Urban power in Switzerland: urban regimes and exchanges of policy resources in three Swiss metropolitan areas

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Proceedings Chapter

Reference

Urban power in Switzerland: urban regimes and exchanges of policy resources in three Swiss metropolitan areas

LAMBELET, Sébastien

LAMBELET, Sébastien. Urban power in Switzerland: urban regimes and exchanges of policy resources in three Swiss metropolitan areas. In: International Academic Association on Planning, Law and Property Rights. 2015. p. 26p.

Available at:

http://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:149186

Disclaimer: layout of this document may differ from the published version.

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PLPR 2015 – 25^th-27^th February 2015 Volos, Greece URBAN POWER IN SWITZERLAND

Urban regimes and exchanges of policy resources in three Swiss metropolitan areas Sébastien Lambelet

Group Politics, Environment, Territories – POLET Department of Political Science and International Relations

University of Geneva sebastien.lambelet@unige.ch

DRAFT – DON NOT QUOTE OR DIFFUSE WITHOUT AUTHOR’S PERMISSION

INTRODUCTION

Many scholars consider Stone’s urban regime theory as a dominant paradigm in the field of urban politics (Imbroscio, 1998; Mossberger, Stoker, 2001:810; Davies, 2002, 2003:253).

Half of the authors contributing to the Oxford Handbook of Urban Politics (Mossberger et al., 2012) refer to Stone’s founding book (1989) despite the variety of their concerns. However, urban regimes raise disagreement among scholars. Some claim that urban regime theory does not fit in the European context since cities do not enjoy enough autonomy from the national state (Le Galès, 1995; Harding, 1997; Davies, 2002, 2003). Others claim that it keeps its analytical relevance and apply the theory to British or French cities (Di Gaetano, Klemanski, 1993; John, Cole, 1998; Dowding et al., 1999; Dormois, 2006; Pinson, 2010). This paper joins the second group of scholars and pays attention to Swiss cities. It argues that urban regime theory fits even better to the Swiss context, since federalism gives a similar level of autonomy to Swiss municipalities than their American counterparts.

Stone defines an urban regime as "an informal yet relatively stable group with access to institutional resources that enable it to have a sustained role in making governing decisions"

(Stone, 1989:4 [original emphasis]). This definition is widely accepted in the literature (Stoker, Mossberger, 1994:197; Stoker, 1995:58-59; Mossberger, Stoker, 2001:813; Mossberger, 2009:42), but still does not explain which resources allow a governing coalition to exert preemptive power¹. Urban regimes literature identifies policy resources when their absence explains the failure of a regime (Sanders, 1986; De Leon, 1992; Orr, Stoker, 1994; Burns, Thomas, 2006) but remains vague in case of success. Even Stone recognizes this weakness (Stone, 2005:330).

This paper tackles this theoretical gap. It focuses on five policy resources that are essential in the field of planning and urban policies (land, law, money, expertise and political support). It argues that controlling these five resources is necessary to form a governing coalition exerting preemptive power. I test this hypothesis focusing on major urban development projects in six Swiss cities (Zurich, Winterthur, Bern, Biel, Geneva and Nyon). I base my empirical analysis on 61 face-to-face interviews conducted between April 2013 and February 2015 with an average duration of 87 minutes. All interviewees appear in Appendix 1. My results suggest

1 For a definition of this concept, see Stone (1988) and Di Gaetano (1997:847).

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that the control of these five policy resources is necessary, but not sufficient to form an urban regime.

The remainder of this paper unfolds as follows. First, I present two research hypotheses and justify the selection of the six urban development projects under study. Second, I apply causal process-tracing (Baltter, Blume, 2008; Blatter, Haverland 2012) to each project to settle whether it is led by a governing coalition. Finally, I compare my six cases and discuss my hypotheses in the conclusion.

RESEARCH HYPOTHESES AND CASES SELECTION

To identify which resources lead to the emergence of an urban regime, I first need to specify criteria defining an urban regime. These criteria generate a debate among scholars (Di Gaetano, Klemanski, 1993; Kantor, et al., 1997; John, Cole, 1998; Downding et al., 1999) until Mossberger and Stoker (2001:829) reaffirm Stone’s original criteria which are: a) a governing coalition including public and private actors, b) a common policy agenda targeting the interests of the coalition, c) the capacity to bring together fragmented policy resources to implement this agenda, and d) a longstanding pattern of cooperation leading to self-confidence between the actors². I refer to these four criteria to define my dependent variable.

To define the five resources representing my independent variables I refer to the typology developed by Knoepfel, Larrue, Varone and Hill (2007) on the base of previous typologies³. My first hypothesis states that these five resources are necessary to establish an urban regime and govern a city.

H1: The control of "land", of "law", of "money", of "expertise" and of "political support" is necessary to establish an urban regime.

I define these five resources as follows. “Land” designates to land property or land availability. “Law” refers to the activation of any legal bases. The legal resource is primarily owned by state actors and constitutes the source of legitimation par excellence for all public actions (Bernoux, 1985:161). Nevertheless, individuals can also activate this resource by appealing to a judicial court and winning their cause. If they do so, state actors lose their control over the legal resource. “Money” designates all financial transactions (gains or losses). The financial resource is commonly used to outsource the control of other resources.

For example, buying a new parcel of land represents an outsourcing of the land resource.

“Expertise” designates essential knowledge and information required to accomplish an urban project. Finally, “political support” refers to a majoritarian point of view of citizens stated through demonstrations, political surveys or, especially in Switzerland, through the use of direct democracy institutions⁴.

I consider that the governing coalition owns a policy resource when one of the coalition’s partners (the public one or the private one) owns it or when the resource is activated jointly.

For example, sharing the cost of a new transport infrastructure represents a joint-activation of

“money”.

2 I simplify the formulation of some criteria.

3 Mostly the one developed by Crozier and Friedberg (1977).

4 For more precise definitions of these policy resources, see Knoepfel et al. (2007: chapter 4).

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According to the elitist theory (Hunter, 1953), an actor owning all policy resources does not seek collaboration with another actor. On the contrary, following the pluralist paradigm (Dahl, 1961), I state that such a resource monopole is not sustainable in the long run. To implement any policy agenda, collaboration based on an exchange of policy resources is indispensable.

However, I claim that an imbalance of power can occur in the governing coalition.

H2 : The actor owning more policy resources outbalances his partner in the governing coalition.

To test my hypotheses, I focus on six Swiss cities in three different metropolitan areas. My case selection is based on two criteria. First, I select a city centre and an edge city (see Garreau 1991) in each metropolitan area. As the city position in a metropolitan network influences its socio-economic characteristics and its urban renewal capacity (Pflieger, Rozenblat, 2010), this first criterion allows me to control the impact of these characteristics on the emergence of urban regimes. Therefore, based on number of inhabitants and commuter flows, I select Zuirch, Winterthur, Bern, Biel, Geneva and Nyon⁵.

Second, nowadays urban governance defines itself around major development projects (Pinson, 2009). Therefore, I select one major development project in each city. All selected projects represent a top priority for local authorities⁶ and seek the renewal of industrial brownfields to create new neighbourhoods. I consider that if I do not observe a governing coalition in such highly strategic projects, the presence of an urban regime governing the whole city can be excluded. Table 1 presents selected urban projects, their goals and the year in which their planning started⁷.

ZURICH - Europaallee

Zurich is the economic capital and the most populated of Switzerland with 384’000 inhabitants (OFS, 2013). Zurich’s dynamism has always generated interest and fascination among urban planners (Eisinger et al., 2007).

Social tension with inhabitants regularly shapes Zurich’s development (Hitz, et al., 1995;

Schmid, 2006). The local population regularly manifests its opposition to huge development projects⁸ (Kühne, 1997:19ss.). These protests lead to a territorial compromise in urban planning from the 1970s to the end of the 1990s (Hitz, et al., 1995; Schmid, 2006). This compromise locates huge buildings complexes necessary for the development of the third sector in the periphery to preserve the downtown from land speculation. Located in the North of the city, the Glattvalley rapidly becomes known as “Europe’s most expensive greenfield”

(Hitz, et al., 1995:261 [Own translation])as it concentrates most of these new buildings.

5 By studying commuter flows in Switzerland, Dessemontet et al. (2010) show that Basel has merged with Zurich metropolitan area. Therefore, I select the three most populated Swiss cities with the exception of Basel and add an edge-city for each of them.

6 All selected projects appear several times in the legislature programs of the municipalities under study.

7 All selected projects are currently under planning or construction.

8 For instance, through a popular vote rejecting the construction of a subway in 1973 or through violent demonstrations claiming the right to live in the downtown for low-income social classes in 1980.

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Table 1:Selected urban projects

City Project’s

name Goals

Planning starting year Zurich Europaallee

New neighbourhood next to the railway central station. 6'000 jobs, 300 housings, a high-school, a hostel and a senior’s residence by 2020.

2003

Winterthur Sulzer area

Renew the 12 hectares industrial brownfield next to the central railway station. Thousands of jobs and housings, a cultural event centre and new buildings for a high-school.

1990

Berne Wankdorf-City

New neighbourhood in the North-East of the city.

3’000 jobs by 2015. Hundreds of housings in a second phase.

1999

Bienne Stades de Bienne

New sport infrastructure (football stadium and ice hockey arena) by 2015. Progressive renewal of the city’s largest industrial zone (138 hectares).

2004

Nyon Martinet- Morâche

Extension of the CBD around the central railway

station. 500 jobs, 500 housings. 1986

Genève

Praille- Acacias- Vernets (PAV)

Renewal of the city’s largest industrial zone (230 hectares) into a mixed neighbourhood. 11’000 jobs and 11’000 housings by 2050-2060.

2005

This political commitment preserving the downtown largely influences the development of the central railway station, one of the most contested projects in Zurich’s history (Wolff, 2012:113). Between 1969 and 2001, 80 million Swiss francs are invested in an unfruitful planning. Called Eurogate, this project is never realized because of two popular votes and many judicial appeals⁹.

The project Euopaallee on which I focus in this paper has two characteristics. First, it follows Eurogate and marks the end of 40 years of unfruitful planning. Second, it turns the page of the territorial compromise since it offers brand new offices to the largest Swiss banks¹⁰ in the middle of the downtown. This project is successfully realized through the emergence of an urban regime governing coalition including the municipal government and the Swiss Federal Railways¹¹ (SBB).

The new neighbourhood Europaallee is located at the south edge of the central railway station (see Figure 1). SBB own land and remove some railways line to make it available for construction. SBB plan the realization of the new neighbourhood over a ten years period so that they can spread out investments and finance themselves the whole project.

9 At one point, even Zurich’s municipal government appeals against the project.

10 UBS, Credit Suisse and Swisscanto.

11 Since their liberalization in 1999, the real estate division of the SBB has to make profit to finance railway infrastructure and to compensate the deficit of the SBB pension fund.

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Figure 1: Location of the new neighbourhoods Europaallee and Zollstrasse. .

After Eurogate’s failure, the Boads of Directors of the SBB understands that an alliance with the Municipality is compulsory and seeks consensus (interviewee 10). The resource “political support” lies behind this reasoning. The SBB know that engaging in cooperation with local authorities at the very first stage of planning will ease the acceptation of the project by the municipal parliament and by voters in case of popular ballot.

The municipal government wants to erase the failures of Eurogate and to revitalize the surroundings of the central station that have an unattractive and unsafe reputation. It engages itself into cooperation thanks to the perspective of creating a brand new neighbourhood in that area without any monetary expense (interviewee 6). Therefore, its interest for collaboration lies on the financial and land resources owned by the SBB.

Cooperation starts in 2003 when the SBB and the Municipality jointly organize a general architectural design competition. They invite three internationally acknowledged architects to shape the contours of the new neighbourhood. This process leads to a “private land use plan”¹² determining the size and the location of future buildings. This plan is transmitted to the local parliament in 2005.

The land use plan requires that all buildings will be submitted to their own architectural design competition, with the Municipality involved in the competition’s jury. Doing so, local authorities have a guarantee regarding the architectural design exemplarity of the future neighbourhood. In exchange, it concedes a higher density of construction than the one set out in the general planning law (Gemeinderat Zurich, 2006: art. 15 and 23). This higher density offers a greater economic profitability to the SBB. In a nutshell, the Municipality concedes a legislative exception in exchange of the right to have a say in the construction stage.

Choosing a private land use plan is not insignificant. It forces the local parliament to vote on the whole plan without modifying some details of the agreement reached between the SBB and the municipal government. Avoiding letting new partners joining the governing coalition

12 Free translation from the German terms „privater Gestaltungsplan”.

Source: Website Europaallee - www.europaallee.ch [Own modifications].

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and keeping it as narrow as possible is a typical strategy of an urban regime (Stone, 1989:2010).

By threatening to reject the whole plan, the centre-left majority of the parliament succeeds to increase the proportion of housing in the future neighbourhood from 20% to 40% (interviewee 9). However, this does not represent a fundamental change since this percentage is based on gross floor area and does not specify the number of housings (interviewee 7). The SBB meet this requirement by implanting a hostel and a luxury senior’s residence. These infrastructures allow them to respect the law while keeping a high profitability.

The Parliament adopts the land use plan in January 2006, but inhabitants of the adjacent local district launch a referendum against it. They fear an excessive gentrification of the city-centre and denounce the very high gains in land value benefiting the SBB. The coalition partners take the opportunity offered by the voting campaign to promote the project and show their narrow cooperation. They are very confident about the result of the ballot and never consider the possibility to lose it (interviewee 11). In September 2006, 65.5% of voters support the land use plan and give a strong legitimacy to the project. To sum up, opponents tried to mobilize the resource “political support” to block it, but in the end this policy resource remains in the hands of the governing coalition.

After the ballot, one of the opponent appeals to municipal building commission and to the cantonal court¹³. Both judicial authorities reject his appeal in 2007. Therefore, the governing coalition keeps the monopole of the legal resource. Construction work starts in 2009 and first buildings are inaugurated in 2012. The construction of the other buildings is currently ongoing and will be finished by 2020.

Parallel to Europaallle, the governing coalition including the SBB and the municipal government of Zurich continue to develop the city-centre. On the other side of the central station, they plan a new neighbourhood named Zollstrasse. The project includes 140 housings, 15’000m² of gross floor area for offices and 7’000m²for shops. Construction work will start in 2017. For Zollstrasse, the governing coalition follows exactly the same procedure as the one of Europaallee. The SBB and the municipal service for urban planning produce a private land use plan by organizing an international architectural design competition. The parliament approves the use land plan in January 2014. No referendum is launched against the project, showing that the governing coalition secured the control of the “political support” over the long run with the electoral victory on Europaallee. Table 2 defines whether this case reveals the presence of an urban regime and summarize the control of the five policy resources under study.

Among the urban projects selected in this paper, Europaallee is the fastest one. It took only six years between the start of the planning procedure and the beginning of construction work.

This case comes very close to the ideal-type of the urban regime described by Stone (1989) in Atlanta. Public-private cooperation starts at the very beginning of the project and continues for the Zollstrasse following the same modus operandi. The governing coalition currently

13 As anecdote, this opponent is Ralph Baenziger, the leading architect of the Eurogate project.

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plans or realizes new buildings next to three other railway stations in Zurich¹⁴. It plans several towers reaching 80 meters although skyscrapers have always been controversial through Zurich’s history (Gimmi, 2011). The governing coalition always operates in the same manner.

It owns “land” and “money” through the SBB, as well as “political support” through the early implication of the Municipality. “Law” is jointly mobilized since coalition partners agree on private land use plans to avoid parliamentary intervention. Finally, “expertise” is jointly owned during the planning stage, since preliminary studies are collectively organized.

Nevertheless, during the realisation stage, the Municipality assumes a passive role and let the monopole of “expertise” to the SBB. They take the responsibility to find out building partners or necessary renters to implement planning. In the end, the SBB clearly hold a dominant position in the governing coalition since they realize huge profits, whereas the Municipality gains are only urbanistic. I now switch to the case of Winterthur.

Table 2: Summary for the case of Zurich.

Criteria of an urban regime Exchanges of policy resources Presence of a governing

coalition including public and private actors

Yes Owned by the local

government Political support Common policy agenda

targeting the interest of the coalition

Yes Jointly owned Law (private land use plan) and expertise (planning stage) Mobilization and

exchanges of policy resources to implement this agenda

Yes Owned by the private partner

Land, money and expertise (realisation stage)

Longstanding pattern of cooperation leading to self-confidence between the actors

Yes Mobilized by opponents

Successfully -

Unsuccessfully Political support and law

WINTERTHUR – Sulzer area

Winterthur is the sixth most populated city in Switzerland. It reaches the symbolic threshold of 100’000 inhabitants in 2008. The city was previously an important industrial hub and its history is closely tied to the Sulzer Company. Building industrial machines, Sulzer knows an important growth until the 1960s, when it reaches a peak of 33’000 employees around the world. Among them, 14’000 work in Winterthur.

In 1989, although it still employs 6’500 workers in Winterthur, Sulzer announces the closure of all its factories located next to the city-centre. The entire city is in shock and its economy almost fall in recession (interviewees 16 and 18). To renew its 11.4 hectares of land, Sulzer presents the project Winti-Nova¹⁵. This project plans the demolition of most industrial buildings to create a new urban neighbourhood with a high density. Through this project, Sulzer seeks profits to reinvest them in other activities of the company. Sulzer has always

14 In Altstetten, Oerlikon and Tiefenbrunnen.

15 Meaning « the new Winterthur » in Swiss German.

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kept this vision of real estate as a secondary activity generating money. The company systematically seeks to win a maximum while investing a minimum (interviewees 15 and 16;

Koll-Schretzenmayr, Müller, 2002:26-27).

Winti-Nova raises loud protest from the citizens of Winterthur who wish to maintain traces from the industrial past and strongly oppose the demolition of buildings (Koll-Schretzenmayr, Müller, 2002:22; Hayoz, 2008: 80-81). Sulzer intentions arouse suspicion of citizens who demand an active participation of local authorities in the planning of the Sulzer area. These reactions lead to the abandonment of the project Winti-Nova and raise awareness of the Municipality. Before these events, the local government had no idea of the issue of urban renewal (interviewee 17). In 1990, local authorities organize a discussion forum with Sulzer and other downtown landowners to determine guiding principles governing the renewal of the city-centre.

Figure 2: Location of the Sulzer areas in the city-centre and in Oberwinterthur.

Source: Wikipédia. http://fluswikien.hfwu.de/index.php/Sulzer_Factory_Area [Modifié par l'auteur].

In 1996, the National Association for Transports and Environment (ATE) appeals against the building authorization of Megalou arguing that the number of parking lots is too high. This appeal suspends the proceedings and constrains Sulzer to negotiate with the ATE. After two years of negotiations, they agree on a plan determining the number and the location of parking lots over the whole Sulzer area. The research for investors can restart but it remains fruitless.

On the one hand, the economical conjuncture has turned down in the meantime (Hayoz, 2008:87). On the other hand, Sulzer is not sufficiently proactive to sell its project (Koll- Schretzenmayr, Müller, 2002).

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After the failure of Megalou, the Municipality gains influence over the planning process through a careful use of the legal resource. Put into force in 2001, the new land planning act transforms the Sulzer area into an area requesting a more complex planning procedure. Local authorities can introduce ratios of affordable housing or special land uses in the land use plans. The Municipality also solves the sensitive issue of the preservation of the industrial heritage. In 2003, it signs an agreement with Sulzer, the cantonal service for the protection of historical monuments and the local association for the protection of cultural heritage. This agreement distinguishes protected buildings from those that can be demolished. Finally the Municipality creates a new administrative service for urban planning and hire new collaborators with a longstanding experience of urban renewal and public-private cooperation¹⁶. Therefore, Sulzer loses its monopole of "expertise". However, the company keeps the initiative of urban development thanks to its land property and to its financial means. Between 2005 and 2009, Sulzer finances preliminary studies in Lagerplatz, in the Megalou area and in Werk 1 (see Figure 2) and delegates the responsibility to obtain the building permit and to finance construction work to other investors¹⁷.

In this second stage, first exchanges of policy resources between Sulzer and the Municipality take place. In Oberwinterthur, Sulzer transfers free of charge six hectares of land to the Municipality for the construction of a new public park in exchange of a higher density on an area of more than 100 hectares. In the Megalou area, a new office complex housing the whole municipal administration and the headquarters of AXA Winterthur has been inaugurated at the end of 2014. These projects are legitimized through several popular votes illustrating the control of the resource "political support" of the Municipality. Nevertheless, the equipment costs of the public park reaching 10 million Swiss francs are in charge of the Municipality.

Considering the importance of the Sulzer area benefiting from a higher density rate, the Municipality would demand larger compensations from the company if the negotiation would take place today (interviewee 15).

The growing scheme of collaboration between Sulzer and the Municipality suddenly comes to an end in 2010, when the company decides to sell its real estate activities and the remaining 60 hectares of land it owns in Winterthur¹⁸. This decision creates a great deal of uncertainty for the Municipality.

"Wir haben inoffiziell erfahren, dass alle Liegenschaften auf dem Markt waren und wir hatten keine Idee wer kommen wird und keine Ahnung was denn passiert wird"¹⁹

Fritz Zollinger, head of the Oberwinterthur project at the municipal office for urban planning. Some members of the municipal parliament consider that the Municipality has to seize this opportunity to acquire all land parcels to steer the process of urban renewal (interviewees 12 and 14). The Municipality does not consider this option since it does not want to bear the depollution

16 Many of them assumed previously similar responsibilities for the Municipality of Zurich.

17 The Abendrot Foundation in Lagerplatz, AXA Winterthur for the Megalou area and Implenia in Werk 1.

18 Until the beginning of the 1990s, Sulzer owns much more land. However, it progressively sells it to other companies such as Zimmer AG, Burkhardt Compression or Optimo AG that acquire some specific activities of the Sulzer concern.

19 "We were informally informed that all land parcels were placed on the market and we had absolutely no idea of who will buy them and what will happen next" [Own translation].

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costs of the brownfields and the major financial risk they represent (interviewee 16). On the opposite, local authorities decide to activate the legal resource to safeguard the planning process and constrain the future owner to cooperate. They establish a protection plan²⁰ over the whole area of Oberwinterthur suspending the planning proceedings for three years and according building permits only under very strict conditions. This legal instrument is rarely used since it adds constraints and gives a right of say to the cantonal government on the planning process. However, under such circumstances the Municipality did not have any other possibility (interviewee 17).

Implenia, the biggest construction company of Switzerland acquires all the land parcels in October 2010, for a total amount of 83 million Swiss francs. The price is particularly low since the sells contract includes the responsibility of depolluting the industrial brownfields. At the beginning, cooperating with Implenia is difficult for the Municipality. The company does not have any emotional link with the city of Winterthur and seeks short-term profitability. Keeping real estate property over a long period of term generating renting revenue does not bear an interest for Implenia. Its goal is to develop the area by creating new buildings and to sell it back to other investors as fast as possible (interviewee 16). Following this strategy, Implenia sell back land parcels with no potential for further development already in 2011²¹. On the one hand, this situation is unsatisfactory for local authorities, since the private partner can change from one day to the next. On the other hand, cooperating with Implenia is also simpler since the relation with the company is unemotional and free of ambiguity. The role of each coalition partner is precisely defined, which was not always the case with Sulzer (interviewee 15).

As soon as it owns the land, Implenia focuses on the project Werk 1 for which Sulzer financed a preliminary study. Werk 1 represents the last perimeter of the Sulzer area with a huge development potential. The project plans the construction of 1'000 housings, new buildings for the high school of applied arts and a new cultural arena. In this third stage, the Municipality demands more counterparts to its new private partner. In exchange of a very high density rate²², Implenia finances all equipment costs of future public places, has to realize 30% of social housings and will sell the cultural arena to the Municipality for the attractive price of one million Swiss francs if the local parliament does not modify the land use plan. If the parliament does so, the cultural arena could cost 4.5 million. This agreement has been proposed by the mayor himself (interviewee 16) to ensure that the parliament will not modify major points of the agreement reached with Implenia. This strategy avoiding parliamentary intervention is identical to the one observed in Europaallee. This clause of the agreement aims at counterbalancing the fact that Werk 1 is ruled by a public land use plan which does not constrain the parliament to voting en bloc.

Until now, the strategy of the new coalition partners has been appropriate. The municipal parliament accepted the land use plan in September 2014 with only two votes against. However, a referendum has been launched by inhabitants opposing the construction of future towers. Voters will give the final decision in March 2015. Until the beginning of the 1990s and the project Winti- Nova, it is the first time that the resource "political support" is mobilized by opponents to urban renewal. Therefore, this voting campaign constitutes a serious test for the new coalition partners.

Concerning the presence of an urban regime, the renewal of the Sulzer area is steered by a governing coalition including Sulzer or Implenia and the Muncipality. A common political agenda

20 Free translation of the term Planungszone in German.

21 Some of these land parcels are sold to Crédit Suisse or Intershop.

22 One of the buildings will reach 100 meters, becoming the tallest building of Winterthur.

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is defined during the Werkstatt'90 or with the agreement about the preservation of industrial heritage in 2003²³. Several exchanges of policy resources take place over the whole period of time, but this project lacks the last criterion of an urban regime. Even holding a dominant position over the Municipality, Sulzer does not follow a clear-cut real estate strategy in the long-term and considers this activity as an easy way to generate profits. By withdrawing from the governing coalition suddenly, Sulzer confronts the Municipality with a fait accompli and forces it to act precipitously. Local authorities have to activate the legal resource to ensure the continuation of public-private cooperation. These elements confirm the absence of mutual trust between partners of the governing coalition. Finally, the cooperation with Implenia is guided by short-term objectives as the company sells its parcels to the highest bidder as soon as the realisation of the projects is secured. Table 3 summarizes the use of policy resources and the criteria defining an urban regime for this case. Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 do the same for the cases of Bern, Biel, Nyon and Geneva.

Table 3: Summary for the case of Winterthur

Yes Owned by the local government

Law (since the 2^nd stage), political support (2^nd stage).

Common policy agenda targeting the interest of the coalition

Yes Jointly owned Law (1^st stage), expertise (since the 2^nd stage).

Mobilization and exchanges of policy resources to implement this agenda

Yes

Owned by the private

partner Land, money, expertise (1^st stage).

Mobilized by

opponents

Successfully Political support (1^st stage), law (1^st stage).

Longstanding pattern of cooperation leading to self-confidence between the actors

No

Unsuccessfully -

Pending Political support (3^rdstage).

BERN – Wankdorf-City

Table 4 : Summary for the case of Bern.

Land, law, political support, expertise (planning stage).

No Jointly owned Money

Yes

Owned by the private

partner Expertise (realisation stage) Mobilized

by

opponents

Successfully - Longstanding pattern of

cooperation leading to self- confidence between the actors

Yes Unsuccessfully -

23 This agreement is still in force and Implenia respected it during the elaboration of the land use plan of Werk 1.

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BIEL – Stades de Bienne

Table 5: Summary for the case of Biel.

Land, political support and (law)²⁴ Common policy agenda

targeting the interest of the coalition

No Jointly owned Money

Yes Owned by the private

partner Expertise

Longstanding pattern of cooperation leading to self- confidence between the actors

No

Mobilized by

opponents

Successfully Law (appeal of the Migros)

Unsuccessfully -

NYON – Martinet-Morâche

Table 6: Summary for the case of Nyon.

coalition including public and private actors.

Yes Owned by the local

government Law

No Jointly owned

Land (public in Martinet, private in Morâche), money

Yes Owned by the private

partner Expertise

No in Morâche;

(Yes)²⁵ in Martinet.

Mobilized by

opponents

Successfully Political support Unsuccessfully Law

24 The Municipality activated "law" but it lost its monopole in a second stage when the company Migros appealed against its decision. Therefore, I put some brackets.

25 The cooperation between HRS and the Municipality started in 2002 and a new agreement has been signed in December 2014. However, as the project restarted form the beginning in 2006 after a popular vote rejecting a new traffic road, it is still early to make a definitive decision.

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GENEVE – Praille-Acacias-Vernets (PAV)

Table 7: Summary for the case of Geneva.

coalition including public and private actors.

No Owned by the local government

Law. Destruction of money and expertise.

No Jointly owned -

No Owned by the private

partner Land

No

Mobilized by

opponents

Successfully

Political support (even if the vote did not take place)

Unsuccessfully -

DISCUSSION

Table 8 summarizes the use of policy resources and the number of criteria corresponding to an urban regime for each case under study. In Zurich, Bern and Winterthur the five policy resources analysed in this paper belong to the governing coalition. These three cities are also the ones approaching the ideal-type of an urban regime. In the three other cities, third-party actors are able to mobilize “law” or “political support” to oppose the political agenda and prevent or delay considerably the project of the governing coalition. These elements are in line with my first hypothesis.

However, among the six cities under study, Zurich is the only one fulfilling all criteria attesting the presence of an urban regime. In Bern and Winterthur, governing coalitions own

“land”, “law”, “money” and “expertise”, but do not form a pure urban regime. Therefore, my results suggest that owning these five policy resources is necessary but not sufficient to establish an urban regime. Finally, even if I observe a public monopole of policy resources in certain cases (Bern, Biel), this monopole is temporary and disappears in the realisation stage at the latest. This observation confirms the pluralist paradigm and Stone’s social-production model stating that resources are fragmented over society and that a public-private coalition represents the only solution to produce social change and renew a city.

For the test of my second hypothesis, I need to determine for each city under study, which actor holds a dominant position in the governing coalition. Three criteria are taken into account to define a dominant position: a) who took the initiative to develop a new neighbourhood in the city? b) who dictates the speed of progress of the project? and c) who will keep control of future development at the end of the current project? Each coalition partner gets one point by criterion. If one criterion was commonly fulfilled, each partner gets half a point. For more details on this method, see Appendix 2. Table 9 gives simplified results and indicates who holds a dominant position in the governing coalition for each city. This table allows me to draw general conclusions on the use of each policy resource under study.

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Table 8: Summary of exchanges of policy resources and criteria of an urban regime.

26 In this case, we consider exchanges of policy resources from the years 2000 since the 1990s were characterized by a quasi-monopolistic position of the private actor.

27 Law was mobilized by the Municipality in the planning stage but then it lost its monopole of the legal resource when a national retail trade company opposes the plan forcing the Municipality to negotiate.

Zurich Europaallee

Winterthur Sulzer area²⁶

Berne Wankdorf-City

Biel Stades de

Bienne

Nyon Martinet Morâche

Geneva PAV

Number of urban

regime’s criteria 4/4 3/4 3/4 2/4 2/4 0/4

Owned by the local

government Political support Law, political support

Land, law, political support, expertise (planning)

Land, political

support, (law²⁷) Law Law

Jointly owned Law, expertise

(planning) Expertise Money Money Land, money -

Owned by the private partner

Land, money, expertise (realisation)

Land, money Expertise

(realisation) Expertise Expertise Land

Mobilized by

opponents

Successfully - - - Law Political support Political support

Unsuccessfully Political support

and law - - - Law -

Pending - Political support - - - -

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Table 9: Actor holding a dominant position in the governing coalition

Comparing Tables 8 and 9, confirms my second hypothesis. The actor holding a dominant position in the governing coalition systematically corresponds to the one owning more policy resources.

My first observation is that the dominant actor is always the one owning “land”. In Bern and Biel, the Municipality engages in cooperation with the private sector only in the realisation stage, since land property combined with other public prerogatives is sufficient to conduct planning alone. In Nyon, the Municipality holds a weaker dominant position since it owns land parcels only over the half of the project’s perimeter. In Winterthur, the indecisive real estate policy of Sulzer diminishes its dominant position and allows the Municipality to gain influence from the 2000s onwards. Finally, in Geneva, small and medium-sized businesses hold a dominant position only through the “land” resource that they do not own but still control through their land lease contracts lasting until 2050 or even 2060.

My results confirm that “law” constitutes the source of legitimisation par excellence for all public actions (Bernoux, 1985:161). On the one hand, when local authorities lose their monopole of the legal resource, they must lower their ambitions and activate other policy resources to compensate. This is what I observe in Biel. On the other hand, if local authorities concede an influence to their private partner on the elaboration of legal bases, the private partner automatically becomes dominant in the coalition. I observe such situations in Zurich through the activation of a private land use plan or in Winterthur with the financial agreement on the cultural arena under the condition that the parliament does not modify the land use plan.

Of course, the financial resource is also decisive to determine the dominant partner. When local authorities renounce to activate it or do not engage in a joint financing, the private partner holds the dominant position, as I observe in Zurich and Winterthur. On the opposite, financing public infrastructures to stay involved in the realisation stage, allows the local government to conserve their dominant position, in accordance with what I observe in Bern and Biel.

The governing coalition always owns “political support” through the involvement of the public partner. In the Swiss context of direct democracy, when local authorities do not activate this resource on their own initiative, they expose themselves to the risk of activation

Number of criteria of an urban regime

0 1 2 3 4

Dominant position of the local government

Strong Biel Bern

Weak Nyon

Dominant position of the private actor

Weak Geneva Winterthur

Strong Zurich

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by opponents. Therefore, Bern and Biel Municipalities decided to organise a popular ballot at an early stage of planning to avoid this risk. When "political support" is activated by opponents, the governing coalition can benefit from it, if it engages in a successful voting campaign and wins the ballot, as I observe in Zurich. On the opposite, a referendum launched by opponents can also be catastrophic when local authorities are underprepared as in Nyon or when they decide to negotiate with opponents and give them the opportunity to enter the coalition. Observed in Geneva, this strategy delays the realisation of the project, makes it unrealizable if financial and land property aspects are not sufficiently taken into account and does not definitively solve the issue, since opponents can reactivate this resource in a later stage. In Geneva, the association for the protection of tenants currently threatens to launch a new referendum if the law regulating social housing proportion in the new neighbourhood is modified by the government.

Finally, “expertise” always belongs to the private partner in the realisation stage. As local authorities do not hold skills and know-how regarding to construction work, they engage in cooperation with the private sector to gain this resource. This is not problematic since this outsourcing allows them to spare money and to avoid high financial risks linked to construction investments. However, local authorities must own “expertise” in the planning stage, either by sharing it with the private partner or by financing studies to produce it. If local authorities do not control “expertise” in the planning stage, the private actor will automatically hold a dominant position in the governing coalition as in Winterthur during the 1990s.

To sum up, none of these five policy resources is sufficient to govern a city. To concretize urban projects, a combination of policy resources is essential. On the opposite, the incapacity to control one of these five resources may lead to the abandonment of the project and seriously threaten the existence of the governing coalition. The popular rejection of the construction of a new street around the city-centre in Nyon or the incapacity of local authorities to free parcels of land in Geneva well illustrate the consequences of such a lack of control.

CONCLUSION

This paper has studied urban governance in six Swiss cities relying on the theoretical framework of urban regimes. It aimed at identifying which policy resources are necessary to establish an urban regime. Applying process-tracing to major urban development projects in each city, my results show that the combination of five policy resources is necessary, but not sufficient to establish an urban regime. These five policy resources are “land”, “law”,

“money”, “expertise” and “political support”. However, the loss of control of one of these resources is sufficient to prevent the emergence of an urban regime or to threaten the existence of an established governing coalition.

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APPENDIX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES Zurich - Europaallee

1. Ralph Baenziger, lead architect of Eurogate and opponent to Europaallee. Interviewed on 27^th June 2013 in Zurich.

2. Kees Christiaanse, architect, developer of the master plan of Europaallee. Interviewed on 28^th June 2013 on the phone.

3. Franz Eberhard, director of the office for urban development from 1997 to 2009.

Interviewed on 12^th June 2013 in Zurich.

4. Thomas Gehrig and Angelo Moser, UBS representatives. Interviewed on 24^th June 2013 in Zurich.

5. Elmar Ledergerber, member of the city government head of the urban development office from 1998 to 2002, mayor from 2002 to 2008. Interviewed on 21^st June 2013 in Zurich.

6. Kathrin Martelli, member of the city government from 1994 to 2010, head of the urban development office from 2002 to 2010. Interviewed on 27^th June 2013 in Zurich.

7. André Odermatt, member of the city parliament between 1995 and 2010, member of the city government head of the urban development office since 2010. Interviewed on 26^th September 2013 in Zurich.

8. Niklaus Scherr, member of the city parliament since 1978. Leader of the referendum committee against Europaallee. Interviewed on 13^th June 2013 in Zurich.

9. Emil Seliner, member of the city parliament from 2002 to 2010. President of the special commission working on the master plan of Europaallee. Interviewed on 17^th June 2013 in Zurich.

10. Andreas Steiger, SBB employee since 1993 and project manager of Europaallee since 2003. Interview on 24^th May 2013 in Zurich.

11. Brigit Wehrli, director of the office for city planning from 1997 to 2012. Interviewed on 23^rd April 2013 in Zurich.

Winterthur – Sulzer Areal

12. Reto Diener, member of the city Parliament since 2002. He appealed to the cantonal court in 2002 against the developing project of Oberwinterthur. Interviewed on 19^th June 2013 in Winterthur.

13. Klara Kläusler, head of the real estate division of the Abendrot pension fund. Interviewed on 26^th June 2013 in Zurich.

14. Walter Langhard, member of the city Parliament since 2000, president of the parliamentary commission for building and construction. Interviewed on 14^th June 2013 in Winterthur.

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15. Michael Hauser, director of the office for urban development since 2007. Interviewed on 12^th June 2013 in Winterthur.

16. Walter Muhmmenthaler, architect at Sulzer real estate between 1992 and 2010, at Implenia since 2010. Interviewed on 20^th June 2013 in Winterthur.

17. Ernst Wohlwend, member of the city government between 1992 and 2002, mayor between 2002 and 2012. Interviewed on 19^th April 2013 in Winterthur.

18. Fritz Zollinger, high-ranking civil servant at the office for city planning and coordinator of the Oberwinterthur development. Interviewed on 8^th May 2013 and on 5^th June 2013 in Winterthur.

Zurich – Europaallee AND Winterthur – Sulzer-Areal

19. Alexander von Teufenstein, executive representative of the real estate division of the Swiss Post. Interviewed on 19^th June 2013 in Bern.

Bern - Wankdorf-City

20. Regula Buchmüller, director of the office for city planning since 2005. Interviewed on 4^th November 2013 in Bern.

21. Daniel Conca, high-ranking civil servant at the real estate office of the city of Bern since 2008. Interviewed on 13^th November 2013 in Bern.

22. Alec von Graffenried, director for sustainable development for Losinger-Marazzi since 2007. Interviewed on 4^th December 2013 in Bern.

23. Jacqueline Hadorn, high-ranking civil servant in the office for urban development since 1993. Interviewed on 19^th November 2013 in Bern.

24. Barbara Hayoz, member of the local government from 2005 to 2012, head of the financial and real estate office from 2007 to 2012. Interviewed on 13^th November 2013 in Bern.

25. Lorenz Held and Stefan Holzinger, SBB real estate representatives, interviewed on 20^th November 2013 in Bern.

26. Christoph Lerch, prefect of the Bern-Mittelland region since 2010. Interviewed on 22^nd November 2013 in Ostermundigen.

27. Rudolf Muggli, member of the executive commission of the fund for land and housing policies from 1998 to 2010. Interviewed on 2^nd December 2013 in Bern.

28. Stéphanie Pehner, member of the local parliament and of the urban planning commission since 2007. Interviewed on 18^th November 2013 in Bern.

29. Bruno Riedo, manager of the land property of the Bern bourgeoisie. Interviewed on 7^th January 2014 in Bern.

30. Alexander Tschäppät, member of the local government since 2001, mayor since 2005.

Interviewed on 16^th December in Bern.

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Biel – Stades de Bienne / Gygax Areal

31. Erich Fehr, member of the city parliament between 1997 and 2008, member of the city government since 2009, mayor since 2011. Interviewed on 26^th November 2013 in Biel.

32. Thomas Gfeller, delegate to city marketing. Interviewed on 3^rd December 2013 in Biel.

33. Martin Kull, CEO HRS Real Estate. Interviewed on 11^th March 2014 in St-Sulpice (VD).

34. Urs Künzi, responsible for construction project at the Previs pension fund. Interviewed on 17^th February 2014 in Wabern bei Bern.

35. François Kuonen, director of the office for urban development. Interviewed on 20^th January 2014 in Biel.

36. Hanspeter Rentsch, member of Executive Group Management Board of Swatch Group since 1995. Interviewed on 6^th March 2014 in Biel.

37. Jürg Saager, director of the office for urban development. Interviewed on 26^th November 2013 in Biel.

38. Hans Stöckli, mayor between 1990 and 2010. Interviewed on 28^th November 2013 and on 28^th January 2014 in Biel.

Geneva – Praille, Acacias, Vernets (PAV)

39. François Baertschi, member of the government of the municipality of Lancy since 2003, head of the department for city planning. Interviewed on 30^th May 2014 in Lancy.

40. Yves Cretegny, director of the Industrial Land Foundation of Geneva since 2011.

Interviewed on 10^thDecember 2014 in Carouge.

41. Isabel Girault, director of the cantonal office for urbanism since 2011. Interviewed on 12^th August 2014 in Geneva.

42. Christian Grobet, member of the cantonal parliament between 1969 and 1981, 1993 and 2005 and since 2013, member of the cantonal government responsible for urban planning between 1981 and 1993 and vice-president of the Association for the protection of tenants (ASLOCA). Member of the referendum committee against the PAV. Interviewed on 3^rd October 2014 in Grand-Saconnex.

43. Antonio Hodgers, member of the cantonal government since the 1^st January 2014, head of the department for town and country planning. Interviewed on 8^th July 2014 in Geneva.

44. Nathalie Luyet, director of the PAV project from 2012 to 2014. Interviewed on 23^rd October in Lausanne.

45. Luc Malnati, urban architect at the Industrial Land Foundation of Geneva between 1998 and 2008, head of the masterplan PAV from 2006 to 2008, has its own architectural firm since 2008.

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46. Philippe Moeschinger, director of the Industrial Land Foundation of Geneva between 1996 and 2011, member of the general direction and of the Boards of Directors of the Comptoir Immobilier since 2011. Interviewed on 11^th November 2014.

47. Mark Muller, member of the cantonal government, head of the department for town and country planning between 2005 and 2012. Interviewed on 15^th May 2014 in Geneva.

48. Rémi Pagani, member of the government of the city of Geneva since 2007, head of the department for construction and city planning. Interviewed on 30^th June 2014 in Geneva.

49. Yves Perriraz, head of West Development by SBB real estate since 2013. Interviewed on 17^th October in Geneva.

50. Nicolas Walder, member of the government of the municipality of Carouge since 2011, head of the department for city planning, environment and mobility. Interviewed on 9^th July 2014 in Carouge.

Nyon – Martinet-Morâche

51. Espero Berta, head of the administrative service for urban planning between 1978 and 2005. Interviewed on 3^rd December 2014 in Morges.

52. Fabienne Freymond-Cantone, member of the municipal parliament from 1997 to 2006, member of the muncipal government since 2006, responsible for finance between 2006 and 2011 and for urban planning since 2011 and Bernard Woeffray, head of the administrative service for urban planning since 2012. Interviewed on 15^th October in Nyon.

53. Thierry Muller, head of development projects by HRS real estate since 2004 and head of the Martinet project. Interviewed on 8^th December 2014 in St-Sulpice (VD).

54. Christian Perrin, member of the municipal parliament since 1978, member of the parliamentary commission in charge of the study of the land use plans Martinet and Morâche in 1998 and 1999. Interviewed on 1^st December 2014 in Nyon.

55. Daniel Rossellat, mayor since 2008. Interviewed on 6^th November 2014 in Nyon.

56. Yves Rytz, president of the Boards of Directors of Rytz&Cie since 1975. Interviewed on 16^thDecember in Nyon.

57. Guy-François Thuillard, member of the municpal government from 1982 to 1997, member of the muncipal parliament since 1998, active member of the ASLOCA.

Interviewed on 11^th December in Nyon.

58. Jean Wicki, head of Jean Wicki real estate. Interviewed on 17^thNovember 2014 in Nyon.

Zurich – Europaallee, Bern – Wankdorf-City AND Geneva - PAV

59. Jürg Stöckli, head of the SBB real estate and member of the Boards of Directors of the SBB since 2011. Interviewed on 2^nd February 2015 in Bern.

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APPENDIX 2

Table 10: Criteria determining the dominant position in the governing coalition and weighting

Criterion A: Who takes the initiative to develop?

Criterion B: Who sets the speed of progress?

Criterion C: Who will keep control of future development after the project?

One point is given for each criterion. The initiative to develop in the Europaallee projet being common, I attribute a half-point to each coalition partner.

REFERENCES

ARNET, Oliver, 1998. “Hans Bernoullis Bodenreform und die Stadt Bern - Reformelemente in der stadtbernischen Bodenpolitik“. In: LÜTHI, Christian und Bernhard MEIER (Hrsg.) Bern - Eine Stadt bricht auf.

Schauplätze und Geschichten der Berner Stadtentwicklung zwischen 1798 und 1998. Bern: Haupt, pp. 123-140.

Criterion A

Criterion B

Criterion C

Number of points

Decision

Zurich Europaallee

The local government 0.5 0 0 0.5 Private partner in a strong dominant position The private partner

0.5 1 1 2.5

Winterthour Sulzer-Areal

The local government 0 0 1 1 Private partner

in a weak dominant position The private partner

1 1 0 2

Berne Wankdorf-City

The local government 1 1 1 3 Public partner

in a strong dominant position The private partners

0 0 0 0

Bienne Stades de

Bienne

The local government 1 1 1 3 Public partner

in a strong dominant position The private partner

0 0 0 0

Nyon Martinet Morâche

The local government 1 0 1 2

Public partner in a weak dominant position The private partners

0 1 0 1

Genève PAV

The local government 0 0 1 1 Private

partners in a weak dominant position The private partners

1 1 0 2