BELGIUM
Jean-François Husson1
Introduction
2015 was a difficult year for many Muslims in Belgium. Following Belgium-based terrorist activities, the fight against radicalism and terrorism was high on political and media agendas, and a sharp increase of Islamophobia-related actions was visible as well.2 There were diverse
initiatives from within the Muslim communities to distance themselves from radicalism and to contribute to interfaith dialogue.
Foreign influence, most notably from Turkey and the Gulf states, was another source of concern. If Turkish-backed positions were strongly (re)affirmed, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait interventions were much more discreet. Voices in favour of an “Islam from Belgium” were heard again but these were divided as there is no consensual view on what this Islam from Belgium would be nor who could produce it.
There were few legal developments other than in the “security” field, except projects in the French-speaking part of the country on Muslim leaders’ training. The French-speaking-part considered setting up Muslim programmes on public TV channels, while Flanders closed them down; this example shows the impact of Belgium’s complex federal structure on relations between public authorities and religious and philosophical communities.3 The 1 Jean-François Husson is Coordinator of the Observatoire des Relations Administratives entre les Cultes, la
Laïcité organisée et l’Etat (O.R.A.C.L.E.), an independent monitoring group on church-state relations. He is a
research associate at CEDEM and CRIS, University of Liège. He is or has been a member of various expert committees and author of numerous reports for public institutions. He is also a guest lecturer at the Université Catholique de Louvain.
2 This was also the case for anti-Semitic and xenophobic incidents.
3 In domains covered by this chapter, the Federal government is responsible for the recognition of
prohibition of slaughtering without stunning, especially in temporary slaughter-houses, was generally implemented, generating some angry reactions from within Muslim communities.
Demands in various fields increased, sometimes sharply: some new mosques were built and others extended; most Muslim burial places were running out of space, leading to extensions being considered; Islamic religious education classes received more pupils. Other developments were the continued increase of self-proclaimed leaders and of religious practices outside traditional places of worship and in more individualised forms.4 Sometimes
linked to these developments, radicalisation among young Muslims (including converts) was increasingly perceived as a social and policy problem, and this perception was also held within Muslim communities.
Public Debates
Public debates covered a wide range of topics, from shared values to church-state relations, through religious leaders’ training, radicalism, integration, discrimination and Islamophobia, interfaith dialogue, and debates around “living together.” The perception of an increasing Muslim presence in Belgium was further fuelled by media coverage of radical groupings or activists and by the influx of mostly Muslim migrants.
Radicalism has been a major concern for both Muslims and public authorities, mainly through terrorist activities, the departures of foreign fighters to Syria/Iraq, and hate speeches. in the military, prisons, and hospitals. Flemish, Walloon, and Brussels Capital Regions have responsibility for regulating local religious communities, burials, and animal welfare. Flemish-, French- and German-speaking Communities are responsible for education (including religious education), young offenders, and media. Provinces (except in the Brussels Capital Region) and municipalities supervise and finance recognised local religious communities, including recognised mosques, and implement regulations coming from the Federal and Regional authorities.
4 On the two latest points, see Torrekens, Corinne, and Ilke Adam, Belgo-Marocains, Belgo-Turcs: (auto)portrait de nos concitoyens (Brussels: Fondation Roi Baudouin, 2015), pp.15, 62-64,
www.kbs- frb.be/uploadedFiles/2012-KBS-FRB/05)_Pictures,_documents_and_external_sites/09)_Publications/3323-POD-BelgoMarocainTurcs_Final.pdf, accessed 3 June 2015.
Reactions, either political or from the Muslim communities, have been very diverse and have covered a wide spectrum.
This prompted the reopening of the debate on the inclusion of the principle of laïcité in the Constitution. Even though this had already been regularly proposed (and rejected) since the early 2000s, the main argument put forward this time was to reaffirm values in the face of increasing religious extremism.5 Similarly, some political parties drafted documents on such
issues; for instance, Mouvement réformateur (Reform Movement, centre-right liberals), the only French-speaking party in the federal coalition government, launched reflections in multiculturalism and suggested various measures, generally opposing reasonable accommodation.6
If the primary objective of religious leaders’ training programmes is to enhance the quality of religious and moral assistance to believers, such programmes have also been considered useful components of anti-radicalisation policies, based on the hypothesis that a better trained clergy was better equipped to counter radical speeches and attitudes.7
Programmes in higher education initiated previously in the Flemish Community8 were
continued. In the French-speaking Community, a commission was set up in order to present proposals on the basis of research submitted to the Minister of Higher Education in 2014.9
The Commission’s report, handed over on 4 December 2015,10 proposed various short and
5 Debates opened in Parliament in January 2016.
6
www.levif.be/actualite/belgique/la-croisade-du-mr-pour-defendre-la-neutralite-de-l-etat/article-belga-420453.html, accessed 5 March 2016.
7 Husson, Jean-François, and Jérémy Mandin, Etude de faisabilité en vue de la création d’un Institut public d’étude de l’Islam (Liège: CEDEM-Université de Liège, 2014),
http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/bitstream/2268/184049/1/CEDEM%20Rapport%202014%2012%2010%20final.pdf, accessed 1 March 2016.
8 Husson, Jean-François. “Belgium”, in Oliver Scharbrodt, Samim Akönül, Ahmet Alibašić, Jørgen S. Nielsen,
and Egdūnas Račius (eds.), Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, vol. 7 (Leiden: Brill, 2016), pp.87-113 (101-102). For KULeuven programme details, see http://theo.kuleuven.be/islam-studeren, accessed 5 March 2016.
9 Husson and Mandin. Etude de faisabilité.
10 Rea, Andrea, Françoise Tulkens, Radouane Attiya, and Brigitte Maréchal, Rapport de la Commission concernant la formation des cadres musulmans et les émissions concédées (Brussels: Université Catholique de
Louvain, 2015),
www.uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/cismoc/documents/Rapport_final_commission_Marcourt(1).pdf, accessed 1 March 2016.
long term measures, from complementary training for imams, to the possible organisation of an Islamic Theology Faculty or a reinforced coordination and support for existing courses and initiatives in French-speaking universities. Concrete steps for the organisation of radio and television programmes on public channels were also proposed. These various proposals received a positive response of the Minister in charge11 but have yet to be implemented.
Police and anti-terrorist measures were based on the important presence of Belgian fighters in Syria and Iraq as well as Belgium-based terrorist activities in Belgium and France. Recent reports confirm that Belgium has the highest per capita ratio of foreign fighters in Syria. Estimates range between 410 and 510 individuals, with an average age of 25.7, among which 47 are women and 6% are converts; 45% were from the Brussels Capital Region (most notably Molenbeek),12 45% from Flanders (mainly Antwerp, Vilvoorde, and Mechelen) and
10% from Wallonia; 79 could be linked to Sharia4Belgium; 180 to 260 are still abroad, 60 to 70 confirmed dead and 55 to 130 returned. At least five are fighting in the ranks of the Assad regime.13
The most spectacular counter-terrorism operations were carried out in Brussels, Halle-Vilvoorde, and Verviers. In the latter city, a terrorist cell made up of three people having returned from Syria was put out of action on 15 January 2015, two – both from Molenbeek – were killed14 and later praised by ISIS in a message that also threatened Belgium.15 After
these operations, the alert level in Belgium was raised to level 3, on a scale of 4, from 16 January to 9 March 2015, leading to military being deployed to protect possible targets, such as police installations. On 22 November 2015, the Belgian connections of the terrorists who acted in Paris on 13 November 2015 were established and the alert level was raised to level 4
11 http://marcourt.wallonie.be/actualites/~huit-propositions-concretes-pour-un-islam-de-belgique.htm?lng=fr,
accessed 1 March 2016.
12 Molenbeek is one of the 19 municipalities that make up Brussels Capital Region.
13 van Ginkel, Bibi, and Eva Entenmann (eds.), “The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union.
Profiles, Threats & Policies”, ICCT Research Paper, vol. 7, no. 2 (April 2016), pp.25-27.
14
www.lesoir.be/759121/article/actualite/belgique/2015-01-15/des-attentats-imminents-contre-police-ont-ete-dejoues-deux-djihadistes-tues, accessed 1 March 2016.
for the Brussels Capital Region,16 leading to schools, metro, and shopping centres being
closed, and to the military being deployed in Brussels and some other city centres.
Numerous trials took place in 2015. One of the most illustrative – due to its connections to other European countries and the Middle East – is the one of Sharia4Belgium that opened on 29 September 2014.17 45 people were charged, including the leader of the
group, Fouad Belkacem. The judgement was pronounced on 11 February 2015 and stated: “The Court concluded that Sharia4Belgium is a terrorist group, as were the two Syrian groups that were joined by different members of Sharia4Belgium. Several accused are condemned as leaders, others as active members of a terrorist group. The Court also established that Sharia4Belgium has played an active role in the departure of several fighters to Syria.”18
Some tensions and hate speeches towards minority groups (most notably Shi’is)19 and
Jews20 continued. Measures were taken against some imams considered radical. The imam of
a Somali Verviers-based mosque was ordered to leave Belgian territory in July 2015 after hate speeches but his appeal was still pending in November 2015.21
A theatre play entitled Djihad,22 written by Ismaël Saidi, achieved a considerable
success. Portraying three young jihadis’ misadventures, it was performed in theatres, schools (more than 10,000 pupils attended it) and on TV, always followed by a debate or interactions between the writer – himself an actor in the play – and the audience.23 The play’s success
16 And to level 3 for the rest of the country.
17 “The Sharia4 movement is a network of radical Muslim groups united by a common ideology based on that of
the former al-Muhajiroun…” (Europol, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2015 (The Hague: Europol and European Union, July 2015), pp.21-22,
www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/p_europol_tsat15_09jun15.pdf, accessed 11 July 2015.
18 www.rechtbankeersteaanlegantwerpen.be/index.php/83-persinformatie/110-terro, accessed 10 July 2015. 19 For instance,
www.dhnet.be/actu/belgique/quinze-ans-de-prison-requis-a-l-encontre-de-jean-louis-denis-564f0ec83570bccfaf2e77a1, accessed 5 May 2016.
20
www.lesoir.be/924722/article/debats/2015-07-01/quel-est-grand-danger-pour-juifs-l-antisemitisme-ou-terrorisme, accessed 5 March 2016.
21
www.lameuse.be/1425138/article/2015-11-16/l-imam-radical-de-dison-n-a-pas-encore-ete-expulse-malgre-un-arrete-d-expulsion, accessed 1 March 2016.
22 Facebook page: www.facebook.com/djihadlespectacle, accessed 5 March 2016.
23 Blogie, Elodie, and Béatrice Delvaux, “Notre dénominateur commun, c’était le français”, Le Soir, 15-16
later spread to France.24 The author’s other ideas to promote an open vision of Islam and to
counter radicalism through video clips, developed with Michaël Privot and Rachid Benzine and supported by Brussels capital Region’s President, faced strong reactions among fringe elements of Muslim communities and were eventually withdrawn.25
Unia26 data detected an increase in Islamophobia. In 2015, 1,596 complaints were
filed compared to 1,670 in 2014. While this is an overall decrease in the total number, the number of cases of discrimination based on religious or philosophical motives increased. The three main discrimination criteria in 2015 were race (38% of the claims), disability (22%) and religious or philosophical affiliations (19% compared to 16% in 2014). The latter reflects a trend as the number of complaints has steadily climbed from 185 in 2010 to 330 in 2015, a 78% increase. Muslim victims represent 93% of the complaints received in 2015. Unia considers that racism is nowadays expressed in religious terms rather than on the basis of skin colour or nationality. A Muslim-organisation, Collectif contre l’Islamophobie en Belgique (Collective against Islamophobia in Belgium, CCIB), observed a sharp increase in Islamophobia, counting 28 acts in the first nine months of 2015 compared to 13 in 2014.27
There are questions as to the validity of these figures, as “Islamophobia” as such is not listed in statistics, circumscribing the possibility to initiate criminal proceedings.28
A more discrete debate re-opened in 2015 around circumcision. More than 25,000 circumcisions were performed in 2014 and 2015, among which around 14,500 were on boys under the age of four and a further 5,500 before adolescence. Questions were raised
24 http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2015/12/29/le-djihad-mis-en-piece_4838932_3224.html, accessed 5
March 2016.
25
www.lalibre.be/actu/belgique/privot-et-benzine-renoncent-aussi-au-projet-de-prevention-du-radicalisme-voici-leur-lettre-ouverte-adressee-a-rudi-vervoort-569bd67e3570ed389526da5c, accessed 5 March 2016.
26 www.unia.be/fr/articles/le-rejet-de-lautre-sexprime-davantage-dans-lespace-public, accessed 2 March 2016.
Unia is the new name of the Interfederal Centre for Equal Opportunities, legally competent to treat reports and complaints related to discrimination.
27 Giot, François-Xavier, “L’islamophobie explose en Belgique”, L’Avenir, 28 September 2016, p.5. 28 On these questions, see
www.lalibre.be/actu/belgique/la-belgique-peine-a-quantifier-l-islamophobie-55bbc9763570b546530c0084. On the opportunity debate, see Fouad, Benyekhlef, “L’échec prévisible de la lute contre l’islamophobie”, La Libre Belgique, 27-28 June 2015, pp.60-61, www.lalibre.be/debats/opinions/l-echec-previsible-de-la-lutte-contre-l-islamophobie-558e1d4b35705238f3461819, both accessed 5 March 2016.
concerning the children’s well-being, costs (estimated at €2.6 million covered by social security services in 2014), and the role of social security services to cover the costs for religiously motivated circumcisions.29 No legislative step has been taken.
Transnational Links
Despite a large proportion of Muslims holding Belgian citizenship, links of various kinds with countries of origin remain, more specifically in the cases of Muslims of Moroccan and Turkish backgrounds. The influence of Gulf States has also been noted.
Every year, the King Hassan II Foundation sends dozens of imams and other clerics to Belgium during the Ramadan period in order to support permanent imams during this busy time.30 Besides that, Moroccan organisations in Belgium have personal rather than
institutional links with Morocco. Some therefore consider that the influence of Morocco on Belgian Muslims is declining.31 Moroccan community organisations being scattered in
various – sometimes antagonistic – factions does not help and leaves them with much less influence than Turkish community organisations which are very well organised through Diyanet. The main umbrella organisation for Moroccan mosques in Belgium is the Rassemblement des Musulmans de Belgique (Union of Muslims in Belgium, RMB), which receives financial support from Morocco. If the Moroccan embassy discreetly supports the RMB (the ambassador attends most important RMB’s events), it does not do so to interfere in Belgian political debates, rather to support Belgian authorities as a general rule. As an example, it was announced that Moroccan policemen would collaborate with the Belgian
29 Herminiaire, Jean-Christophe, “Circoncision: un acte illégitimement remboursé”, L’Avenir, 12 February 2016,
pp.2-3.
30 www.fh2mre.ma/la-fondation/fondation-a-la-une/ramadan-2015--animation-religieuse-pour-les-mre.html,
accessed 1 March 2016.
police in Antwerp, Brussels, Verviers, and Vilvoorde from 2016 onwards, with the aim of countering radical preachers and potential foreign fighters.32
The situation is different in Turkish mosques funded and supported by the Belgian-based branch of the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs (Belçika Diyanet Vakfi). Turkish officials are present at mosque openings and, when recognised, most of these mosques prefer to leave unoccupied imam posts that could be paid by the Belgian state, resorting instead to imams sent by Diyanet, who usually hold four-year tenures. Their theological training is not questioned, but their knowledge of Belgian languages and customs is. Diyanet is currently addressing this problem by providing imam training in Turkey to young Muslims of Turkish background from Belgium or France.
Turkish community organisations were in the spotlight in 2015 as some MPs of Turkish descent were uncomfortable with commemorations of the 100th anniversary of the
Armenian genocide. The press underlined the low profile of the French-speaking Socialist Party (PS), guessing it had no intention to anger parts of its electorate,33 while the
French-speaking centrists (CDH) excluded the Member of the Brussels Parliament Mahinur Özdemir, the first ever head scarf-wearing MP in Belgium,34 bringing numerous and varied Turkish
reactions, including from the ruling AKP in Turkey.35 This also raised more widely the
question of a potential conflict of loyalties facing politicians with a migrant background.36
32
www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail_des-agents-de-police-marocains-patrouilleront-l-an-prochain-a-bruxelles-et-anvers?id=9099267 and www.lalibre.be/actu/belgique/des-agents-de-police-marocains-l-an-prochain-a-bruxelles-et-anvers-56122c4d35700fb92f72b4a4, both accessed 15 March 2016.
33
www.lalibre.be/actu/belgique/il-y-a-100-ans-personne-au-ps-ne-contestait-le-genocide-armenien-55410f5d3570fde9b2f8b25a or www.lalibre.be/debats/opinions/genocide-armenien-et-racolage-ethnique-5550d58735704bb01c3d7165, accessed 15 March 2016.
34 www.lecho.be/dossier/genocidearmenien/Turkish_connection.9639987-8096.art?ckc=1, accessed 15 March
2015.
35
www.levif.be/actualite/belgique/apres-son-exclusion-du-cdh-mahinur-ozdemir-recoit-le-soutien-du-parti-d-erdogan/article-normal-397817.html and www.lalibre.be/actu/politique-belge/comment-le-pouvoir-turc-met-la-pression-sur-les-autorites-belges-556df3e235709a87ac683c39, accessed 15 March 2016,
36
Numerous demonstrations also took place in support of the Turkish president (such as in Hasselt, drawing 15,000 people, on 10 May,37 or in Brussels on 23 May 2015), or in protest
against him (as in Brussels in October 2015).38 The Gülen-leaning International Festival of
Language and Culture (IFLC) – unwelcome in Turkey – gathered 7,000 people in Brussels in June.39
On 6 October 2015, the 25th Europalia Festival was inaugurated in Brussels, in
presence of King Philippe of Belgium and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The 2015 festival was devoted to Turkey, and many cultural events took place,40 with various
political dimensions and reactions,41 most notably from the Armenian community and some
other minorities from Turkey.42
The Saudi-based Muslim World League keeps an important presence in Belgium. Belgian authorities chose to give the Saudi-backed CICB (also known as Grande Mosquée or Mosquée du Cinquantenaire) the role of representing all Muslims in Belgium in the 1970-80s. Despite the CICB having been stripped of this role of representation, its ideological influence remains strong through its activities, as well as through some imams it has trained and members of the General Assembly of the Executif des Musulmans de Belgique (Executive of Muslims in Belgium, EMB) close to it. It occupies a building belonging to Belgian authorities, benefiting from a lease that has been questioned in Parliament and the media while the Minister of the Interior announced a security check by the Security of State (Sûreté de l’Etat).43 This question was also instrumentalised by the Flemish far-right party
37 Joie, Catherine, “‘C’est grâce à lui que la Turquie en est là aujourd’hui’”, Le Soir, 11 May 2015, p.2. 38
www.lalibre.be/actu/belgique/des-belgo-turcs-manifestent-a-bruxelles-contre-la-visite-du-president-erdogan-56129a363570b0f19f23c996, accessed 15 March 2015.
39 Gauthier, Flavie, “L’opposant d’Erdogan fait son festival”, Le Soir, 8 June 2015, p.9. 40 http://europalia.eu/en/home/home_82.html, accessed 15 March 2015.
41 Coppi, D., and M. Dubuisson, “La visite de recep Erdogan suscite un certain embarras”, Le Soir, 2 October
2015, p.4.
42 Janne d’Othée, François, “Mauvaise année pour la Turquie”, Le Vif, 2 October 2015, pp.60-62, or U.M., “Les
minorités de Turquie se sentent exclues d’Europalia”, La Libre Belgique, 5 October 2016, p.14.
43 Compte rendu intégral avec compte rendu analytique traduit des interventions (CRIV 54 PLEN 085),
Vlaams Blok that proposed an inquiry commission on the “possibility to forbid international funding from Muslim fundamentalist circles to mosques and Islamic institutes.”44
Qatar and Kuwait provide some financial support to mosques and other organisations. Detailed and verified information is rare but, as an example, the 2014 accounts of the Ligue des Musulmans de Belgique (League of Muslims in Belgium, LMB) filed in 2015 show financial support from charities from Qatar and Kuwait in the amount of €1.2 million.45
Law and Domestic Politics
The system of Belgian church-State relations is based on the recognition of religious denominations and philosophical organisations.46 There was no piece of legislation regarding
Islam specifically in Belgium in 2015 and the few publications in the Official Journal (Moniteur Belge) refer to the funding of the Executive of Muslims in Belgium, broadcasting time in Flanders, and the approval of budgets or accounts of recognised mosques.
Broadcasting on public radio and television channels has followed divergent courses in the Flemish Community, where it ended on 31 December 2015, and in the French-speaking Community, where a Commission proposed setting up such broadcasts in 2016.47
Various authorities and some Muslim organisations established or updated plans or took measures to deal with radicalism. Some of these are classified. These plans have a broad
44 Proposition de résolution visant à organiser une enquête concernant la possibilité d’interdire le financement des mosquées et des instituts islamiques au moyen de fonds internationaux provenant des milieux
fondamentalistes musulmans (Resolution proposed to hold an investigation into the possibility of banning the
funding of mosques and Islamic institutions through international funds from fundamentalist Muslim circles), www.lachambre.be/doc/flwb/pdf/54/0868/54k0868001.pdf, accessed 1 March 2016.
45 Royen, Marie-Cécile, “Le Qatar investit chez les Frères”, Le Vif, 11 March 2016, pp.24-26. 46 For a detailed presentation of the system, see Husson, “Belgium.”
47 Rapport de la Commission concernant la formation des cadres musulmans et les émissions concédées (2015),
www.uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/cismoc/documents/Rapport_final_commission_Marcourt(1).pdf, accessed 1 March 2016.
remit. A new article has been introduced in the chapter on terrorism of the Criminal Code;48 it
punishes leaving or entering Belgian territory in order to commit terrorist acts. A Radicalism Unit was set up in 2014 within the federal Ministry of the Interior. Among other activities, it coordinates the STRESAVIORA (Strengthening Resilience against Violent Radicalisation) project, which is supported by the European Commission. Measures relative to information exchanges and to track “foreign fighters” have also been adopted.49
A National Task Force (NTF) was set up and is coordinated by the Organe de Coordination pour l’Analyse de la Menace (Coordination Unit for Threat Assessment, OCAM).50 Participants are federal and local police, Sûreté de l’Etat (State Security, VS-SE),
Military Intelligence, Department of Foreign Affairs, Cellule de Traitement de l’Information Financière (Belgian Financial Intelligence Processing Unit, CTIF) and Office des Etrangers (Immigration Office). Communities and Regions started participating in 2015. The federal plan is called Plan R; it was enlarged in 2015 to include the foreign fighters’ issue and to develop preventive measure, hence the inclusion of Communities and Regions. On 29 January 2015, the Walloon government adopted a so-called Walloon radicalism plan (Plan radicalisme wallon) with the aim of coordinating the detection and prevention of radicalism. The prevention aspect stresses not only the social and professional integration of residents who are either foreign or of foreign backgrounds, but also the role of local religious communities (including mosques). In April 2015, the Flemish government adopted a 40-point plan later presented to Parliament: it combined support to local authorities, initiatives to counter radical discourses in schools, better integration and language knowledge for migrants, etc., as well as improved imam training and various measures regarding mosques.51
48 Numbered as Article 140; this chapter includes Articles 137 to 141.
49 Service Public Fédéral Intérieur, Rapport d’activités 2014 (Brussels, 2015), p.10. The 2015 report was not
available at the time of writing.
50 www.comiteri.be/index.php/en/39-pages-gb/306-what-is-the-coordination-unit-for-threat-assessment,
accessed 15 March 2016.
51 Actieplan ter preventie van radicaliseringsprocessen die kunnen leiden tot extremisme en terrorisme,
The budget is estimated at €1.2 million. This plan received support from all parties within the Flemish parliament, except the far-right Vlaams Belang.52 The Flemish parliament established
a follow-up commission for the Government’s plan and some parliamentary proposals were put forward, such as a “Concept paper for new regulations on tackling radicalisation, focusing on the prevention of radicalisation processes that can lead to extremism and terrorism.”53 Phone hotlines were also established by various authorities and departments.
Under-minister of the Brussels Capital Region Bianca Debaets developed initiatives for inter-faith dialogue, including a magazine titled Lueurs (Lights) with interviews of nine prominent faith or humanist leaders.54
Despite announcements in 2014,55 there was no federal or regional legislation to
forbid the wearing of religious symbols by public servants providing frontline services.56 A
decision by a Labour Court in November 2015 was in favour of employees of the Brussels Capital Region Employment Service wearing the head scarf despite new internal regulations forbidding it. The Court found that the Belgian principle of neutrality did not imply “exclusive” neutrality that would allow such a prohibition.57 On the other hand, the city of
Verviers received a favourable decision on its ban of overt religious symbols (including the head scarf) for pupils.58
52
www.hln.be/hln/nl/957/Binnenland/article/detail/2275498/2015/04/03/Vlaamse-regering-keurt-40-puntenplan-tegen-radicalisering-goed.dhtml, accessed 15 March 2016.
53 Conceptnota voor nieuwe regelgeving betreffende de aanpak van radicalisering, gericht op de preventie van radicaliseringsprocessen die kunnen leiden tot extremisme en terrorisme,
www.vlaamsparlement.be/parlementaire-documenten/parlementaire-initiatieven/965562, accessed 15 March 2016.
54 www.lalibre.be/regions/bruxelles/un-autre-dialogue-interconvictionnel-558853293570f340d74a52e3 and
www.lalibre.be/regions/bruxelles/bruxelles-les-lueurs-du-dialogue-face-aux-tenebres-567afb0e3570ed3894bd5b13, both accessed 5 March 2016.
55 Husson, “Belgium.”
56 www.premier.be/sites/default/files/articles/Accord_de_Gouvernement_-_Regeerakkoord.pdf, accessed 9 July
2015.
57 www.lalibre.be/economie/libre-entreprise/porter-le-voile-sur-le-lieu-de-travail-56960e973570ed389512e317,
accessed 5 March 2016.
58
This is an example of debates around reasonable accommodation: with no legal framework, such debates resort either to informal local arrangements or end up in the courts, on a case-by-case base. Other debated items are female-only sport activities (fitness, swimming pools), prayer rooms, dress code, refusal of a male doctor, etc. The idea of adopting a legal framework has been put forward but a national approach is considered unrealistic since there is no consensus on the need for such a comprehensive legal framework, and because of the obstacles in implementing it across the multiple authorities within the complex Belgian federal structure.59
Despite an increasing number of halal-labelled products, there are multiple certifications. The EMB is working on a common project with other actors60 but no solution
has emerged yet. The Belgian halal market is worth an estimated €1.7 billion.61 More and
more companies seek halal certification for their products62 and public export offices (such as
AWEx in Wallonia) promote exports of halal products made in Belgium.63 Therefore,
controversies and tensions remain, such as the one sparked when it became known that a traditional regional syrup from the Liège area was halal certified; a call for a boycott was launched64 in August 2015 and a local politician even returned a pot,65 neglecting to note the
fact that such certification was favourable for exports.66
59 www.lalibre.be/actu/belgique/la-societe-belge-reste-flexible-avec-l-islam-54e9f78235701001a1dfc46c and
www.lecho.be/nieuws/archief/Accommodements_de_raisonnables.9595306-7499.art?highlight=accomodements %20%28d%C3%A9%29raisonnables, accessed 5 March 2016.
60 www.embnet.be/Affairessociales/regioWalloni%C3%ABBrussel/LabelHalal/tabid/521/Default.aspx, accessed
10 July 2015.
61
www.lalibre.be/economie/actualite/le-marche-belge-des-produits-halal-estime-a-1-7-milliard-d-euros-522f152e35702bc05f0c9844, accessed 1 March 2016.
62
www.lesoir.be/959995/article/economie/2015-08-11/plus-en-plus-d-entreprises-belges-font-certifier-leurs-produits-halal, accessed 1 March 2016.
63 www.awex.be/fr-BE/L'exportpratique/conseil-export/Documents/2013/exportateur%20162%20decembre
%202013_1.pdf, accessed 2 May 2016.
64
www.lameuse.be/1351183/article/2015-08-10/trahison-appel-au-boycott-rien-ne-va-plus-pour-le-sirop-de-liege-depuis-l-annonc, accessed 2 May 2015.
65 www.lesoir.be/962142/article/debats/editos/2015-08-14/halal-arretons-jouer-sur-peurs, accessed 2 May 2016. 66
The organisation of animal slaughter for ‘Id al-Adha was very controversial in 2015. The EMB delivers two types of certificates for halal slaughter, one for professionals (valid for one year) and temporary certificates (valid for three days). Gaia (an animal rights association) pursued its campaign opposing slaughter without stunning, and launched a massive campaign by post and in the press67 in September 2015.68 Veterinary associations
also expressed their opposition to ritual slaughtering.69 The basic piece of legislation is the
law of 14 August 1986 on animal protection and welfare.70 Articles 15 and 16 forbid
slaughtering without stunning, allowing exceptions for religious purposes in circumstances determined by the Government in agreement with the slaughterhouse. The Council of State decided in July 2015 that slaughtering without stunning in temporary slaughterhouses was illegal. In the Flemish Region, Minister Ben Weyts announced that slaughtering without stunning would end in 2015 in temporary slaughterhouses with the possible extension of prohibition to all slaughterhouses at a later date. This move was seen as electioneering aimed at gaining far-right voters.71 The Flemish local government association also issued guidelines
for municipalities.72 In reaction, various Muslim organisations requested alternatives to be
considered. 48 associations filed complaints against the decision of the Flemish government73
but the legality of the latter was confirmed in court.74
67 See for instance the advert in Le Soir, 7 July 2015, p.7.
68 In the same campaign, Gaia had gathered 10,000 persons for a demonstration in 2014. 69 Report of one of the veterinary associations, www.upv.be/service.php?
module=library&action=get_file&target=5029&options=%7Clng:fr, and an example of press coverage, www.levif.be/actualite/belgique/les-veterinaires-contre-l-abattage-sans-etourdissement/article-normal-410397.html, both accessed 2 May 2016.
70 Loi du 14 août 1986 relative à la protection et au bien-être des animaux,
www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=fr&la=F&cn=1986081434&table_name=loi, accessed 2 May 2016. This law is now under the purview of the Regions, leading to divergent developments around the country.
71
www.lalibre.be/debats/opinions/egorgement-de-mouton-sans-etourdissement-rite-ou-droit-absolu-55d34e273570b54653552189 and www.lesoir.be/960073/article/debats/editos/2015-08-12/abattage-rituel-gare-l-instrumentalisation, accessed 2 May 2016.
72
www.vvsg.be/sociaal_beleid_en_werk/Etnisch-culturele_diversiteit/Documents/2015/Handleiding_Organisatie_Offerfeest_2015.pdf, accessed 2 May 2016.
73
www.7sur7.be/7s7/fr/1731/Islam/article/detail/2414197/2015/08/06/Plainte-d-organisations-musulmanes-contre-Ben-Weyts.dhtml, accessed 2 May 2016.
74 www.lalibre.be/actu/belgique/abattage-rituel-les-musulmans-deboutes-55f99d343570b0f19eac1cbd, accessed
In Wallonia, where around 75% of cattle had been killed in temporary slaughterhouses in 2014, the Government negotiated with slaughterhouses (most of them private) and the EMB to ensure that slaughtering (without stunning) would take place in permanent slaughterhouses only but that these would have longer opening hours during three dedicated days.75 Temporary slaughterhouses were therefore not deployed in municipalities as
in previous years. In the Brussels Capital Region, around 40% of the cattle had been killed in 2014 in the permanent Anderlecht slaughterhouse and slightly less than 60% in temporary installations in Schaerbeek, Molenbeek, and Brussels city.76 Temporary slaughterhouses were
not prohibited by the Region in 2015 but some municipalities decided not to open them.77
Reactions among Muslim communities were diverse. Beside already mentioned EMB negotiations with regional authorities, there were calls for a boycott and invitations to use alternatives. Some fringe organisations tried to gain visibility with declarations and petitions on this matter,78 a clear instrumentalisation of the issue in an attempt to counterbalance the
EMB or sometimes local mosques.
A compulsory integration course for non-EU immigrants (inburgering traject) had already existed in the Flemish Region. The Walloon Region adopted a largely voluntarily welcome course (parcours d’accueil) in 201479 and decided in September 2015 to turn it into
a larger compulsory programme, with 120 hours of French as a foreign language, 20 hours on citizenship plus a social/professional integration unit.80 The Brussels Capital Region followed
the move, taking a similar decision in December 2015 and planning compulsory attendance
75
www.7sur7.be/7s7/fr/1731/Islam/article/detail/2328766/2015/05/19/Les-abattages-etales-sur-trois-jours-pour-la-fete-de-l-Aid.dhtml, accessed 2 May 2016.
76
www.lalibre.be/regions/bruxelles/vers-un-etourdissement-des-moutons-en-2016-559c22263570e4598cce48a4, accessed 2 May 2016.
77 www.bruxelles.be/artdet.cfm/8732/Fete-du-sacrifice-2015-Pas-de-site-dabattage-temporaire, accessed 2 May
2016.
78 See for example, www.lapetition.be/petition.php/Petition-Fete-du-Sacrifice/16667, from Plateforme des Musulmans de Belgique, with only 1,578 signatures on 8 May 2016.
79
http://gouvernement.wallonie.be/le-parcours-d-int-gration-des-primo-arrivants-adopt-par-le-gouvernement-wallon, accessed 5 March 2016.
80
from 2017 onwards.81 Such changes were prompted by the influx of migrants and the parallel
question of how to instil in them the “values of our society.” In the same prospect, the Federal government decided to only grant residence permits to foreigners who signed a document in which they subscribe to European values, freedoms, and constitutional principles.82
Activities and Initiatives of Main Muslim Organisations
The Executif des Musulmans de Belgique (Executive of Muslims in Belgium, EMB),83 was
under various forms of pressure coming from several quarters. These included political, conservative, or radical fringes within Muslim communities and/or some groupings and personalities attempting to gain more influence, in the Belgian context and/or from foreign countries. Other parts of the communities, including progressive ones, were challenging what they considered the EMB’s lack of legitimacy or representativeness. These combined pressures turned into turmoil. If the administration of the Executive was still working,84 the
Executive as such was in crisis (because of multiple factors such as internal conflicts, interpersonal tensions, appeals against the composition of the EMB, etc.) prompting parliamentary questions and ministerial action. The Minister in-charge announced profound changes in the organisation of the representation of Muslim communities (including a
81
www.lalibre.be/actu/belgique/bruxelles-a-son-parcours-d-integration-obligatoire-56607e3d357031c12afbbae9, accessed 5 March 2016.
82 www.lecho.be/actualite/archive/Pas_de_sejour_sans_adhesion_aux_valeurs.9691045-1802.art, accessed 5
March 2016.
83 See Husson, “Belgium”, pp.103-105 for EMB’s role and composition.
84 Dealing with mosque supervision, imams’ administration, and organising monthly training sessions for imams
controversial split into French-speaking and Flemish-speaking wings) in 2015,85 implemented
by a governmental decree on 15 February 2016.
While mosques in Flanders and Brussels are recognised on a case-by-case basis, Wallonia recognised a first batch of 43 in 2006 (39 remaining, four having lost their recognition due to administrative problems) but none has been recognised since, as Walloon provinces, citing budgetary constraints, have been reluctant to recognise the remaining mosques. These arguments were apparently set aside in the context of anti-radicalisation plans and 22 existing mosques appear set to be recognised in Wallonia in 2016. In Flanders, there were 28 recognised mosques at the end of 2015 and around 50 future recognitions were announced.86 In the Brussels Capital Region, only 14 out of 80 mosques are recognised, with
seven more applications pending,87 others are apparently not seeking recognition.
In accordance with regional regulations, elections were held in most recognised mosques88 where committees had been elected five years ago. The process went smoothly,
with rare exceptions showing tensions, sometimes initiated by more radical groups. In many cases, these elections brought new generations into power, with professional competencies (accounting etc.) but also often with a more vindictive posture towards established authorities.
85
www.lalibre.be/actu/belgique/a-l-executif-musulman-l-union-fait-encore-la-force-5571f0a935709a87ac759362, accessed 1 March 2016.
86 www.demorgen.be/binnenland/aantal-erkende-moskeeen-verdriedubbelt-b39f3385, accessed 1 March 2016. 87
/www.dhnet.be/regions/bruxelles/bruxelles-a-peine-14-mosquees-reconnues-par-la-region-564500553570ca6ff8d5b94f, accessed 1 March 2016.
88 Mosques can ask the EMB to be recognised by regional governments. They then become public
establishments with similar advantages to those of other denominations (such as the Catholic fabriques
d’églises). This process is managed by an Islamic committee (comité islamique) elected by all members
choosing to be affiliated to these mosques - no fee can be levied. Their imams’ salaries can be paid by the Federal Ministry of Justice. The imams can receive housing or an equivalent allowance from the Province or the Brussels Capital Region that also covers the mosque’s deficit. A non-recognised mosque is usually an
association sans but lucratif (non-profit organisation, quite similar to a charity) and has little or no public
financial support but fewer administrative constraints. Its ruling body is elected by members, who usually pay a membership fee. See Husson, “Belgium”, pp.95-98, for more details.
New mosques opened (e.g. UCCIB mosque Selimiye in Saint-Josse, Brussels)89 while
works started (e.g. Malmédy)90 or procedures initiated for others as in Fléron,91 Glain,92 La
Louvière,93 and Beringen.94 Some mosques have some problems in terms of space, leading to
new buildings, extensions of existing ones,95 or prayers performed on the street.96 At least one
(in Maaseik) was temporarily closed after police searches.97
Demands have been increasing for Muslim parcels in cemeteries in various parts of the country. In Brussels, some municipalities belong to an inter-municipal organisation providing Muslim, Orthodox, and Jewish parcels, while some others have Muslim parcels in their municipal cemetery and yet others have none; hence, the question of inequality of treatment regarding the municipality of residence was raised in 2015.98
In public schools (run by Flemish, French- and German-speaking Communities, or local authorities), education in all recognised religions and non-confessional moral education are planned for two periods a week (being gradually reduced to one in the French-speaking Community). Exemptions (in the Flemish Community) or alternatives (Education in Philosophy and Citizenship or EPC, in the French-speaking Community) are possible. In all Communities, the number of pupils attending Islamic religion education classes increased. In
89 Husson, “Belgium”, p.105. It was inaugurated in presence of Saint-Josse Mayor and Member of Brussels
Capital Region Parliament, Emir Kir, who holds a dual Belgian-Turkish citizenship.
90 www.lavenir.net/cnt/dmf20150608_00661263, accessed 1 March 2016.
91
www.lameuse.be/1313194/article/2015-06-17/fleron-une-mosquee-pour-500-musulmans-et-un-minaret-de-2180-metres-a-retinne, accessed 1 March 2016. Accompanied by controversies in terms of land planning and neighbourhood relationships, this project received a loan from Diyanet; Geerkens, Mélanie, “Querelles de minarets”. Le Vif, 30 October 2015, pp.42-45.
92 This project was eventually approved but works management by the mosque’s curators has been contested;
Geerkens, “Querelles de minarets”, pp.42-45.
93 www.rtbf.be/info/regions/detail_bientot-la-construction-d-une-nouvelle-mosquee-dans-l-entite-de-la-louviere?
id=8973933, accessed 1 March 2016.
94 In a former striptease club, www.demorgen.be/binnenland/stripclub-wordt-moskee-b058c023, accessed 1
March 2016.
95 Such as the mosque Alkhalil in Brussels (see video on their website: http://alkhalil.be, accessed 1 March
2016).
96 As happened in the mosque Al Inaba in Berchem-Sainte-Agathe (Brussels),
/www.lacapitale.be/1314804/article/2015-06-19/berchem-sainte-agathe-une-rue-bloquee-pour-que-les-fideles-puissent-prier-video, accessed 1 March 2016.
97 www.demorgen.be/binnenland/burgemeester-sluit-moskee-neeroeteren-na-huiszoeking-bbd3950d, accessed 1
March 2016.
98
the Flemish Community, 1,023 schools organised such classes in 2014-2015; among schools directly operated by the Flemish Community, 533 schools were concerned compared to 331 in 2006-2007, representing a 60% increase.99 In Antwerp municipality-run schools, Islamic
religious education classes now draw an absolute majority of pupils.100 Catholic, Protestant,
Jewish, and Muslim educational institutions exist beside public (Community’s or local) ones.101 In addition to Muslim denominational primary schools, the first secondary school
opened in 2015, La Vertu, organised by Enseignement Confessionel Islamique de Belgique (Islamic Denominational Schools in Belgium, ECIB).102 Other, non-denominational, schools
also exist. Among these are Gülen-oriented initiatives, with Lucerna schools in the Flemish Community and Ecole des Etoiles (Stars’ School) in the French-speaking Community. One of these opened in Liège in 2015, after similar schools opened in Charleroi and Brussels. These schools, primarily aimed at a Turkish audience, are officially open to pupils from all religions.103
Various activities were set up in order to reaffirm the solidarity of Muslim communities with Belgian society as a whole and to prevent stereotyping Muslims as terrorists. With other recognised denominations, the Exécutif des Musulmans de Belgique (Executive of Muslims in Belgium, EMB) was a co-organiser of the demonstration “Together in Peace - Liberté et Respect - Vrijheid en Respect”104 that took place on 15 March 2015 and
attracted some 3,500 people.105 Representatives of the EMB and/or from different Muslim
99
www.hln.be/hln/nl/1265/Onderwijs/article/detail/2303541/2015/04/29/Islamonderwijs-in-Vlaanderen-gaat-er-fors-op-vooruit.dhtml, accessed 1 March 2016.
100http://atv.be/nieuws/meerderheid-leerlingen-stedelijk-basisonderwijs-volgt-islam-25517, accessed 1 March
2016.
101 Private schools, whether denominational or not, once recognised (with conditions mainly related to the
curriculum and teachers qualifications) receive important public financial support - teachers’ salaries are paid by the Flemish, French- or German-speaking Community, part of the operating cost is subsidized, as are some investments.
102
www.rtl.be/info/belgique/societe/une-premiere-en-belgique-une-ecole-secondaire-islamique-ouvrira-ses-portes-a-la-rentree-739111.aspx, accessed 1 March 2016.
103 www.rtbf.be/info/regions/detail_une-ecole-libre-non-confessionnelle-a-liege?id=8930114, accessed 1 March
2016.
104 http://togetherinpeace.be, accessed 1 March 2016.
105 www.demorgen.be/binnenland/3-500-betogers-op-straat-tegen-terreur-en-polarisatie-bdc0d2e1, accessed 1
associations took part at the various demonstrations against violence and in solidarity with terror victims.
Open-door events were more widely held in 2015 than in previous years, including at six mosques in Verviers,106 and school visits in Namur.107 Among other initiatives, Initiatives
citoyennes pour un Islam de Belgique (Citizen’s Initiatives for Islam of Belgium, ICIB) held a joint press conference with the Comité de coordination des organisations juives de Belgique (Coordinating committee of Jewish associations of Belgium, CCOJB) to promote a better relationship and increased understanding between both communities, and to fight against racism.108 In Arlon, in a symbolic gesture, the Muslim community gave €2,405 to help
restore the local listed synagogue.109
Muslim Population: History and Demographics
As Belgium did not own colonies with a Muslim majority or a significant Muslim population, the presence of Muslims in Belgium remained marginal110 until the signing of labour
agreements with some Muslim majority countries, notably Turkey and Morocco, in 1964. The percentage of Muslims in the population has become a difficult and sensitive topic of debate, as illustrated by an Ipsos111 survey showing that the percentage of Muslims in
106 www.lameuse.be/1213913/article/2015-02-15/operation-seduction-menee-par-six-mosquees-vervietoises,
accessed 1 March 2016.
107 www.rtbf.be/info/regions/detail_une-ecole-de-ciney-visite-la-mosquee-de-namur?id=8915015, accessed 1
March 2016.
108
www.levif.be/actualite/belgique/des-organisations-juives-et-musulmanes-developpent-des-activites-communes/article-normal-400625.html, accessed 1 March 2016.
109
www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail_la-communaute-musulmane-offre-2-405-euros-pour-sauver-la-synagogue-d-arlon?id=8985894, accessed 5 March 2016.
110 There were mainly tradesman (based in Antwerp, as early as the 19th century) and diplomats, joined from the
1950s onwards by small numbers of students from Arab countries and political refugees of Muslim majority countries (such as Albania).
111
www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3466/Perceptions-are-not-reality-Things-the-world-gets-wrong.aspx, accessed 30 June 2015. The Pew Research Center therefore raised the question about the panel selection, www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/17/5-facts-about-the-muslim-population-in-europe, accessed 5 March 2016.
Belgium is estimated by the Belgian population to be 29%, 23 points higher than it was in reality at the time. Attempts to put forward some estimates led to fiery debates among academics.112
In the absence of the registration of religious or philosophical affiliations, only estimates and surveys can be used.113 Detailed estimates are regularly produced by Jan
Hertogen,114 based on countries of origin.115 He previously set a figure of around 716,000
Muslims or 6.5% of the Belgian population in 2013,116 and increased this to 7% in 2015.117
This can be compared with earlier data on the attendance of Islamic religious education classes, with 5.9% or even 6.9% of Muslim pupils frequenting Catholic schools in 2010-2011.118 All indicators show a regular increase in both the number and percentage of the
112 Husson, “Belgium”, p.106.
113 For a discussion, see El Battiui, Mohamed, Meryem Kanmaz and Firouzeh Nahavandi (eds.), Mosquées, imams et professeurs de religion islamique en Belgique: Etat de la question et enjeux (Brussels: Fondation Roi
Baudouin, 2004), pp.7-8,
www.kbs-frb.be/uploadedfiles/kbs-frb/files/fr/pub_1448_mosquees_imams_prof_islam.pdf, accessed 9 November 2014; Dassetto, Felice, L’iris et
le croissant: Bruxelles et l’Islam au défi de la co-inclusion (Louvain-la-Neuve: Presses universitaires de
Louvain, 2011), pp.21-26, Fadil, Nadia, “Belgium”, in Jørgen S. Nielsen, Samim Akönül, Ahmet Alibašić and Egdūnas Račius (eds.), Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, vol. 6 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), pp.84-107 (84-85), or Husson, Jean-François, “Le financement des cultes, de la laïcité et des cours philosophiques”, Courrier
hebdomadaire du Centre de recherche et d'information socio-politiques, no. 1703-1704 (2000), pp.3-90 (84-89). 114 Mainly Hertogen, Jan, “Moslims in België van 6.3% naar 6.5% van de Bevolking”, 8 October 2014,
www.dewereldmorgen.be/blog/janhertogen/2014/10/08/moslims-in-belgie-van-63-naar-65-van-de-bevolking, accessed 14 June 2015, Hertogen, Jan, “In België wonen 628.751 moslims, 6,0% van de bevolking”, 11 September 2008, www.npdata.be/BuG/100, accessed 14 June 2015, Hertogen, Jan, “Moslims in België per gewest, provincie en gemeente. Evolutie 2011, 2013 en 2015”, 18 September 2015, www.npdata.be/BuG/318-Onderzoekscommissie, accessed 5 March 2016. These estimates will be used in the absence of other detailed ones. Discussions on his methodology have taken place with some researchers concerned that any
overestimation may feed fears of some kind of “foreign invasion”. See, for instance Dassetto, L’iris et le
croissant, pp.21-26, Fadil, “Belgium”, pp.84-85.
115 Such estimates tend to neglect people from Muslim majority countries who are not Muslims (e.g. Middle
Eastern Christians), an aspect taken into account by Hertogen, as well as converts. See Dassetto, L’iris et le
croissant, pp.21-26).
116 Hertogen, “Moslims in België.”
117 Hertogen, “Moslims in België per gewest, provincie en gemeente.”
118 Estimated to be around 14,000 for Belgium (author’s own calculations based on Sägesser, Caroline, “Les
cours de religion et de morale dans l’enseignement obligatoire”, Courrier hebdomadaire du Centre de
recherche et d'information socio-politiques, no. 2140-2141 (2012), pp.3-59). The Catholic schools network has
even produced a note on how to teach Catholic religion in classes with a majority of Muslim pupils; SeGeC,
Entre enracinement et ouverture: Le cours de religion catholique dans les classes du secondaire à forte présence musulmane (Brussels: 2014),
http://enseignement.catholique.be/segec/fileadmin/DocsFede/FESeC/religion/enracinement_ouverture.pdf, accessed 14 June 2015.
Muslim population in Belgium, with estimates rising as high as 1 million, or 10.2% of the population by 2030.119
Muslim Population Estimates on 1 January 2015 are 781,887 Muslims out of a population of 11,209,044. This represents 7% compared to 6.5% in 2013.
Ethnic/National Backgrounds120 Moroccan: 332,224 (46.4% of Muslim population)
Turkish: 179,558 (25.8%) Others: 204,696 (27.8%).121
More than 91% and 93% respectively of Muslim Belgian residents of Moroccan or Turkish background now have Belgian citizenship; a large majority of them have dual citizenship.122 Converts (who are not
counted here) have been estimated between 6,000 and around 30,000.123
Inner-Islamic Groups
119 Pew Research Center, “The Future of the Global Muslim Population. Region: Europe”, 27 January 2011,
pp.10-11, 15, www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/future-of-the-global-muslim-population-regional-europe, accessed 14 June 2015.
120 These data could not be updated, hence s slight difference with other totals in the table. 121 Hertogen, Jan, “Moslims in België van 6.3% naar 6.5% van de Bevolking”, 8 October 2014,
www.dewereldmorgen.be/blog/janhertogen/2014/10/08/moslims-in-belgie-van-63-naar-65-van-de-bevolking, accessed 14 June 2015.
122 Torrekens and Adam, Belgo-Marocains, Belgo-Turcs, pp.33-34.
123 Aksöyek, Ataman (ed.), Sociographie de la population turque et d’origine turque: Quarante ans de présence en Belgique (1960-2000), Dynamiques, problèmes, perspectives (Brussels: Centre de Relations Européennes,
Geographical Spread The Muslim population is unevenly spread in the country, concentrating mainly in some parts of Brussels127 and in (former) industrial
and mining areas around Antwerp, Gent, Liège, Charleroi, and in the province of Limburg.
The Muslim population is spread as follow: Brussels Capital Region: 35.5% (23.6% of the entire population)
Flemish Region: 42.2% (5.1%) Walloon Region: 22.3% (4.9%).128
Number of Mosques There are slightly fewer than 300 mosques;
292 decided to participate in the election of the Executive of Muslims in Belgium (EMB) in 2014 but only 284 sent delegates. According to the EMB, there are 68 to 80 mosques in Brussels Capital Region (18 recognised), 76 in Wallonia (39 recognised), and 151 in Flanders (28 recognised).129
124 Koksal, Mehmet. “Bienvenue Chez Les Chiites... Au Royaume de Belgique”, June 2010,
www.minorites.org/index.php/2-la-revue/789-bienvenue-chez-les-chiites-au-royaume-de-belgique.html, accessed 18 June 2015.
125 www.le360.ma/fr/politique/religion-plus-de-1800-marocains-chiites-en-belgique-53155, accessed 1 March
2016.
126 www.bladi.net/conversion-marocains-chiisme.html, accessed 18 June 2015.
127 Estimates are above 20% of the population in eight out of 19 Brussels Capital Region municipalities,
reaching 40% in Molenbeek and Saint-Josse. See Hertogen, Jan, “Aantal en % moslims per gemeente, provincie en gewest op 01/01/2015”, 18 September 2015, www.npdata.be/Data/Vreemdelingen/NIS/Vreemdelingen-gemeenten/2015/Moslims-2015-Tabel.xls.
128 Hertogen, Jan. “Aantal en % moslims.”
129
www.dhnet.be/regions/bruxelles/bruxelles-a-peine-14-mosquees-reconnues-par-la-region-564500553570ca6ff8d5b94f, www.vlaamsparlement.be/plenaire-vergaderingen/984979/verslag/986041 and www.embnet.be/Mosqu%C3%A9es/R%C3%A9gionBruxellesCapitale/ Mosqu
Muslim Burial Sites130 A majority of Muslims of an immigrant background (especially Moroccans) prefer to be buried in their country of origin and sometimes purchase insurance that covers transportation costs. Places of burial in Belgium are segments within local cemeteries and are located in the following places:
Brussels Capital Region:131
- In Forest, Etterbeek, and Anderlecht, plus interfaith sections in Schaerbeek132
cemetery (based on Evere and Zaventem territories), run by an inter-municipal organisation.
Flemish Region:
- Province of West-Flanders: Oostende, Brugge, Roelselare, and Kortrijk
- Province of East-Flanders:
%C3%A9esbruxelloises/tabid/531/Default.aspx ; www.embnet.be/Mosqu%C3%A9es /R
%C3%A9gionWallonne/Mosqu%C3%A9esenWallonie/tabid/530/Default.aspx ; www.embnet.be/ Mosqu %C3%A9es/regioVlaanderen/Moskee%C3%ABninVlaanderen/tabid/152/Default.aspx, all accessed 1 March 2016.
130 Mainly based on Beersmans, Dirk, and Niels Goovaerts (eds.), Islamitisch begraven in Vlaanderen, inspiratie voor lokaal overleg (Brussels: Kruispunt Migratie-Integratie, 2013),
www.kruispuntmi.be/sites/default/files/brochure_islamitisch_begraven_2013.pdf and www.embnet.be/Affairessociales/D%C3%A9c
%C3%A8sEnterrement/Parcellesmusulmanes/tabid/335/Default.aspx, both accessed 1 March 2016.
131 www.embnet.be/SocialeZaken/D%C3%A9c
%C3%A8sEnterrement/Parcellesmusulmanes/ParcellesmusulmanesdanslaR %C3%A9giondeBruxelles/tabid/435/Default.aspx, accessed 1 March 2016.
132 www.pouvoirslocaux.irisnet.be/fr/acteurs/les-intercommunales/intercommunale-dinhumation, accessed 1
Gent/Zwijnaarde, Ronse, and Sint-Niklaas
- Province of Flemish-Brabant:
Leuven, and Tienen
- Province of Antwerp: Antwerp, Turnhout, and Mol
- Province of Limburg: Lommel, Neerpelt, Overpelt, Leopoldsburg, Beringen, Heuden-Zolder, Houthalen-Helchteren, Genk, Maaseik, Maasmechelen, and Sint-Truiden.
Walloon Region:
- Province of Liège: Huy, Fleron, Robermont, and Jupille; another is planned in Cheratte-Bas (Visé)
- Province of Hainaut: Charleroi, Tournai, La Louvière, Farciennes, Mons, Manage, and Boussu
- Province of Namur: Andenne, Namur, and Sambreville
As far as can be ascertained, there are none in the Walloon Brabant and Luxembourg Provinces.
“Chaplaincy” in State Institutions Muslim chaplaincies exist in institutions for young offenders (less than a dozen chaplains), hospitals (rarely on an
employment basis with the institution), and penitentiaries (17 chaplains but less than seven full-time equivalents in 2014; there is a plan to increase their number). Discussions of introducing a Muslim military chaplain have produced no results yet.133
Halal Products Halal food is largely available, in small halal shops and in supermarkets,134 especially in
Muslim-populated areas.
Slaughtering without stunning is now forbidden in temporary slaughter-houses in the Flemish and Walloon Regions; it remains authorised in permanent slaughter-houses and in the Brussels Capital Region.135
Halal meals are available in prisons; some prisons serve no-pork meals only in order to facilitate meal management.136
Places of Islamic Learning and Education Muslim institutions recognised by the authorities (i.e. receiving public funding and issuing recognised diplomas/certificates): - Association ECIB (Enseignement
133 Husson and Mandin, Etude de faisabilité, pp.70-76.
134 www.lameuse.be/1283815/article/2015-05-10/le-halal-un-business-qui-a-la-cote-a-liege, accessed 2 March
2016.
135 www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail_abattage-sans-etourdissement-seulement-a-bruxelles?id=9051502, accessed
2 March 2016.
136 See the answer in Parliament of Minister of Justice Stefaan De Clerck (CD&V) on 23 April 2010, Chambre des Représentants, Questions et réponses écrites, QRVA 52 104, pp.318-319,
Confessionnel Islamique de Belgique) has launched a nursery and primary schools in the Brussels Capital Region: Al Ghazali (Etterbeek), La Plume (Molenbeek), La Vertu (Schaerbeek). A secondary school opened for the 2015-2016 school year. Once recognised, these schools receive the same funding as Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish institutions.
Other Muslim institutions:
These are not recognised by public authorities or the EMB. Despite considering themselves institutions of higher education, their diplomas and certificates are not recognised in Belgium. They do not receive any public funding. All are based in the Brussels Capital Region.
- European Islamic Institute (Institut Islamique Européen), linked to the Centre Islamique et Culturel de Belgique and the
Muslim World League,
www.centreislamique.be/fr/homepage. - Faculté des Sciences Islamiques de Bruxelles (FSIB), www.faculte-islamique.be.
- Alkhayria Belgica runs regular conferences and courses in Islamic sciences, www.alkhayria.org.
Muslim Media and Publications Muslim Television and Radio Broadcasting (Moslim Televisie- en Radio Omproep – MRTO),137 established by the Flemish side of
the EMB, ceased broadcasts on 1 January 2016.
Various private radio stations operate, most notably in Brussels, such as Arabel FM.138
Another enterprise is Gold FM (launched in 2005), a commercial and community-based Turkish radio station.139
In the printed press, Aya Lifestyle, a Dutch-language quarterly lifestyle magazine for Muslim women, was launched in September 2014.140
Main Muslim Organisations
- Executive of Muslims in Belgium (Exécutif des Musulmans de Belgique – Executieve van de Moslims van Belgïe, EMB, Rue de Laeken 166-168, 1000 Brussels, tel.: ++32 22100230, www.embnet.be, Facebook page:
www.facebook.com/Ex%C3%A9cutif-137 No known website as the one mentioned in last year’s edition does not exist anymore. Their Facebook page
(www.facebook.com/MTRO-249410631764816, accessed 1 March 2016), is closed but still accessible.
138 www.arabel.fom, accessed 1 March 2016. 139 www.goldfeMbe/v2, accessed 1 March 2016.
des-Musulmans-de-BelgiqueExecutief-van-de-Moslims-van-Belgi%C3%AB-476351699186357/). As the representative body to the Belgian authorities, it is recognised and financed by the Federal government. In 2014, its members were elected in a general assembly chosen among mosques’ representatives.141
- Council of Theologians (Conseil des Théologiens, same address as EMB). In connection with the EMB, the Council of Theologians provides answers to questions submitted by the EMB, local mosques, or other national or international religious organisations, and reflects on religious and theological questions relevant to Muslims in Belgium. Any imam hired by a recognised mosque is submitted to the Council for approval. The Council determines the start date of Ramadan and intervenes in public debates.142
- Coordination Council of Islamic Institutions (Conseil de coordination des institutions islamiques). Up to now a more discreet body, it was also set up in the context of the 2014 designation of the EMB; its role is to intervene in public debates on behalf of Muslim communities whereas the EMB role is limited to “church”-state relations. - Diyanet (Belçika Diyanet Vakfi – Diyanet de Belgique – Diyanet van Belgïe,
Chaussée de Haecht 67, 1210 Brussels, tel.: ++32 22185755, www.diyanet.be (in Turkish)). Coordinates all mosques linked to the Turkish government.
- Union of Muslims in Belgium (Rassemblement des Musulmans de Belgique, RMB, Boulevard Baudouin 18, 1000 Brussels, Facebook page:
www.facebook.com/pages/Rassemblement-des-Musulmans-de-Belgique/541296152619233?fref=ts). Characterised by its links to Morocco and its commitment to dialogue with other religions.
141 Husson, “Belgium.”
- Islamic and Cultural Centre of Belgium (Centre Islamique et Culturel de Belgique,
CICB, Parc du Cinquantenaire 14, 1000 Brussels,
www.centreislamique.be/en/homepage, Facebook page:
www.facebook.com/pages/Centre-Islamique-et-Culturel-de-Belgique-Bruxelles/236285763107429?fref=ts). A centre of the Saudi-based Muslim World League,143 it was the first contact organisation for Belgian authorities prior to the
formation of the EMB.
- Islamic Federation of Belgium (Fédération Islamique de Belgique - Belçika Islam Federasyonu, FIB-BIF, Rue Kessels 28-30, Brussels, tel.: ++32 22198079,
www.fibif.be (in Turkish only), Facebook page:
www.facebook.com/belcika.islam.federasyonu). Coordinates Turkish Milli Görüş mosques.
- Union of Islamic Cultural Centres in Belgium (Union des Centres Culturels Islamiques de Belgique, UCCIB, Rue Charles Demeer 1-3, 1020 Brussels, www.selimiye.be). Coordinates Turkish Sülyemancı mosques.
- There are various local/provincial/regional mosques federations such as Union des Mosquées de Liège, Union des Mosquées de Bruxelles, Union des Mosquées du Hainaut, Union des Mosquées de Charleroi, Unie van Moskeeën en Islamitische Verenigingen in de Provincie Antwerpen (UMIVPA), etc.
- European Council of Moroccan Oulemas (Conseil européen des Oulémas marocains, CEOM, Avenue Louise 275, 1000 Brussels, tel.: ++32 26444493, www.ceomeurope.eu (in Arabic only)). The Council considers itself a source for intellectual and religious references for Moroccans living in Europe and a contributor to dialogue among cultures and religions in European societies.
