Article pp.37-39 du Vol.23 n°1 (2003)

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SCIENCES DES ALIMENTS, 23(2003) 37-39

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Meat consumption before and after BSE in France and the European Union

P. Mainsant ¹

Meat has been presented to consumers in a largely traditional way for the last 40 years. Most meat is still sold fresh rather than frozen, especially in France. And while the vast majority of meat is now ready-packed, such packing is only a service; there has been no fundamental change in the product itself.

The small proportion of meat-based ready-made dishes is on the increase eve- rywhere, but is still only marginal. Quality meat too remained a marginal seg- ment until 1996, with the exception of chicken, where supply in France became structured at an early date in response to preference changes (see below).

Where once it was sold by small specialist traders, in the last 40 years meat distribution to households has gone the way of all foodstuffs and been taken over by hypermarkets and supermarkets. Meat has been no exception and modern distribution has gradually hived off the 'product' attributes of the traditional butcher's, including freshness and more recently 'quality'.

From 1960 to 1980 income and price were the mainsprings of growth in consumption and of its internal substitutions. As throughout the industria- lised world, total meat consumption in the EU and in France was driven by higher incomes and the lower relative retail price of meat. This fall in price stem- med from improved productivity in farming, processing and distribution. Such advances were not uniform across the board and, as beef made less progress than pigs and poultry, beef output grew but more slowly and its relative share declined constantly.

From 1980 to 1995 preference changes shifted the 'price-income' goal- posts. Substitutions, which had previously been dictated by relative prices, were more commonly the result of changes in consumer preferences for product charac- teristics and more specifically their adaptation to modern lifestyles. Products that saved time, that appealed to children, that had symbolic content, or that benefited from a communication budget achieved more dynamic performances, regardless of changes in their relative prices (e.g. boiled ham, minced meat, convenience foods).

The product's value was increasingly determined by added attributes such as

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38 Sci. Aliments 23(1), 2003 P. Mainsant

brand names and symbols. The reputed nutritional value of products, in this context, followed the vagaries of fashion that were somewhat unfavourable to red meat, and primarily to beef. Beef began to decline in absolute volume around 1985 and this trend continued through the BSE scares.

As the population became urbanised, consumers eventually became cut-off from agricultural production, leading to a lack of understanding and then increasing distrust of changing production techniques, which were perceived of as being potentially dangerous. Consumers came to express growing concern for human health and then for environmentally friendly farming. The implementa- tion of regulations on the use of hormones, on traces of pesticides and antibio- tics, and on ground water are evidence of this trend. Meat consumption was little involved, except occasionally with hormones (strong boycott of veal in France in 1980). A highly detrimental factor went unnoticed in the 1980s in that the young and educated were consuming ever less meat. This increased distrust on the part of city-dwellers came to a head in 1996.

Since 1996 the abscess has burst and meat consumption has been affected by BSE. The crisis broke out in the EU in spring 1996 with the revela- tion that BSE could be transmitted to humans. Beef consumption slumped in the UK and France (-30%), but recovered almost to its previous levels within a few months. In France a raft of measures reassured public opinion, mostly the removal of SRM (specified risk material) in the slaughterhouse. The beef industry set out to further reassure consumers by introducing both traceability from the farm to the plate and massive market segmentation by means of product conformity certificates. Household consumption was 're-nationalised'. All these measures entailed costs (rendering, traceability and segmentation) that went unnoticed because of falling production prices.

BSE remained in the news after 1996 and spread throughout the entire meat and food sector. It has tremendous symbolic significance: people had been killed by ruminants that had been turned into carnivores by the lure of quick profits.

Other food scares sprang up in the BSE-tainted atmosphere. In October 2000, a minor news story about a BSE-infected cow in the backwoods of France caused a new scare, reflecting latent and persistent consumer concern. Beef consumption in France slumped this time by 50%. By contagion, within three months Ger- many, Italy and Spain saw similar falls with their first cases of BSE-infected cattle.

As with the first crisis, the slump did not last and beef consumption in France was back to near normal levels in eight months. Spectacular measures were taken to reassure people (general ban on animal meal, BSE testing of all cattle, destruc- tion of all material posing a potential risk, etc.). The residual effect of the second scare is now evaluated at a 5% fall in beef consumption, which breaks down into two components: the loss of a few consumers (2%) and a small fall in the mean level of consumption. In some of the other EU countries hit by the second scare the return to 'near normal' consumption levels has been more difficult: while achieved in Italy since mid-2001, new factors delayed this in Germany in 2002.

In France the measures taken during the second scare were very costly with a sizeable rise in production, processing and distribution costs. Retail prices have almost all been up in 2002 despite the slump in production prices for all types of meat. Whereas Agenda 2000 had planned for an overall reduction in production prices, the second BSE crisis has already wiped out the effect of this reduction on retail prices.

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Meat consumption before and after BSE in France and the European Union 39

It is reasonable to think that a third BSE scare is unlikely. The BSE scare finally became less newsworthy in the French media in 2001, largely because of the numbers of cattle reported to be BSE-infected. As they came from a source of contamination that was drastically cut in 1996 and as the average incubation time is five years, clinical cases should gradually disappear in 2003 in the countries most affected (UK, Ireland, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Swit- zerland). As the problem of super-BAB (infected animals born after 1996), although mysterious, has not been sizeable in any of these countries, it may be hoped that it will not hit the headlines after 2003. Death rates from nvCJD have clearly been falling in the UK since 2001 and a total forecast of about 200 deaths is fairly widely accepted by the scientific community, which radically counters earlier scare-mongering about BSE (e.g. 600,000 deaths). While the European media are tiring of the BSE story, European public opinion has been deeply marked by the second scare and will remain lastingly distrustful of the modernised agro-food complex.

After 2003, the mark left by BSE on the meat industry should be limited to the paid satisfaction of strong demand for natural products. The measu- res taken to prevent BSE have all been in place for a long time now. One measure, traceability, is a radical change that has been more or less genera- lised in the EU for bovines. It is now becoming common in the pig and lamb sectors. This provides a cornerstone for all the measures designed to reassure consumers through market segmentation based on 'quality'. Organic farming is likely to develop in all countries but resolutely remaining a niche market. Inte- grated farming, which is being taken up in France, is a movement that sets itself up as a basic standard. Between the two extremes are various quality approaches (label rouge, product certification, PGI, AOC, branding). All of these will attempt to meet new forms of 'food' demand born of the BSE crisis.

This demand relates to 'natural' production and processing. These responses will be very diverse. None of them aims to go back to the Middle Ages and the modernity of the industry will not be fundamentally challenged.

This readiness to pay for 'naturalness' is a source of value that is far from running dry. Consumers, with their new-found vigilance, will remunerate these market segments depending on their various degrees of willingness to pay and depending on the moves of the distribution companies. In France, it is already very apparent that hypermarkets and supermarkets are adapting to changing demand and no revolution in food shopping is therefore underway. It is a remarkable fact that image-building investments of big name stores are based largely on these new forms of demand and that French hyper- and supermarkets are exploiting this movement through their commercial events. This sudden interest from hyper- and supermarkets presages sustained growth in volume in these market segments.

The scars left by BSE in consumer opinion are not a long-term threat to the consumption of food industry products. Consumption levels will only be marginally altered. However, the financial value of consumption is set to rise. All of the changes made in the industry have a cost, which will be met by the new levels of 'willingness to pay' derived from the crisis. In our affluent, educated and urbanised societies, such willingness to pay is currently widespread. Hypermarkets and supermarkets have obviously grown wise to this. Finally, the industry's communication should aim to win back the young and educated consumers who were already showing clear signs of abandoning the product before BSE.