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Fire investigations by the DBR Fire Research Section 1959-1962
Shorter, G. W.; Burnett, C. G.; Shaver, J. J.; Galbreath, M.
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Aerial view of fire at Ottawa Hunt and Golf C'Iub , February 1962 (Photo Features Ltd. ｾ Ottawa).
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PREFACE
The Fire Research Section of the Division of Building Research continues to study fires in the field. This report, the fifth
such report to be issued, presents summaries of the fires that have been attended during the year s 1959 -1962. During this period, vi ait s were also made to the scenes of fires at Montreal, Quebec, and Kingston, Ontario, although, as in previous years, the majority of the investigations were carried out in the Ottawa area.
The experience gained during the study of fires in the field, although not of a statistical nature, indicate certain deficiencies in fire protection features in construction. It is intended to publish a paper or series of papers on these deficiencies.
In all of this work the Section is grateful for the co-operation received from fire officials and in particular members of the Ottawa Fire Department and the office of the Ontario Fire Marshal.
The authors of this report, G. W. Shorter, a mechanical engineer, is Head of the Fire Research Section, C. G. Burnett and J. J. Shaver are Technical Officers in the Fire Research Section whose main duties are in connection with the preparation of the National Fire Codes, and M. Galbreath, an architect, who is a member of the DBR Building Standards Section, working on fire matters related to the National Building Code.
Ottawa July 1964
R. F. Legget, Director.
( ii)
FIRE INVESTIGATIONS BY THE DBR FIRE RESEARCH SECTION
1959-1962 by
G. W. Shorter, C. G. Burnett, J. J. Shaver and M. Galbreath
This report contains summarie s of fir e inve stigations carried out in the years 1959 to 1962 and a brief analysis of the 147 major fires that have been investigated by the Division of Building Research since the study began in 1950. Although this study is
generally restricted to investigations in the Ottawa area, visits were made to the scenes of fires of special significance which occurred in other localities. Among the latter were the cities of Montreal and Kingston.
As in previous reports, summaries of the thirty fires investigated from 1959 to 1962 are given together with photographs to supplement the written de scriptions. In each summary the fire is described under the following headings: (a) General, (b) Construction, (c) Separations, (d) Exits, (e) Spread of Fire and (f) Remarks. A detailed synopsis is used as a lead-in to each summary to introduce the type of occupancy, chronology, weather and an estimate of the amount of the loss incurred.
Data for all the fires reported upon since 1950 have been used for the brief analysis in Appendix A. Figures A-I, A-2, and A-3
show the frequency distribution of fires by (a) month, (b) day of week, and (c) hour of day, respectively. In addition, other miscellaneous data on the fires by occupancy are presented in Table A-I. It should be emphasized that this analysis illustrates the distribution of only those fires which have been investigated by the Fire Section and does not necessarily apply to fires in general.
The building referred to in the caption for each summary is always that in which the fire originated. The losses reported refer not only to this building but also to any others involved in the fire. The figures given are only approximate values and may vary considerably from the actual losses sustained. They are included, however, to give some estimate of the severity of the fire.
In 1959, a serious fire wh ich destroyed a number of
buildings occurred in a small town near Ottawa. A report on this fire is contained in D. B. R. Fire Study No.8, "Report on Conflagration in
(iii)
Lanark, Ontario, June 15, 1959." Information obtained from the Lanark fire is not included in the c ornp i l ation of data which appears in Appendix A of this report.
Certain general observations can be made as a result of these fire investigations. One of the more serious construction
defects which was found at many of the fires was the lack of adequate fire stopping particularly where servi.ces pass through floors. In many instances an otherwise effective fire separation had been rendered ineffective by fire spreading through service passages. It would appear that more rigid supervision and inspection of the fire stopping of service passages would do much to remedy this problem.
Many of the fires that occurred in older row housing spread due to the lack of fire separations between the units,
particularly in the space beneath the roof and above the ceiling of the floor below. This situation which is now catered for by modern building codes usually results not only in severe fire damage but also affects units which would not otherwise suffer water and smoke damage.
Undoubtedly delayed detection has been a major factor in many of these incidents in reducing the effectiveness of fire fighters in confining the fire. Frequently the fire fighters upon their arrival have been confronted with a serious fire already involving large areas of a building. As a consequence, they immediately have the additional task of protecting exposed buildings.
The investigation of fire fatalities in the Province of Ontario, which was carried on in conjunction with the annual studies of fire deaths in the Province, and was reported upon in DBR Internal Reports Nos. 71, 90, 127 and 176, has been discontinued. The last report covering the years 1957-1958 was published in May 1959. This report includes fires investigated in which fatalities occurred and the fact that loss of life did occur is reported.
DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 1/59 Date of fire: Day of week: Time of fire: Weather: 30 Dec. 1958 Tuesday 4.00 a. m. 25°F - R. H. 88% NW wind 7 mph, Fog. Occupancy: No. of storeys: Location: Population: Estimated loss: Residential (Apartment house) 3 plus basement Ottawa 270,000 $70,000.
General: This building consisting of two wings was located on the north-west corner of a street intersection (Figure 1), When the occupants of a fir st floor apartment in the north wing awoke to find smoke in their rooms they turned in an alarm. At this time a fire involving wood-frame storage lockers was burning in the basement. An open interior wood staircase leading from the rear of the basement to the upper floors of the north wing became involved in the initial stages of the fire, thereby cutting off escape by this route (Figure 3).
Construction: "Ordinary" construction: brick masonry bearing walls, wood joist floors, plaster ceilings, with approximately 3000 sq ft per floor. The dimensions of the building were 63 by 50 ft with a narrow court varying from 6 ft 6 in. to 8 ft in width located at the rear of the building (Figure 4). The structure contained 24 apartments housing 72 people.
Separations: During the fire, the design and location of this building presented two exposure hazards to the fire department. The north wall of the apartment block containing a number of window openings was separated by a distance of 3 ft from a Ii-storey wood-frame structure clad with asphalt siding (imitation brick), The narrow court presented the second exposure hazard as there were window openings on both sides. On the east and south sides of the building street widths provided sub-stantial spatial separations. The west side of the building faced a l2-ft lane and contained no window openings in that portion of the building involved. An interior masonry wall which extended from the basement to the roof divided the building including the attic space into separate compartments.
Exits: A narrow corridor on each floor of the north wing provided a means of escape from all apartments in two directions, either to a centrally located enclosed stairway or to a rear service stairway, If the fire had occurred in the south wing, escape might have been more difficult as there was access to only one staircase or a fire escape stair which terminated 12 ft above ground.
Spread of Fire: Fire-fighting operations confined the fire to the building of origin. The fir e appear e d to have originated in the vicinity of wooden storage bins in the basement on the north side of the building. A definite cause was not determined due to the amount of burning in the
area. An open doorway leading from the basement to the service stairway at the rear allowed smoke and flames to travel to the upper floors. The fire entered the walls through the open spaces around the water and waste pipes leading from the basement (Figure 2) and followed up the walls to the apartments on each floor. finally
reaching the roof of the building. The interior masonry dividing wall effectively confined the fire to that portion of the building originally involved, including the attic space.
Remarks: Basement fires are usually difficult to extinguish particularly where detection is delayed and the fire is allowed to develop to serious proportions before extinguishment begins. Not only is it difficult to extinguish a fire in a basement, but the fire may spread undetected upwards via openings around pipes in concealed wall spaces. These were the conditions at this fire complicated by the fact that an open stairway leading from the basement assisted the vertical spread of the fire.
3
-DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 2/59
Date of fir e: Day of week: Time of fire: Weather: 9 Jan. 1959 Tuesday 5.50 a. m.
8°F -R. H. 62%
SW wind 16 mph. Occupancy: No. of storeys: Location: Estimated loss: Residential (row housing) 3 plus cellar Ottawa $20,000.General: This building was typical of residential construction in Ottawa at the turn of the century. It was constructed to provide two single
family residences. A carriageway extended through the centre of the building to the rear yard. The fire originated in that half of the building to the right of the carriageway (Figure 5). This portion of the building including a 2 -storey addition at the rear had been converted into a
rooming house. Many of the rooms contained electrical appliances whi'ch were used for preparing meals.
The fire, first noticed by one of the occupants was burning in the exterior wall adjacent to the front stairway at the second floor level. It was reported that the rapid progress of the fire prevented escape by this stairway.
Construction: The building including the 2 -storey wing at the rear was divided into thirteen rooms. The construction was of wood frame with brick veneer. Exterior walls were of 2 - by 4-in. studs faced on both sides with 3/4-in. boards laid horizontally with no insulation or fire stopping. Interior finish was plaster on wood lath. There was
approximately 1000 sq ft of floor area on both the first and second floors. Separations: The side walls of the building consisted of 2 - by 4-in.
studs with 3/4-in. boards and plaster finish as described previously. The walls of the adjoining buildings wer e faced with brick veneer. The front of the building faced a wide street while at the rear there was an open yard. The separation between the two halves of the building over the carriageway did not extend through the common attic space.
Exits: The wooden interior stairway which was
3i
ft wide had an open balustrade extending from the first floor to the third. The stairway to the basement was cut off by a door at the fir st floor level.Iron balconies outside the back bedroom windows on the second and third floors were connected by a 2 -ft wide fire escape stair leading to a vertical iron ladder attached to the wall and terminating 7 ft above the ground (Figure 6). The bedrooms on the second and third floor s opened into a 15 -ft long dead-end corridor.
Spread of Fire: The fire which appeared to have originated in the walls on the second floor quickly involved the c or r idor s and stairway (Figure 7).
In general the fire was confined to this open area although some of the rooms and the attic space became involved also (Figure 8). In spite of the lack of fire separation in the attic space the fire was
prevented from entering the other half of the building by the fire fighters. Remar ks: The main point of intere st in this fire was the influence of the open stairway not only on the development of the fire but also on the escape of the occupants. Due to the rapid involvement of the stairway a number of the occupants had to seek refuge on the second floor
balcony at the front of the building prior to the arrival of the fire depart-m ent , No explanations were given as to why the rear fire escape was not used.
5
-DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 3/59
Date of fir e: Day of week: Time of fire: Weather: 27 Jan. 1959 Tuesday 10.00 p. m. 0° F -R. H. 79% E wind 1 mph. Occupancy: No. of storeys: Location: Population: Estimated loss: Business and personal 3 plus cellar Cornwall, Ontario 40,000 $200,000.
General: At approximately 10.00 p. rn , a patrolling policeman discovered a fire burning in a 3 -storey commercial building located on one of
Cornwall's main streets (Figure
9).
The first floor of the building was a retail store with a jeweller's workshop, offices and an apartment on the second floor. The third floor was used as a lodge room. The fire appeared to have started on the second floor and burned for 5 hours completely destroying the second and third floors and the roof of the building (Figure 12). Because of the amount of debris on the top floor s a definite cause of the fire could not be determined.Construction: The building had load -bearing brick walls. wood joist floor s, flat roof and wood stud partitions with an area of 2800 sq ft on the ground floor and 1600 sq ft on the upper floors.
Separations: A brick wall dividing the upper floors might have reduced the area of the fire but for an unprotected opening at the second floor level through which the fire passed to the other half of the building.
The north wall of the building (shown at right in Figure 9) was of brick. The roof of the adjoining building was 18 in. higher and the roofing material carried down the wall face. The fire fighter s concentrated on this area preventing the fire from spreading to this building. The south wall, of solid brick construction, was pierced by former door and window openings. Some flame and smoke penetrated these weak points and the fire fighters had to cut out plaster and
strapping to prevent the spread of fire into the adjacent building.
At the rear of the building there was a maze of combustible materials. A wood deck at the first floor level extended to the back lane, and wooden stairs, footpaths and railings led to similar
constructions in all the neighbouring buildings (Figure 10).
Exits: There was only one interior means of egress from the third floor in this building. A 3 -ft wide wooden stairway with a 20 -ft
connecting corridor at the second floor led down to a ground floor exit (Figure 11). At the rear of the building a metal fire escape stair and ladder gave access to the flat roof over the single storey portion of the building. An enclosed wooden stair at the end of the flat roof led to the back lane.
6
-Spread pf Fire: Prior to the fire, workmen had been resurfacing the walls of the corridor on the second floor and the front stairway with wallboard which resulted in the exposure of many of the stud partitions. The fire spread rapidly in these partitions to the third floor and the ventilated space between the roof and third floor ceiling where it ignited the wood planking and the tar and gravel finish on the roof. Live ember s dropping down between the wall studs started fires in the walls on the fir st floor but these fires were checked before serious damage was done.
Remarks: Two important factor s in the development of this fire were delayed detection and the exposure of wood-frame partitions during the renovation of the corridor and stairway.
7
-DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 4/59
Date of fire: Day of week: Time of fire: Weather: 17 March 1959 Tuesday 8.30 p. m. 12°F -R.H.
850/0
NE wind 15 mph. Occupancy: No. of storeys: Location: Estimated loss: Business and personal service 3 plus cellar Ottawa $180,000. General: This 3 -storey building located on the northeast corner of a street inter section (Figure 13) was the scene of a fire which burned for 5 hours severely damaging the enti r e building. At the time of the fire the fir st floor of the building was occupied by a bank and the second and third floors which were used for offices were unoccupied as they were being renovated. The fire was discovered by the janitor of the building who noticed smoke coming from the bank ceiling and upon investigating found a fire in progress on the second floor. It was reported that smoke and flames were issuing from the second and third floor windows upon the arrival of the fire department making entry difficult.Construction: The building was of steel frame and masonry construction with wood joist floors. The first floor ceiling was of acoustic tiles and gypsum board on metal furring channels suspended by wire ties from the wood floor joists.
On
each floor the area was approximately 3000 sq ft. Separations:On
the west and south sides of the building street widths provided substantial spatial separations. The north and east walls of the building wer e brick with no window openings (Figur e 14).Exits: There were two narrow wooden stairways leading to the upper floor s located at the front and rear of the building. These stairways were enclosed by wood stud partitions protected by plaster. It was noted that the plaster on the outside of the stair enclosure extended only to the underside of the suspended ceiling leaving a space
approximately 3 ft in height completely unprotected.
Spread of Fire: The fire was reported to have started on the second floor. Workmen had been employed in the alterations to the upper floors and had left openings in the floor in the centre of the building between the second and third storeys. The openings in the floor appeared to have provided a flue effect in spreading the fire from the second to the third floor and roof. The fire penetrated down into the fir st floor ceiling but was confined there. The fir st floor was not involved in the fire but received considerable water damage. A
definite cause for the fire was not determined but a possible cause was the careless disposal of a cigarette in the accumulated rubbish on the second floor.
Remarks: Once again delayed detection allowed a fire to develop to serious proportions before the arrival of the Fire Department. Floor openings between the second and third storeys no doubt also contributed to the spread of the fire.
9
-DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 5/59
Date of fire: Day of week: Time of fire: Weather: 22 April 1959 Wednesday 10.00 p. rn , 43°F -R. H. 57% S wind 12 mph. Occupancy: No. of storeys: Location: Estimated loss: Commercial and industrial (storage) 3 Ottawa $300,000.
General: This fire which started in the late evening in a furniture storage warehouse continued to burn throughout the night in spite of fire-fighting operations. Fire fighters were still overhauling the site when it was visited the following morning.
Construction: The building was of load-bearing masonry construction with unprotected interior steel columns and beams (Figure l6). The floors were of 4-in. laminated wood plank and the roof was of concrete construction. All former window openings were filled in with brick and stucco. Ceiling heights in the storage area were low, and furniture was closely packed in wire mesh cages.
Separations: The building was divided into compartments by l2-in. brick walls pierced in several places by openings for ramps, etc. (Figure l7). The floors also were open at stairs and ramps.
The warehouse was surrounded by open space - bounded by the river on one side and by railway tracks and truck courts on the other s (Figure l5).
Spread of Fire: The origin of the fire was undetermined; nevertheless, the openings in the fire separations provided the opportunity for the
fire to spread throughout the building.
Remarks: If compartmcntation is to be effective, all openings in the enclosing elements must be protected.
DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 6/59 Date of fire: Day of week: Time of fire: Weather: 15 May 1959 Friday 11. 24 p. rn , 48° F -R. H. 58% SW wind 7 mph. Occupancy: No. of storeys: Location: Estimated loss: Commercial and industrial (storage) 3 plus cellar Ottawa $750,000.
General: Shortly after 11.00 p. m. a passerby noticed smoke coming from the roof of this three -storey building (Figure 18) and called the fire department. Upon arrival, the fire department found the rear portion of the building burning vigorously and the fire spreading rapidly. As a consequence fire-fighting operations were mainly directed towards protecting exposures. The fire eventually spread through rear wall openings on the second floor to ignite an attached 2 -storey storage
building. In addition an adjacent paint storage warehouse was threatened (Figur e 20). The building contained alar gequantity of radio and
electronic equipment. A definite cause of the fire was not determined due to the amount of interior burning.
Construction: The exterior walls of the building were of brick 12 and 16 in. thick. The columns and beams were of heavy timber sections (Figure 19), the columns on the fir st floor being 12 by 12 in. The floor s were of 2- by 12-in. joists 16 in. o. c. and 3/4-in. tongue-and-grooved boards. In the office section the ceilings were of galvanized sheet
steel nailed to the under side of the joists.
Separations: The front or south wall faced a street width which provided a substantial spatial separation. The rear or north wall formed a common wall with the 2-storey storage shed. There were unprotected window
openings in this wall. A portion of the west wall served as a common wall with the 2-storey paint storage warehouse. Openings in this wall were protected by fire doors. On the east side there was an aluminum clad storage shed located 3 ft from the rear portion of the structure. Open spaces in the form of railroad siding and trucking areas provided spatial separations at the perimeter of the fire area which further reduced the exposure hazard.
Spread of Fire: The fire which was reported to have originated in the basement spread to the upper floor s by means of an open elevator shaft located on the west side of the building (Figure 21). The combustible construction of the floor s and partitions materially assisted the develop-ment of the fire. Former window openings in the. rear wall on the second floor permitted the fire to enter the 2-storey storage shed at the rear ｾ
the building. Fire -fighting operations prevented any further spread of the fire.
11
-Remarks: Early detection of this fire could have reduced the loss. Open elevator shafts and stairways permitting the unrestricted vertical spread of fire are one of the major factors contributing to the rapid involvement of entire buildings.
12
-DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 7/60
Date of fire: Day of week: Time of fire: Weather: 31 Jan. 1960 Sunday 5.30 a. m. 9° F -R. H. 76% ENE wind 12 mph. Occupancy: No. of storeys: Location: Population: Estimated loss: Mercantile 3 plus cellar Hull, P. Q. 55,000 $225,000. General: This fire which burned for 5 hour s involved four buildings to varying degrees (Figures 22 and 23). Three of the buildings, former residences, had been converted into mercantile or commercial
occupancies. In two of the buildings there were apartments on the third floor. The fire started in the building occupied by a pharmacy, a type-writer shop, offices and apartments. An adjacent structure used as a municipal library received extensive damage in the upper floors. The building adjacent to the library contained offices and an addition on the roof used as the library stock room. This building received substantial fire damage. Damage to a stone masonry structure on the other side of the building of origin was limited to that caused by smoke and water. This building contained a jeweller's shop on the fir st floor and apart-ments on the second and thir d floor s.
For the purposes of this report the building of origin will be referred to as the pharmacy building, its neighbours as the jeweller's building and the library building, and the building adjacent to the library as an office building (see plan view Figure 26).
Construction: The pharmacy building in which the fire originated was of wood frame construction having a floor area of 1650 sq ft with brick veneer on the front and tin sheeting at the rear. A 2 -storey wood -frame addition having a floor area of 750 sq ft extended from the rear of the pharmacy building to the lot line. This structure was faced with stucco and was covered by a built -up flat roof (Figure 25).
The 3 -storey library building had a floor area of 925 sq ft and was of brick masonry construction with wood joists and a flat built-up roof except for a tin-faced mansard portion on the front of the building. There was a great deal of wooden decorative trim on the front of this building. A 5-ft roofed and partly enclosed wooden balcony extended across the rear of the building at the fir st floor level (Figure 24).
The office building was of brick masonry construction 2 storeys in height having a flat roof and a floor area of 630 sq ft. A third floor room of wood-frame construction clad with asbestos siding had been constructed on the roof of this building. This room was used for the storage of library books and was connected to the adjacent
p
13
-Separations: The four buildings mainly involved all faced a street width which provided spatial separation; a similar situation existed at the rear of the buildings where there was open yard space. To the right of the office building there was a lane having a width of 10 ft.
The stone masonry wall of the jeweller's building provided a good con-struction separation, the only weakness being at the roof line.
Exits: An open wooden stairway in the centre of the library building gave access to the first and second floors and an enclosed stairway led up to the third floor. A metal fire escape and ladder at the head of the enclosed stairway provided a means of escape down the outside of the building.
Spread of Fire: It is believed that the fire started in the pharmacy building which was completely burnt out. The fire then spread to the roof of the library building quickly involving the third floor stack area.' The fire did not spread to the second floor but did spread through an open doorway into the book storage room on the top of the adjacent
office building. In the office building the second floor was also involved. There was slight damage in the jeweller's building although fire fighters had broken out part of the wood finish on the roof in order to confine the fire.
Remarks: The quantity of wood in the form of cornices and finishing trim probably contributed to the spread of fire between the buildings but the heavy masonry construction was of importance in containing the fires that developed. There is an interesting comparison between the almost complete destruction of the wood-frame building (pharmacy) and the lesser damage to the masonry building.
DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 8/60 Date of fire: Day of week: Time of fire: Weather: 24 April 1960 Sunday 3.30 p. m. 47° F - R. H. 94% NNE wind 9 mph. Occupancy: No. of storeys: Location: Estimated loss: Mercantile 3 plus cellar Ottawa $90,000.
General: This fire in a retail paint store (Figure 27) was discovered when a passerby noticed smoke coming from a second storey window at the front of the building. Prior to discovery the fire had made rapid progress in the wooden storage racks on the second floor, and was
spreading in the combustible board ceiling and wood joists supporting the third floor when the fire fighters arrived.
Construction: The building was constructed of solid brick-bearing walls and wooden joists. The flat roof was finished with tar and gravel over wood sheathing. Large windows were installed in the front and rear walls. Separations: The solid brick-bearing walls on the north and south sides of the building extending above the roof provided construction separations. The front (or east) wall faced a street and the rear wall faced a laneway which provided both spatial separations and access for fire fighters. Exits: A narrow wooden interior staircase at the rear of the building provided the only means of egress from the second and third floors to ground level.
Spread of Fire: The fire originated at the rear of the second floor near wooden racks stocked with cans of paint (Figure 28) and spread rapidly to involve the combustible board finish on the ceiling and the interior storage separations. Heat created by the fire broke the glass in the large windows in the front and rear walls of the second floor.
Remarks: The cause of the fire was not definitely determined due to extensive burning in the area of origin. The combustible nature of the interior finish and storage racks enabled this fire to develop very rapidly. Fortunately the fire department arrived in time to prevent the stored painting materials from becoming involved to any extent.
15
-DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 9/60 Date of fire: Day of week: Time of fire: Weather: 14 July 1960 Thursday 4.31 p. m. 72°F - R. H. 41% NE wind 16 gusting to 20 mph. Occupancy: No. of storeys: Location: Estimated loss: Residential 2 plus cellar Ottawa $10,000.
General: The fire occurred in a 2-storey two family residence. The fire originated on an upper verandah which was part of an addition at the rear of the residence. Apparently the fire was caused by a child igniting some combustible material. Although the fire department response was quite rapid the fire spread to a residence on one side and threatened to spread to the residence on the other side.
Construction: The building in which the fire originated was of frame construction clad with wood siding.
Separations: The separation between the residence in which the fire originated and the one which became involved was approximately 4 ft. In this 4-ft space there was a wooden stair leading to the second floor flat. On the other side of the residence that was burning there was a separation of approximately 17 ft to the next building.
Exits: There were two exits from the ground floor and the exit from the second floor was by an exterior wooden stairway.
Spread of Fire: The fire rapidly spread from the porch area to the upper floor of the residence which quickly became well involved. The adjoining building separated by a narrow space was clad on the upper half with stucco and on the lower half with asphalt siding (imitation brick). The roof had asphalt shingles. Flames ignited the 1/4-in. plywood forming the bottom part of the eaves of this latter residence and a hole was burned through opposite the stair landing of the house originally involved. In addition roof sheathing under metal flashing had ignited opposite the stair landing.
Fire then tended to spread to the building on the other side when the facing board of the eave on the other side became ignited .. In this instance the soffit under the eave did not ignite.
Remarks: The interesting feature of this fire is the influence of spatial separations on the spread of fire from one building to another. It is possible that if this fire had occurred under different circumstances, i. e. at night or had gone undiscovered for some time, the residence that was threatened might have become involved. In residential construction, the ignition of the eaves can lead to the development of a serious fire within the roof space, particularly in the case of pitched roofs.
DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 10/60 Date of fire: Day of week: Time of fire: Weather: 22 August 1960 Monday 8.45 p. m , 69°F - R. H. 94% NNE wind
9
mph light rain. Occupancy: No. of storeys: Location: Estimated loss: Commercial and industrial 1 plus basement Ottawa $130,000.General: This building was used for the warehousing and shipping operations of a firm manufacturing biscuits and candy. A passerby discovered the fire when his attention was attracted by smoke from the basement of the building. Upon the arrival of the fire department, and when observed through windows the fire appeared to be confined to a small area. However, when fire fighters affected entry to the building the fire immediately flashed throughout the structure. This rapid involvement of the whole building forced fire-fighting operations to be concentr ated on pr otecting exposur e s.
Construction: This brick and masonry 1 -storey building was
approximately 150 ft in length and 50 ft in width with a full basement (Figure 29). The flat roof deck was constructed of wood sheathing covered with tar and gravel. The deck lay on 2 - by 6 -in. wood joists which were supported by wood-framing members bearing on steel gir der s (Figur e 30). Beneath the steel gir der s a combustible ceiling had been installed on wooden member s supported by the bottom flange of steel girders. The space between the ceiling and the roof which had no fire stops was approximately 5 ft high. The floors were wood and combustible sheathing was used as an interior wall finish.
Interior columns were cast iron pipe and heavy steel girders supported the main floor of the warehouse (Figure 31). The steel or cast iron members were not protected.
Separations: This building was located on the southwest corner of a street intersection. The front (north) and east sides faced street widths which provided substantial spatial separations. A windowless wall on the west side was approximately 2 ft from the masonry side wall of the adjacent building. The rear wall, containing no window' openings was separated by a distance of approximately 5 ft from the neighbouring 2 -storey apartment building. Wooden balconies and
stair s of the apartment building projected into this space. Exits: There were doors at the front and side.
Spread of Fire: The fire started in the basement which contained cardboard cartons of packaged goods and wooden storage racks.
17
-The fire then spread to the first floor through unprotected openings. This whole area quickly became involved following the entry for fire-fighting purposes. The fire then spread into the open space above the ceiling, eventually causing the roof deck to fail. Fire-fighting operations confined the fire to the building of origin. Remarks: Two significant factor s that contributed to the spr ead of the fire were delayed detection and the high fire load which consisted of combustible contents and combustible interior finish materials. The open nature of the building undoubtedly contributed to the rapid involvement of the complete structure. It was difficult for the fire fighters to apply water effectively on burning materials due to the storing of the packaged materials in large piles. The masonry walls performed quite satisfactorily in containing the fire. In an occupancy such as this the use of sprinkler s might well limit the damage in that fire fighter s would gain valuable time. One
interesting feature was the damage to an exterior bearing wall due to the expansion of one of the steel beams supporting the first floor (Figure 32).
18
-DBR FIRE STUDY
NO.
11/61Date of fire: Day of week: Time of fire: Weather: 25 January 1961 Wednesday 6.00 p. m. _10 F - R. H. 55% SWS wind 25 mph gusting to 38 mph. Occupancy: No. of storeys: Location: Population: Estimated loss: Mercantile 2 plus cellar Montreal 1, 200, 000 $135,000.
General: This fire originated in a small 2 -storey wood -frame building housing a furniture store on the ground floor with sleeping accommodation on the floor above. The fire quickly spread to an adjacent 3 -storey
building hous ing a tavern on the ground floor and sleeping accommodation on the floors above. Both of these buildings were severely damaged and the fire threatened to spread to surrounding structures. As a result of this fire two people died, one in hospital as a result of smoke poisoning and one in the fire.
Construction: The walls of the building of origin were of IIp l a n k wa.II!'
construction (solid wood wall) clad on the outside with brick veneer and having an interior finish of plaster and wood lath. The floor s were of wood joist construction with plaster on wood lath ceiling. The roof was 2-in. wood plank laid on wood joists with a tar and gravel surface. The floor area of this building was approximately 2500 sq ft. The adjacent building which subsequently became involved was of similar construction.
Separations: The buildings involved were located on the northeast corner of a street intersection in an older section of the city. The front (south side) of the building of origin faced a street width which provided substantial spatial separation (Figure 33). Separations on the east and west sides were provided by the wood-frame walls of the building of origin. Immediately to the east a brick masonry wall varying in thickness from 12 to 8 in. prevented the further ,spread to the adjoining structure (Figure 33). On the west side of the building of origin there was no effective separation, consequently the 3 -storey tavern building became involved. Further spread of the fire on the north side of the tavern building was prevented by a brick masonry' wall (Figure 34).
Spread of Fire: The fire which originated in the 2-storey furniture store spread to the 3 -storey tavern building. In spite of the fact that both these buildings were well involved the fire was prevented from spreading to adjacent buildings. Masonry walls together with the efforts of the fire fighters stopped the advance of the fire in an easterly and northerly direction.
III'
19
-Remarks: This fire occurred in an older congested area of the city where mixed and inferior construction often contributes to the seriousness of fires. This fire provided an excellent contrast between the effectiveness of solid masonry walls and wood-frame walls in confining a severe fire. The damage was very severe to
both these buildings and although the 3-storey tavern building remained standing it was ordered demolished by the building inspector.
DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 12/61 Date of fire: Day of week: Time of fire: Weather: 25 January 1961 Wednesday 2.30 p. m. _10 F - R. H. 55% WSW wind 23 mph gusting to 36 mph. Occupancy: No. of storeys: Location: Estimated loss: Re sidential (apartment) 5 plus basement par king gar age
Metropolitan Montreal $750, 000. General: This fire occurred in a new apartment building located on a street of predominantly single family row houses. There were 50
apartments in the building. The local building bylaw permitted 3 storeys in combustible construction and so the builder had used concrete block bearing walls and floor s of wood joist construction over two floor s of concrete construction. The fir e is believed to have started in the kitchen of a third floor apartment at the front of the building as a result of
cooking oil boiling over on the stove. A crippled woman who occupied the apartment had to be rescued from her living room balcony (Figure 35).
The fire appeared to have spread through the joists to the rear of the building where it entered a vertical shaft around a 4-in. waste pipe connected to the bathrooms on each floor. This led to the rapid development of the fire. A man living near the apartment block was called home by his wife and entered the apartment basement at an early stage of the fire. He said he heard air whistling up the shaft and saw burning fragments drop through to the basement floor. In the
shaft, there had been some attempt to stop the holes with cement mortar where the pipe passed through the concrete floor. This mortar was loose and fell out during the cour se of the fire. Pieces of mortar were observed on the floor under the shaft following the fire.
The fire burned for 8 hours before it was brought under control. The City of Montreal Fire Department was called in to assist the local fire department.
Construction: Exterior and interior bearing walls were constructed of concrete and concrete block. Interior partitions were wood stud' finished with gypsum board. The first two floors were constructed of reinforced concr ete, while the upper three floor s were wood joists with ceilings of gypsum lath and l/2-in. plaster having mesh over
joints. The roof was wood joist construction which supported a gypsum lath and plaster ceiling. The exterior surface was of tar and gravel built -up roofing.
21
-Separations: The front of this building faced a street which provided a substantial spatial separation. The distance between the apartment building and the house immediately to the west was 15 ft from the edge of the balcony and l7t ft from wall to wall (Figure 37). The windows were recessed at the balconies. At the east end of the building a space of 20 ft separated the building from an identical apartment block. All of the outer walls of the building contained a high proportion of window area which would tend to reduce the effectiveness of the spatial
separations provided. Separations between floors consisted of concrete slabs on the first two floors and wood joist floors (approximately 1 hour fire resistance) for the upper three floors. Unfortunately. the
effectiveness of these separations was reduced by holes cut in the floor for electrical cables and pipe shafts, many of which were not filled in following installation of the services. An example of such a defect was evident in the kitchen immediately above the kitchen in which the fire started. A cupboard was charred by flames which passed through the holes made to bring the electrical power to the stove. Lack of fire stops in the wood joist floors further reduced their effectiveness.
The centre stairwell and elevator shaft were surrounded by masonry walls which extended to the exterior walls (Figure 36). The doorways to the corridor s on either side were open at each floor level. This was therefore in effect an open stair.
Exits: One main stair and elevator shaft with doorways on each floor led through a common lobby to the front door. Five back stair sled from two apartments on each floor to the basement parking garage and thence by a door to the yard (Figure 38).
Spread of Fire: The fire spread via the concealed spacing of the third floor ceiling joists to a service shaft at the rear of the building and then upwards through the two floors above. An area approximately
30 ft in diameter and extending from the second floor level to the roof was completely burned out. The pipe shaft was located in the centre of this area. The fire did not spread to the outer walls or windows except at the top of the building where the roof was destroyed. No damage by radiation was done to adjacent buildings. The fire did not enter the stairwell and there was no sign of damage in this area. The fire was confined to the building of origin mainly by the efforts of the fire department.
Remarks: The principal lesson to be learned from this fire is that nominal fire endurance is not enough. One -hour protected floor s should have contained the fire in the compartment of origin. That it failed to do so can be attributed to the chopping up of the construction to accom-modate the installation of plumbing and electrical services and to the lack of fire stopping in the wood floor5 between apartments.
DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 13/61 Date of fire: Day of week: Time of fire: Weather: 28 Jan. 1961 Saturday 3.45 p. rn , 16° F - R. H. 830/0 W wind 12 mph light snow. Occupancy: No. of storeys: Location: Estimated loss: Mercantile 2 plus cellar Ottawa $105, 000.
General: This fire originated in the cellar of a 2-storey building occupied by a drugstore on the ground floor with offices and apartments on the floor above. While replenishing a fuel oil tank in the cellar the driver of an oil truck discovered that oil was discharging onto the cellar floor as a result of a broken vent pipe. He immediately returned to his depot for equipment to pump the oil out of the cellar. Shortly after hi s departure the oil ignited and the resulting fire was discovered by a clerk in the drugstore. It was suggested that the ignition of the oil was associated with a furnace that was in operation at the time.
Construction: The building was of solid brick construction with the exception of a portion of the north wall at the rear of the building. An opening made in this portion of the wall which was wood frame covered by tin sheeting may be seen in Figure 40. The roof and floor structures were of wooden construction and the roof covering was tar and gravel built-up roofing. The interior finish was plaster on wooden lath. Separations: This building was located on the northeast corner of a
street intersection. The front (west side) and south, sides faced
street widths which provided substantial spatial separations. The rear east wall (Figure 40) faced a lane. The north wall (solid brick)
extended above the roof and provided an effective separation between the adjacent building and the building of origin. The rear portion of this wall (wood-frame construction) provided the separation between an adjoining 1 -storey storage shed.
Exits: There were two interior wooden stairways located at the middle and rear of the building. These stairways which opened onto the street on the south side of the building provided the means of egress from the upper floor.
Spread of Fire: The fire which rapidly involved the basement ceiling construction spread to the upper floors through openings around water and waste pipes eventually involving the space between the second floor ceiling and the roof. Figure 39 shows one of the upper floor bathrooms to which the fire spread via pipe openings. Although the building of origin became well involved during the course of the fire the fire fighters prevented the fire from spreading to the adjoining building.
23
-Remarks: The significant features of this fire arose from the inadvertent spillage of oil on the basement floor. In the fir st instance it is unlikely that this fire would have occurred if this spillage had not taken place. Its subsequent ignition, however. not only contributed fuel to the fire but when burning, generated large volumes of dense smoke. This smoke hampered the efforts of the fire fighters in extinguishing this fire. Undoubtedly the lack of fire stops particularly around service pipes facilitated the spread of the fire to the upper floor s.
DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 14/61 Date of fir e: Day of week: Time of fire: Weather: 30 Jan. 1961 Monday 8.10 p. rn , 15°F -R.B. n/a. Occupancy: No. of storeys: Location: Population: Estimated loss: Mercantile 1 Ajax, Ontario 8000 $150, 000. General: The fire occurred in a "supermarket" located in a shopping centre (Figure 41). It is believed to have been caused by a cigarette butt which had been swept up when the store closed and left in a car d-board container in the garbage room at the rear of the building. Fire departments from neighbouring municipalities were called in to assist the Ajax Volunteer Fire Department. A new water works system installed in the previous year provided an adequate water supply.
The fire was reported at 8. lap. rn , and shortly afterwar ds the Volunteer Fire Department was at the building. Upon their arrival smoke was appearing through the eave above the source of the fire. The only access to the building was through service doors 'which could not be opened. The eave was approximately 22 ft above the ground and the Chief determined that the only method of fighting the fire was from above. An aerial ladder truck was requested from a town that was 10 miles away. By the time this equipment arrived. flames were belching out the front of the store and across the parking lot. Owing to the direction of the wind, equipment could get close to the fire and water was played on side walls to prevent the fire from spreading to adjacent buildings. Extinguishment was finally achieved following the collapse of the roof structure. Side walls warped from the intense heat, but did not collapse. Nevertheless, while fighting the fire from the rear, a concrete block from the eave fell down narrowly missing one of the fire fighters and to avoid possible accident, fire fighters were pulled back from close proximity to the structure. The Ajax Fire Chief expressed an opinion that construction having concrete blocks at the eave should be made secure to eliminate such accidents.
While the fire was burning, the manager of the bank next door (Figure 4l) checked the heat of the south wall next to the fire. The wall did not become warm on the inside and painted surfaces were unaffected. The only damage to the bank interior was due to water leaking into the joist space above the ceiling and wetting the gypsum cor e lath which caused some acoustic tiles to loosen and fall down. Construction: Exterior walls were l2-in. concrete block with
reinforcing in horizontal joints every third course. This was permitted as an alternative to pilaster s which the owner objected to because their use would have reduced the usable width of the store. Roof construction
25
-was 14 W. F. 30 beams at 121 ft o. c. bearing on the side walls and a central beam approximc...tely 20 in. deep. Decking was corrugated steel roof membrane, bonded felt and gravel (Figure 44). The building was 90 by 120 ft.
Separations: Double concrete block walls separated the supermarket from the adjacent buildings on the north (Figure 42) and south. The east side or front of the building faced a parking lot (Figure 41) and the west side faced service roads which provided substantial spatial
separations.
Exits: Entrance door s at the front and a receiving door at the rear provided exits from the building. The exits were not of significance in this case as the building was unoccupied at the time the fire started. Spread of Fire: The fire was contained in the building of origin because of the following conditions:
(1) the dir ection of the wind blowing along the major axis of the structure and over the parking lot,
(2) walls which were not common to adjacent bui.l din g s ; (3) adjoining walls whose construction projected above
the roofs of adjacent buildings (Figure 43), and (4) the application of water on the side walls of the
structure.
Remar ks: This is a good example of a building in which limitations on construction practices such as those contained in the National Building Code of Canada were effective in reducing the extent of the fire. The National Building Code requirements applicable to a single-storey retail store of between 10,000 and 24,000 sq ft were met in this building in that
(1) the roof was of non-combustible construction, (2) the exterior walls were of l2-in. concrete
blocks (fire endurance of over 2 hour s), and (3) there was adequate space separation on the
exposures of the building not protected by con-struction separation. The fire therefore was so limited in size that it could be controlled by the available fire-fighting services and the adjoining buildings were involved only to the extent of some water damage.
26
-DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 15/61
Date of fire: Day of week: Time of fire: Weather: 31 Jan. 1961 Monday 11. 30 p. m ,
_4
0F - R. H. 67%
NW wind 11 mph. Occupancy: No. of storeys: Location: Estimated loss: Mercantile 3 plus cellar Montreal $156, 000.General: This fire is one of a series of fires which occurred in a period of a few days in Montreal and was studied by members of the Fire Section. The building in which this fire occurred was one of
several older type buildings to burn during the severely cold weather in the winter of this year. The building housed two retail stores on the ground floor and apartments on the two upper floors (Figure 45). A fire which originated in one of the stores quickly spread to the other and eventually involved the whole building. The relatively high los s was due to the fact that not only was the structure severely damaged but the contents of the two stores were a total loss.
Construction: The exterior walls were of plank wall construction with brick veneer cladding. The wooden floors were supported on wood joists with plaster ceilings beneath. All of the interior finish was plaster on wood lath. The roof was a mansard type roof clad with asphalt shingles (Figure 45). The third floor rooms were situated in the roof space with projecting dormer windows.
Separations: The front of the building faced a street width (40 to 50 ft) which provided a substantial spatial separation. The adjacent building on the right of the building involved (Figure 45) had a brick wall.
On
the other side of the building there was a 12-ft lane. There were windows in both the wall of the building involved and the. building on the other side of the lane but they were not directly opposite each other. An 8-in. brick wall separated the building involved from a I-storey annex at the rear (Figure 46). There was an open parking area at the rear of the annex. No fire separation existed between the two stores. What appears to be a fire wall (see projection at centre of mansard roof, Figure 45) was actually a combustible wall.
Exits: There were interior wooden stairs in each store.
Spread of Fire: The fire was contained in the building of origin and did not involve the storage annex at the rear.
Remarks: The ability of construction and spatial separations to contain a fire was demonstrated in this instance. Masonry walls performed well while the combustible separation between the two stores allowed the
27
-fire to spread relatively easily in spite of the efforts of the -fire fighters. The substantial spatial separation at the front effectively reduced the exposure hazard to buildings across the street. Although the 12 -ft lane would not on it s own be sufficient to stop the spr ead of fire to the adjacent building it did allow room for fire fighters to utilize hose streams to stop the spread of the fire.
DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 16/61 Date of fire: Day of week: Time of fire: Weather: 1 Feb. 1961 Wednesday 2.30 a. m.
_9°F - R. H. 69%
WNW wind 11 mph. Occupancy: No. of storeys: Location: Estimated loss: Re s idential 4 Montreal $25,000.General: This fire occurred in one half of a divided 4-storey building (Figure 47) occupied as a rooming house, with individual tenants in each room. The landlady who lived on the ground floor attended the Quebec heaters which were the sole source of heating for the establish-ment. These solid fuel space heaters were located on the landings at each floor level of an open wooden stairwell. Smoke pipes from the Quebec heaters crossed each landing to a common stack at the centre rear of the building. This fire which started while the occupants were asleep was suspected to have originated behind a Quebec heater on the ground floor landing. Three persons died as a result of this fire. Construction: The exterior walls of this building were plank wall construction clad with brick veneer. A masonry fire wall divided the building into two units. The wooden floors were supported on wood joists with plaster on wood lath ceilings. The sloping wood roof was clad with asphalt shingles. The interior finish throughout the building was plaster on wood lath. Pieces of tin were fastened to the walls behind the smoke pipes. The floor areas were approximately 600 sq ft in size.
Separations: The front of the building faced a street width (50 ft) which provided a substantial spatial separation. Spatial separation was also provided at the rear by a yard. There were masonry walls
separating the building of origin from the buildings on either side. Exits: All the rooms opened off the common landings near the open
stairwell. There was a Quebec heater and a gas stove for cooking on each landing. A fire escape consisting of wooden balconies connected by steel and wooden stair units was installed at the rear of the building
serving the unit where the fire originated. This escape could be reached through either a window or a door from two rooms on each floor. The steel and wood fire escapes led from balcony to balcony and down to the backyard. Occupants of the front rooms could not reach the balconies without crossing the landing of the open stair. Spread of Fire: The fire quickly spread up the open stairwell. The
stairway showed signs of burning throughout, and the flight to the fourth floor was almost burned through. The fire was essentially
29
-confined to the unit of origin which was severely damaged.
Nevertheless, the fire did penetrate a fire wall beside the stairwell and spread into the upper floors of the adjoining unit. As a conse-quence this unit suffered fire damage in the upper floors as well as general smoke and water damage.
Remarks: The principal feature of this fire was the influence of the open interior stairwell on the rapid spread of the fire. In this instance the location of heating devices on the stair landings presented a fir e hazar d in the stairwell.
DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 17/61 Date of fire: Day of week: Time of fire: Weather: Z Feb. 1961 Thursday 1. 00 p. m ,
_zo
F - R. H. 67% W wind 16 mph. Occupancy: No. of storeys: Location: Estimated loss: Commercial and industrial Z Montreal $64,000. General: While in Montreal studying other fires which had occurred previously, DBR personnel attended this fire which was still in progress (Figures 48 and 49) upon their arrival. The fire occurred in a small Z-storey industrial building, housing a paint store on the ground floor, and a clothing manufacturer on the upper floor. All of the occupants of the second floor escaped safely by enclosed stairways.Construction: The walls of the building were constructed of concrete block. The wooden floor s wer e supported on wood joists. The wooden
roof deck was supported on wood joists and had a tar and gravel sur-face. The interior finish was the unfinished surface of the concrete block walls.
Separations: There were varying spatial separations at the front, rear and one side of the building formed by yards and a street width (Figures 48 and 49). On the other side of the building there was a good construction separation formed by the block wall of the building of origin and the block wall of the adjoining 1 -storey garage building (Figure 48).
Exits: There were two enclosed stairs at opposite ends of the building.
Spr ead of Fir e: The fire was confined to the building of origin. Remarks: This fire is another example of the effectiveness of construction and spatial separations in confining a fire.
31
-DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 18/61
Date of fir e: Day of week: Time of fire: Weather: 4 Feb. 1961 Saturday 10.30 a. rn , 15°F - R. H. 79% NNW wind 7 mph. Occupancy: No. of storeys: Location: Estimated los s: Assembly 3 plus basement Ottawa $500,000.
General: The fire occurred in a large church building (Figure 50) located at a street intersection in the centre of Ottawa's main
mercantile and business district. This building which was one of Ottawa's landmarks, had been constructed 86 years ago. Some years previous to the fire a portion of the ground floor of the church annex (extreme left in Figure 50) was leased out for occupancy as a
commercial art gallery. The fire originated in an excelsior pile in a room at the rear of the gallery used for the crating and uncrating of art objects. The fire spread rapidly through the gallery and then to the church proper. The whole building was ultimately involved and damaged beyond repair (Figure 52). In order to fight this fire the Chief of the fire department issued a general alarm bringing in all available off -duty fire fighter s and mustering much of the city's fire apparatus at the fire scene. The major problem which faced the fire department was the containment of the fire in the building of origin. It was not until 4 hours after the alarm was received that the fire department considered the fire to be under control.
Construction: The exterior load-bearing walls were of heavy
masonry construction, approximately 16 -in. cut limestone (Figure 50). The wooden roof structure consisting of various pitched sections was supported on heavy wooden beams. In 1889 an annex originally used as a parsonage and later as a Sunday school hall was added (left-hand portion of Figure 50). In the annex some of the structural framing was of steel and cast iron. As in the main building, the roof structure was of wood construction. In general, the interior finish was plaster on wood or metal lath. This church, like other s of the same period, made extensive use of wood decorative finish.
Separations: The front of the building (south wall) and the east wall (at right of Figure 50) faced street widths which provided substantial spatial separation and access for fire fighting. The west wall of the church building was solid masonry. Adjacent to this wall was a covered passageway, leading under the Sunday school hall to a rear courtyard (Figure 51). The north (rear wall) of the building which was of solid masonry had a jog in it (Figure 51) with those portions of wall area that faced the courtyard having window openings. The lower window openings of the buildings facing the church across the 12-ft wide courtyard had been filled with glass block (Figure 54).
In the church proper there were no fire separations. There were a number of concealed spaces, however, particularly in the complex roof structure which contained combustible framing member s. In
the central portion of the school hall there was an open area surrounded by glazed panels which extended to the second floor. Thus there was no fire separation between the art gallery which occupied the lower floor of the Sunday school hall and the floor above which was still occupied as a Sunday school hall (Figure 53). The masonry wall at the west end of the church proper formed an incomplete separation between the church and the Sunday school hall.
Exits: In the church proper there were a number of exits leading to the street. There were two exit door s from the art gallery, one to the covered lane and one to the street.
Spread of Fire: A pile of excelsior in a room at the rear of the art gallery became ignited and in spite of the efforts of a staff member to extinguish it the fire quickly involved other combustible material. In spite of the fact that an alarm was turned in relatively promptly, flames were issuing from the rear windows of the gallery and the fire was spreading into the Sunday school hall area when the fire department arrived. The fire then spread into the roof structure over the church at a point near the front wall where the masonry wall was breached by wooden framing members. Once the fire was in the church roof it became impos sible to control it and major efforts wer e directed to
preventing the spread of fire to neighbouring buildings. Fire penetrated the building to the west of the Sunday school hall through a duct system, but was controlled. Some smoke and water damage was reported in the buildings to the north of the narrow courtyard but no fire. The fire was essentially confined to the building of origin, the church, Sunday school hall and art gallery being a total loss.
Remarks: Much credit must be given to fire department operations which confined the fire to the building of origin. This was particularly true in the case of buildings to the north of the church which had large areas of unprotected window openings at the upper floor s (Figures 52 and 54). Vast quantities of water were used both in protecting
exposures and in extinguishing the fire. In this fire, the presence of concealed spaces and incomplete fire separations seriously hampered the fire department in any attempt to control the fire within the
33
-DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 19/61
Date of fire: Day of week: Time of fire: Weather: 11 Feb. 1961 Saturday 6.50 p. m. 18°F -R.H. 75% SE wind 5 mph. Occupancy: No. of storeys: Location: Estimated loss: Re sidential (row housing) 2 plus cellar Ottawa $25.000. General: This fire occurred in the end dwelling of a 3-door row
(Figures 55 and 56) when a living room chesterfield ignited, apparently as the result of two young children playing with an electric hot plate. Prior to the start of the fire the father of the children was in the
adjoining kitchen. He discovered the fire upon entering the living room to see why the children were so quiet. As he entered the living room the children ran out of the room and he believing they had left the building attempted to extinguish the fire by using his hands and then by throwing a pail of water on it. Both methods failed and the fire developed very rapidly. He was forced to leave the house and while doing so
unfortunately left the front door open. Quickly realizing the children were still inside he and other s attempted to enter the burning building but were unsuccessful. The bodies of the two children were subsequently found by members of the fire department in an upstairs bedroom (Figure 55). Construction: This building was of wood-frame construction with the
front and side walls having a brick veneer finish and the rear walls wood siding. The flat wood roof was covered with tar and gravel. The interior finish was plaster on wood lath either painted or papered.
Separations: This building was located at a street intersection so that the front wall and one side wall (north wall) faced street widths which provided substantial spatial separations (Figure 55). The rear wall faced an open yard which also provided a spatial separation. The south wall of the 3 -door row was located 18 in. from the north wall of the adjacent structur e which was clad with asphalt siding (imitation brick). There were no fire walls between the dwellings and an undivided attic space extended the length of the building.
Exits: There was a front exit leading directly to the street and a rear exit leading through a wooden shed (Figures 55 and 56).
Spread of Fire: The fire rapidly involved the ground floor and spread quickly to the upper floor via the open staircase. It then spread into the open attic space causing severe damage to the two adjoining dwellings. The fi r e was confined to the building of origin.
Remarks: This tragic fire clearly emphasizes the importance of some responsible person making absolutely LIre that everyone is out of a building before he or she attempts to extinguish a fire. A significant feature of this fire is the effect of an open door on the development of a fire.
35
-DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 20/61
Date of fire: Day of week: Time of fire: Weather: 13 Feb. 1961 Monday 1. 00 a. rn , 10° F - R. H. 800/0 ENE wind 9 mph. Occupancy: No. of storeys: Location: Estimated loss: Business and personal services 1 Ottawa $50,000.
General: This fire originated in a small I-storey building occupied as a restaurant (Figure 57) shortly after closing. The fire was discovered by a police constable on patrol duty who saw smoke coming from the building. The fire was well advanced in the building of origin and was spreading to an adjacent 2 -storey building upon the arrival of the fire department; consequently fire -fighting efforts were concentrated on protecting exposures.
Construction: The building of origin was of wood-frame construction with an exterior stucco finish on the front of the building. On the two side walls and rear wall the exterior cladding was wood sheathing. The flat roof was supported on wood joists bearing on wood stud walls and sheathed with rough lumber cover ed with tar and gravel. The interior finish was combustible fibreboard.
Separations: The front of the building faced a street width which pro-vided a substantial spatial separation. This building abutted the three adjacent buildings (Figure 58). The only fire separations were provided by the brick veneer walls of the buildings at either side and by the
masonry block wall of the building at the rear. The side wall of the building had unprotected window openings (Figure 58).
Exits: There was one exit located at the front of the building.
Spread of Fire: The fire quickly involved the building of origin, its rapid development being influenced by the combustible interior linings. It then spread to the roof space and upper floor of the adjoining 2-storey building on the Corner (Figure 57). The fire was confined to these two structures.
Remarks: Delayed detection and the absence of adequate fire separation wer e significant factor s in this fire.
36
-DBR FIRE STUDY NO. 21/61
Date of fire: Day of week: Time of fire: Weather: 15 April 1961 Saturday 10.30 p. m. 38°F -R.H. 72% E wind 14 mph gusting to 23 mph. Occupancy: No. of storeys: Location: Estimated loss: Residential (apartment) 3 plus basement Ottawa $82,000.
General: This fire originated in the basement locker room of a 3 -storey apartment building located at a street intersection (Figure 59). At the time the fire was detected the locker room was completely involved. The fire was discovered by two people at about the same time. One was the janitor who, upon being awakened by his cat, saw a reflection of fire in the glass door of his basement apartment. The other person noticed smoke in his ground floor apartment. The basement area was well involved and the fire was spreading to the upper floors upon the arrival of the fire
department. An older woman residing in a ground floor apartment located immediately above the locker room (Figure 60) died in this fire which severely damaged the entire building.
Construction: This 3 -stor ey building was approximately 40 by 50 ft in area and had a full basement. There were three apartments on each floor and a janitorIs apartment in the basement. The fr ont and two side walls
were of solid brick construction and the rear wall was of stone masonry. The flat roof structure was constructed of heavy timber sheathed with rough lumber covered with tar and gravel. There was an open space under the roof deck extending over the whole building. The wooden floor s were supported on wood floor joists. The interior finish was plaster on wood or metal lath.
Separations: The front (west) and the south side walls (of the building) faced street widths which provided substantial spatial separations. The rear (east) wall of the building was separated from the masonry west wall of the adjacent building by a 10-ft lane which provided access for the fire fighters. The solid brick north wall abutted on the solid brick wall of the adjoining building. In all cases the exterior walls were parapetted above the roof. One serious defect in the interior fire separations was the presence of a centrally located open stairwell serving the upper floors.
ｾＺ There were four exits from the building, one at the front, one at the side and two at the rear. The front entrance opened onto a ground floor hall, which in turn, served the open staircase leading to the upper floors. At the rear, one entrance served the basement and the other
opened onto the rear of the ground floor hallway. The side entrance served the basement area. Steel fire escapes were installed at the front and rear to provide a second exit for occupants of the upper two floors. At the
