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Proulx, G.
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Highrise evacuation: a questionable concept
Proulx, G.
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2001, pp. 221-230
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NRCC-44675
HIGHRISE EVACUATION: A QUESTIONABLE CONCEPT
Guylène Proulx, Ph.D.
Fire Risk Management Program Institute for Research in Construction National Research Council Canada
ABSTRACT
A number of people have died in the process of evacuating highrise buildings during fires. These casualties are found in corridors and stairwells, away from the room of fire origin. In highrise buildings, the fire safety approach has always been to assume that as long as the fire did not start in the means of egress, corridors and stairwells were safe for occupants to evacuate. After reviewing a number of tragic fires, it is argued that for occupants, the compartment of fire origin as well as all corridors and stairwells are the most dangerous places to be during a fire. In North America, the evacuation procedure for most highrise buildings requires that upon hearing the fire alarm signal, occupants should evacuate the building by the closest exit. This evacuation approach is challenged. Instead, the non-evacuation or “stay-in-place” procedure is proposed as the most appropriate behaviour during highrise building fires for highrise residential, hotel, and dormitory buildings.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decades, a number of people have died in the process of evacuating highrise buildings during fires. These casualties have been found by rescue officers in corridors and stairwells, often far away from the site of the fire. It is relatively easy to understand that people who are intimately close to the location of fire origin can be quickly overcome by products of combustion, particularly if these people have limitations or were under the influence of medication, alcohol or drugs. However, it is more difficult to understand that 6 perfectly fit young adults died in the stairwells around the 29th floor of a highrise residential building, when the fire started in an apartment on the 5th floor, as it happened in the Forest Laneway fire [1, 2]. By examining a number of case studies it appears that similar scenarios are reported in other highrise building fires. Victims have been found in corridors and stairwells which are locations that are assumed to be safe means of egress. Further, it is quite disturbing to observe that, in the same fires, occupants who decided to stay in their apartments, even apartments on the fire floor, were safe and non-injured. This makes the evacuation of a highrise building during a fire a questionable concept.
A review of Canadian fire statistics regarding the number of death and injuries in residential buildings indicates that in absolute numbers, there are considerably more casualties in lowrise in comparison to highrise buildings. This fact is not surprising since there are many more lowrise residential buildings in Canada, and therefore, many more people are living in lowrise buildings. However, fires in highrise buildings have the potential of killing a much larger number of occupants than lowrises. Furthermore,
highrise fires tend to become media headlines; especially if the tragedy involves casualties. Highlighting those fires shocks the imagination of the public who believes that fire-wise, highrise buildings are more dangerous than lowrises. This is forcing the fire safety community to find solutions to prevent reoccurrence of innocent victims in highrise fires. Considerable fire protection equipment and systems are now required in highrise buildings; should a change in the evacuation approach be also required?
BACKGROUND OF THE STAY-IN-PLACE APPROACH
In 1983, Judge John B. Webber published his public inquiry report into Canadian fire safety in highrise buildings [3]. In this report he reviewed the circumstances of 5 fires in highrise apartments, 3 hotel and 2 office buildings. Among his recommendations is one regarding a better public education program to promote the alternative of stay-in-place and to increase public knowledge on how to “defend in stay-in-place”.
Further, over 12 years ago, James Macdonald of Travelers Insurance Co. published a report entitled: “Non-evacuation in compartmented fire resistive buildings can save lives and it makes sense” [4]. In this report, Macdonald briefly reviewed 21 fires that occurred in highrise residential, hotel, dormitory and hospital buildings located in the United States, one case was in Canada. These fires, that happened between 1961 and 1988, were reported and published in different issues of the Fire Journal. Of the 113 deaths that occurred in these 21 fires, it is estimated that 93 people (82%) died in the process of evacuation. Further it is reported that of the 113 casualties, 85 or 75% occurred on the fire floor. Macdonald concluded that in fire resistive compartmented buildings, it is safer not to evacuate, that evacuation from the fire floor increases the chances of deaths and that self-closers for corridor doors are important tools to contain and control the spread of fire.
In May 2000, at the NFPA World Fire Safety Congress in Denver, Prof. John Bryan, Charles Jennings, Robert Schifiliti and Mary Marchone spoke under the topic of “To Leave or Not to Leave – That is the Question!”. In a separate talk, without any coordination, I gave a presentation entitled: “Is it wise to evacuate during a highrise fire?”. Both sessions on the stay-in-place approach were well attended and fostered vivid discussions. Consequently, it appears timely to revisit this approach.
It is reported, for 1987-1991, that around 15,000 highrise fires occurred annually in the United States, with an average loss of 74 civilian deaths and nearly 720 civilian injuries [5]. Most highrise fires and associated losses happened in apartment buildings. It is estimated that in highrise apartment buildings, 60% of the fire fatalities were in the same room as the fire when ignition occurred. Regrettably, for many fires, the possible movement and behaviour, as well as the location, of casualties are not always reported.
NEW CASE STUDIES
In order to revisit the stay-in-place approach, other case studies have been studied. Unfortunately, in the past 15 years, very few highrise fires with casualties have been
properly documented and published. Another source of information is the press, since highrise fires are often reported, especially if there were casualties involved. However, the details reported by the press should be considered with care since many reporters tend to wrap up a story without much verification. Further, reporters rarely correct their mistakes, even when pointed out to them.
Among the highrise fires documented, one is the 50th Street East, New York City fire that occurred in a 10-storey residential apartment building on January, 1988 [6]. The fire started in an unoccupied doctor’s office on the first floor at around 8:20 PM. Smoke spread rapidly to the 2 stairwells since the stairwell-doors were propped open on the first floor. Occupants attempted to evacuate their apartments but many had to turn back because of the smoke condition in the 2 stairwells. This fire caused 4 casualties, 3 were found in the 2 stairwells and one person on the 9th floor in an apartment with the main door open. The author of the report commented that; “Tenants who stayed put in their apartment behind closed doors were unharmed”.
The Webber report [3] details 2 highrise residential fires with casualties away from the compartment of fire origin. The first was in August 1982 in a 38-storey apartment building at 88 Bloor St. East in Toronto. The fire started in mid-morning from a cigarette left unattended on a living room couch in an apartment on the 18th floor. The occupant of the apartment fled the fire, leaving the main entrance door open. This fire brought on 1 casualty, a man who lived on the 30th floor was found in the stairwell around the 21st floor. A second fire at 170 Lees Avenue in Ottawa caused 3 casualties. The fire started on the 7th floor of the 20-storey building. The occupant of the apartment of fire origin was smoking in bed and fell asleep. At around 11:30 PM she awoke to find her mattress on fire and fled the apartment. The 2 stairwells of the building became clogged with smoke very rapidly. Two of the casualties were found in the stairwells on the 21st floor and another casualty was found with 5 unconscious occupants in the other stairwell on the 16th floor.
A fire occurred at the Indianapolis Athletic Club in Indianapolis, Indiana on February 1992 [7]. The 9-storey building was housing a private hotel, assembly rooms and athletic club. At the time of the fire there were around 50 occupants in the building. The fire was detected in an assembly room just after midnight on the third floor. Two firefighters died and 4 were injured when the fire flashed-over on the 3rd floor. One civilian casualty was found in a stairwell around the 7th floor, 4 more were injured when they attempted to escape. Little is known about the human behaviour during this fire.
There have been a considerable number of fires in dormitories and fraternity halls in US colleges in past decades. One of these recent fires that has shocked the public is certainly the Seton Hall fire in New Jersey, that occurred in the Boland Hall dormitory which killed 3 students, in January 2000. This fire has not been properly documented and published yet, but a number of articles were published in national and local newspapers. Although details may not be accurately reported in news articles, at this time, it is the only information to draw upon regarding this fire. The dormitory fire started at around 4:30 AM in the 3rd floor lounge of the 6-storey building which housed around 600
students. It appears that many students initially ignored the fire alarm signal since that building was known for its large number of nuisance alarms which totaled to 18 in the 4 months prior to the fire. Students delayed their initial response but were later warned by others to leave. A chaotic evacuation followed, characterized by considerable movement to warn and help friends before leaving the building. Over 50 students were injured by smoke during their evacuation, 3 very seriously and 3 young men died. The press reported however, that 2 students slept through the fire. They were discovered by mid-day, un-injured and in perfect condition. One of these “sleep-in” was in a room on the fire floor. From these facts reported by the press, it appears that occupants could have stayed in their rooms during this fire to evacuate safely later that morning.
For these new cases of highrise fatal fires it appears that the stay-in-place approach could have saved occupants who attempted to escape from compartment other then the compartment of fire origin. To paraphrase Bennan [8] it appears that the recurrent “key feature of the response of both victims and survivors in these fatal fires is their late awareness of the fire incident” which confronted them with substantial quantity of smoke when they attempted to evacuate the building.
TWO DETAILED CASE STUDIES
An important element that should be looked into is if occupants decided to stay in the building and protect-in-place, what was the condition that motivated this decision and what was the outcome. These elements are very difficult to find since they are usually not part of standard reports on fire incidents. Only a few highrise fires have been studied in sufficient detail using interviews or questionnaires, accounting for a representative sample of the occupants, to provide suitable information. Ideally the data obtained after a highrise fire should include:
1. Number of casualties intimate with the location of fire origin 2. Number and location of casualties in other enclosures:
• How did the smoke (or fire) reach these occupants? Main door open, window, ventilation system or other.
3. Number and location of casualties in the means of egress
4. Number and location of occupants who attempted evacuation but had to return home or to seek refuge with others
• Condition and location for turning back • Location and condition in refuge area
5. Number and location of occupants who decided not to evacuate • Rationals for this decision
• Condition in that location
To obtain a fair account of a fire and to understand occupant behaviour, it is important to know what the occupants who survived did. Not too many reports detailed the behaviour of survivors. Two recent Canadian highrise residential fires were studied with an emphasis on the occupant behaviour which provide argument in favor of the stay-in-place approach.
The first fire study is called the Ambleside fire which occurred in Ottawa in January 1997 [9, 10]. At around 4:30 PM on a Friday afternoon, a fire started in the lobby closet of an apartment on the 6th floor of a 25-storey highrise apartment building. The fire possibly started from an unproperly cleaned pipe left in a jacket that was stored in the closet. The 2 occupants of the apartment of fire origin, aged 80 and 82 years old, could not escape since the fire was in the entrance. Although the fire alarm signal sounded and all occupants heard it, most of them decided to stay-in-place, which is the procedure in this apartment building. Upon their arrival, the fire department asked for an announcement to be made on the building voice communication system instructing residents to immediately evacuate the building. Following this message, most occupants attempted to evacuate, only 17% decided to stay in their apartments and "protect in place" as shown in Figure 1. All the occupants located above the fire floor mentioned encountering smoke conditions during their evacuation, only 38 managed to escape without assistance. It appears that the 3 stairwells became clogged with smoke very rapidly. Just over half of the occupants who attempted to evacuate managed to escape. The occupants who were unsuccessful in their attempt returned to their apartment or took refuge in someone else's apartment. Following the evacuation 2 seniors had heart attacks, one of whom died 10 days after the fire. One of the 2 occupants from the apartment of fire origin succumbed from smoke inhalation and severe burns 2 months after the fire.
During this fire, although initially the very large majority of occupants decided to stay-in-place in accordance with the Fire Safety Plan for that building, a majority immediately complied with the evacuation order delivered through the voice communication system. Occupants above the fire floor who stayed home during the whole event did not get smoke inside their apartment. Among the questionnaire respondents, 54% mentioned that some smoke migrated inside their apartment when they opened their main entrance door. Protect-in-place actions such as putting towels, carpet or tape to prevent the smoke from entering was reported by 63% of the respondents. Among the occupants who stayed-in-place, 64% were forming a cluster of 2 to 15 people, which is a concept described by Prof. Bryan following his analysis of a number of highrise fires [11]. While waiting to be rescued the occupants who stayed-in-place were talking, watching TV, listening to the radio and stepping out on the balcony from time to time to check on the fire department activities. After this fire, occupants who had persistently continued their descent in the smoky stairwells to follow the evacuation order were extremely frustrated to discover that occupants who stayed-in-place were safe and uninjured.
The second fire study, which was mentioned previously, is the Forest Laneway fire in North York, which killed 6 occupants in 1992 [1, 2]. In this building, the fire started from a dropped cigarette on a couch of an apartment on the 5th floor of the 29-storey building. Since the fire was discovered at around 5 AM, most occupants were in their apartment in bed when they became aware that something unusual was happening. When the occupant of the apartment of fire origin left his apartment, he left the main door open. Since apartment doors in that building were not yet equipped with self-closing devices the door of the apartment of fire origin remained opened, contaminating the corridor and the stairwell located across the hall that had an unlatched door. As presented in Figure 1, following this fire out of 219 occupants who answered a questionnaire, 71% or 155
occupants decided to stay-in-place once they became aware of the fire. Among the group of people who decided to stay-in-place, a majority of 85 people argued that there was too much smoke to evacuate, 20 thought that it was safer to stay, 19 didn’t know what they were expected to do and 31 were told by others to stay. All the people who decided to stay-in-place had a look in the corridor or the stairwell before making their decision; in doing these investigation activities, 39 took refuge with friends or neighbours to stay-in-place, forming a cluster. Among the 64 occupants who attempted to evacuate the building, only 18 were successful, the 46 others had to turn back; 41 returned to their apartment and 5 took refuge in a neighbour’s apartment, forming a cluster. All the occupants who had to turn back had started their evacuation from above the fire floor; among these evacuees, only 9 successfully evacuated the building that morning. Among the respondents who decided or were forced to stay-in-place, 76% indicated that smoke entered their apartment from the main door (65%) the ventilation system (13%) while many were unsure how it entered. There was significantly more smoke in the apartment above the 15th floor where 90% of the respondents had smoke. A number of protect-in-place activities were indicated by 89% of the respondents who attempted to seal the main door or took refuge on their balcony. The smoke conditions in this fire appeared much worse than the ones of the Ambleside fire.
Figure 1: Evacuation choices and outcomes for the Ambleside and Forest Laneway Fires
The numbers reported in Figure 1, for the Forest Laneway fire, do not account for the 6 people who died in this fire. It is the author’s belief that these victims who started their evacuation from above the fire floor, probably attempted to evacuate down a stairwell and then turned back up the stairs before they were overcome by smoke at the top of either one of the 2 stairwells. It is suggested that they were attempting to seek refuge onto the roof of the building, although the door to the roof was locked. None of the occupants who stayed-in-place during this fire were seriously injured.
Ambleside Fire building respondents attempted to evacuate protected in place evacuated successfully unsuccessful in evacuation attempt returned to own apartments sought refuge in other apartments 137 people (100%) 114 people (83%) 23 people (17%) 61 people (54%) 53 people (46%) 29 people (55%) 24 people (45%)
Forest Laneway Fire 219 people (100%) to evacuate attempted returned to own apartments 64 people (29%) 41 people (89%) successfully evacuated 18 people (28%) in place protected sought refuge in other apartments 155 people (71%) 5 people (11%) unsuccessful in building respondents evacuation attempt 46 people (72%)
THE STAY-IN-PLACE APPROACH FOR WHICH BUILDING?
The stay-in-place approach is not proposed for all highrise buildings. The choice of this strategy should depend on a number of building characteristics. For instance, it is not proposed to use the stay-in-place for highrise office buildings. Office buildings usually have open concept floor plans unlike residential or hotel buildings. This fact is significant for 2 main reasons: it reduces the possibility for the fire to be contained within a compartment and it limits the possibility for “protect-in-place” activities for the occupants. It could be also stressed that the need for a stay-in-place approach is not suggested for office buildings since occupants are usually better prepared to evacuate to other floors or to the outside since they are alert, dressed and responsible mainly for themselves. Many office buildings also have well-maintained fire safety systems with an audible fire alarm signal and voice communication capacity, some trained staff and they may also have conducted evacuation drills and trained floor fire wardens.
These conditions are completely different in highrise residential, hotel and dormitory buildings where the “stay-in-place” approach in proposed. In the latter type of buildings, occupants are particularly vulnerable when they are asleep, thus since most fires start at night, it is likely that many occupants will be in the building and will not be readily prepared to evacuate immediately at the sound of the fire alarm signal. Although residential, hotel and dormitory buildings present some differences regarding human factors, they appear particularly suitable for the stay-in-place approach. Some recurrent behaviour in these types of buildings have been observed, which are arguments in favor of the stay-in-place approach:
• The long time delay to start evacuation after perceiving the fire alarm signal, noticing fire cues or receiving a warning. This can be due to a number of factors such as the non-recognition of the fire alarm signal as a fire alarm, lack of training in the emergency procedure, large number of nuisance alarms, conditions and state at the time of warning, etc. When the occupant finally decides to leave their compartment the fire has been burning for a substantial period of time producing a considerable amount of gas and smoke which makes it the worse time to travel the corridors and stairwells.
• The travel distance to reach ground level could be very long for occupants of the upper floors. Many people are unable to travel down a large number of floors without rest periods. If there is smoke or a crowd, these conditions will become even more difficult.
• There is already limited response to a fire alarm signal. It has been observed time and time again that some occupants do not respond to the sound of a fire alarm. They cannot be expected to evacuate a highrise building solely with the warning of an alarm signal.
• People with mobility limitations are occupying highrise buildings, they cannot be expected to evacuate by themselves. Often there is no plan for the evacuation of people with disabilities.
• During fires the means of egress tend to become contaminated with gas and smoke. No matter the pressurization system, if occupants are opening doors to the stairwells simultaneously on numerous floors, including the fire floor, all the
means of egress get contaminated. Further, when the fire department arrives on location, the movement of firefighters to reach the fire and the doors propped open for hose lines on the fire floor will cause the means of egress to become contaminated. This is the reason why occupants should never start evacuating once the fire department has arrived at the building; this is the worse time to start evacuation.
• The suites or compartments of residential, hotel and dormitory buildings offer means to defend-in-place such as sheets, towels or tape to block up doors and cracks from which smoke could penetrate. Occupants have access to a telephone to call for help and to obtain information. Some highrises have balconies where occupants can seek refuge.
• If occupants are expected to stay-in-place when the fire alarm signal goes off, the number of prank alarms should be considerably diminished since there will be no “fun” at pulling an alarm for which no-one has to get out in their pyjamas! • Finally, the stay-in-place approach appears simple for occupants to learn, since
many are already doing it.
The main argument against the stay-in-place approach can be summarized as the: “what if…?”. What if the fire spreads out of control? What if the smoke travels in the ventilation system? etc. However, besides the MGM Grand Hotel fire it was impossible to find a highrise fire casualty located in an enclosed-compartment, other then the compartment of fire origin, who had not opened the main door during the fire.
The stay-in-place approach should be implemented only if the highrise building meets specific criteria. Here are the essential criteria proposed:
• The building should be above 6 storey in building height since evacuation of lowrise buildings is usually faster in terms of travel distance.
• This approach should be implemented only in residential, hotel and dormitory buildings where occupants are located in enclosed compartments. In such compartments, occupants typically have access to tools for protect-in-place activities and they have access to a telephone and a window or balcony to identify their location.
• The building should be of non-combustible construction. • Self-closers should be installed on all entry doors.
• A central alarm system should be present to warn occupants of the occurring fire.
• Finally, a voice communication system is indispensable to inform occupants of the fire, to provide them with information on the evolution of the event and to give them tips on protect-in-place activities they should be carrying out.
IN FAVOUR OR AGAINST?
Some fire departments are already applying this approach: namely New York City and Ottawa, in Canada. Many are averse to the idea. A number are proposing to evacuate at least the occupants on the fire floor and the floor above, arguing that they are
most at risk. The evacuation of those occupants, however, is probably the most dangerous thing to do. Since occupants in residential, hotel or dormitory buildings tend to delay their time to start, they could be exposed to deadly conditions in the corridor of the fire floor during evacuation and occupants above would have to pass the fire floor in the stairwell, which could be lethal.
Battalian chief John Norman of New York argues that “The large number of occupants, plus long, vertical egress distances, make evacuation of all occupants above the fire a last resort technique.” [12] He further emphasizes that: “From experience, as well as analysis of each of these incidents (highrise residential fires), we know that the preferred behavior for occupants of apartments other than the fire apartment is to remain in their apartment until the fire is extinguished.”
EDUCATION AND TRAINING
The main difficulties with this new approach is in educating the public. In the past, the message has always been “when you hear the fire alarm signal, leave the building immediately”; now the message would be “when you hear the fire alarm signal, stay where you are and prepare to protect-in-place”. Although it is a complete change of message, it might not be that difficult for highrise building occupants to make the shift since they are already quite reluctant to evacuate when the fire alarm is activated. The latest educational message by the NFPA to highrise occupants, is to use their judgement and consider the alternative to evacuate or to stay-in-place according to certain conditions. This educational message, which is excellent in itself, might be difficult for occupants to understand and apply, although this statement is yet to be verified. From interviews with victims, it appears that many people have a hard time to evaluate how dangerous smoke can be and how fast the conditions can change during a fire. Victims who evacuated the World Trade Center after the bombing and fire in 1993 said that they continued moving down the stairwell although the smoke conditions were worsening even if they thought they might be heading toward the fire, since they didn’t know what else they could do [13]. Considerable education is necessary to inform the public on the basics of fire development. Further information on how to protect-in-place is necessary during training, on a notice behind the main door and through the voice communication system during a fire. The rationale behind this new approach should be transmitted to occupants for them to understand that the stay-in-place approach is appropriate for this building but may not be for another one.
CONCLUSION
A large number of case studies of highrise fires have been reviewed through the years which show that evacuation is a questionable concept for occupants away from the compartment of fire origin. In past highrise fires, occupants who decided to stay-in-place were safe and uninjured while some occupants who attempted to evacuate exposed themselves to substantial danger. It is argued that the stay-in-place approach should only be implemented in residential, hotel and dormitory highrise buildings. These buildings should also be constructed of non-combustible material, should be equipped with
self-closers on all main doors, have a central alarm system to warn occupants and a voice communication system to inform occupants of the evolution of the incident and the protect-in-place activities they should apply. It is expected that this new approach should limit the number of needless deaths and injuries of occupants attempting to evacuate highrise buildings during fires.
REFERENCES
1. Proulx, G. 1996, “Critical factors in high-rise evacuations”, Fire Prevention, No. 191, July/August, Fire Protection Association, UK, pp.24-27.
2. Proulx, G, Pineau, J, Latour, J. C, Stewart, L, 1995, "Study of the Occupants' Behaviour During the 2 Forest Laneway Fire in North York, Ontario on January 6, 1995", IRC-IR-705, Internal Report, Institute for Research in Construction, National, Research Council Canada, Ottawa, 74 p.
3. Webber, J. B., 1983, Report of the Public Inquiry Into Fire Safety in Highrise Buildings, Ministry of the Solicitor General, Government of Ontario, Toronto.
4. Macdonald, J., 1985, “Non-evacuation in compartmented Fir Resistive Buildings can save lives and it makes sense”, Travelers Insurance Co., Hartford, CT, 27p.
5. Hall, R. J., “U.S. High-rise fires: the big picture”, NFPA Journal, Quincy, MA, Vol. 88, No. 2, pp. 47-53.
6. Kirby, E. R. 1988, “Apartment Building Fire East 50th Street New York City”, Report 019, United States Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency. 7. Isner, S. M., 1992, “3 die, 8 injured in Athletic Club fire”, NFPA Journal, Nov./Dec.
1992, pp. 31-38.
8. Brennan, P., 1999, “Victims and survivors in fatal residential building fires” Fire and Materials, Vol. 23, pp. 305-310.
9. Proulx, G.; Ouellette, M.J.; Leroux, P.; Bailey, K.R. 1998, Study of the Occupant's
Behavior during the Ambleside Fire in Ottawa on January 31, 1997, IRC-IR-771, Institute for Research in Construction, National Research Council Canada, Ottawa, Canada, 42p.
10. Proulx, G., 1998, "The impact of voice communication messages during a residential highrise fire", Human Behaviour in Fire – Proceedings of the First International Symposium, University of Ulster, Belfast UK, pp. 265-274.
11. Bryan, L. J., 1985, “Convergence Clusters”, Fire Journal, No. 79, Vol. 6, pp. 27-30, 86-90.
12. Norman, J., 1999, “Tragic high-rise fires spur dramatic fire safety improvements”, With New York Firefighters, New York, pp. 19-21.
13. Fahy, R. F., Proulx, G., 1995, “Collective common sense: A study of human behavior during the World Trade Center evacuation”, NFPA Journal, March/April, pp. 59-67.
