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(2)2 Dear Colleagues, Through the last three decades, emerging infectious diseases continued to be a major cause of morbidity and mortality in the world

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In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Address by

DR HUSSEIN A. GEZAIRY REGIONAL DIRECTOR

WHO EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN REGION to

THE INTERCOUNTRY MEETING ON

AVIAN INFLUENZA AND PREPAREDNESS FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN REGION

Cairo, Egypt, 28–30 November 2005

Dear Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen,

It gives me great pleasure to welcome you all to this intercountry meeting on avian influenza and preparedness for pandemic influenza in the Eastern Mediterranean Region. I would like to express my great appreciation to all of you for being here in Cairo to share with each other your thoughtful ideas on how to manage emerging outbreaks of avian influenza and strategically prepare for the anticipated pandemic of influenza. A warm welcome is extended to our colleagues from WHO headquarters in Geneva, the US Naval Medical Research Unit Three (NAMRU-3)––a WHO collaborating centre, the distinguished members of the Surveillance Regional Advisory Group (SRAG), and to the representatives from our Member States.

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Dear Colleagues,

Through the last three decades, emerging infectious diseases continued to be a major cause of morbidity and mortality in the world. Since December 2003, outbreaks of the highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza virus have occurred in poultry populations across Asia and parts of Europe. The outbreaks are historically unprecedented in scale and geographical spread. Their economic impact on the agricultural sector of the affected countries has been large and has generated a worldwide concern. Since late July 2005, outbreaks in domestic poultry as well as wild birds have been reported in the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Turkey and Romania. Three contiguous WHO regions – Western Pacific, South- East Asia and Europe – now have H5N1 activity in wild fowl and poultry stocks. Evidence shows that the H5N1 virus is probably endemic in many parts of Asia. It has established an ecological niche in poultry, making it extremely difficult to control outbreaks. Outbreaks have recurred despite aggressive control measures, including the culling of more than 140 million poultry birds as of September 2005. Human cases, with an overall fatality rate of around 50%, have been reported in Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand and Viet Nam. Almost all human infections can be linked to contact with infected poultry.

The increasing likelihood that the current unprecedented and wide spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 will result in emergence of a new virus, causing a future human pandemic influenza, is a serious growing concern to the whole word. The high levels of morbidity and mortality associated with pandemic influenza in the last century are simply dreadful to contemplate. The current avian influenza outbreaks are caused by a highly pathogenic influenza virus that may re-assort or mutate to adapt itself to human strains. There are three prerequisites to start an influenza pandemic: emergence of a new virus, ability of the new virus to replicate and cause disease in humans and ability of the new virus to spread efficiently from human to human. The first two prerequisites have already been met. A pandemic of human influenza can spread rapidly and exponentially around the entire globe in 6–12 months. It can lead to unimaginable levels of illness, suffering, death, social disruption and economic disaster. The timing and severity of a flu pandemic is uncertain, but experts predict a pandemic will occur.

The emergence of acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) clearly reflected this growing threat. Among the many different lessons we learned from the SARS outbreak was that an

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emerging infectious disease in one country is a threat to all other countries; infectious diseases do not respect international political borders. Even in the absence of a curative drug and preventive vaccine, emerging infections can be contained with high level government commitment, strengthening of epidemiological and public health services, and through international and intercountry collaboration. Needless to say, the role of the World Health Organization (WHO) and other international technical agencies is critical in catalysing international cooperation and support. Appropriate communication with the public, media and other stakeholders is essential. Global partnerships and rapid sharing of data and information enhance preparedness and response.

With the recent developments in Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean Region is now surrounded by foci of outbreaks of avian influenza. The flight paths of migratory birds pass through the Region on their way between Asia, Europe and Africa. The daily dynamic interaction between many countries in the Region with other countries, especially Asian countries, through the movement of expatriate workers, tourism and trade, could easily result in introduction of influenza into the Region and further dissemination of influenza to the whole world. The Region is host to extremely crowded religious congregations, such as the hajj and umra pilgrimages to Makkah. The hajj is attended by more than two million persons

from more than 140 countries from all over the world, and could provide an excellent setting for further spread of the disease to the whole world.

We need to be well prepared by strengthening pandemic preparedness at all levels.

There is need to prepare regional and national pandemic preparedness plans with strong surveillance components for both animal and human influenza. This is an endeavour that requires establishment of continuous and exemplary collaboration between the human and animal sectors. This is why we have invited veterinarians to attend this important meeting.

Our goal is to detect and rapidly report the occurrence of avian influenza in our countries as it occurs and to spare no effort in this regard. We are urging all governments to work now on a pandemic preparedness plan, so that even in an emergency such as this, they will be able to provide basic public services such as transport, sanitation and power to minimize the risk of transmission of avian influenza to humans with aggressive response to animal outbreaks. The importance of having detailed and comprehensive preparedness plans, including a risk communication strategy and procurement of antivirals for stockpiling, among other activities, can not be over-emphasized. Together with our Member States, we at WHO, the World

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Organization for Animal Health (OIE) and the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations can be catalysts for change in the crucial interface between humans and animals. Planning must include international cooperation between wealthy and poor countries to reduce the opportunity for national and international spread and to reduce the death, illness and social disruption which have been a feature of all previous influenza pandemics.

Dear colleagues,

It is time to establish and strengthen our laboratory capacities in viral diseases, promote research activities and local production of vaccines. There is a long way to go but we have to make a start without further delay.

I would like to thank you all again, and ask all of you to make the utmost benefit of this meeting through sound discussions and exchange of ideas for developing strategic plans to contain and combat the anticipated threat of pandemic influenza. I wish you all a successful meeting and a pleasant stay in Cairo.

Références

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