ADVANCED EU LAW – DROI2055-2
Cases & Materials
Faculté de Droit, de Science Politique et de Criminologie
Université de Liège
Prof. dr. Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel
pieter.vancleynenbreugel@ulg.ac.be
III
WELCOME
Dear students,
The European Union (EU) is one of the most fascinating international organisations currently
in operation. No other organisation over the past century succeeded in shaping, refining and
structuring a truly autonomous supranational legal order that constantly keeps evolving
towards a closer union between the States and peoples of Europe. At the same time, the EU
remains a project under construction, which has become the object of ever more intense
criticism.
This course will offer you a panoramic perspective of the state of European Union law today
by introducing a series of themes showcasing EU law’s potential and limits in the current EU
institutional setup. The law having played a major role in building a supranational legal order,
its limits have nevertheless also become clear more than ever before, in the wake of successive
Euro-crises and the results of the UK referendum on 23 June 2016. The course therefore
explicitly invites you to think critically about the state of EU law – and more generally the
European Union – today. The basics of the EU legal order being outlined in introductory
courses to the field (at the ULg, those courses include ‘droit institutionnel européen’ in the
second year and ‘droit matériel européen’ in the third), this course will presuppose some
knowledge on EU law and the EU institutions in order for you to be able to follow it. If you do
not have such knowledge, you will be required – in the early weeks of the course – to catch up
with this independently.
The course will be structured around three themes and one supplementary topic, all related to
the quest for an ever more perfect European Union grounded in law and legal norms. The first
theme focuses on the EU internal market, the limits to its current setup and the steps taken to
overcome some of the legal loopholes not envisaged by the Founding Fathers of the European
Union. Attention will be paid to both classical fundamental freedoms case law and more
state-of-the-art secondary legislation, including data protection regulation. The second theme
focuses on the institutional functioning of the EU itself. A more perfect Union presupposes
better streamlined institutions and decision-making procedures as well. The third theme relates
to the Economic and Monetary Union, which occupies a special status within the EU Treaty
framework; considered technical and esoteric by many, the crisis sparked renewed interest in
this field. Finally, we end the course on the legal implications and potential future directions in
the wake of the 23 June 2016 U.K. referendum results. Studying the legal implications of a
pending Brexit, we will discuss how this change may affect the outlook and structure of the
EU in the decades to come.
This reader contains case law and legislation, as well as basic outlines for each lecture meant
to help you maintain some structure in the materials covered in class sessions. At the same
time, the materials chosen are only a starting point for reflection and discussion; they are above
all meant to trigger your input during class sessions.
Do not hesitate to contact me at pieter.vancleynenbreugel@ulg.ac.be or during class breaks. I
look forward to meeting you in class every Friday of the first term!
V
TABLE OF CONTENTS
WELCOME ... III
TABLE OF CONTENTS ... V
COURSE SCHEDULE AND SETUP ... 1
PRACTICAL INFORMATION ... 3
a. Course format ... 3
b. Course materials – class preparation ... 3
c. Time slots ... 4
d. Written assignments – two case notes ... 4
e. Exam ... 5
HOW TO READ A JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION? ... 7
LEARNING GOALS ... 9
1. TOWARDS A MORE PERFECT UNION? LAW AND POLITICS IN
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ... 11
LECTURE 1: THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ACTOR
... 13
Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v
Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration ... 15
Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L. ... 21
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 26 October 2012 ... 27
2. PERFECTING THE INTERNAL MARKET ... 39
LECTURE 2: THE HORIZONTAL APPLICATION OF EU FREE MOVEMENT
RIGHTS ... 41
Case 36/74, B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v Association Union cycliste
internationale, Koninklijke Nederlandsche Wielren Unie and Federación Española
Ciclismo... 43
Case C-94/07, Andrea Raccanelli v Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der
Wissenschaften eV. ... 49
Case C-171/11, Fra.bo SpA v Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches eV
(DVGW) - Technisch-Wissenschaftlicher Verein ... 57
LECTURE 3: ECONOMIC FREEDOMS AND SOCIAL RIGHTS IN THE
INTERNAL MARKET ... 63
Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v
Republik Österreich ... 65
VI
Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s
Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti ... 81
Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska
Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet
... 93
Case C-333/13, Elisabeta Dano and Florin Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig ... 111
LECTURE 4: DATA PROTECTION ... 127
Case C-131/12, Google Spain ... 129
Case C-362/14, Schrems ... 147
Regulation 2016/679, General Data Protection Regulation ... 169
3. IMPROVING THE EU’S INSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONING ... 201
LECTURE 5: OPENNESS AND TRANSPARENCY IN EU INSTITUTIONAL
FUNCTIONING ... 203
Regulation 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and
Commission documents ... 205
Case C-280/11 P, Council v Access Info Europe ... 213
Case C-350/12 P, Council v in ‘t Veld ... 225
Case T-677/13, Axa Versicherung AG v European Commission ... 241
LECTURE 6: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTION IN POST-LISBON EU
LAW ... 263
Case C-617/10, Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson ... 265
Opinion 2/13 ... 275
LECTURE 7: ENHANCED COOPERATION: A NEW INSTITUTIONAL WAY
FORWARD? ... 309
Part VI, Title III TFEU ... 311
Joined Cases C-274/11 and C-295/11, Spain and Italy v Council ... 315
Case C-209/13, United Kingdom v Council ... 329
4. BEYOND MARKET INTEGRATION: THE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY
UNION ... 335
LECTURE 8: FOUNDATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE ECONOMIC AND
MONETARY UNION ... 337
Part III, Title VIII, TFEU ... 339
Protocol No 4 on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the
European Central Bank ... 351
Decision 2004/258/EC of the European Central Bank of 4 March 2004 on public
access to European Central Bank documents (ECB/2004/3) ... 369
Case T-590/10, Gabi Thesing and Bloomberg Finance v European Central Bank .. 373
VII
Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón of 14 January 2015 in Case C-62/14,
Peter Gauweiler and others v. Deutsche Bundestag ... 387
Case C-62/14, Peter Gauweiler and others v. Deutsche Bundestag ... 433
Bundesverfassungsgericht, Gauweiler Press Release 21 June 2016 ... 451
Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of 18 July 2017, press release ... 455
LECTURE 10: SAVING THE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION OUTSIDE
AND INSIDE THE EU LEGAL ORDER ... 457
Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v Governement of Ireland, Ireland and The Attorney
General ... 459
On steps towards Completing Economic and Monetary Union (COM/2015/0600
final) ... 481
5. THE FUTURE’S LOOKING GLASS: BREXIT ... 491
LECTURE 11: THE EU LAW IMPLICATIONS OF AND SOLUTIONS FOR A
BREXIT-SITUATION ... 493
Article 50 TEU ... 495
1
COURSE SCHEDULE AND SETUP
Eleven two hour lecture sessions will be organised, which will take place during our regular
time-slot on Fridays from 10.30 to 13.00.
In addition to the lectures, a visit to the Court of Justice in Luxemburg will be organised on
Wednesday 22 November. The visit forms part of the course – for organisational purposes, you
will be asked to register explicitly for this visit during the first class. More practical information
on the visit and the programme will be communicated to you in due course.
The following lectures will be organised in the Séminaire 10 classroom (B31 – Sart Tilman
campus):
1. Course introduction – the role of law in European integration – How to read and
summarise a judgment – preparing a case note (22/09)
2. Perfecting the internal market: horizontalising free movement rights (29/09)
3. Perfecting the internal market: economic freedoms v. social rights? (6/10)
4. Perfecting the internal market: data protection (20/10)
5. Improving EU institutional functioning: transparency and access to documents:
buzzwords or reality? (27/10) – Submission case note 1
6. Improving EU institutional functioning: fundamental rights protection in post-Lisbon
EU law (10/11)
Individual feedback on written assignment (8/11 or 10/11)
7. Improving EU institutional functioning: enhanced cooperation as new institutional
reality? (17/11)
Visit to the Court of Justice in Luxemburg (22/11)
8. Beyond market integration: legal foundations of the Economic and Monetary Union
(24/11) – Submission case note 2
Individual feedback on written assignment (29/11 or 1/12)
9. Beyond market integration: Economic and Monetary Union in crisis (1/12)
10. Beyond market integration: saving the EMU outside and inside the EU legal order
(8/12)
11. The EU law implications of a “Brexit” (15/12)
Course materials consist in a reader containing course outlines, cases and materials, available
at the Presses Universitaires. Additional materials will be posted on eCampus.
3
PRACTICAL INFORMATION
a. Course format
This course is an advanced EU law course. “Advanced” should be understood to have two
dimensions. On the one hand, the course will offer a more in-depth discussion of familiar
materials from your introductory EU law courses. On the other hand, it will also cover more
advanced materials not generally treated in those introductory courses. Its aim is to highlight
themes that are important for anyone engaged in EU law practice or having a keen interest in
the functioning and future of the European Union. As such, it envisages to provoke discussion,
to incite lawyerly reflection and to introduce important institutional and substantive law themes
to you.
As the EU is a complex organisation and as it is impossible to cover everything in this course,
the selected themes – capita selecta approach has been opted for. Although themes may strike
you as different and varied in scope, they all related to the same fundamental question: how
does EU law shape a supranational legal order, in which Member States’ legal orders are
embedded and what legal problems are created by this supranational reality, both on the
institutional and substantive law fronts?
b. Course materials – class preparation
This reader contains the materials that are essential and that will be used in detail during the
lecture sessions. You can bring those materials to the exam preparation and you may add notes
to them. Additional materials will be posted on e-Campus; you are free to print them, but you
cannot take them with you during the course.
The TEU, TFEU and the Charter of Fundamental Rights have been posted on eCampus; you
may print them as well and take them to the exam. In any case, printed versions will be made
available to you when preparing your oral exam.
The course will be taught in an interactive way; that means that ex cathedra lecture moments
will be complemented by discussion sessions on the materials. You are therefore expected to
read the cases for each session in advance! That will not only facilitate our discussion, but will
help you to come to class with questions that may be relevant to others as well. The aim is
really to stimulate discussion, so you do not have to be afraid to interrupt the lecture and ask
me a question if things happen to be unclear.
No particular textbook is assigned for this course. For your information, I propose some
suggestions regarding textbooks, which may help you in structuring and framing the materials
covered in class:
K. Davies, Understanding EU law, Oxford, Routledge, 6
thEdition, 2015, 184 pp. (a
clear English-language introduction to European Union law).
P. Craig and G. De Búrca, EU law. Text, cases and materials, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 6
thEdition, 2015, 1380 p. (the standard textbook in the field, covers
a lot of ground not necessarily covered in this class, yet it may also offer a background
framework to help you in your studies).
4
R. Schütze, An introduction to European Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2015, 2
ndEdition, 380 p. (another clear introduction to EU law, both from
institutional and substantive law perspectives)
K. Lenaerts and P. Van Nuffel, European Union Law, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 3
rdEdition, 2011, 1334 p. (a very complete textbook, covering every area in an in-depth
fashion; as such, it offers a true encyclopaedia for anyone wanting to understand a field
of EU law in a detailed way).
Please bear in mind that this is a 6 ECTS course, which means that you will be expected to
work above and beyond the 30 hours of class time. You are in principle expected to work three
hours for each hour of class; take your preparations seriously and make sure to read materials
in advance. This will help you more meaningfully to contribute to class discussions and prepare
for the questions asked during the exam or when writing your discussion summaries on the
eCampus forum.
c. Time slots
As mentioned above, the regular course time slot is Friday morning from 10.30 to 13.00 in the
Séminaire 10 classroom (B31 – Sart Tilman campus). In addition, a visit to the Court (22/11)
and two complementary feedback moments (29/11 or 1/12 and 15/12) on your written
assignment (see d.) will be organised.
d. Written assignments – two case notes
As an English-language course, the Advanced EU law sessions also want to teach you how to
write in a foreign language. In order to accomplish that aim, you will be required to prepare
two short papers over the course of the semester. Those papers are set up as reflection papers
in the format of a case note. The first case note will be on any judgment of your choice covered
in lectures 2-3-4. The second case note covers any judgment of your choice covered in lectures
5-6-7.
Those case notes offer an opportunity to test your skills in identifying the key points in a
judgment. I will ask you to pick one of the judgments covered in class and to prepare a five to
eight pages case note on that judgment. In that case note, you are required to summarise and
analyse the judgment according to the following structure:
I.
Relevant facts
II.
Judgment (+ potentially preceded by analysis of Advocate General’s
Opinion)
III.
Analysis: questions covered include – yet are not limited to – the
following:
a. Did the Court follow its earlier case law or did it establish a new
precedent?
b. Did the Court take into account special factual circumstances?
c. What future questions does the judgment raise or neglect in being
reasoned the way it is?
d. What kind of action is to be taken by either the Court or other
institutions of the European Union in order to remedy some of the
problems you have identified with the judgment?
5
The challenge of this assignment is to offer a clear and sharp analysis of a judgment covering
the facts in five to eight pages covering all three elements. On eCampus, you will find a number
of examples of Common Market Law Review case notes, which constitute the standard format
in this respect. In the first class, I will give you a set of examples and provide you with more
detailed instructions in this regard. It goes without saying that, whenever the cases have already
been commented on in this venue, you are still expected to offer your proper – and somewhat
original – analysis to the case.
Being able to summarise and structure a case is one of the key learning goals of this course.
The case note therefore counts for a total of 8 points out of 20 to be awarded in this case
note. Both case notes will be graded individually on a scale of 20; the second case note will
explicitly take into account any improvements made in terms of writing style and analysis and
a bonus can be allocated if significant improvement can be noticed.
Do not be afraid of the workload and challenges associated with this process. The
judgments to be summarised will have been discussed to some extent in the course sessions
and the writing process will be supervised by me over the course of the semester. The main
purpose of this course is to offer you guidance and supervision throughout this process. That
is why I will correct the case notes and offer you individual feedback on your written work on
two occasions. Doing so will allow you to receive individual feedback and to improve your
English writing and analysis skills as part of this course. Over the course of the semester, two
feedback moments will be scheduled. In a 15 minute feedback session, I will offer you points
for improvement and give you guidance as to how to improve your writing skills in the future.
More information on how to schedule those appointments will be communicated via eCampus.
In terms of practical instructions, case notes have to be prepared in Times New Roman, font 12,
spacing 1.15, and may not exceed eight pages. The structure to be followed is the above (roman
numbers I, II and III, followed by a, b and c as subdivisions). You are expected to submit the
written version via eCampus on Fridays 27/10 and 24/11 at 10.00 am at the latest,
accompanied by a written version to be deposited with Mme Caroline Langevin, B33, 2
ndfloor, secretariat Institut d’Etudes Juridiques Européennes.
e. Exam
In addition to the two case notes, which count for 8 of your 20 final points, an oral exam will
be organised during the January exam period, during which 12 points can be earned. At this
stage, you will have 30 minutes of preparation time. You will receive two general questions
relating to the course themes, which you can discuss during the oral exam session (which will
last about 20 minutes). I may also ask you small questions relating to other subject-matters
covered in class. The purpose will be to have an informed discussion on the subject-matter of
the course, which is why the exam questions will be kept vague. The point of those questions
is to offer a starting point for an informed discussion on the topics covered by this course.
Preparation will be open-book; you can bring your annotated course materials and legislation
to the exam.
7
HOW TO READ A JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION?
The cases and materials covered here include mainly judgments by the Court of Justice and the
General Court. In order to smoothen the reading and preparation process, I would like to offer
you five guidelines meant to help you in structuring your readings.
Start by reading the operative part: the judgment always contains an operative part; in
case of a reference for a preliminary ruling, the answer to the question asked by the
national jurisdiction – or thought to be asked by it when the Court of Justice rephrases
it – will be given. In actions for annulment, the Court will only dismiss or grant the
application, leaving you with less information on what the legal issue in the case was.
In that case, you will have to delve immediately into the whole of the Court’s obiter
dicta – i.e. the reasoning preceding the conclusion reached by the judges – to understand
what was really at stake. In a preliminary reference procedure, you can already partially
infer the question from the answer given by the Court; it therefore pays to start reading
the operative part.
Clearly distinguish and summarise the facts of a case: although many people tend to
read high-level and general insights in Court judgments, always be aware that, in the
mindset of the Court, it is resolving a particular case at hand. Judges are above all
problem-solvers; when confronted with a specific question, they are tasked to answer
it. As such, it is necessary for you to infer what the problem actually is that confronts
the Court in a particular case. For that purpose, it is essential to consult the facts of the
case and the legislation in issue. Even when the Court will eventually invoke an
unwritten general principle of EU law, it is crucial to understand why the Court did so,
why no other provision of EU law was/could have been invoked. I would therefore
advise you to summarise the facts of the case and to distinguish the relevant legal
question as apparent from them. It is often on the basis of peculiar facts that peculiar
answers to legal questions are given, so link facts and law after having read the
operative part!
Distinguish between the arguments of the parties and the findings of the Court: in the
obiter part of the judgment itself, you will find a lot of paragraphs restating the
arguments made by the parties to the proceedings in writing and orally. That
information is interesting, as it guides the Court to develop its own legal reasoning.
However, as you are mainly interested in the Court’s legal reasoning, I would encourage
you to continue your reading – following a summary of the facts – with the findings of
the Court. Only if those findings leave you with questions or if you want to understand
what led the Court to this conclusion, the arguments of the parties are to be consulted.
In more recent case law, the Court has begun to distinguish – using subtitles – between
arguments of the parties and findings of the Court. That is not the case in earlier case
law; it will then be up to you to make the distinction!
Link the judgment to other cases: when reading the judgment – especially in later stages
of the course – make explicit links to judgments studied earlier; how does the judgment
fit earlier precedents? Does it deviate from them – and if so – to what extent? Although
the Court does indeed solve individual cases, it has to be predictable to some extent.
Assess for each case whether you could have predicted the answer on the basis of
8
precedent case law; asking yourself that question will enhance your understanding of
legal reasoning and of how the Court actually works.
Reflect critically on the legal reasoning developed by the Court: once you have found
the Court’s reasoning, the next step will be to reflect critically on what the Court said;
did it make a general or generalizable statement or did it just address a specific
situation? Why did the Court invoke a specific provision or principle? What are the
effects of that decision, potentially, for Member States and individuals? Is the judgment
workable in practice or does it pose difficulties for Member States, national
jurisdictions or litigants? Could the Court have reasoned otherwise in your opinion? If
available, try to read the Advocate General’s Opinion in this context as well. The aim
of your reading should be to question profoundly, on the basis of your previous
knowledge of EU law or precedents established by the Court itself, the judicial
reasoning or interpretation of EU legal instruments. In adopting a critical perspective
on what the Court does, your understanding of EU law will improve.
9
LEARNING GOALS
The course aims to increase your knowledge, practical and critical reflection skills with
regard to themes of EU law.
In terms of knowledge,
the course will expand your knowledge on selected themes that go beyond the
traditional topics covered in basic EU law courses, introducing you to legal regimes
aimed at making the EU work better;
you will learn terminology you are familiar with in your native language in an English
context;
you will better understand the links between primary and secondary EU law and the
role of the Court in outlining that relationship;
you will identify bridges between substantive and institutional law problems that have
been distinguished commonly, for pedagogical reasons, in EU law analysis;
you will understand better how the European Union functions and how this functioning
is grounded firmly in supranational law;
you will be introduced to economic and monetary integration and its relationship to the
more classical field of EU internal market law;
you will analyse the legal implications of a “Brexit” in the wake of the United
Kingdom’s referendum.
In terms of practical skills,
you will actively learn how to read, interpret and understand judgments by the Court of
Justice;
you will be able to summarise a judgment and prepare a case note on the matter; your
progress in developing English writing skills will be supervised and monitored over the
course of the semester;
you will take part, in writing, in discussions on the subject matter in English;
you will develop be able to follow, in a more informed way, debates on the future of
the European Union.
In terms of critical reflection skills,
you will learn to think critically about the role of the Court of Justice in EU legal
integration;
you will be able to read and critically assess points of view developed by legal scholars;
you will develop your own point of view on the legal desirability of proposed solutions
at the EU level;
you will be able to put EU law debates in the perspective of more general political
debates on the role and future of the European Union;
you will be able to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the current EU
integration through law setup.
11
1. TOWARDS A MORE PERFECT UNION? LAW AND POLITICS IN
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
The European Union is a remarkable international organisation. Part of its uniqueness lies in
the power of legal rules originating in and underlying the organisation. Early on, the Court of
Justice of the European Union – then European Economic Community – recognised the direct
effect and primacy of Treaty rules and secondary legislation derived from them over Member
States’ law. As a result, law became a tool directly to integrate Member States’ legal orders in
an unprecedented fashion, entrusting individuals with rights to be invoked against EU
institutions, Member States and other individuals
The firm belief in law led to a gradual extension of legal bases included in the Treaties and to
the adoption of a now-binding Charter of Fundamental Rights. The first part of this course –
comprising its introductory lecture – will demonstrate precisely how the law has structured and
at the same time restrained future EU integration developments. As such, the intricate link
between law and politics in European integration will be demonstrated, which constitutes the
background against which the course will further develop.
13
LECTURE 1: THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ACTOR
What makes EU law special? How does it distinguish itself from public international law and
from Member States’ national or regional legal norms? The answer to that question lies in the
“hybrid” nature of EU law, having features of both public international and national law. Those
features have been conferred on EU law by means of two crucial judgments: Van Gend & Loos
and Costa/ENEL. In this first session, we will read and interpret both judgments as starting
points for a peculiar ‘integration through law’ framework underlying the European Union. That
framework, it will be argued, is grounded in an understanding of EU law as comprising
subjective rights to be invoked against EU institutions, Member States and even other
individuals. The recognition of rights thus gave rise to what can be called ‘the politics of law’
underlying EU integration. In that understanding, EU law has become a ‘political’ tool to
reshape or reformulate existing national legal provisions or to escape from private law
obligations. The emergence of EU fundamental rights only contributed further to this. This first
session will explain and develop that framework, against the background of which the other
course themes will be assessed.
Materials to read:
Court of Justice, 5 February 1963, Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie
Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration,
ECLI:EU:C:1963:1.
Court of Justice, 15 July 1964, Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L.,
ECLI:EU:C:1964:66.
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 26 October 2012, [2012] O.J.
C 326/391 (browse through the Charter – what kind of rights can you distinguish? Do
you find any rights you would not normally have expected in a fundamental rights
instrument?).
Lecture 1 outline:
a. Introduction to the course
1. Course theme
2. Course setup
3. Practical information
b. The importance of law in European integration
1. Public international law basis –Treaty setup
2. Going beyond public international law: defining EU law
3. Primary v. secondary law
c. The key features of EU law: primacy and direct effect
1. Van Gend & Loos: direct effect of EU law
2. Costa/Enel: primacy of EU law
3. Consequences of direct effect and primacy
4. Limits of direct effect and primacy: the curious case of directives
d. Building on primacy and direct effect: ‘integration through law’
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2. The scope of EU law vis-à-vis Member State law
3. The politics of law
Questions for discussion:
Distinguish the direct and indirect impact of the principle of direct effect on the
development of EU law? What is its importance today?
What are the implications of the EU’s integration through law strategy for the
development of an ever more perfect European Union?
15
Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v
Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration
Parties
IN CASE 26/62
REFERENCE TO THE COURT UNDER SUBPARAGRAPH ( A ) OF THE FIRST PARAGRAPH AND UNDER THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 177 OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY BY THE TARIEFCOMMISSIE, A NETHERLANDS ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL HAVING FINAL JURISDICTION IN REVENUE CASES, FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THAT COURT BETWEEN
N.V . ALGEMENE TRANSPORT - EN EXPEDITIE ONDERNEMING VAN GEND & LOOS, HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT UTRECHT, REPRESENTED BY H.G . STIBBE AND L.F.D . TER KUILE, BOTH ADVOCATES OF AMSTERDAM, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE CONSULATE-GENERAL OF THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS
AND
NEDERLANDSE ADMINISTRATIE DER BELASTINGEN ( NETHERLANDS INLAND REVENUE ADMINISTRATION ), REPRESENTED BY THE INSPECTOR OF CUSTOMS AND EXCISE AT ZAANDAM, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE NETHERLANDS EMBASSY,
Subject of the case
ON THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS :
1 . WHETHER ARTICLE 12 OF THE EEC TREATY HAS DIRECT APPLICATION WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF A MEMBER STATE, IN OTHER WORDS, WHETHER NATIONALS OF SUCH A STATE CAN, ON THE BASIS OF THE ARTICLE IN QUESTION, LAY CLAIM TO INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH THE COURTS MUST PROTECT;
2 . IN THE EVENT OF AN AFFIRMATIVE REPLY, WHETHER THE APPLICATION OF AN IMPORT DUTY OF 8% TO THE IMPORT INTO THE NETHERLANDS BY THE APPLICANT IN THE MAIN ACTION OF UREAFORMALDEHYDE ORIGINATING IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY REPRESENTED AN UNLAWFUL INCREASE WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 12 OF THE EEC TREATY OR WHETHER IT WAS IN THIS CASE A REASONABLE ALTERATION OF THE DUTY APPLICABLE BEFORE 1 MARCH 1960, AN ALTERATION WHICH, ALTHOUGH AMOUNTING TO AN INCREASE FROM THE ARITHMETICAL POINT OF VIEW, IS NEVERTHELESS NOT TO BE REGARDED AS PROHIBITED UNDER THE TERMS OF ARTICLE 12;
Grounds
I - PROCEDURE
NO OBJECTION HAS BEEN RAISED CONCERNING THE PROCEDURAL VALIDITY OF THE REFERENCE TO THE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY BY THE TARIEFCOMMISSIE, A COURT OR TRIBUNAL WITHIN THE MEANING OF THAT ARTICLE . FURTHER, NO GROUNDS EXIST FOR THE COURT TO RAISE THE MATTER OF ITS OWN MOTION .
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A - JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS AND THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT CHALLENGE THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT ON THE GROUND THAT THE REFERENCE RELATES NOT TO THE INTERPRETATION BUT TO THE APPLICATION OF THE TREATY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE NETHERLANDS, AND THAT IN PARTICULAR THE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DECIDE, SHOULD THE OCCASION ARISE, WHETHER THE PROVISIONS OF THE EEC TREATY PREVAIL OVER NETHERLANDS LEGISLATION OR OVER OTHER AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO BY THE NETHERLANDS AND INCORPORATED INTO DUTCH NATIONAL LAW . THE SOLUTION OF SUCH A PROBLEM, IT IS CLAIMED, FALLS WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE NATIONAL COURTS, SUBJECT TO AN APPLICATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS LAID DOWN BY ARTICLES 169 AND 170 OF THE TREATY .
HOWEVER IN THIS CASE THE COURT IS NOT ASKED TO ADJUDICATE UPON THE APPLICATION OF THE TREATY ACCORDING TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE NATIONAL LAW OF THE NETHERLANDS, WHICH REMAINS THE CONCERN OF THE NATIONAL COURTS, BUT IS ASKED, IN CONFORMITY WITH SUBPARAGRAPH ( A ) OF THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 177 OF THE TREATY, ONLY TO INTERPRET THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 12 OF THE SAID TREATY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF COMMUNITY LAW AND WITH REFERENCE TO ITS EFFECT ON INDIVIDUALS . THIS ARGUMENT HAS THEREFORE NO LEGAL FOUNDATION .
THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT FURTHER ARGUES THAT THE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION ON THE GROUND THAT NO ANSWER WHICH THE COURT COULD GIVE TO THE FIRST QUESTION OF THE TARIEFCOMMISSIE WOULD HAVE ANY BEARING ON THE RESULT OF THE PROCEEDINGS BROUGHT IN THAT COURT .
HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO CONFER JURISDICTION ON THE COURT IN THE PRESENT CASE IT IS NECESSARY ONLY THAT THE QUESTION RAISED SHOULD CLEARLY BE CONCERNED WITH THE INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY . THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH MAY HAVE LED A NATIONAL COURT OR TRIBUNAL TO ITS CHOICE OF QUESTIONS AS WELL AS THE RELEVANCE WHICH IT ATTRIBUTES TO SUCH QUESTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF A CASE BEFORE IT ARE EXCLUDED FROM REVIEW BY THE COURT OF JUSTICE . IT APPEARS FROM THE WORDING OF THE QUESTIONS REFERRED THAT THEY RELATE TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY . THE COURT THEREFORE HAS THE JURISDICTION TO ANSWER THEM .
THIS ARGUMENT, TOO, IS THEREFORE UNFOUNDED . B - ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CASE
THE FIRST QUESTION OF THE TARIEFCOMMISSIE IS WHETHER ARTICLE 12 OF THE TREATY HAS DIRECT APPLICATION IN NATIONAL LAW IN THE SENSE THAT NATIONALS OF MEMBER STATES MAY ON THE BASIS OF THIS ARTICLE LAY CLAIM TO RIGHTS WHICH THE NATIONAL COURT MUST PROTECT .
TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE PROVISIONS OF AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY EXTEND SO FAR IN THEIR EFFECTS IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER THE SPIRIT, THE GENERAL SCHEME AND THE WORDING OF THOSE PROVISIONS .
THE OBJECTIVE OF THE EEC TREATY, WHICH IS TO ESTABLISH A COMMON MARKET, THE FUNCTIONING OF WHICH IS OF DIRECT CONCERN TO INTERESTED PARTIES IN THE COMMUNITY, IMPLIES THAT THIS TREATY IS MORE THAN AN AGREEMENT WHICH MERELY CREATES MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN THE CONTRACTING STATES . THIS VIEW IS CONFIRMED BY THE PREAMBLE TO THE TREATY WHICH REFERS NOT ONLY TO GOVERNMENTS BUT TO PEOPLES . IT IS ALSO CONFIRMED MORE SPECIFICALLY BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INSTITUTIONS ENDOWED WITH SOVEREIGN RIGHTS, THE EXERCISE OF WHICH AFFECTS MEMBER STATES AND ALSO THEIR CITIZENS . FURTHERMORE, IT MUST BE NOTED THAT THE NATIONALS OF THE STATES BROUGHT TOGETHER IN THE COMMUNITY ARE CALLED UPON TO COOPERATE IN THE FUNCTIONING OF THIS
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COMMUNITY THROUGH THE INTERMEDIARY OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE .
IN ADDITION THE TASK ASSIGNED TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE UNDER ARTICLE 177, THE OBJECT OF WHICH IS TO SECURE UNIFORM INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY BY NATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, CONFIRMS THAT THE STATES HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT COMMUNITY LAW HAS AN AUTHORITY WHICH CAN BE INVOKED BY THEIR NATIONALS BEFORE THOSE COURTS AND TRIBUNALS . THE CONCLUSION TO BE DRAWN FROM THIS IS THAT THE COMMUNITY CONSTITUTES A NEW LEGAL ORDER OF INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE BENEFIT OF WHICH THE STATES HAVE LIMITED THEIR SOVEREIGN RIGHTS, ALBEIT WITHIN LIMITED FIELDS, AND THE SUBJECTS OF WHICH COMPRISE NOT ONLY MEMBER STATES BUT ALSO THEIR NATIONALS . INDEPENDENTLY OF THE LEGISLATION OF MEMBER STATES, COMMUNITY LAW THEREFORE NOT ONLY IMPOSES OBLIGATIONS ON INDIVIDUALS BUT IS ALSO INTENDED TO CONFER UPON THEM RIGHTS WHICH BECOME PART OF THEIR LEGAL HERITAGE . THESE RIGHTS ARISE NOT ONLY WHERE THEY ARE EXPRESSLY GRANTED BY THE TREATY, BUT ALSO BY REASON OF OBLIGATIONS WHICH THE TREATY IMPOSES IN A CLEARLY DEFINED WAY UPON INDIVIDUALS AS WELL AS UPON THE MEMBER STATES AND UPON THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY .
WITH REGARD TO THE GENERAL SCHEME OF THE TREATY AS IT RELATES TO CUSTOMS DUTIES AND CHARGES HAVING EQUIVALENT EFFECT IT MUST BE EMPHASIZED THAT ARTICLE 9, WHICH BASES THE COMMUNITY UPON A CUSTOMS UNION, INCLUDES AS AN ESSENTIAL PROVISION THE PROHIBITION OF THESE CUSTOMS DUTIES AND CHARGES . THIS PROVISION IS FOUND AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PART OF THE TREATY WHICH DEFINES THE 'FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMUNITY '. IT IS APPLIED AND EXPLAINED BY ARTICLE 12 .
THE WORDING OF ARTICLE 12 CONTAINS A CLEAR AND UNCONDITIONAL PROHIBITION WHICH IS NOT A POSITIVE BUT A NEGATIVE OBLIGATION . THIS OBLIGATION, MOREOVER, IS NOT QUALIFIED BY ANY RESERVATION ON THE PART OF STATES WHICH WOULD MAKE ITS IMPLEMENTATION CONDITIONAL UPON A POSITIVE LEGISLATIVE MEASURE ENACTED UNDER NATIONAL LAW . THE VERY NATURE OF THIS PROHIBITION MAKES IT IDEALLY ADAPTED TO PRODUCE DIRECT EFFECTS IN THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEMBER STATES AND THEIR SUBJECTS .
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 12 DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION ON THE PART OF THE STATES . THE FACT THAT UNDER THIS ARTICLE IT IS THE MEMBER STATES WHO ARE MADE THE SUBJECT OF THE NEGATIVE OBLIGATION DOES NOT IMPLY THAT THEIR NATIONALS CANNOT BENEFIT FROM THIS OBLIGATION .
IN ADDITION THE ARGUMENT BASED ON ARTICLES 169 AND 170 OF THE TREATY PUT FORWARD BY THE THREE GOVERNMENTS WHICH HAVE SUBMITTED OBSERVATIONS TO THE COURT IN THEIR STATEMENTS OF CASE IS MISCONCEIVED . THE FACT THAT THESE ARTICLES OF THE TREATY ENABLE THE COMMISSION AND THE MEMBER STATES TO BRING BEFORE THE COURT A STATE WHICH HAS NOT FULFILLED ITS OBLIGATIONS DOES NOT MEAN THAT INDIVIDUALS CANNOT PLEAD THESE OBLIGATIONS, SHOULD THE OCCASION ARISE, BEFORE A NATIONAL COURT, ANY MORE THAN THE FACT THAT THE TREATY PLACES AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE COMMISSION WAYS OF ENSURING THAT OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED UPON THOSE SUBJECT TO THE TREATY ARE OBSERVED, PRECLUDES THE POSSIBILITY, IN ACTIONS BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS BEFORE A NATIONAL COURT, OF PLEADING INFRINGEMENTS OF THESE OBLIGATIONS .
A RESTRICTION OF THE GUARANTEES AGAINST AN INFRINGEMENT OF ARTICLE 12 BY MEMBER STATES TO THE PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE 169 AND 170 WOULD REMOVE ALL DIRECT LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS OF THEIR NATIONALS . THERE IS THE RISK THAT RECOURSE TO THE PROCEDURE UNDER THESE ARTICLES WOULD BE INNEFFECTIVE IF IT WERE TO OCCUR AFTER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A NATIONAL DECISION TAKEN CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY .
THE VIGILANCE OF INDIVIDUALS CONCERNED TO PROTECT THEIR RIGHTS AMOUNTS TO AN EFFECTIVE SUPERVISION IN ADDITION TO THE SUPERVISION ENTRUSTED BY ARTICLES 169 AND 170 TO THE DILIGENCE OF THE COMMISSION AND OF THE MEMBER STATES .
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IT FOLLOWS FROM THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS THAT, ACCORDING TO THE SPIRIT, THE GENERAL SCHEME AND THE WORDING OF THE TREATY, ARTICLE 12 MUST BE INTERPRETED AS PRODUCING DIRECT EFFECTS AND CREATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT .
III - THE SECOND QUESTION
A - THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
ACCORDING TO THE OBSERVATIONS OF THE BELGIAN AND NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENTS, THE WORDING OF THIS QUESTION APPEARS TO REQUIRE, BEFORE IT CAN BE ANSWERED, AN EXAMINATION BY THE COURT OF THE TARIFF CLASSIFICATION OF UREAFORMALDEHYDE IMPORTED INTO THE NETHERLANDS, A CLASSIFICATION ON WHICH VAN GEND & LOOS AND THE INSPECTOR OF CUSTOMS AND EXCISE AT ZAANDAM HOLD DIFFERENT OPINIONS WITH REGARD TO THE 'TARIEFBESLUIT' OF 1947 . THE QUESTION CLEARLY DOES NOT CALL FOR AN INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY BUT CONCERNS THE APPLICATION OF NETHERLANDS CUSTOMS LEGISLATION TO THE CLASSIFICATION OF AMINOPLASTS, WHICH IS OUTSIDE THE JURISDICTION CONFERRED UPON THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES BY SUBPARAGRAPH ( A ) OF THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 177 .
THE COURT HAS THEREFORE NO JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THE REFERENCE MADE BY THE TARIEFCOMMISSIE .
HOWEVER, THE REAL MEANING OF THE QUESTION PUT BY THE TARIEFCOMMISSIE IS WHETHER, IN LAW, AN EFFECTIVE INCREASE IN CUSTOMS DUTIES CHARGED ON A GIVEN PRODUCT AS A RESULT NOT OF AN INCREASE IN THE RATE BUT OF A NEW CLASSIFICATION OF THE PRODUCT ARISING FROM A CHANGE OF ITS TARIFF DESCRIPTION CONTRAVENES THE PROHIBITION IN ARTICLE 12 OF THE TREATY .
VIEWED IN THIS WAY THE QUESTION PUT IS CONCERNED WITH AN INTERPRETATION OF THIS PROVISION OF THE TREATY AND MORE PARTICULARLY OF THE MEANING WHICH SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE CONCEPT OF DUTIES APPLIED BEFORE THE TREATY ENTERED INTO FORCE .
THEREFORE THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO GIVE A RULING ON THIS QUESTION . B - ON THE SUBSTANCE
IT FOLLOWS FROM THE WORDING AND THE GENERAL SCHEME OF ARTICLE 12 OF THE TREATY THAT, IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER CUSTOMS DUTIES OR CHARGES HAVING EQUIVALENT EFFECT HAVE BEEN INCREASED CONTRARY TO THE PROHIBITION CONTAINED IN THE SAID ARTICLE, REGARD MUST BE HAD TO THE CUSTOMS DUTIES AND CHARGES ACTUALLY APPLIED AT THE DATE OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY .
FURTHER, WITH REGARD TO THE PROHIBITION IN ARTICLE 12 OF THE TREATY, SUCH AN ILLEGAL INCREASE MAY ARISE FROM A RE-ARRANGEMENT OF THE TARIFF RESULTING IN THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE PRODUCT UNDER A MORE HIGHLY TAXED HEADING AND FROM AN ACTUAL INCREASE IN THE RATE OF CUSTOMS DUTY .
IT IS OF LITTLE IMPORTANCE HOW THE INCREASE IN CUSTOMS DUTIES OCCURRED WHEN, AFTER THE TREATY ENTERED INTO FORCE, THE SAME PRODUCT IN THE SAME MEMBER STATE WAS SUBJECTED TO A HIGHER RATE OF DUTY .
THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 12, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTERPRETATION GIVEN ABOVE, COMES WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE NATIONAL COURT WHICH MUST ENQUIRE WHETHER THE DUTIABLE PRODUCT, IN THIS CASE UREAFORMALDEHYDE ORIGINATING IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, IS CHARGED UNDER THE CUSTOMS MEASURES BROUGHT INTO FORCE IN THE NETHERLANDS WITH AN IMPORT DUTY HIGHER THAN THAT WITH WHICH IT WAS CHARGED ON 1 JANUARY 1958 .
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THE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO CHECK THE VALIDITY OF THE CONFLICTING VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT WHICH HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO IT DURING THE PROCEEDINGS BUT MUST LEAVE THEM TO BE DETERMINED BY THE NATIONAL COURTS .
Decision on costs
THE COSTS INCURRED BY THE COMMISSION OF THE EEC AND THE MEMBER STATES WHICH HAVE SUBMITTED THEIR OBSERVATIONS TO THE COURT ARE NOT RECOVERABLE, AND AS THESE PROCEEDINGS ARE, IN SO FAR AS THE PARTIES TO THE MAIN ACTION ARE CONCERNED, A STEP IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THE TARIEFCOMMISSIE, THE DECISION AS TO COSTS IS A MATTER FOR THAT COURT .
Operative part
THE COURT
IN ANSWER TO THE QUESTIONS REFERRED TO IT FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING BY THE TARIEFCOMMISSIE BY DECISION OF 16 AUGUST 1962, HEREBY RULES :
1 . ARTICLE 12 OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY PRODUCES DIRECT EFFECTS AND CREATES INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT . 2 . IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER CUSTOMS DUTIES OR CHARGES HAVING EQUIVALENT EFFECT HAVE BEEN INCREASED CONTRARY TO THE PROHIBITION CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 12 OF THE TREATY, REGARD MUST BE HAD TO THE DUTIES AND CHARGES ACTUALLY APPLIED BY THE MEMBER STATE IN QUESTION AT THE DATE OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY .
SUCH AN INCREASE CAN ARISE BOTH FROM A RE-ARRANGEMENT OF THE TARIFF RESULTING IN THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE PRODUCT UNDER A MORE HIGHLY TAXED HEADING AND FROM AN INCREASE IN THE RATE OF CUSTOMS DUTY APPLIED . 3 . THE DECISION AS TO COSTS IN THESE PROCEEDINGS IS A MATTER FOR THE TARIEFCOMMISSIE.
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Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L.
Parties
IN CASE 6/64
REFERENCE TO THE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 177 OF THE EEC TREATY BY THE GIUDICE CONCILIATORE, MILAN, FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THAT COURT BETWEEN
FLAMINIO COSTA AND
ENEL ( ENTE NAZIONALE ENERGIA ELETTRICA ( NATIONAL ELECTRICITY BOARD ), FORMERLY THE EDISON VOLTA UNDERTAKING )
Subject of the case
ON THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLES 102, 93, 53 AND 37 OF THE SAID TREATY Grounds
BY ORDER DATED 16 JANUARY 1964, DULY SENT TO THE COURT, THE GIUDICE CONCILIATORE OF MILAN, ' HAVING REGARD TO ARTICLE 177 OF THE TREATY OF 25 MARCH 1957 ESTABLISHING THE EEC, INCORPORATED INTO ITALIAN LAW BY LAW N . 1203 OF 14 OCTOBER 1957, AND HAVING REGARD TO THE ALLEGATION THAT LAW N . 1643 OF 6 DECEMBER 1962 AND THE PRESIDENTIAL DECREES ISSUED IN EXECUTION OF THAT LAW...INFRINGE ARTICLES 102, 93, 53 AND 37 OF THE AFOREMENTIONED TREATY ', STAYED THE PROCEEDINGS AND ORDERED THAT THE FILE BE TRANSMITTED TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE .
ON THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 177
ON THE SUBMISSION REGARDING THE WORKING OF THE QUESTION
THE COMPLAINT IS MADE THAT THE INTENTION BEHIND THE QUESTION POSED WAS TO OBTAIN, BY MEANS OF ARTICLE 177, A RULING ON THE COMPATIBILITY OF A NATIONAL LAW WITH THE TREATY .
BY THE TERMS OF THIS ARTICLE, HOWEVER, NATIONAL COURTS AGAINST WHOSE DECISIONS, AS IN THE PRESENT CASE, THERE IS NO JUDICIAL REMEDY, MUST REFER THE MATTER TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE SO THAT A PRELIMINARY RULING MAY BE GIVEN UPON THE ' INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY ' WHENEVER A QUESTION OF INTERPRETATION IS RAISED BEFORE THEM . THIS PROVISION GIVES THE COURT NO JURISDICTION EITHER TO APPLY THE TREATY TO A SPECIFIC CASE OR TO DECIDE UPON THE VALIDITY OF A PROVISION OF DOMESTIC LAW IN RELATION TO THE TREATY, AS IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR IT TO DO UNDER ARTICLE 169 .
NEVERTHELESS, THE COURT HAS POWER TO EXTRACT FROM A QUESTION IMPERFECTLY FORMULATED BY THE NATIONAL COURT THOSE QUESTIONS WHICH ALONE PERTAIN TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY . CONSEQUENTLY A DECISION SHOULD BE GIVEN BY THE COURT NOT UPON THE VALIDITY OF AN ITALIAN LAW IN RELATION TO THE TREATY, BUT ONLY UPON THE INTERPRETATION OF THE ABOVEMENTIONED ARTICLES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE POINTS OF LAW STATED BY THE GIUDICE CONCILIATORE .
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ON THE SUBMISSION THAT AN INTERPRETATION IS NOT NECESSARY
THE COMPLAINT IS MADE THAT THE MILAN COURT HAS REQUESTED AN INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY WHICH WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE BEFORE IT .
SINCE, HOWEVER, ARTICLE 177 IS BASED UPON A CLEAR SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE, IT CANNOT EMPOWER THE LATTER EITHER TO INVESTIGATE THE FACTS OF THE CASE OR TO CRITICIZE THE GROUNDS AND PURPOSE OF THE REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION .
ON THE SUBMISSION THAT THE COURT WAS OBLIGED TO APPLY THE NATIONAL LAW
THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT SUBMITS THAT THE REQUEST OF THE GIUDICE CONCILIATORE IS ' ABSOLUTELY INADMISSIBLE ', INASMUCH AS A NATIONAL COURT WHICH IS OBLIGED TO APPLY A NATIONAL LAW CANNOT AVAIL ITSELF OF ARTICLE 177 .
BY CONTRAST WITH ORDINARY INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, THE EEC TREATY HAS CREATED ITS OWN LEGAL SYSTEM WHICH, ON THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY, BECAME AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE MEMBER STATES AND WHICH THEIR COURTS ARE BOUND TO APPLY .
BY CREATING A COMMUNITY OF UNLIMITED DURATION, HAVING ITS OWN INSTITUTIONS, ITS OWN PERSONALITY, ITS OWN LEGAL CAPACITY AND CAPACITY OF REPRESENTATION ON THE INTERNATIONAL PLANE AND, MORE PARTICULARLY, REAL POWERS STEMMING FROM A LIMITATION OF SOVEREIGNTY OR A TRANSFER OF POWERS FROM THE STATES TO THE COMMUNITY, THE MEMBER STATES HAVE LIMITED THEIR SOVEREIGN RIGHTS, ALBEIT WITHIN LIMITED FIELDS, AND HAVE THUS CREATED A BODY OF LAW WHICH BINDS BOTH THEIR NATIONALS AND THEMSELVES . THE INTEGRATION INTO THE LAWS OF EACH MEMBER STATE OF PROVISIONS WHICH DERIVE FROM THE COMMUNITY, AND MORE GENERALLY THE TERMS AND THE SPIRIT OF THE TREATY, MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE STATES, AS A COROLLARY, TO ACCORD PRECEDENCE TO A UNILATERAL AND SUBSEQUENT MEASURE OVER A LEGAL SYSTEM ACCEPTED BY THEM ON A BASIS OF RECIPROCITY . SUCH A MEASURE CANNOT THEREFORE BE INCONSISTENT WITH THAT LEGAL SYSTEM . THE EXECUTIVE FORCE OF COMMUNITY LAW CANNOT VARY FROM ONE STATE TO ANOTHER IN DEFERENCE TO SUBSEQUENT DOMESTIC LAWS, WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING THE ATTAINMENT OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE TREATY SET OUT IN ARTICLE 5 ( 2 ) AND GIVING RISE TO THE DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITED BY ARTICLE 7 .
THE OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN UNDER THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE COMMUNITY WOULD NOT BE UNCONDITIONAL, BUT MERELY CONTINGENT, IF THEY COULD BE CALLED IN QUESTION BY SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATIVE ACTS OF THE SIGNATORIES . WHEREVER THE TREATY GRANTS THE STATES THE RIGHT TO ACT UNILATERALLY, IT DOES THIS BY CLEAR AND PRECISE PROVISIONS ( FOR EXAMPLE ARTICLES 15, 93 ( 3 ), 223, 224 AND 225 ). APPLICATIONS, BY MEMBER STATES FOR AUTHORITY TO DEROGATE FROM THE TREATY ARE SUBJECT TO A SPECIAL AUTHORIZATION PROCEDURE ( FOR EXAMPLE ARTICLES 8 ( 4 ), 17 ( 4 ), 25, 26, 73, THE THIRD SUBPARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 93 ( 2 ), AND 226 ) WHICH WOULD LOSE THEIR PURPOSE IF THE MEMBER STATES COULD RENOUNCE THEIR OBLIGATIONS BY MEANS OF AN ORDINARY LAW .
THE PRECEDENCE OF COMMUNITY LAW IS CONFIRMED BY ARTICLE 189, WHEREBY A REGULATION ' SHALL BE BINDING ' AND ' DIRECTLY APPLICABLE IN ALL MEMBER STATES '. THIS PROVISION, WHICH IS SUBJECT TO NO RESERVATION, WOULD BE QUITE MEANINGLESS IF A STATE COULD UNILATERALLY NULLIFY ITS EFFECTS BY MEANS OF A LEGISLATIVE MEASURE WHICH COULD PREVAIL OVER COMMUNITY LAW .
IT FOLLOWS FROM ALL THESE OBSERVATIONS THAT THE LAW STEMMING FROM THE TREATY, AN INDEPENDENT SOURCE OF LAW, COULD NOT, BECAUSE OF ITS SPECIAL AND ORIGINAL NATURE, BE OVERRIDDEN BY DOMESTIC LEGAL PROVISIONS, HOWEVER FRAMED, WITHOUT BEING
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DEPRIVED OF ITS CHARACTER AS COMMUNITY LAW AND WITHOUT THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE COMMUNITY ITSELF BEING CALLED INTO QUESTION .
THE TRANSFER BY THE STATES FROM THEIR DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEM TO THE COMMUNITY LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS ARISING UNDER THE TREATY CARRIES WITH IT A PERMANENT LIMITATION OF THEIR SOVEREIGN RIGHTS, AGAINST WHICH A SUBSEQUENT UNILATERAL ACT INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMUNITY CANNOT PREVAIL . CONSEQUENTLY ARTICLE 177 IS TO BE APPLIED REGARDLESS OF ANY DOMESTIC LAW, WHENEVER QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY ARISE .
THE QUESTIONS PUT BY THE GIUDICE CONCILIATORE REGARDING ARTICLES 102, 93, 53, AND 37 ARE DIRECTED FIRST TO ENQUIRING WHETHER THESE PROVISIONS PRODUCE DIRECT EFFECTS AND CREATE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT, AND, IF SO, WHAT THEIR MEANING IS .
ON THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 102
ARTICLE 102 PROVIDES THAT, WHERE ' THERE IS REASON TO FEAR ' THAT A PROVISION LAID DOWN BY LAW MAY CAUSE ' DISTORTION ', THE MEMBER STATE DESIRING TO PROCEED THEREWITH SHALL ' CONSULT THE COMMISSION '; THE COMMISSION HAS POWER TO RECOMMEND TO THE MEMBER STATES THE ADOPTION OF SUITABLE MEASURES TO AVOID THE DISTORTION FEARED .
THIS ARTICLE, PLACED IN THE CHAPTER DEVOTED TO THE ' APPROXIMATION OF LAWS ', IS DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE LEGISLATION OF THE DIFFERENT NATIONS WITH REGARD TO THE OBJECTIVES OF THE TREATY FROM BECOMING MORE PRONOUNCED .
BY VIRTUE OF THIS PROVISION, MEMBER STATES HAVE LIMITED THEIR FREEDOM OF INITIATIVE BY AGREEING TO SUBMIT TO AN APPROPRIATE PROCEDURE OF CONSULTATION . BY BINDING THEMSELVES UNAMBIGUOUSLY TO PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH THE COMMISSION IN ALL THOSE CASES WHERE THEIR PROJECTED LEGISLATION MIGHT CREATE A RISK, HOWEVER SLIGHT, OF A POSSIBLE DISTORTION, THE STATES HAVE UNDERTAKEN AN OBLIGATION TO THE COMMUNITY WHICH BINDS THEM AS STATES, BUT WHICH DOES NOT CREATE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT . FOR ITS PART, THE COMMISSION IS BOUND TO ENSURE RESPECT FOR THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ARTICLE, BUT THIS OBLIGATION DOES NOT GIVE INDIVIDUALS THE RIGHT TO ALLEGE, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF COMMUNITY LAW AND BY MEANS OF ARTICLE 177 EITHER FAILURE BY THE STATE CONCERNED TO FULFIL ANY OF ITS OBLIGATIONS OR BREACH OF DUTY ON THE PART OF THE COMMISSION .
ON THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 93
UNDER ARTICLE 93 ( 1 ) AND ( 2 ), THE COMMISSION, IN COOPERATION WITH MEMBER STATES, IS TO ' KEEP UNDER CONSTANT REVIEW ALL SYSTEMS OF AID EXISTING IN THOSE STATES ' WITH A VIEW TO THE ADOPTION OF APPROPRIATE MEASURES REQUIRED BY THE FUNCTIONING OF THE COMMON MARKET .
BY VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 93 ( 3 ), THE COMMISSION IS TO BE INFORMED, IN SUFFICIENT TIME, OF ANY PLANS TO GRANT OR ALTER AID, THE MEMBER STATE CONCERNED NOT BEING ENTITLED TO PUT ITS PROPOSED MEASURES INTO EFFECT UNTIL THE COMMUNITY PROCEDURE, AND, IF NECESSARY, ANY PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT OF JUSTICE, HAVE BEEN COMPLETED . THESE PROVISIONS, CONTAINED IN THE SECTION OF THE TREATY HEADED ' AIDS GRANTED BY STATES ', ARE DESIGNED, ON THE ONE HAND, TO ELIMINATE PROGRESSIVELY EXISTING AIDS AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, TO PREVENT THE INDIVIDUAL STATES IN THE CONDUCT OF THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIRS FROM INTRODUCING NEW AIDS ' IN ANY FORM WHATSOEVER ' WHICH ARE LIKELY DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY TO FAVOUR CERTAIN UNDERTAKINGS OR PRODUCTS IN AN APPRECIABLE WAY, AND WHICH THREATEN, EVEN POTENTIALLY, TO DISTORT COMPETITION . BY VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 92, THE MEMBER STATES HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SUCH AIDS ARE
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INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE COMMON MARKET AND HAVE THUS IMPLICITLY UNDERTAKEN NOT TO CREATE ANY MORE, SAVE AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THE TREATY; IN ARTICLE 93, ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY HAVE MERELY AGREED TO SUBMIT THEMSELVES TO APPROPRIATE PROCEDURES FOR THE ABOLITION OF EXISTING AIDS AND THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW ONES .
BY SO EXPRESSLY UNDERTAKING TO INFORM THE COMMISSION ' IN SUFFICIENT TIME ' OF ANY PLANS FOR AID, AND BY ACCEPTING THE PROCEDURES LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 93, THE STATES HAVE ENTERED INTO AN OBLIGATION WITH THE COMMUNITY, WHICH BINDS THEM AS STATES BUT CREATES NO INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF THE FINAL PROVISION OF ARTICLE 93 ( 3 ), WHICH IS NOT IN QUESTION IN THE PRESENT CASE .
FOR ITS PART, THE COMMISSION IS BOUND TO ENSURE RESPECT FOR THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ARTICLE, AND IS REQUIRED, IN COOPERATION WITH MEMBER STATES, TO KEEP UNDER CONSTANT REVIEW EXISTING SYSTEMS OF AIDS . THIS OBLIGATION DOES NOT, HOWEVER, GIVE INDIVIDUALS THE RIGHT TO PLEAD, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF COMMUNITY LAW AND BY MEANS OF ARTICLE 177, EITHER FAILURE BY THE STATE CONCERNED TO FULFIL ANY OF ITS OBLIGATIONS OR BREACH OF DUTY ON THE PART OF THE COMMISSION .
ON THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 53
BY ARTICLE 53 THE MEMBER STATES UNDERTAKE NOT TO INTRODUCE ANY NEW RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT IN THEIR TERRITORIES OF NATIONALS OF OTHER MEMBER STATES, SAVE AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED IN THE TREATY . THE OBLIGATION THUS ENTERED INTO BY THE STATES SIMPLY AMOUNTS LEGALLY TO A DUTY NOT TO ACT, WHICH IS NEITHER SUBJECT TO ANY CONDITIONS, NOR, AS REGARDS ITS EXECUTION OR EFFECT, TO THE ADOPTION OF ANY MEASURE EITHER BY THE STATES OR BY THE COMMISSION . IT IS THEREFORE LEGALLY COMPLETE IN ITSELF AND IS CONSEQUENTLY CAPABLE OF PRODUCING DIRECT EFFECTS ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES AND INDIVIDUALS . SUCH AN EXPRESS PROHIBITION WHICH CAME INTO FORCE WITH THE TREATY THROUGHOUT THE COMMUNITY, AND THUS BECAME AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE MEMBER STATES, FORMS PART OF THE LAW OF THOSE STATES AND DIRECTLY CONCERNS THEIR NATIONALS, IN WHOSE FAVOUR IT HAS CREATED INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT .
THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 53 WHICH IS SOUGHT REQUIRES THAT IT BE CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CHAPTER RELATING TO THE RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT IN WHICH IT OCCURS . AFTER ENACTING IN ARTICLE 52 THAT ' RESTRICTIONS ON THE FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONALS OF A MEMBER STATE IN THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER MEMBER STATE SHALL BE ABOLISHED BY PROGRESSIVE STAGES ', THIS CHAPTER GOES ON IN ARTICLE 53 TO PROVIDE THAT ' MEMBER STATES SHALL NOT INTRODUCE ANY NEW RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT IN THEIR TERRITORIES OF NATIONALS OF OTHER MEMBER STATES '. THE QUESTION IS, THEREFORE, ON WHAT CONDITIONS THE NATIONALS OF OTHER MEMBER STATES HAVE A RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT . THIS IS DEALT WITH BY THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 52, WHERE IT IS STATED THAT FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT SHALL INCLUDE THE RIGHT TO TAKE UP AND PURSUE ACTIVITIES AS SELF-EMPLOYED PERSONS AND TO SET UP AND MANAGE UNDERTAKINGS ' UNDER THE CONDITIONS LAID DOWN FOR ITS OWN NATIONALS BY THE LAW OF THE COUNTRY WHERE SUCH ESTABLISHMENT IS EFFECTED '.
ARTICLE 53 IS THEREFORE SATISFIED SO LONG AS NO NEW MEASURE SUBJECTS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONALS OF OTHER MEMBER STATES TO MORE SEVERE RULES THAN THOSE PRESCRIBED FOR NATIONALS OF THE COUNTRY OF ESTABLISHMENT, WHATEVER THE LEGAL SYSTEM GOVERNING THE UNDERTAKING .
ON THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 37
ARTICLE 37 ( 1 ) PROVIDES THAT MEMBER STATES SHALL PROGRESSIVELY ADJUST ANY ' STATE MONOPOLIES OF A COMMERCIAL CHARACTER ' SO AS TO ENSURE THAT NO DISCRIMINATION REGARDING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH GOODS ARE PROCURED AND MARKETED EXISTS BETWEEN NATIONALS OF MEMBER STATES . BY ARTICLE 37 ( 2 ), THE MEMBER STATES ARE UNDER
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AN OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN FROM INTRODUCING ANY NEW MEASURE WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 37 ( 1 ).
THUS, MEMBER STATES HAVE UNDERTAKEN A DUAL OBLIGATION : IN THE FIRST PLACE, AN ACTIVE ONE TO ADJUST STATE MONOPOLIES, IN THE SECOND PLACE, A PASSIVE ONE TO AVOID ANY NEW MEASURES . THE INTERPRETATION REQUESTED IS OF THE SECOND OBLIGATION TOGETHER WITH ANY ASPECTS OF THE FIRST NECESSARY FOR THIS INTERPRETATION .
ARTICLE 37 ( 2 ) CONTAINS AN ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION : NOT AN OBLIGATION TO DO SOMETHING BUT AN OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN FROM DOING SOMETHING . THIS OBLIGATION IS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY ANY RESERVATION WHICH MIGHT MAKE ITS IMPLEMENTATION SUBJECT TO ANY POSITIVE ACT OF NATIONAL LAW . THIS PROHIBITION IS ESSENTIALLY ONE WHICH IS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING DIRECT EFFECTS ON THE LEGAL RELATIONS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES AND THEIR NATIONALS .
SUCH A CLEARLY EXPRESSED PROHIBITION WHICH CAME INTO FORCE WITH THE TREATY THROUGHOUT THE COMMUNITY, AND SO BECAME AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE MEMBER STATES, FORMS PART OF THE LAW OF THOSE STATES AND DIRECTLY CONCERNS THEIR NATIONALS, IN WHOSE FAVOUR IT CREATES INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT . BY REASON OF THE COMPLEXITY OF THE WORDING AND THE FACT THAT ARTICLES 37 ( 1 ) AND 37 ( 2 ) OVERLAP, THE INTERPRETATION REQUESTED MAKES IT NECESSARY TO EXAMINE THEM AS PART OF THE CHAPTER IN WHICH THEY OCCUR . THIS CHAPTER DEALS WITH THE ' ELIMINATION OF QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES '. THE OBJECT OF THE REFERENCE IN ARTICLE 37 ( 2 ) TO ' THE PRINCIPLES LAID DOWN IN PARAGRAPH ( 1 ) ' IS THUS TO PREVENT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ANY NEW ' DISCRIMINATION REGARDING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH GOODS ARE PROCURED AND MARKETED...BETWEEN NATIONALS OF MEMBER STATES '. HAVING SPECIFIED THE OBJECTIVE IN THIS WAY, ARTICLE 37 ( 1 ) SETS OUT THE WAYS IN WHICH THIS OBJECTIVE MIGHT BE THWARTED IN ORDER TO PROHIBIT THEM .
THUS, BY THE REFERENCE IN ARTICLE 37 ( 2 ), ANY NEW MONOPOLIES OR BODIES SPECIFIED IN ARTICLE 37 ( 1 ) ARE PROHIBITED IN SO FAR AS THEY TEND TO INTRODUCE NEW CASES OF DISCRIMINATION REGARDING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH GOODS ARE PROCURED AND MARKETED . IT IS THEREFORE A MATTER FOR THE COURT DEALING WITH THE MAIN ACTION FIRST TO EXAMINE WHETHER THIS OBJECTIVE IS BEING HAMPERED, THAT IS WHETHER ANY NEW DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN NATIONALS OF MEMBER STATES REGARDING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH GOODS ARE PROCURED AND MARKETED RESULTS FROM THE DISPUTED MEASURE ITSELF OR WILL BE THE CONSEQUENCE THEREOF .
THERE REMAIN TO BE CONSIDERED THE MEANS ENVISAGED BY ARTICLE 37 ( 1 ). IT DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE CREATION OF ANY STATE MONOPOLIES, BUT MERELY THOSE ' OF A COMMERCIAL CHARACTER ', AND THEN ONLY IN SO FAR AS THEY TEND TO INTRODUCE THE CASES OF DISCRIMINATION REFERRED TO . TO FALL UNDER THIS PROHIBITION THE STATE MONOPOLIES AND BODIES IN QUESTION MUST, FIRST, HAVE AS THEIR OBJECT TRANSACTIONS REGARDING A COMMERCIAL PRODUCT CAPABLE OF BEING THE SUBJECT OF COMPETITION AND TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES, AND SECONDLY MUST PLAY AN EFFECTIVE PART IN SUCH TRADE . IT IS A MATTER FOR THE COURT DEALING WITH THE MAIN ACTION TO ASSESS IN EACH CASE WHETHER THE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY UNDER REVIEW RELATES TO SUCH A PRODUCT WHICH, BY VIRTUE OF ITS NATURE AND THE TECHNICAL OR INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS TO WHICH IT IS SUBJECT, IS CAPABLE OF PLAYING AN EFFECTIVE PART IN IMPORTS OR EXPORTS BETWEEN NATIONALS OF THE MEMBER STATES .
Decision on costs
THE COSTS INCURRED BY THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AND THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT, WHICH HAVE SUBMITTED OBSERVATIONS TO THE COURT, ARE NOT RECOVERABLE AND AS THESE PROCEEDINGS ARE, IN SO FAR AS THE PARTIES TO THE MAIN ACTION
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ARE CONCERNED, A STEP IN THE ACTION PENDING BEFORE THE GIUDICE CONCILIATORE, MILAN, THE DECISION ON COSTS IS A MATTER FOR THAT COURT .
Operative part
THE COURT
RULING UPON THE PLEA OF INADMISSIBILITY BASED ON ARTICLE 177 HEREBY DECLARES : AS A SUBSEQUENT UNILATERAL MEASURE CANNOT TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER COMMUNITY LAW, THE QUESTIONS PUT BY THE GIUDICE CONCILIATORE, MILAN, ARE ADMISSIBLE IN SO FAR AS THEY RELATE IN THIS CASE TO THE INTERPRETATION OF PROVISIONS OF THE EEC TREATY;
AND ALSO RULES :
1 . ARTICLE 102 CONTAINS NO PROVISIONS WHICH ARE CAPABLE OF CREATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT;
2 . THOSE INDIVIDUAL PORTIONS OF ARTICLE 93 TO WHICH THE QUESTION RELATES EQUALLY CONTAIN NO SUCH PROVISIONS;
3 . ARTICLE 53 CONSTITUTES A COMMUNITY RULE CAPABLE OF CREATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT . IT PROHIBITS ANY NEW MEASURE WHICH SUBJECTS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONALS OF OTHER MEMBER STATES TO MORE SEVERE RULES THAN THOSE PRESCRIBED FOR NATIONALS OF THE COUNTRY OF ESTABLISHMENT, WHATEVER THE LEGAL SYSTEM GOVERNING THE UNDERTAKINGS .
4 . ARTICLE 37 ( 2 ) IS IN ALL ITS PROVISIONS A RULE OF COMMUNITY LAW CAPABLE OF CREATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WHICH NATIONAL COURTS MUST PROTECT .
IN SO FAR AS THE QUESTION PUT TO THE COURT IS CONCERNED, IT PROHIBITS THE INTRODUCTION OF ANY NEW MEASURE CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ARTICLE 37 ( 1 ), THAT IS, ANY MEASURE HAVING AS ITS OBJECT OR EFFECT A NEW DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN NATIONALS OF MEMBER STATES REGARDING THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH GOODS ARE PROCURED AND MARKETED, BY MEANS OF MONOPOLIES OR BODIES WHICH MUST, FIRST, HAVE AS THEIR OBJECT TRANSACTIONS REGARDING A COMMERCIAL PRODUCT CAPABLE OF BEING THE SUBJECT OF COMPETITION AND TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES, AND SECONDLY MUST PLAY AN EFFECTIVE PART IN SUCH TRADE;
AND FURTHER DECLARES :
THE DECISION ON THE COSTS OF THE PRESENT ACTION IS A MATTER FOR THE GUIDICE CONCILIATORE, MILAN .
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Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 26 October 2012
The European Parliament, the Council and the Commission solemnly proclaim the following text as the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
The peoples of Europe, in creating an ever closer union among them, are resolved to share a peaceful future based on common values.
Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It places the individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice.
The Union contributes to the preservation and to the development of these common values while respecting the diversity of the cultures and traditions of the peoples of Europe as well as the national identities of the Member States and the organisation of their public authorities at national, regional and local levels; it seeks to promote balanced and sustainable development and ensures free movement of persons, services, goods and capital, and the freedom of establishment.
To this end, it is necessary to strengthen the protection of fundamental rights in the light of changes in society, social progress and scientific and technological developments by making those rights more visible in a Charter. This Charter reaffirms, with due regard for the powers and tasks of the Union and for the principle of subsidiarity, the rights as they result, in particular, from the constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the Member States, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Social Charters adopted by the Union and by the Council of Europe and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and of the European Court of Human Rights. In this context the Charter will be interpreted by the courts of the Union and the Member States with due regard to the explanations prepared under the authority of the Praesidium of the Convention which drafted the Charter and updated under the responsibility of the Praesidium of the European Convention.
Enjoyment of these rights entails responsibilities and duties with regard to other persons, to the human community and to future generations.
The Union therefore recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out hereafter. TITLE I
DIGNITY Article 1 Human dignity
Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected. Article 2
Right to life
1. Everyone has the right to life.
