... 285

4.5. References ... 286

5. B

... 295

6. A

... 319

CHAPTER 1:GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND AIMS OF RESEARCH 1

1. General introduction and aims of research

In psychological research, emotion is one research topic that has a relatively high variety of theoretical traditions and levels of analysis (cf. Cornelius, 1996; Kagan, 2007;

Parrott, 2007; Russell, 2012). For example, there are appraisal theories, basic emotion theories, social constructionist theories, two-dimensional theories, and attribution theories.

Examples for levels of analysis are the biological level and the cognitive level. Although there is no single definition of emotion, there is converging agreement among emotion theories that emotional states are best thought of as processes that unfold over time involving several components (e.g., Kagan, 2007; Keltner & Gross, 1999; Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 1981;

Moors, 2009; Parrott, 2007; Scherer, 2005; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001). These components are appraisal, action tendencies, bodily reaction, expression, and feeling.

The way people think about an event is related to the emotion they have about it. For example, imagine that you are driving on the motorway on your way to meet a friend in the afternoon. While driving, it begins to rain. For this day, a serious thunderstorm was forcast but you do not worry very much because the weather has been perfect all day long. However, within a few minutes the rain drops are getting bigger and suddenly it is dark outside. The rain is becoming so strong that you can hardly see the lanes that mark the sides of the motorway.

Eventually, you have to slow down the car. You are thinking that you will be late to see your friend but that you are still in control of the situation. Thus, at this moment, you feel probably very angry. A few minutes later, the heavy rain is turning into a hailstorm. The strength of the hail increases. You start thinking that your (degree of) control over the situation is vanishing.

Finally, you have to somehow stop the car and park it on the breakdown lane because you cannot see anything but the hailstorm when you look out the window. You are thinking that you will be very late to see your friend. Additionally, you realize that the mobile network is down, when you try to phone your friend. You start thinking that you cannot prevent your

CHAPTER 1:GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND AIMS OF RESEARCH 2 friend from waiting unnecessarily. Further, you are thinking that you cannot do anything about this situation, neither call for help nor drive the car. Thus, at this moment, your anger is presumably changing into despair. Next, you start thinking that though the weather is

uncontrollable, you can (at least) control what you can do in this situation, which is to park the car on the breakdown lane, to stay inside the car, and to wait for the terrible weather to be over. Thinking that you can do something in this uncontrollable situation reduces the intensity of your despair a bit. This example aimed to illustrate that (a) appraising that the situation blocks or obstructs a current goal elicts a negative feeling. In the example, thinking that you are going to be late to see your friend was an appraisal of goal obstruction. Furthermore, (b) thinking about the intrinsic controllability of the situation and determining what you can or cannot do in the situation determines the type of negative feeling. Specifically, appraising that the situation is uncontrollable influences the determination of the personal abilities to act adequately on the situation. In the example, the appraisal of goal obstruction and perceived high control over the situation elicited anger, whereas appraisals of goal obstruction and perceived very low control prompted despair. Thus, the (cumulated) appraisals about goal obstruction, degree of controllability and ability to act on the situation elicited particular (negative) emotions.

1.1. Appraisal processes in emotion

The idea that thinking (i.e., cognition) influences emotion and feelings dates back to Greek philosophy (see Frijda, 1986; Scherer, 1984). Nonetheless, the first theories of emotion, for example, by William James (1884) or Wilhelm Wundt (1902), did not include this emotion component. Years later, in the 1960s, the pioneering work by Magda Arnold (1960), Richard Lazarus (1966), and Stanley Schachter (1964) laid the foundation for cognitive theories of emotion. In the 1980s, different researchers who were working largely independently of each other further developed these cognitive theories of emotion (see for a

CHAPTER 1:GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND AIMS OF RESEARCH 3 review, Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Frijda, 1986; Roseman, 1984; see for a review, Roseman

& Smith, 2001; Scherer, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). They came to be known as appraisal theories of emotion.

The central tenet of appraisal theories is that the underlying mechanism of emotion is appraisal. Appraisal refers to rapid, automatic, and subjective evaluations of objects or events (e.g., Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). The events can occur outside or within the person. They are judged regarding their relevance and their relation to current goals and resources. Based on these evaluations, a particular emotional response is elicited with specific correlates in the central and the peripheral response systems. For example, the emotion of fear can be aroused by appraisals of goal obstruction and very low power to act, and is accompanied by inner eyebrow raise, lip corner retraction, and increase of general muscle tone; joy can be aroused by appraisals of goal conduciveness and high control, and might involve smiling and a decrease of the general muscle tone (cf., Scherer, 2001).

Appraisal theories assume that the emotions people experience toward an event are predictable from the appraisals they have made about it (for an overview, see, e.g., Scherer et al., 2001). They provide theoretical frameworks about the appraisal processes. Because emotions are the immediate result of a subjective meaning analysis (i.e., appraisal), the person is prepared to do something about the object or event resulting in an adaptive reaction to maintain or to achieve well-being.

Although appraisal theories resemble each other much more than they deviate from each other (see for a review, Ellsworth, 1991; Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003), there are some important differences, for example, in the appraisals considered to be most important for the subjective meaning analysis. Furthermore, some appraisal theories make particular predictions about the relation between appraisals, the relation between appraisal and other emotion

components such as facial expression and action tendencies, and the influence of beliefs on

CHAPTER 1:GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND AIMS OF RESEARCH 4 appraisals. Specifically, the Component Process Model (Scherer, 1984, 2001, 2009) proposes a particular sequence of appraisals, a specific appraisal-driven response patterning in the other emotion components, appraisal biases, and a synchronization processes between emotion components.

1.1.1. Scherer’s Component Process Model

The appraisal theory guiding this thesis research is Scherer’s Component Process Model (Scherer, 1984, 2001, 2009). This model defines emotions as dynamic processes consisting of several emotion components that enable adaptive responses through

synchronized changes of the components. (a) Appraisal is the central component that drives the response patterns in the other components, which are (b) autonomic physiology, (c) action tendencies, (d) (motor) expression, and (e) subjective feeling. Each component has a unique function in the emotion process. Through appraisal, people evaluate objects or events that are of major importance to them. The autonomic physiology component regulates the body systems (e.g., the cardio-vascular system). The action tendencies component prepares and directs actions (e.g., approaching or withdrawing from an object). The expression component communicates the reaction and behavioral intention (e.g., a frown can communicate an appraisal of goal obstruction). The subjective feeling component monitors the internal state (e.g., whether there is a felt emotion or not). The Component Process Model provides a comprehensive architecture about the appraisal process, illustrated in Figure 1.

Contrary to other appraisal theories, the model postulates a fixed sequence of

appraisal checks (also called stimulus evaluation checks). Appraisal checks are the “smallest”

unit of the appraisal process. Figure 1 exemplifies this sequence of appraisal checks that are categorized in terms of four major appraisal objectives, which represent the major aspects of information that a person needs to check or to evaluate in order to adaptively react to a salient event:

CHAPTER 1:GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND AIMS OF RESEARCH 5

Figure 1. Comprehensive illustration of the appraisal process and the interrelations of the appraisal process with other components of emotion and psychological structures proposed by the Component Process Model (Figure from Sander, Grandjean, & Scherer, 2005).

(1) Relevance. Appraisal checks that evaluate the relevance of the event, inspect the following aspects about it: (a) Is the event novel (sudden, familiar, or predictable)? (b) Is the event pleasant or unpleasant? (c) Is the event relevant to current goals? (In Figure 1, the red arrow right next to Event symbolizes the prerequisite of the appraisal process: An event initiates the appraisal process only when it is appraised to be of major relevance).

(2) Implication. Appraisal checks assess the event’s implication by checking: (a) Who caused the event?, (b) Why was it caused?, (c) What is the probability of possible outcomes of the event?, (d) To what extent is the event unexpected?, (e) Is the event conducive or obstructive to achieve current goals?, and (f) Is it urgent to act on the event?.

(3) Coping. Appraisal checks determine coping potential by checking: (a) Can natural agents (humans or animals) control the event?, (b) Do I have the power to act on the

CHAPTER 1:GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND AIMS OF RESEARCH 6 event or to change its contingencies?, and (c) Can I adjust to the consequences of the event?

(4) Normative significance. Appraisal checks evaluate the normative significance of the selected response by checking: (a) Is my response to the event compatible with my internal standards? And (b) Is my response to the event compatible with the standards of society?

This thesis research focuses on the appraisal checks of goal conduciveness

(implication), control (coping), and power (coping). These appraisal checks play an important role in the differentiation of emotions, which was illustrated in the example at the beginning of this introductory chapter. The goal conduciveness check judges whether the event helps or blocks goal attainment. The more an event facilitates goal attainment, the more it is appraised as conducive; whereas the more it blocks or delays goal attainment, the more it is appraised as obstructive. The control check determines the extent to which an event or its outcomes can be controlled by people or animals as opposed to other forces (e.g., chance, the weather, etc.).

The power check appraises one’s ability to act in a given situation in order to change the outcomes and contingencies according to current goals, needs, desires, or values. The sources of power can be, for example, physical strength, money, social attractiveness, information, knowledge or expertise (French & Raven, 1959; Klein, 1998). The Component Process Model emphasizes the distinction between the (intrinsic) controllability of events and one’s personal ability to act on the event. A detailed description about the other appraisal checks is provided, for example, by Sander, Grandjean, and Scherer (2005) or by Scherer (2001).

By means of the appraisal process, people constantly scrutinize their environment and internal state to discover changes of personal relevance, which are then further appraised to infer a comprehensive meaning. The Component Process Model postulates that continuous changes in the environment, the body, or the mind trigger a sequential and recursive appraisal

CHAPTER 1:GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND AIMS OF RESEARCH 7 process. In addition, the model does not rule out parallel processing. This assumption is

compatible with the hypothesis of a fixed appraisal check sequence because the essential criterion for the sequence hypothesis is the point at which the processing of an appraisal check reaches preliminary closure. In other words, the processing of the appraisal checks may begin in parallel, but they only reach closure in a fixed sequence: preliminary closure about the degree of goal conduciveness is needed before preliminary closure about coping potential can be achieved. Preliminary closure is a reasonable result of an appraisal check that warrants efferent commands to the response modalities in other emotion components. In Figure 1, the bold descending arrows represent these efferent commands.

Furthermore, the Component Process Model makes specific predictions about the influence of appraisal-driven commands on other emotion components (viz. autonomic physiology, action tendencies, expression, and subjective feeling) in the model’s

componential patterning theory (described in detail in Scherer, 2001; for a most current version, see Scherer, 2009). In particular, the result of each subsequent appraisal check is predicted to differentially and cumulatively drive the response patterns in the other emotion components. The componential patterning theory predicts these patterns for each component.

For example, the appraisals of goal conduciveness and power drive distinct facial expressions.

Efferent commands of the goal conduciveness check are predicted to trigger muscle movements over the brown region (or corrugator region). Thus, appraisals check results of goal obstruction prompt frowning communicating activation and reactivity, that is,

announcing that some action will follow in order to do something about the blockage of current goals. In contrast, a result of goal conduciveness causes relaxation of facial muscles communicating that everything is fine. In comparison, efferent commands of the power check are predicted to drive the response patterning of both the upper and the lower face. For

example, an appraisal check result of low power will trigger eyebrow raising, mouth stretch

CHAPTER 1:GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND AIMS OF RESEARCH 8 and lip corner retraction expressing protection and submission. In contrast, a result of high power will cause frowning and tightening of the lips communicating assertion and

dominance.

Another particular notion of the model is the proposition that appraisal processes interact with other cognitive processes, which can bias appraisal check results. In Figure 1, examples of cognitive processes are provided in the line above the sequence of appraisal objectives. To name but one example, beliefs about oneself (e.g., locus of control is a personal belief of what causes events, and self-efficacy is a belief of one’s ability to attain desired outcomes; Levenson, 1974) provide additional information about one’s resources to act, which are important for a conclusive processing of appraisal checks and the resulting

emotional responses. A person who has high self-efficacy beliefs might often overestimate the degree of power to act on an event, resulting in a tendency to react with anger to most events.

In comparison, another person who has low self-efficacy beliefs could permanently

underestimate the degree of power, producing predominantly emotional responses of fear or sadness. Beliefs about oneself have the potential to bias the processing of the control and the power checks in a stable manner. Stable biases can result in emotional responses that are little adaptive and might lead in the long term to emotional disturbances.

Finally, the Component Process Model differs from other appraisal theories by predicting that synchronized changes in the response patterning of the emotion components are necessary for the emergence of subjective feelings. Only when the synchronization between emotion components reaches a critical threshold a subjective feeling is consciously felt. The emotion components are interdependent and changes in one component are likely to evoke related changes in the other components. Once initiated by efferent commands from the appraisal component, the other components integrate and exchange information about state changes as well as updated efferent commands from the appraisal component. These

CHAPTER 1:GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND AIMS OF RESEARCH 9 processes of information integration and exchange are recursive. They are realized through a complex network of feed-forward and feedback connections (for a detailed example, see, Sander et al., 2005, pp. 322–323).

1.1.2. Empirical evidence

To date, the hypotheses made by the Component Process Model with respect to the sequence hypothesis, the componential patterning theory, the influence of cognitive biases, and the emotion component synchronization have been tested only to a limited extent.

Empirical evidence for a sequential processing of appraisal checks in

psychophysiological recordings was found in several experiments but it is limited to the earlier part of the sequence, namely, the novelty, the intrinsic pleasantness, the goal relevance, and the goal conduciveness checks. In facial expressions, it was shown that the novelty check effects preceded the intrinsic pleasantness check effects (Delplanque et al., 2009), that the relevance check effects occurred earlier than the goal conduciveness check effects (Aue, Flykt, & Scherer, 2007), and that the intrinsic pleasantness check effects preceded the goal conduciveness check effects (Lanctot & Hess, 2007). Regarding the central processing (investigated in brain activity), it was demonstrated that the novelty check effects preceded the intrinsic pleasantness and the goal relevance check effects, and that the intrinsic

pleasantness check effects were followed by the goal conduciveness check effects (Grandjean

& Scherer, 2008). The sequence hypothesis has not been systematically tested for appraisal checks that are hypothesized to be processed subsequently to the goal conduciveness check.

Therefore, this thesis research pursues testing of the sequence hypothesis to “later” appraisal checks of the sequence. In particular, the prediction that the processing of the control and the power checks reach preliminary closure later than the goal conduciveness was examined. In two extensive experiments, this prediction was tested by recording event-related potentials and facial electromyography.

CHAPTER 1:GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND AIMS OF RESEARCH 10 Empirical evidence for the appraisal-driven response differentiation was obtained in autonomic physiology and facial muscle activity (Aue et al., 2007; Aue & Scherer, 2008, 2011; Delplanque et al., 2009; Kappas & Pecchinenda, 1999; Kreibig, Gendolla, & Scherer, 2012; Lanctot & Hess, 2007; Smith, 1989; van Reekum, 2000; van Reekum et al., 2004), in brain activity (Grandjean & Scherer, 2008) as well as in voice physiology and acoustics (Johnstone et al., 2007). The appraisal-driven response pattering of the novelty, the intrinsic pleasantness, the goal relevance, and the goal conduciveness checks have been investigated in many experiments, but only one experiment was designed to examine the response patterning of the control and the power checks (second experiment van Reekum, 2000). In this

experiment, the control and the power check effects were investigated in peripheral psychophysiological measures such as facial electromyography and heart rate. In order to examine the plausibility of the notion that appraisal check results drive the responses in facial expressions, facial muscle activity (using facial electromyography) and brain activity (using electroencephalography or event-related potentials) should be concurrently recorded. Such simultaneous recordings make it possible to examine whether patterns in brain activity—

associated with the processing of appraisal checks—are similarly found in facial muscle activity patterns. Hence, to replicate and to extend previous findings, this thesis investigates the appraisal-driven response differentiation of the goal conduciveness, the control, and the power checks in facial electromyography. Further, it compares these appraisal check patterns in facial electromyography with the appraisal check patterns in event-related potentials.

Empirical research on the relationship between the appraisal process and personal belief variables is scarce. The relationship is predicted to be important because it can help explain individual differences in the appraisal process. Personal beliefs can bias the

processing of appraisal checks in a systematic way, which can, for example, cause permanent overestimation or underestimation of one’s controllability over the course of events. Those

CHAPTER 1:GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND AIMS OF RESEARCH 11 biased estimations can elicit less adaptive emotional responses and can lead to emotional disturbances in the long run. Previously, control beliefs (i.e., illusion of control, locus of control) were proposed that can influence the processing of the control check as well as self- beliefs (e.g., self-esteem and general self-efficacy) that can bias the processing of the power check (Wranik-Odehnal, 2005). These hypothesized relationships between the coping potential appraisal and the self-belief variables have not been tested so far. Therefore, in this thesis, they are examined for the first time.

Empirical examination of the synchronization hypothesis has started recently. For the appraisal component and the subjective feeling component, information integration and exchange was investigated using electroencephalography. For the appraisal component, one study demonstrated that appraisal checks have specific brain state correlates of a particular oscillatory brain activity (Grandjean & Scherer, 2008). For the subjective feeling component, one study showed that states of subjective feelings had a different oscillatory brain activity pattern than states of no subjective feelings (Dan-Glauser & Scherer, 2008). Despite this empirical evidence, the mechanisms and rules underlying the information integration and exchange within and between emotion components remain unclear. Therefore, in a first step in this thesis, the synchronization patterns between the appraisal and the facial expression components are investigated by examining the coherence between the event-related potential and the facial electromyography data.

To summarize, existing evidence in support of the sequence hypothesis, the

componential patterning theory, the influence of cognitive biases, and emotion component synchronization exists but is rather limited. In this thesis, these identified lacks of empirical knowledge will be addressed. The focus will be on four levels of analysis—the biological, the cognitive, the theoretical, and the behavioral level.

CHAPTER 1:GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND AIMS OF RESEARCH 12

1.2. Level of analysis

Emotion phenomena can be investigated at any of several levels of analysis (for a review, see Parrott, 2007). For example, they can be studied in terms of biology, cognition, behavior, or social context. The choice of the research methods depends on the choice of the level of analysis. On the biological level, emotions are studied in central nervous system activity such as event-related potentials, resting electroencephalography activity or frequency bands, or in the periphery of the body (e.g., facial muscle activity changes or heart rate changes). On the cognitive level, emotions can be studied via self-report measures or more objective measures of reaction times. In self-report measures, people rate their beliefs or current affective states, and in reaction time, cognitive processes can be indirectly inferred.

For example, the longer the reaction time the more complex and less automatic was the processing of the task stimulus and the respective behavioral response selection. Moreover, emotion phenomena can be investigated on a theoretical level by reviewing the existing literature on a particular topic, which aims to analyze and integrate published (and unpublished) material.

The research in this thesis links particularly the biological level with the cognitive level. In other words, research methods of cognitive neuroscience and behavioral analyses of cognitive emotion psychology are employed to test the predictions about the appraisal process made by the Component Process Model. In light of the outlined research goals, the methods of choice on the biological level are electroencephalography and facial electromyography.

Electroencephalography offers a high temporal resolution in the range of milliseconds which is necessary to investigate the temporal dynamics of the neural evaluative processes that underlie the appraisal process. Facial electromyography allows for concurrent measurement of immediate and often subtle facial expressions that are hypothesized to be driven by the results of appraisal checks. The methods investigating the cognitive level are self-report measures

CHAPTER 1:GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND AIMS OF RESEARCH 13 that assess participants’ self-beliefs and subjective feeling states, which are predicted to be associated with the central processing of appraisal checks. On the theoretical level, existing literature is reviewed with respect to similarities and contradictions in the conceptualizations of coping potential appraisal. Therefore, the major appraisal theories and Weiner’s attribution theory are compared with each other. The social level of analysis is left out in the experiments of the thesis because this analysis is beyond the scope of the research questions that are

addressed in this thesis. For example, neither interaction between people, effects of gender, nor effects of social contexts (e.g., work, school, or sport clubs) on the appraisal process are studied.

1.3. The aims of the thesis research

The major goals of this thesis research are to test the predicted temporal dynamics of emotion-antecedent appraisal for implication (i.e., the goal conduciveness check) and coping (i.e., the control and the power check: Q1.1 and Q1.2; investigated in event-related

potentials), to test the predicted response patterning in facial expressions for these appraisals (Q2; investigated in facial electromyography), to investigate the predicted influence of individual difference variables on the control and the power checks (Q3), and to examine the plausibility of the synchronization hypothesis between two emotion components (appraisal and facial expression; Q4). In the theoretical part of this thesis the major appraisal theories and Weiner’s attribution theory are analyzed with respect to similarities and differences in the conceptualizations of the aspects that are estimated by coping potential appraisal. Second, in the empirical part, two experiments are conducted to address the following research questions:

Q1.1 What are the temporal dynamics of the processing of the goal conduciveness check, the control check, and the power check?

Q1.2 To what extent does perceived control influence the processing of the power check?

CHAPTER 1:GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND AIMS OF RESEARCH 14 Q2. Do facial responses show a sequential and cumulative pattern of appraisal check

results?

Q3 To what extent do self-beliefs that are hypothesized to be related to the control check and the power check influence their processing and the associated appraisal-driven effects in facial expressions?

Q 4 Can time intervals be identified that suggest synchronization between the central processing of appraisal checks and the associated efferent effects in facial expressions?

1.4. Outline of the thesis structure

Each chapter of the thesis addresses one of the research aims. In chapter 2, the theoretical part of the thesis, the major appraisal theories and Weiner’s attribution theory are analyzed regarding the conceptualization of coping potential appraisal. Based on this analysis, the key aspects of coping potential appraisal are extracted. Finally, the role of the identified key aspects in the estimation of coping potential are discussed.

Chapter 3, the empirical part of the thesis, consists of five divisions, one for each research question. In chapter 3.1, the experiment investigates the temporal dynamics of the processing of the goal conduciveness and the power checks. In this experiment, a gambling task is used to manipulate the information about these appraisal checks. The predicted sequential processing of the goal conduciveness and the power checks is tested in event- related potentials (using electroencephalography; Q1.1). In chapter 3.2, the processing of coping potential appraisal is further investigated in a second experiment by additionally implementing a manipulation of the control check into the gambling task. Similarly, in event- related potentials, the temporal dynamics of the processing of the goal conduciveness, the control and the power checks are examined (Q1.1, Q1.2). In chapter 3.3, facial expressions are inspected regarding the predictions that the forehead, the brow, and the cheek regions are

CHAPTER 1:GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND AIMS OF RESEARCH 15 driven by results of the control and the power checks (Q2), and that effects of the goal

conduciveness check precede effects of both the control and the power checks in time (Q1.1).

In chapter 3.4, the impact of self-belief variables (i.e., locus of control, self-esteem, and general self-efficacy) on the processing of the control and the power checks as well as the related appraisal-driven facial expressions are explored (Q3). The empirical part finishes with chapter 3.5, in which the synchronization hypothesis is examined for the appraisal (in event- related potentials) and the facial expression components (in facial electromyography) using the psychophysiological data of the two experiments. According to the synchronization hypothesis, the response patterns in event-related potentials and facial electromyography are predicted to show a considerable amount of response coherence over time, suggesting moments of synchronization during the response unfolding (Q4).

The thesis concludes with a general discussion of the conducted research in Chapter 4.

The contributions are discussed with respect to the aims of this thesis research. The caveats associated with the experimental design and the analyses are also taken into account. The general discussion provides suggestions for future directions of research on emotion- antecedent appraisal processes.

CHAPTER 1:GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND AIMS OF RESEARCH 16

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CHAPTER 1:GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND AIMS OF RESEARCH 20

CHAPTER 2:THEORETICAL PART 21

2. Theoretical part

2.1. The estimated situational aspects of coping potential appraisal 2.1.1. Abstract

People evaluate the importance of events by means of appraisal. Appraisal theory proposes different appraisals as central in the elicitation and differentiation of emotions. For example, the coping potential appraisal, whereby people judge their potential to act on the eliciting event, is important because it is predicted to further differentiate positive and

negative emotions. Specifically, appraising an event as obstructive to a current goal prompts a negative emotion, which is further differentiated as sadness if coping potential appraisal determines that nothing can be done about this situation (i.e., low coping potential). On the contrary, if it determines that something can be done to maintain or attain a goal (i.e., high coping potential), the negative emotion is differentiated into anger. In this review, the major appraisal theories and Weiner’s attribution theory are examined regarding the

conceptualization of the emotion-antecedent coping potential appraisal. Emotion-antecedent coping has received little attention in comparison to coping processes that can take place after emotion elicitation, or in the area of achievement contexts. Those coping processes that are subsequent to emotions are not addressed in this review. Instead, the aim is to identify the estimated aspects of an event, which are referred to as coping potential or control appraisal.

On basis of these aspects, directions are highlighted for empirical studies and theoretical refinements of coping potential appraisal.

Keywords: emotion-antecedent coping, appraisal theory, attribution theory, controllability, ability Introduction

CHAPTER 2:THEORETICAL PART 22

2.1.2. Introduction

Emotion-antecedent coping potential appraisal is important to further differentiate emotions towards an event that has been appraised in terms of goal relevance and goal congruency (Scherer, 2001). The appraisal approach to emotion explains situational and individual differences in emotional responses by assuming appraisal as the underlying mechanism. The central notion is that the way people appraise a situation determines the elicited emotion. Appraisal theories define emotion by the function it serves, which is to promote adaptive behavioral responses that have the general goal of maintaining personal well-being (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). Although appraisal theories differ in the number and the labels of conceptualized appraisal criteria, they commonly suggest appraisals of novelty, valence, goal/need, coping potential/agency, and norms/values in the personal meaning analysis of situations (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Scherer, 1988). The central notion of appraisal theories is that the results of appraisal criteria determine the emotional response. For example, a situation that is appraised as relevant and obstructive to current goals elicits a negative emotion. Next, whether this negative emotion is differentiated into anger, sadness, fear, or disgust depends on the degree of appraised coping potential. In particular, different appraisal theories predict that appraisals of low coping potential will elicit sadness, whereas appraisals of high coping potential will prompt anger (Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, 1984;

Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990; e.g., Scherer, 2001; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Smith &

Kirby, 2009a; Smith & Lazarus, 1990).

Although coping potential appraisal is considered important in the appraisal process, the major appraisal theories differ in the labeling and the level of detailed conceptualization of this appraisal. Weiner’s attribution theory conceptualizes controllability as one central

attribution in the elicitation of distinct emotion in achievement contexts. His attribution theory is included in the theoretical review because the theory makes a strong link between particular

CHAPTER 2:THEORETICAL PART 23 (subjective) cognitions and emotions. The present review aims to analyze the

conceptualizations of coping potential that are made by the major appraisal theorists (Lazarus, Frijda, Roseman, Smith and Ellsworth, Scherer, and Smith and colleagues), and Weiner’s attribution theory in order to identify the similarities and differences between these theories.

The expectation is that the identified aspects of coping/control appraisals provide a comprehensive picture of what appraisal theories refer to when they define emotion- antecedent coping potential appraisal. Based on the identified similarities and differences, hypotheses about the cognitive mechanisms that underlie the estimation of coping potential appraisal can be formulated, which can be tested in experimental studies. In other words, the overarching question of this review is: What are the central aspects of coping potential appraisal according to the selected theories?

2.1.3. Conceptualizations of coping potential appraisals

Given that the review aims to compare the definitions of coping/control appraisals in the major appraisal theories and Weiner’s attribution theory, the respective theories are not explained in full length. Table 1 provides the extracted key aspects that each theory used in defining coping/control appraisal. The definitions of coping potential appraisal are presented in form of operationalized appraisal questions. Furthermore, the key aspect of each definition was identified and labeled correspondingly. The definitions are sorted according to the key aspects.

2.1.3.1. The cognitive-motivational-relational theory by Lazarus

Lazarus organizes appraisal into two categories of primary and secondary appraisals (Lazarus, 1991). Primary appraisal comprises the criteria of goal relevance, goal

congruence/incongruence, and goal content. Secondary appraisal determines the options and prospects for coping. It involves the criteria of agency (oneself or another person), coping

CHAPTER 2:THEORETICAL PART 24 potential and future expectations about the predicted success of owns actions. Coping

potential evaluates whether and how the person-environment relationship can be improved.

Lazarus (1991) conceptualized coping potential as an appraisal that is important for generating emotions which is distinct from a coping process that follows emotions. The appraisal of coping potential determines the possibilities to influence an event and to improve its potential outcome. Coping potential appraises the degree to which a person believes coping is possible by any means (Smith & Lazarus, 1993). In contrast to action tendencies that are more rigid and automatic, Lazarus conceptualization of the coping process refers to strategies that are more psychological, complex, deliberate, and planful. As coping strategies, Lazarus distinguished between problem-focused and emotion-focused coping (cf. Lazarus, 1991).

Lazarus also considered a control aspect to be important in the emotion process. In an earlier work that focused on the relationship between stress, appraisal, and coping (Lazarus &

Folkman, 1984), he made a clear distinction between control as a (general or situational) belief that influences appraisal and as cognitive or behavioral efforts to deal with a stressful encounter.

Lazarus latest definition of coping potential was used for the present review (Lazarus, 2001). Coping potential appraisal is defined to consist primarily of the conviction about one’s ability (or inability) to act on a situation in order to change it to the better. This definition is included in Table 1 in form of two appraisal questions, which have been labeled as conviction about one’s ability and conviction about one’s inability. Lazarus emphasized that the

estimation of the ability to act is rather a subjective belief than a correct assessment of the objective controllability of a situation. Moreover, a subjective ability belief is highly situation specific.

CHAPTER 2:THEORETICAL PART 25 2.1.3.2. Theory of the core of emotion processes by Frijda

In an eclectic approach, Frijda (Frijda, 1986) encompassed all appraisal dimensions that are necessary to maximize a detailed differentiation between emotional states. He holds the view that it is best to think of emotions as processes “at the level of goals and action control rather than at the level of incipient or overt action” (Frijda, Kuipers, & Terschure, 1989, p. 213). In his theory of emotion, Frijda (1986, p. 454) described a diagnoser as a core appraisal of the emotion process. The diagnoser appraises a situation in terms of possible actions. Furthermore, in Frijda’s opinion, controllability influences primarily emotional intensity.

In his empirical work (Frijda, 1987; Frijda et al., 1989), Frijda and his collaborators showed that the appraisal dimensions of modifiability (“Was the situation’s outcome

immutable, or could someone or something still change it in some way?”) and controllability (“Could you still affect the situation in any way?”) loaded on the same factor in a factor analysis of the dimensionality of appraisal. In other words, the finding suggested a single bipolar dimension of a controllability-uncontrollability appraisal.

2.1.3.3. Roseman’s appraisal theory about emotions

Roseman’s appraisal theory tries to specify the appraisal criteria that elicit discrete emotions. In his theory he conceptualizes an appraisal of control potential that evaluates

“whether there is nothing one can do or something one can do about the motive-relevant aspects of an event” (Roseman, 2001, p. 68). The appraisal result is binary: the situational coping potential can be appraised as high or low. This implies that if personal abilities to influence an event are appraised as high, behavioral efforts are mobilized, whereas when they are appraised as low, no behavioral efforts are initiated.

The theoretical conceptualization of coping potential in Roseman’s theory has slightly changed over the years. Based on the empirical evidence of his studies, he changed the initial appraisal label of legitimacy into power and then into control potential or influence potential

CHAPTER 2:THEORETICAL PART 26 (Roseman, 1984, 1991; 1996, respectively), which might reflect that it is difficult to find an appropriate label for this appraisal. Appraisal of control potential evaluates whether an event is controllable by the self, and whether one could do something about an event to change it (Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996, p. 262). Control potential does not evaluate whether one is able to cope with an event, which would be an appraisal of coping potential. Roseman and his collaborators distinguish two appraisals of control potential (i.e., perceived ability to act on an event) and coping potential (i.e., capacity to adjust to an event). For the sake of

simplicity, in the review, coping potential appraisal refers to Roseman’s appraisal concept of control appraisal.

Roseman (2001) proposes two levels of processing at which coping (control) potential appraisal is carried out by people. He distinguishes between a sophisticated assessment and a primitive judgment. The sophisticated assessment is based on a complex analysis of the skills and the resources a person has at his or her disposal. These appraisals are then compared to the situational demands as well as to the skills and the resources that other people have in this situation. Thus, the sophisticated assessment involves social comparisons and evaluates the availability of external (social) resources. On the contrary, the primitive judgment is based on the perceived speed (or suddenness) as well as the intensity of a situational input. However, he does not further specify whether these assessments, which differ in their processing complexities, are processed in parallel or in a sequence, whether they are always processed and to what extent their processing depends on the situation.

2.1.3.4. Structural appraisal model by Smith and Ellsworth

Smith and Ellsworth (1985) distinguish six independent appraisal criteria in their structural appraisal model. Two of them are self-other responsibility/control and situational control.

CHAPTER 2:THEORETICAL PART 27 The appraisal of the self-other responsibility/control evaluates two aspects: agency (self or others) and whether the agent(s) had situational control (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).

The situational control appraisal evaluates whether anyone could control the circumstances or not. Although the appraisal of situational control is orthogonal to the appraisal of self-other responsibility/control, the appraisal outcomes along these two dimensions are predicted to be related (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). In the subsequent study, the appraisals of self-other

responsibility/control and situational control were highly related with each other contradicting a finding of a preceding study (Smith & Ellsworth, 1987). This inconsistency was explained by the different contexts of both studies indicating that the appraisal of coping potential (i.e., self-other responsibility/control and situational control) is context depend. Possible

underlying mechanisms are not specified in the structural appraisal model of emotion.

2.1.3.5. The Component Process Model by Scherer

In the Component Process Model (Scherer, 1984, 2001, 2009) one of the four central appraisal criteria is coping potential determination. Coping potential appraisal is predicted to consist of three appraisal aspects: (1) control, (2) power, and (3) adjustment (Scherer, 1984, 2001, 2009). Furthermore, the model predicts that these three appraisal aspects are assessed in a fixed sequence. Such a strong assumption about a sequential appraisal processing is not made by the other theories. The sequential processing of coping potential appraisal is predicted to be as follows: first, the control check assesses to what extent an event or its outcomes can be influenced by natural agents (people or animals). Next, if control is possible, the power check evaluates one’s power to exert control or to recruit others for help. If the appraisal result of control and power is that not much or nothing can be done about an event, the adjustment check determines how well a person can adjust or live with the consequences.

The Component Process Model emphasizes that control and power appraisals are independent of each other. Control refers to the evaluation whether an event can generally be