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Abbreviations ... 10
List of Figures ... 11
Introduction: The puzzle of contingent protection ... 13
1. The puzzle of contingent protection and the research question ... 14
2. The research ... 20
3. What is contingent protection? ... 24
4. The cases under study: the Unites States trade administration, U.S. testimonies to the U.S. Congress, the European Union Commission and stakeholders in the European Union ... 33
5. How this research fills a gap ... 42
6. Outline of the dissertation ... 48
Chapter 1: Constructing contingent protection through discourse, narratives, and discourse coalitions ... 53
1. Introduction ... 53
2. A Discourse theory approach of contingent protection ... 55
2.1. Defining discourse ... 55
2.2. Discourse and the discursive order ... 57
2.3. Discourse analysis as the study of subject-positioning ... 59
2.4. Discourse and power relations ... 63
3. Some epistemological considerations ... 65
4. Conceptual framework and methodology ... 67
4.1. Constructing the social world through narratives ... 67
4.2. Shared discourse: Discourse coalitions ... 74
4.3. Methodological steps ... 81
5. Conclusion ... 84
Chapter 2: Contingent protection as enforcement: the US Administration discourse ... 87
1. Introduction: How to study the US Administration discourse ... 87
1.1. Defining the scope of analysis: on the actors under scrutiny ... 88
2. Constructing contingent protection through the narrative on enforcement ... 91
2.1. Beginning of the narrative: the problems in the United States trade relations ... 93
2.1.1. The issues that call for enforcement ... 94
2.1.1.1. Issue 1: Unfair trade practices and distortions ... 94
2.1.1.2. Issue 2: The unleveled playing field ... 97
2.1.1.3. Issue 3: The need to defend US trade rights ... 98
2.1.2. The special case of the U.S.-China problem ... 101
2.2. Middle of the narrative: contingent protection as an instrument of enforcement and its discursive components ... 104
2.2.1. The dimensions of enforcement and contingent protection and the place of contingent protection as a tool of enforcement ... 105
2.2.2. The articulation of contingent protection within the enforcement narrative ... 108
2.2.2.1. The enforcement of US trade laws and the defense of US trade rights ... 108
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2.2.2.2. Framing anti-dumping and countervailing duties in the
enforcement narrative ... 111
2.2.2.3. Safeguards as a tool of enforcement ... 116
2.2.2.4. Contingent protection as discursive embedded liberalism ... 120
2.2.2.5. Us and them in the US Administration discourse: the misuse of contingent protection by third parties ... 126
2.2.2.6. The so-called emerging issues and contingent protection: the case of currency manipulation ... 133
2.3. End of the narrative: the construction of the effects of contingent protection ... 136
2.3.1. The main effects: putting folks back on the job ... 137
2.3.2. A leveled playing field reached through contingent protection and the ability to win ... 141
3. Conclusions on the key aspects of the US Administration discourse on contingent protection ... 146
Chapter 3: The discursive construction of Trade Defence Instruments: the case of the European Commission’s discourse ... 153
1. Introduction ... 153
2. The narrative on contingent protection within the EU trade policy ... 157
2.1. Beginning of the narrative: free trade is good ... 158
2.2. Middle of the narrative: “Europe cannot afford to be naïve” ... 160
2.3. End of the narrative: We need to enforce trade rules with trade defence instruments ... 167
2.3.1. Enforcement in the European Commission’s narrative ... 167
2.3.2. Contingent protection as fighting distortions ... 172
2.3.4. Positioning the self and the others ... 175
2.3.5. The reform of Trade Defence Instruments ... 188
3. Conclusion ... 192
Chapter 4: Contending constructions of trade remedies: the discourse coalitions in the United States ... 199
1. Introduction ... 199
1.1. Methodological considerations ... 201
2. Overview of the different narratives on contingent protection ... 203
2.1. The effectiveness axis of narratives on contingent protection ... 205
2.2. The expansion/shrink axis of narratives on contingent protection ... 205
3. Discourse coalition one: Contingent protection is effective but needs to be strengthened and expanded in scope ... 206
3.1. Beginning of the narrative: Contingent protection is a necessary tool to fight unfair trade practices ... 208
3.1.1. Manufacturing and industrial policy in the construction of contingent protection ... 210
3.1.2. Diverging constructions of international economic relations ... 212
3.2. Middle of the narrative: Contingent protection is functioning, but a number of issues are causes for concern ... 213
3.2.1. Contingent protection and the need to strengthen its application ... 214
3.2.2. Contingent protection and the threat of courts ... 216
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3.2.3. Contingent protection and the issue of currency manipulation ... 218
3.2.4. What is at stake according to the narrative ... 223
3.3. End of the narrative: Contingent protection should be reinforced and expanded ... 224
3.3.1. The Government should be more aggressive in its use of trade remedies ... 225
3.3.2. The scope of contingent protection should be expanded because of the emergence of new challenges ... 227
3.4. Conclusions ... 228
4. Discourse coalition two: Contingent protection is ineffective and therefore needs to be reinforced and expanded ... 230
4.1. Beginning of the narrative: Contingent protection is necessary to ensure fair trade ... 231
4.1.1. The case of the meta-discourse on trade with China ... 235
4.2. Middle of the narrative: Contingent protection is failing to provide adequate protection ... 237
4.2.1. Cheating in international trade: the issue of transshipment ... 237
4.2.2. Contingent protection is failing ... 240
4.2.3. Congress’ true intent is not respected ... 242
4.2.4. The result of failing enforcement ... 244
4.3. End of the narrative: There is urgent need to enforce and update contingent protection ... 246
4.3.1. The need to make it easier to use ... 247
4.3.2. The requirement to act on the external dimension and the WTO’s counterproductive role ... 248
4.3.3. The urgent call to reinforce enforcement by changing the law and current practices ... 249
4.3.4. The necessity to expand contingent protection ... 250
4.4. Conclusions ... 251
5. Discourse coalition three: Contingent protection is ineffective and should not be expanded ... 254
5.1. Beginning of the narrative: Free trade is beneficial ... 255
5.2. Middle of the narrative: Contingent protection is detrimental and intrinsically flawed ... 258
5.3. End of the narrative: Other trade measures should be used and contingent protection should not be expanded ... 260
5.4. Conclusion ... 263
6. Discourse coalition four: Contingent protection is effective but needs to be shrunk ... 264
6.1. Beginning of the narrative: Contingent protection is effective and necessary ... 265
6.2. Middle of the narrative: Contingent protection nonetheless contains flaws and presents a risk for international economic relations ... 267
6.3. End of the narrative: The scope of contingent protection should not be expanded and its application not be reinforced ... 270
6.3.1. The issue of the exchange rate and contingent protection ... 273
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6.4. Conclusions ... 275
7. On discourse coalitions’ constructions of contingent protection in the United States ... 276
7.1. The underlying constructions of social reality ... 277
7.2. Understanding the elements of contention between discourse coalitions ... 280
7.3. On the contribution of this chapter to the academic literature ... 281
Chapter 5: Trade Defence Instruments and contending narratives in the European Union ... 283
1. Introduction ... 283
1.1. Mapping the speaking actors ... 287
1.2. The discourse coalitions in the European Union ... 288
1.3. Outline of the chapter ... 289
2. Discourse coalition one: Contingent protection should be expanded in response to new challenges and other forms of unfair trade practices ... 290
2.1. Beginning of the narrative: Contingent protection is an important trade policy tool ... 292
2.2. Middle of the narrative: The current scope of contingent protection is too restrictive ... 293
2.3. End of the narrative: Concrete reforms of trade defence instruments are necessary ... 295
2.4. Conclusion on the first discourse coalition ... 296
3. Discourse coalition two: The Trade Defence Instruments are under threats .. 298
3.1. Beginning of the narrative: Contingent protection is a trade policy tool most important to shield EU businesses ... 299
3.1.1. Contingent protection and unfair trade practices ... 300
3.1.2. The dire effects of unfair trade practices ... 303
3.1.3. The positive impact of trade remedies ... 305
3.1.4. Alleged detrimental effects are overblown ... 307
3.1.4. A fair level of profits for European businesses ... 308
3.2. Middle of the narrative: Contingent protection is under multiple threats in Europe ... 309
3.2.1. The deficient enforcement of TDIs ... 309
3.2.2. The modernization threat ... 311
3.2.3. On China’s (non-)market economy status ... 312
3.3. End of the narrative: Strong policy support for contingent protection is what we need ... 315
4. Discourse coalition three: Contingent protection is protectionism and should be shrunk or phased out ... 320
4.1. Beginning of the narrative: Contingent protection is a form of protectionism ... 320
4.2. Middle of the narrative: The impact of changing international economic relations on contingent protection ... 322
4.3. End of the narrative: Contingent protection should be shrunk ... 324
5. Discourse coalition four: Contingent protection is a necessary trade policy instrument, but it should not be expanded ... 327
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5.1. Beginning of the narrative: Contingent protection is a necessary and
legitimate trade policy tool ... 327
5.2. Middle of the narrative: Yet, contingent protection has serious side effects ... 329
5.2.1. Criticism of trade defence instruments functioning ... 330
5.2.2. Cost for importers and consumers ... 331
5.2.3. The threat to the EU’s trade relations ... 333
5.3. End of the narrative: Contingent protection should be limited in scope, clarified and made transparent ... 334
6. Conclusions on discourse coalitions in the European Union ... 337
Chapter 6: Conclusions ... 343
1. The main teachings of the dissertation ... 344
1.1. On the theoretical approach ... 344
1.2. Competing discourses and the comparison between narratives ... 348
2. A new light on the paradoxes of contingent protection ... 358
2.1. The first paradox of contingent protection ... 358
2.2. The second paradox of contingent protection ... 360
2.4. The third paradox of contingent protection ... 362
3. On most recent developments in the U.S. and EU trade policy ... 365
Annex 1: Methodological considerations on the use of NVIVO in this research ... 375
Annex 2: Supporting information ... 379
Bibliography ... 381
Primary sources ... 381
Interviews ... 418
Legislation and cases ... 419
Statistical resources ... 422
Newspaper articles and blog posts ... 423
Secondary sources ... 427
