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Contents
Acknowledgements ii
I General Introduction
1II Theoretical background.
91 RP analysis of temporal profiles 10
1.1 Introduction . . . 10
1.1.1 Temporal profiles . . . 13
1.2 A model of rational anticipation and adaptation . . . 16
1.2.1 Loewenstein and Prelec’s model of temporal profiles . . . 19
1.2.2 A numerical example. . . 21
1.3 Nonparametric characterization. . . 27
1.3.1 Rationalizability and revealed preference conditions . . . 27
1.4 Empirical application . . . 30
1.5 Conclusion . . . 34
2 Non-intersecting Pareto Curves 35 2.1 Introduction . . . 35
2.2 Notation and definitions . . . 38
2.3 The no intersection property. . . 39
2.4 Transferable utility . . . 44
2.5 Applications . . . 46
2.5.1 Two-sided matching . . . 46
2.5.2 The Coase theorem . . . 50
2.5.3 Becker’s Rotten kid Theorem . . . 52
2.6 Maximal admissible NIP classes. . . 54
2.7 Conclusion . . . 57
III Applications.
58 3 Self-financed training and the marriage. 59 3.1 Introduction . . . 593.2 Data. . . 63
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3.3 Results . . . 65
3.3.1 Robustness . . . 73
3.4 Marriage and self-financed training: A possible mechanism . . . 86
3.4.1 Testing the bargaining hypothesis . . . 89
3.5 Conclusion . . . 93
4 Intra-household insurance and leverage constraints. 94 4.1 Introduction . . . 94
4.2 Data. . . 98
4.3 Empirical analysis. . . 100
4.4 Life cycle model without commitment . . . 108
4.4.1 Parameterization . . . 114
4.5 Identification and Estimation . . . 119
4.6 Results . . . 121
4.6.1 Time use and leverage based constraints . . . 122
4.6.2 Response to income shocks . . . 126
4.6.3 Changes in the leverage constraints . . . 128
Changes in the LTI limit . . . 128
4.7 Conclusion . . . 130
IV General conclusion
132V References
136 A Appendix of Chapter 1 148 A.0.1 Summary statistics . . . 148A.0.2 Proof of Proposition 5. . . 148
A.0.3 Proof of Proposition 7. . . 149
A.0.4 Connections between AAER, Loewenstein and Prelec and the lifecycle models . . . 150
B Appendix of Chapter 2 152 B.1 Proofs. . . 152
B.2 Construction and properties ofG(u,f) . . . 167
C Appendix of Chapter 3 169 C.0.1 Summary statistics of the dataset . . . 169
C.0.2 Intensive margin of training: counts . . . 170
C.0.3 Training and demographics: Probit estimation . . . 172
C.0.4 Credit constraint . . . 173
C.0.5 Labor force attachment: cumulative measure . . . 176
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D Appendix of Chapter 4 183
D.0.6 Working hours and p-LTI . . . 183
D.0.7 Marginal effects across LTV distribution. . . 185
D.0.8 Age difference between spouses as distribution factor. . . 187
D.0.9 No commitment or limited commitment . . . 190
D.0.10 Leverage ratios and employment rates. . . 190
D.0.11 Negative financial shocks . . . 192
D.0.12 Wage processes . . . 193
D.0.13 Fertility . . . 194
D.0.14 Initial bargaining . . . 195
D.0.15 Initial assets . . . 195
D.0.16 Solution method . . . 196