Conflict and performance in R & D organizations: some preliminary findings.

•*&*

m

LIBRARY

OF THE

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF

TECHNOLOGY

._.l?l

G

PAPER

,FRED

P.

SLOAN SCHOOL

OF

MANAGEMENT

RESEARCH PROGRAM ON THE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Conflict, and Performance in R & D Organizations: Some Preliminary Findings

^ •^ ^..;1 William M. Evan

RESEARCH PROGRAM ON THE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF RESEARCH AND EEVELOPMENT

Conflict and Performance in R & D Organizationsj_ Some Preliminary F indings --i'

[ l.n IC.rJ, William M. Evan " ''^-•; Sept. 1965 -^___.li.#l^^ Presented at the

Second Conference on Research Program Effectiveness Sponsored by the Office of Naval Research

Washington, D.C.

July 28, 1965

The research described in this paper was supported by Grant No.

NsG 235 of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for research studies on the organization and management of R&D.

Revised Sept. I965

CONFLICT AND PERFORMANCE IN R Se D ORGANIZATIONS: SOME PRELIMINARY FDTOINGS*

William M. Evan Sloan School of Management

Maseachusetts Institute of Technology

With relatively few exceptions, social scientists studying organizational phen-omena have not focused their attention on conflicts. Some notable exceptions are

the studies of Robert Kahn and his colleagues on role conflicts and Harrison White

2

on managerial conflicts and sociometric structure. Clearly, this paucity of research on conflict cannot be due to the scarcity of the phenomena. Any denizen of any

organ-ication, whether engaged in manufacturing,

R&D,

or any other function for that

matter, knows this is not trxie. Hence, why the relative inattention to this facet of organizational life?

This is indeed a difficult question in the psychology and sociology of research. Suffice it to say that some problems are less complex than others, some are more significant from a theoretical or a practical viewpoint, some are more fashionable or more readily fundable. It may be that conflicts are so omnipresent in

organiza-tions, as well as in the world as a whole, that they tend to be taken for granted.

In addition, they are difficult to investigate because the parties involved are often not willing to discuss them openly with social scientists. This may be particularly true where conflicts are triggered off by the exercise of power which give rise to a

3

sense of injustice.

The purpose of this study is to investigate some causes and consequences of several types of conflicts in two

R&D

organizations, one in government and one

2

-THE PROBLEM

An underlying assumption of this study Is that conflicts are endemic in organiza-tions because of a lack of consensus as to the expectations and prescriptions for various organizational positions^ or a lack of uniform commitment to organizational objectives. A second assumption of this study is that some types of conflicts are detrimental and some are beneficial from the point of view of both organizational and individual goals. Thirdly, the principle of minimizing conflict, subscribed to by some managers and social scientists, may have some validity for crisis

organiza-tions, such as armies, or for so-called routine organizations, such as some manufac-turing organizations, but not for knowledge- and technology-producing organizations,

k

such as those engaged in research and development.

In R & D organizations, as in other types of organizations, conflicts arise at

various points in the structure: at top managerial levels in the course of policy

making, between various levels of management, and between various departments at a

given level in the hierarchy which require "lateral relationships' among managers whose departments are interdependent in function. Another and perhaps distinctive locus of conflict in R & D organizations is the project team.

In the conduct of R & D, whether in a university, in an industrial organization, or in a government laboratory, there is a growing trend toward teamwork. This trend

has been encouraged by the emergence of inter-disciplinary areas, the growing size

of research projects, the increasing cost of equipment, and the increasing complexity of problems which require a systems approach and the complementary skills of several disciplines. This secular shift away from the academic model of the individual

scholar to a team effort in research has been documented in several studies, including

a recent report by Hagstrom on the incidence of teamwork among the faculty of various disciplines at the University of California, where it ranges from 29^ in mathematics

and statistics to 97^ in physics.' Whenever such teamwork occurs, there is a huilt-in opportunity for a variety of conflicts to erupt.

The focus of this study is on the project-team level in the organizational structure in which two or more individuals of the same or different specialties col-laborate in the solution of a problem. The major problem to be investigated is:

What kinds of conflicts at the project-group level are beneficial for the performance of R & D, what kinds are detrimental, and why?

A TYPOLOGY OF PROJECT GROUP CONFLICTS

The theoretical framework for this research was suggested by some of the concepts developed by Parsons and Bales in analyzing social systems. All groups, organizations, or social systems, in general, must solve internal and external problems if they are

to survive. Every social system is expected or seeks to perform some function in

relation to its environment. Internally, if the system is to be viable, it must

satisfy the social and psychological needs of its members. Thus, one of the dimensions

of conflict has to do with the external environment of the project group as distinct from a conflict having to do with social-emotional relations, namely, with inter-personal relations among the project group members. Problems pertaining to the environmental demands of the social system may involve technical or task conflicts; on the other hand, problems concerned with social-emotional factors may involve

interpersonal conflicts. Another dimension of social system conflicts deals with the status of the parties involved. Do the conflicts arise among peers or do they arise among one or more of the subordinates and the supervisor of the project group? Since some research suggests that obstacles to communication are fewer among status equals

Q

than status unequals, we would expect that conflicts arising between subordinates and project group supervisors would have different effects on performance than those conflicts occurring among status equals within the project.

- k

-The cross-classification of the two dimensions of conflict, technical versus interpersonal conflict, on the one hand, and peer conflict versus supervisor-subordinate conflict, on the other, yields four types of conflicts (Figure l). In

other words, in the performance of project group research, at least four types of

Insert Figure 1 about here

.

conflicts may arise: (a) task conflict among peers, i.e., disagreement among pro-ject members as to what the objectives of the project shall be and how to achive them; (b) task conflict between one or more project members and the project super-visor; (c) interpersonal conflict among peers, for example, personal dislikes or mutual distrust among project members; and (d) interpersonal conflict between one

or more project members and the project supervisor. We are not, of course, suggest-ing that this typology of project group conflicts exhausts all those that in fact occur. A variety of administrative conflicts, for example, do not clearly fall

in any of these four types.

Are all four types of conflict dysfunctional for the attainment of the objec-tives of a project group? Our principal hypothesis is that technical conflicts have

a positive effect on performance whereas interpersonal conflicts have a negative effect on the performance of R fis D project teams. In the work of project teams, as

in the history of science and technology as a whole, it was anticipated that contro-versy would arise over the objectives of a project as well as the means employed to reach the objectives and, ceteris paribus, that it would have a beneficial effect on the performance of the group.

Several decades ago, Edwin Boring, in his presidential address to the American Psychological Association, observed that:

"The history of science, like Hegel's view of the history of tho>i,:;ht,

is one long series of theses, set off by ardently advocated antitheses, with ultimate syntheses terminating controversy and marking a step forward. This picture, it seems to me, holds not only for speculative philosophical psychology but also for the most rigorously observational work. Controversy has always been part of the method of science.

"H

Controversy in project team work, or technical conflict in our terminology, can potentially be adjudicated by rational means, and hence could conceivably open the way to alternative perspectives on the part of project group members. Interpersonal

conflict, because it does not lend itself as readily to rational management, may prove disruptive and interfere with the performance of the project group. In short,

it was predicted that technical conflict, whether among project group peers or

between members of the project and the supervisor would be positively correlated with project group performance. In view of the fact that performance in

organiza-tions, particularly in R & D, is a complex, multi-determined phenomenon, any one

variable is apt to account for only a small amount of the variance. Accordingly, several classes of variables, psychological, social-psychological, and sociological, were built into the research instrument of this study in the expectation that the correlations between types of conflict and performance would be mediated in varying

12 degrees by these variables.

DESIGN OF THE STUDY

To test the principal hypothesis of the study, a survey was designed involving

the administration of a questionnaire in two

R&D

organizations, a governmental and an industrial laboratory. The governmental laboratory is engaged primarly in basis and applied research in aerodynamics; the industrial laboratory is predomin-antly concerned with development work in the field of electronics. In each

organiza-tion, we ascertained the pattern of collaboration among scientists and engineers on 13

official project teams. The identification of the memberships of various project teams proved to be a surprisingly difficult problem to solve. Once this identification

was made vith the help of a special questionnaire addressed to the supervisors in the two laboratories^ all project group members were asked to complete a question-naire which included a variety of questions pertaining not only to types of con-flict but also to hypothetical causes of conflict and several measures of perform-ance.

In selecting the project groups from both organizations, we stipulated that

the project group should number at least 2 individuals, should have a duration of at least 6 months, and should involve some degree of task interdependence. These stipulations were deemed necessary if we were to observe any conflicts among the group members.

The nature of the data, as is already apparent, is cross-sectiorial in character which means that interpretations of the direction of causality are especially diffi-cult. Although on theoretical grounds we are predicting that some types of con-flict have positive "effects" and others have negative "effects" on performance, what we observe, of course, are only concomitant variations. A panel study, on the

one hand, and laboratory and field experiments, on the other, could overcome these deficiencies. Another characteristic of the data of this study is that it involves reports of behavior and attitudes by means of a self-administred questionnaire. This has the advantage of encouraging anonymity and confidentiality and the disad-vantage of affording an opportunity for some respondents to distort their responses

at will. Obtaining an accurate measure of response bias is still a challenging problem in survey research.

The questions pertaining to our four types of conflict were of a sociometric nature. Each project group member was asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 7 how much

he usually disagreed on technical matters with each of his fellow project group members. Similarly, he was asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 7 how much he usually disliked or had difficulty getting along with each of his fellow project group members and with his supervisor. The intricacies of measuring conflict and

- ₇

-performance suggested the advisability of obtaining comparable data from three parties: all members of the project groups, first-level supervisors of the project

groups, and second-level supervisors. Thus, in the government laboratory we obtained responses from 82 scientists and engineers associated with 27 projects and from 27

first-level and 27 second-level supei-visors. In the industrial laboratory, our survey included 159 scientists end engineers who were associated with 37 project groups, 30 first-level supei^isors, and 30 second-level supervisors (Figxire 2).

Insert Figure 2 about here.

The total number of respondents in the survey was 355

•

RESULTS

The measurement of performance in R & D organizations still poses a challenge to both administrators and social scientists. In this study, two kinds of meas\ires

were obtained, subjective and objective. The subjective measure consisted of a

set of rating scales on how productive the project groups are as seen by the group' members themselves, by the first-level supervisors, and by the second-level super-visors. A similar subjective measure was obtained of project group creativity. Although subjective rating scales are often not very reliable, the two objective

measxires we obtained, number of articles and number of patents, are also not trouble-free. The number of patents received by project-group members is in part a func-tion of the kinds of tasks they are engaged in and the organizational policies in regard to patenting inventive ideas. Similarly, the number of articles published by project group members is affected by the type of task and the organizational policies concerning the public sharing of information. Another objective measure

of _{performance which we sought to obtain was the ratio of budgeted costs to actual}

costs. Our efforts, however, were in vain because the unit of the accounting systems

8

-to a department or a large-scale project cross-cutting various departments.

The analysis of the data thus far permits an examination of the relationship between types of conflict and productivity. Since the productivity ratings, as is

clear from Table 1, are, with one exception, significantly intercorrelated in both

Insert Table 1 about here.

laboratories, they were averaged, in the Interest of simplifying the presentation

of the findings, into a composite productivity rating. This composite rating, for each project group, consists of an average of the ratings of project group members on how productive their groups are, and of the ratings of first-level and second-level supervisors on the productivity of their project group. As in the case of

Table 1, the unit of analysis throughout this report is the project group, not the

«

individual engineer or scientist.

The project group means on the four types of conflict and on the composite productivity rating are shown in Table 2. The group means on the four types of

Insert Table 2 about here

.

conflict appear to be higher in the industrial than in the governmental

labora-tory, and roughly equal on the composite productivity rating. Especially noteworthy

is the fact that the means for the two types of technical conflict are approximately twice as high as the means for the two types of interpersonal conflict. This find-ing may mirror the actual relative frequency of these types of _conflict or else

the relative difficulty that project group members have in answering questions about interpersonal conflict as compared with technical conflict.

The zero-order correlation between types of conflict and performance are pre-sented in Table 3. Since we are dealing with ordinal data, the Kendall rank order

- ₉

-correlation was used rather than the Pearson product -moment -correlation. The hypo-thesis that Interpersonal conflict is negatively correlated with productivity is

partially supported by the results in Table 3. Of the four Kendall Taus in the two laboratories involving the relationship between interpersonal conflict and

produc-tivity^ three are negative and one reaches the .01 level of significance. The corollary hypothesis that technical conflict would be positively correlated with performance is not supported, at least not for the measure of composite rating of

productivity Tfrfiich we have thus far analyzed: two of the four Kendall Taus are

positive, one is negative, end one is zero.

The noticeably higher correlations among the government project groups than among the industrial project groups may be a function of the difference in organi-zational climate, of the nature of the missions of the two organizations, or of

the terms of employment of the engineers and scientists. These differences may

be somewhat clarified by exploring the zero-order correlations by means of partial association. Among the several intervening variables we have so far examined to ascertaih whether they affect the zero-order correlation between conflict and pro-ductivity, two seem to be enlightening.

In Table k, we have partialled out the effect of project group loyalty at

Insert Table k about here

,

two levels of this variable, above and below the median, and correlated conflict with productivity. The scores on project group loyalty are derived from a seven-point rating scale q^uestion on "How important is your association with your project group?

"

Among the project groups in the government laboratory, the original signifi-cant correlation (i.e., the zero-order correlation) of -.38 between interpersonal conflict among peers and productivity is markedly affected by the degree of project group loyalty. In groups with a high degree of project group loyalty, the original

- 10

-negative correlation is enhanced, but it is diminished when project group loyalty

is low. Also noteworthy is the increased negative correlation from .10 to .50

between interpersonal conflict with supervisors and productivity under a condition of low degree of project group loyalty. The negative effect of interpersonal con-flict on performance is especially pronounced when there is an absence of social support from project group members in the form of loyalty as well as a strained relation with the supervisor.

The original positive correlation of .ik between technical conflict among peers and productivity among the groups in the government laboratory is also noticeably affected by degree of project group loyalty. Under a condition of low degree of project group loyalty, the correlation becomes .25. And even the vir-tually zero correlation of technical conflict with supervisors and productivity

increases to .12. Also suggestive is the difference in magnitude of the correla-tions between low degree and high degree of project group loyalty. Under a condi-tion of high degree of project group loyalty, there is virtually no correlation between technical conflict and productivity. Evidently, for technical controversy to develop and engender higher productivity, group cohesion may well be an impedi-ment. Thus we observe a slight tendency for technical conflict to be positively associated with productivity, as predicted, only under a condition of low project group loyalty.

Among the industrial project groups, the mediating effect of project group loyalty on the relationship between conflict and productivity is not at all evident. Notwithstanding the higher incidence of various conflicts in the industrial labor-atory which we observed in Table 2, we did not find any appreciable correlations between conflict and productivity for these groups in Table 3, nor do we notice

in Table k any consistent effects of project group loyalty on the zero-order

11

may be due to the higher rate of tiirnover of professional personnel in the indus-trial laboratory than in the governmental laboratory. If this explanation is true,

we would expect to observe a lower degree of project group loyalty among the industrial groups than among the governmental groups. Similarly, if in fact the professionals in the industrial laboratory have less Job security and are more transient than those in the government laboratory, we might expect them to have

a lower degree of loyalty to the organization as a whole, and possibly, as a

conse-ll^

quence, a higher degree of loyalty to their profession. We find some measure of

support for these anticipated differences in Table 5 which presents the means of

the project groups on three types of loyalties: loyalty to the project group.

Insert Table 5 about here.

loyalty to the

R&D

organization, and loyalty to the profession. Compared with the governmental groups, industrial groups are lower in degree of project group

loyalty, about equal in loyalty to the organization, and higher in professional loyalty.

Another group attribute that appears to affect the relationship between con-flict and productivity is the size of the project group. In Table 6, we partialled

out this variable into project groups with four or less members and five or more members. The smaller the project group, the greater is the negative correlation between interpersonal conflict and productivity. This is true for the govern-mental as well as the industrial project groups. In other words, in smaller project groups interpersonal conflict is more detrimental to productivity than

in larger groups. Presumably in smaller groups, one cannot as readily avail oneself of a pattern of avoidance in the event of interpersonal conflict as in

the case of larger groups. As a consequence, interpersonal conflict is more likely to exert a negative influence on productivity in smaller than in larger groups.

- 12

-The impact of project group size on the relationship between technical conflict and productivity is not consistent. However, the effect of group size in the indus-trial laboratory on the relationship between technical conflict and productivity

is noteworthy. The original correlations of .00 and .Oh become .lU and .12 under

a condition of smaller group size and -.07 and -.23 under a condition of larger group size. In short, at least among the industrial groups, technical conflict appears to have a slight positive effect on productivity among smaller groups and

a negative effect among larger groups. If this finding were also true of the govern-ment project groups, it would be more suggestive than it is. However, among the government project groups, technical conflict among peers apparently has a more positive effect on productivity in larger groups than in smaller groups. Whether the differential impact of project group size on the relationship between technical conflict and productivity in the two laboratories is due to differences in the degree of project group loyalty or to other factors is, at this stage of the analysis, unclear.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

A preliminary analysis of survey data on a sample of project groups in two laboratories provides some measure of confirmation of the hypothesis that inter-personal conflict is negatively associated with performance and technical conflict

is positively associated with performance. The evidence is more persuasive for the detrimental effect of interpersonal conflict than for the beneficial effect

of technical conflict.

The relationship between conflict and performance appears to be partly depen-dent upon at least two variables: group loyalty and group size. Under a high degree of group loyalty, the negative effect of interpersonal conflict on perform-ance seems to be more pronounced than under a low degree of group loyalty. This

- ₁₃

-industrial laboratory.

Group size also appears to affect the relationship of conflict and performance in that in smaller project groups, at least in the industrial laboratory, technical conflict is more likely to arise and have a positive effect on performance than in larger project groups where interpersonal conflict is more apt to have a negative effect on performance.

Thus management may have to attend to the possible adverse consequences for performance of a high degree of project group loyalty. Apparently, a high degree of project group loyalty, at least in the government laboratory, is not as conducive

as a low degree of project group loyalty to the emergence of technical conflict and hence to the positive effect that it may have on performance. With respect to project group size, management seems to be faced with a trade-off between the negative effects of smaller groups, which seem to be conducive to a high degree of

interpersonal conflict, and the positive effects of smaller groups in facilitating technical controversy that may be productive

.

If these preliminary findings are confirmed by further analysis of the data

of this study, they would underscore the need for management of R & D organizations to consider the consequences of such variables as group size and group loyalty for project group performance and the capabilities of supervisors to manage various types of conflict that arise in the course of team effort. Otherwise put, mana-gerial decisions involved in establishing and dissolving project groups should take account of psychological, social-psychological, and sociological factors affecting group performance. Vfhile we do not as yet have a firm body of knowledge on the factors that lead to optimal group performance, particularly in R So D organizations, some knowledge is accvunulating which could improve managerial decisions pertaining to the composition of project teams.

Figure

1

TYPES

OP

CONFLICT

IN

PROJECT GROUPS

Parties to the

Conflict

Issues

In

Conflict

Peers

Supervisor-Subordinates

Technical

Conflict

Interpersonal

Conflict

TC

peers

Figure

2

DESIGN

OP

THE SURVEY

Governmental Laboratory Industrial Laboratory Total

Number

of

Groups

27

37

6k

Number of

Project

Group

Members

82

159

2J«1

Number of

First-Level

Supervisors

27

30

57

Number

of

Second-Level

Supervisors

27

30

57

Table

1

INTERCORRELATION

OP

PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR PROJECT GROUPS

IN

A

GOVERNMENTAL

AND

AN

INDUSTRIAL LABORATORY

(Kendall Taus)

Project Groups

In a

Governmental

Laboratory

(N

21)

Project

Groups

in

an

Industrial

Laboratory

(N " ₃₇₎ ,

Self-Rating

of

Project

Group

Productivity

Supervisor

Rating

of

Self-Rating

of

Project

Group

Project

Group

Productivity

Productivity

Supervisor

Rating

of

Project

Group

Productivity

._ Plrst-Level Supervisor Rating of Project

Group

Productivity Second-Level Supervisor Rating

of

Project

_Group

Productivity .30'

.^Z

»««

.27»

Ik .i*l«»«

.28*

'

significant

_at

the

_,05

level

•**

_aignif

Table

1

INTERCORRELATION

OP

PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR PROJECT GROUPS

IN

A

GOVERNMENTAL

AND

AN

INDUSTRIAL LABORATORY

(Kendall Taus)

Project

Groups

In a

Governmental

Laboratory

(N

27)

Self-Rating

of

Project

Group

Productivity

Supervisor

Rating

of

Project

Group

Productivity

Project

Groups

in

an

Industrial

Laboratory

(N " ₃₇₎ .

Self-Rating of

Project

Group

Productivity

Supervisor

Rating

of

Project

Group

Productivity

._ First-Level Supervisor Rating

of

.30< Project

Group

Productivity

.13 »•»

Second-Level

Supervisor Rating

of

.27^ Project

Group

Productivity .I'* .i*l«««

.28»

*

significant

_at

the

.05

level

Table

2

PROJECT

GROUP

MEANS"*"

ON

CONFLICT

AND

PERFORMANCE

IN

A

GOVERNMENTAL

AND

AN

INDUSTRIAL LABORATORY

Project

Groups

Project

Groups

In a in a

Governmental

Industrial

Types

of

Conflict.

Laboratory

Laboratory

.

TC

.32

*35

peers

TC

^

.37

.38

sup-sub

,

IC

1 .17

.21

peers

IC

^

.15

.17

sup-sub

Performance

•

Composite

Rating

.69

.70

on

Productivity

(average of

self-rating,

supervisor

and

manager

ratings)

Table

3

RANK

ORDER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN TYPES

OP

CONFLICT

AND

PERFORMANCE

IN

GOVERNMENTAL

AND

INDUSTRIAL PROJECT GROUPS

(Kendall Taus)

Composite Rating

of

Productivity

Oovernmental

Industrial

Project

Groups

Project

Groups

Types

of Conflict

(N-27)

(^"37)

IC >

-.38»»

.

^02

peers

IC

-.10

-.13

sup-sub

TC

.1^

'OO

peers

TC

-.02

.04

sup-sub

Table

^

RANK

ORDER

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN TYPES

OP

CONFLICT

AND

COMPOSITE

RATING

OP

PRODUCTIVITY

IN

GOVERNMENTAL

AND

INDUSTRIAL

PROJECT

GROUPS,

CONTROLLING

FOR

PROJECT GROUP LOYALTY

(Kendall Taus)

Composite Rating of Productivity

Low

Degree

of

High Degree of

Project Group

Zero-Order

Project

Group

Loyalty

i

Correlations

Lovalty

Table

5

mean"*"

loyalties

op

project

groups

in

a

governmental

and an

industrial

laboratory

Governmental

Industrial

Project

Groups

Project Groups

(N-27)

(N-37)

Type

of

Loyalty

Loyalty

to

Project Group

,^1

»3^

Loyalty

to

the

R&D

.61

*S^

Organization

Loyalty

to

the

Profession

.38

.67

*

_The

_{means computed}

in

this

table are based on the

means

of

each

of

Table

6

RANK

ORDER CORRELATIONS

BETWEEN

TYPES

OF

CONFLICT

AND

COMPOSITE

RATING

ON

PRODUCTIVITY

IN

GOVERNMENTAL

AND

INDUSTRIAL

PROJECT

GROUPS,

CONTROLLING

FOR

PROJECT GROUP

SIZE

(Kendall Taus)

Type o f

Con

flict

Governmental

Project

Croups

IC

peers

IC

8Up-8Ub

TC

peers

TC

Gup-oub

C

omposite Rating

of

Productivity

Project

Groups

of

^

or less

Members

..as* -.21

.03

..03

Zero-Order

Correlations

[..38»»]

C-.io]

C

.I'O

C-.02]

Project

Groups

of

5

or

more

Members

..

-.32

-.06

.33

-.15

Industrial

Project

Groups

(JiliZl IC

peers

IC

sup-sub

TC

peers

TC

sup-sub

-.05

-.28»

.li»

.12

C

.02]

C-.13]

C

.00]

-.02

-.09

-.23

-.07

*

significant

_at

the

_.05

level

FOOTNOTES

* _Revised version of e paper presented at the Second ONE Conference on Research Program Effectiveness, Washington, D.C., July 27-29, I965.

The author is indebted to a NASA grant to M.I.T. which made this study possible.

He is also grateful to James R. Brovm, John Goering, and James R. Miller III for their help in processing the data,

1. Robert L. Kahn et al., Organizational Stress: Studies in Role Conflict and

Ambiguity, New York: Wiley, 1964.

2. Harrison White, "Management Conflict and Sociometric Structure, " American Journal

of Sociology, LXVII (September, I961), pp. I85-I99.

3. Robert L. Kahn, "Introduction," in Robert L. Kahn and Elise Boulding, eds..

Power and Conflict in Organizations, New York: Basic Books, 196i<-, _{pp. 1-7;}

William M. Evan, "Superior-Subordinate Conflict in Research Organizations, " Administrative Science Quarterly. 10 (June, I965) _PP. 52-64.

k. Walno W. Suojanen, "Management Theory: Functional and Evolutionary," Journal of the Academy of Management, 6 (March, I963)/ pp. 12-17.

5. See, for example, H. A. Landsberger, "The Horizontal Dimension in a Bureaucracy," Administrative Science Quarterly, 6 (December, I961), pp. 299-332; George Strauss,

"Tactics of Lateral Relationships, " _{Administrative Science Quarterly,} 7

(September, I962) pp. I6I-I86; George Strauss, "Work-Flow Frictions, Interfunc-tional Rivalry and Professionalism: A Case Study of Purchasing Agents, " _Human

-2-6.

See,

for example,

Lowell

H,

Mattery

and

George

P.

Bush,

eds,.

Team-work

In

Research

,

Washington,

D.C.:

American University

Press,

1953»

pp.

171-186;

William

H.

Whyte,

Jr.,

The

Organization

Man

.

New York:

Doubleday

Anchor,

1956,

pp.

219-222;

A. H.

Cottrell,

"Scientists:

Solo or

Concerted,"

in

Bernard Barber

and

Walter

Hirsoh,

eds., The

Sociology

of Science

.

New

York:

Free

Press,

1962,

pp.

388-393*

7.

Warren

0,

Hagstrom,

"Traditional

and

Modern

Forms

of

Soientific

Team-work,"

Administrative

Science Quarterly

. 9

(December,

196^),

pp.

241-263.

8. Cf.

Talcott

Parsons,

"General

Theory

in

Sociology,"

In

Robert

K,

Merton,

Leonard

Broom,

and

Leonard

S.

Cottrell,

Jr.,

eds..

Sociology.

Today

.

New

York:

Basic Books,

1959,

pp.

'*-l6;

Talcott

Parsons

et al. «

Theories

of Society

.

Vol.

1,

New York:

Free

Press,

1961,

pp.

30-79;

Robert

P.

Bales,

Interaction

Process

Analysis;

A

Method

for the

Study

of

Small

Groups

.

Cambridge:

Addison-Wesley

,

1951

•

9.

See,

for

example,

E. P.

Torrance,

"Some

Consequences

of

Power

Dif-ferences on

Decision Making

in

Permanent

and

Temporary Three-Man

Groups,"

in A. P.

Hare,

E. P.

Borgatta,

and

R. F.

Bales,

eds..

Small

Groups

.

New York:

Knopf,

1955,

PP.

^182-1192; N. R. P.

Maier

and

L. R.

Hoffman,

"Quality

of

First

and

Second Solutions

in

Group

Problem

Solving," Journal

of Applied Psychology

. ^^

(August,

I960),

pp.

278-283;

N. R. F.

Maier

and

L. R.

Hoffman,

"Organization

and

Creative

Problem Solving," Journal

of

Applied Psychology

.

k5

(August,

10. See, for example, Evan, op. clt.

11. Edwin G. Boring, History, Psychology and Science; Selected Papers, New York: John Wiley, I963, p. 68.

12. For an analysis of the methodology of survey research, see, for example, Patricia L. Kendall and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "Problems of Survey Analysis,"

in Robert K. Merton and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, eds.. Studies in the Scope and

Method of "The American Soldier," Olencoe. 111.: Free Press, 1950,

pp. 133-196; Herbert Hyman, Survey Design and Analysis; Principles. Cases,

and Procedures, Glencoe, 111.: Free Press,

1955-13. Cf. William M. Evan, "Organizational Lag," Human Organization, in press.

Ik. Cf. Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, 2nd editionj Glencoe, 111.; Free Press, 1957, PP. 225-386; Alvin W. Gouldner,

"Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles-I, Administrative Science Quarterly, 2 (December, 1957)> PP« 28I-306;

W. G. Bennis, N. Berkowitz, M. Affinito, end M. Malone, "Reference Groups and Loyalties in Out-Patient Departments,"" Administrative Science Quarterly,

2 (December, 1957), PP. '+8I-5OO.

15. See, for example, D. Cartvright and A. Zander, eds.. Group Dynamics; Research

and Theory, 2nd edition, Evanston, 111.: Row Peterson, I96O; Barry E. Collins and Harold Guetzkow, A Social Psychology of Group Processes for Decision-Making, New York; Wiley, 1964; Edwin J. Thomas and Clinton F. Fink, "Effects of Group Size," Psychological Bulletin, 60 (July, I963), _PP. 371-38^+; Donald C. Pelz,

"Some Social Factors Related to Performance in a Research Organization, "

-1*-and

N. R. P.

Maler,

"Quality

and

Acceptance

of

Problem Solutions

by

Members of

Homogeneous

and

Heterogeneous Groups," Journal

of

Date

Due

^

«i)V.

0&M9M'

|\G S'89

MIT LIBRARIES 3 TOfl

DD3

lllilPI

m'<^

a^T

5fi7 MITLIBRARIES 3

TDSD

DD3 ATT 5T5

MirLIBRARIES >mM-(o^^ 3 TDfiD

DD3 aiT bD3

3 TDflD

0D3

fiTT

bll

MIT LIBRARIES 3 TOfl D D03 a

1751803

HD28 M.I.T. Alfred P.Sloan

,^)<j-^5^ .mUiU School of Management

'

Nos.lU2-65V7orking Papers.

Nos.151-65

.a

b54

^fcf

3 ^loao

D03

a^T

t.e'i

1^-7

ri'!-^l„.,„..T

3

TOaO

DD3

^00

153

H'^'^^''

SIGN

this card and present it with book

3"'^"o'a d"

'

Q 3 a b T 1 35 _{at the}

_CIRCULATION

_DESK.

3

TOaD

DD3

TOD

13a

MASSACHUSETTS

INSTITUTE

OF

TECHNOLOGY

LIBRARIES

MIT LIBHARIES 3

loao 003

a iilllll

'^-^^

tiT

iba

DEWEY

LIBRARY