MEASURE H THE ETERNITY OF GOD AED H CREATED DURATIONS
Thesis
presented to the Faculty of Philosophy of the Laval University
in
partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements
for
The Doctorate of Philosophy
by
Sister Mary Jocelyn Garey, O.P., Ph.L. Rosary College, River Forest, 111.
The external sensibles are rightly divided into proper, common and per accidens.
The ultimate end of man is felicity.
We may proceed to a knowledge of truth in two ways, by means of resolution and by means of composition.
Foreword.
PART I
TRANSLATION OF JOHN OF ST. THOMAS’ COMMENTARY ON ST. THOMAS' TREATISE
DE DEI AETERNITATE
Explanation of the littera of St. Thomas ... 5
Disputation IX Art. 1, Whether Eternity includes the Notion of Duration and of Measure with Respect to God ... ... 7
Art. 2, Whether Eternity is the Measure of created Things ... 40
Art.3, Whether Things are physically contained and measured by Eternity even before they are in themselves ... . • 61
Disputation X Art. 1, What is the measure of the beatific Vision... . 113
Art. 2, What the Aevum is and in what subject it is found... 134
Art. 3, Discrete time ... 165
Authors and Works to which Reference is made... . 172
PART II REFLECTIONS ON ETERNITY, EVITERNITY AND TIME The Problem of Measure in the Eternity of God... ... 176
Eternity measures created Durations ... 188
The Subject of the Aevum... ... 203
Deus movet Creaturam spiritualem per Tempus ... 208
It has "been said that if the problem of time could be solved there would result a great release of the human spirit. In fact, many of the problems which torment the mind of man are more or less involved with time, to cite but one example : the problem of man’s free will and God’s knowledge of future contingent events. It was Boethius who suggested that the study of eternity, not time, would
shed a ray of light on this knotty problem.
While it is true that time is better known to us than eternity, yet the most fundamental problems to which time gives rise can be solved only by a study of eternity. Time is better known only because it is the duration in which and to which we are present, not only as to our being but as to our ovm knowledge of it. This however does not mean that time is in itself something quite clear. An object is intelligible only insofar as it is in act. Upon investigation however time proves to be more potential than actual. The past is no longer, the future is not yet, and the only actuality, the present, is not time because it has no succession of before and after which is of the very essence of time. Thus time, which is very close to pure potentiality, can shed but little light upon our many problems, which viewed in the light of eternity may seem less contradictory and im possible.
study of eternity for which we used John of St. Thomas1 commentary on St. Thomas’ treatise on eternity. To make this beautiful and profound commentary better known by making it available to a greater number of readers we have translated it into English. We here present the translation and some considerations or reflections to which the commentary gave rise.
ST. THOMAS' TREATISE DE DEI AETERNITATE
ON THE ETERNITY OF GOD
EXPLANATION OF THE LITTERA OF ST. THOMAS
Upon the immutability of God which St. Thomas treated in the preceding question follows eternity, which implies immutable duration. In the present question St. Thomas considers two things in regard to eternity. First he considers eternity secundum se.
Second he considers it in comparison with created durations. He treats of eternity secundum se in the first three articles while in the other three articles he compares eternity and created durations.
In article 1 St. Thomas explains the definition of eternity; in the next article he shows that it belongs to God alone to be eternal and in article 3 he shows that eternity truly and prop erly so-called is in God alone. He explains the definition of eternity from two characteristics: the interminability of duration, lacking beginning and end, and immutability, by reason of which it lacks suc
cession. Thus eternity is defined as the simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life. Later we shall explain this definition more fully.
From the same principle he concludes that God is eternal because He is immutable, so that just as the formality of time follows upon movement, or mutability, so eternity follows upon immutability. Similarly he concludes (art. 3) that it belongs to God to be eternal
because He alone is immutable. According however as some beings receive immutability from Him, they share in His eternity. It is of these matters that we shall treat in the following disputation.
As to the second consideration, St. Thomas first
compares eternity with time, then with the aevum which is the measure of created, permanent (or non-successive) duration. Subsequently he considers the aevum in itself and then whether it is one or many.
St. Thomas shows that the difference between eternity and time must be taken primo and per se from the fact that time follows upon movement and succession, whereas eternity lacks succession and is s imult ane ous ly-who le. He considers (art, 5) that the difference be be tween eternity and the aevum is that the latter measures those things which in their being undergo no change, although there is change in their operations or accidents. Time, on the other hand, measures those things which are mutable according to their being and not only according to their operation. Eternity measures that which does not allow change either in being or operation or in anything whatsoever. Finally (art. 6) he shows that there is only one aevum just as there is only one time; for just as the most simple and most regular movement founds one formality of time measuring other movements, so the first eviternal substance has one aevum which is more simple and more perfect and which measures the other eviternal substances.
OF MEASURE WITH RESPECT TO GOD.
1. As we noted in the explanation of the first article of St. Thomas’ littera* eternity includes two things : one pertaining as it were to its extension, namely that it lacks all limit of duration, which is to have infinity in its duration; the other, belonging to the mode of its duration, namely that it lacks all succession and mutability. Therefore eternity is defined as the simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life (Boethius, de Consolatione, V). Now interminable life explains the duration lacking all limit of beginning and end. Life is used rather than duration to explain by the word life divine being as well as operation, for both are of the same duration and equally incompatible with succession and mutability. Simultaneous ly- whole and perfect possession are said in order to exclude all notion of
succession and mutability in measuring, for succession and movement do not possess perfectly nor simultaneously, but they pass away. Consequent ly something is present and something is absent and thus it cannot possess the whole. Possession, therefore, in measure is opposed to succession or change, not only materially in the very entity of the thing which is measure, but even formally in the nature of measure, so that it does not measure by succession and replication on that which is measured; but it
measures in a mode which is supremely one and immutable, not by passing away, but by possessing.
2. From these considerations arise the different accept ations of eternity,for sometimes in the Scriptures something is called eternal in regarding only the length and extension of duration, other times by regarding its nature of uniformity and immutability. In the first acceptation some things are called eternal either because of their very long duration, as the mountains are called eternal (Ps. 75: 5) : Thou enlightenest wonderfully from the everlasting hills; and (Gen. 49: 26): Until the desire of the everlasting hills should come; or on account of a duration absolutely without end, as the pains of hell are called eternal (Isa. 35: 14) : Which of you shall dwell with everlasting burn ings ? and (Matt. 25 : 46) : And these shall go into everlasting punish ment. In the second way the eternity of God is shown through supreme
immutability, as (Ps. 101 : 28) : But thou art always the selfsame, and thy years shall not fail; or also through a mode of possession and of dwelling, as (Isa. 57: 15) : For thus saith the High and the 'Einrinant that inhabiteth eternity; where eternity is designated by a mode of possession and rest, that it be understood as apart from all movement and succession.
3. In speaking therefore of eternity in this second meaning, as it arises from complete immutability, there are two points of controversy among theologians in explaining its intrinsic quiddity.
First, whether eternity is really and entitatively divine duration or something besides duration. Second, in what way the nature of measure consists in relation; but eternity cannot bespeak a real relation since it is not distinct from divine nature or duration. If, however, measure is a relation of reason it cannot belong to the constitution of eternity which is something real. Thus it will not have the nature of measure.
4. As to the first problem, some hold that all duration necessarily includes some succession, because it includes the continuity through which duration is maintained. Aureolus holds this opinion (1 Sent., d. 9, p. 2, a. 2, in the arguments which he gives in the fourth place). "Whence he concludes that eternity is not duration, but the divine nature in so far as it has the power of coexisting with infinite, imaginable time, just as immensity is a certain power by which it can attain all imaginable space. However, Banes (Q. X, a. 2) for another quite different reason, held that eternity is not formally duration, because duration formally implies uniformity of measure. The duration of God, however, is that which is measured by eternity. Hence (a. 1, dub. 2) he explains the nature of eternity, which is the uniformity of immutable nature, which although it really is the measure of divine duration, has this, completively however from the intellect. Thus St. Thomas (Q. X, a. 1) says that the apprehension of uniformity is the very nature of eternity, for between God as measured and eternity as measuring there is no real relation, but one of reason only.
5. Concerning the second point there are three main opinions. The first holds that neither essentially nor completively does eternity imply anything of reason, but that it is the uniformity of immutable nature inasmuch as it has the nature of measure. So Cajetan (1, q. 10, a. 1) held. However, he did not say that eternity implies the nature of real measure in reference to God, but he said that eternity consists in the nature of uniformity in that uniformity has the nature of measure. It is indeed true that Cajetan, interpreting St. Thomas, "the nature of eternity consists in the apprehension of uniform ity", says that it must not be understood that it consists in apprehend ing or knowing, so that eternity would have its completion from the soul, as does time; but he immediately explains that the unity of uniformity is actually given without the act of the soul, and thus he says that uniformity does not depend on the act of reason but is something real. He did not however say that the very nature or relation of measure is real.
6. The second opinion holds absolutely that eternity adds something of reason over and above the real nature of duration, by way of a certain respect of reason. Some hold that this relation of
reason belongs to eternity only indirectly and by way of a complement, because in this way the relation of measure belongs to it. Others hold that this respect of reason is included even directly, for it is of the essence of eternity to be measure.
7. Finally the third opinion holds that eternity adds to the reality of duration not a respect of reason but a negation. Those who hold this opinion are divided, however, for some hold that eternity
adds to duration the negation of succession of cessation and of depen dence on another, which is explained by the words interminable, simul- taneously-whole and perfect. And therefore such duration can coexist with all created durations, not, however, that it extends itself positive
ly to these durations, as do the will and the intellect. Thus Scotus (Quodlib. 6) held. Secondly, Suarez (Meta., d. 50, sect. 4, n. 12,13) says that nothing of reason is included in the formal nature of eternity in so far as it depends on the apprehension of our intellect. He adds, however, that in reality eternity, just like simplicity and infinity, includes a negation, but not only a negation of cessation or of success ion (this is true even of the duration of the angels) but a negation of a dependence on another, by which that duration is rendered necessary. He says that St. Thomas taucht this (1 Sent., d. 19, q. 2, a. l).
8. Finally Vasquez (i, q. X, d. 31, c. 5) says that eternity is constituted essentially by something real, namely duration, and by something of reason, not relative but negative, namely by the negation of measure with respect to God Himself. When eternity is said to have a measure, this measure is not to be understood as a measure in the mode of quantity but as measure in the mode of perfection by which it is the measure of created durations. And the reason for this is that
God cannot in Himself be measured by His duration, since by reason of His duration He is measurable rather than measuring. Nor, as far as we are concerned, can we measure Him by eternity, since it is of the nature of measure that it be more known than the measured and make it known. However, by eternity as by a measure, we cannot make known the mensurability of God. Molina follows this same opinion about negation of measure (Q. X, a. 1, d. 3, cone. 2, 3). However, he holds that eternity does not include in its formal nature any being of reason by which it would be constituted or completed, although it cannot be under
stood or explained by us except through some negation of succession, or relation of measure.
9. NEVERTHELESS, I SAY H THE FIRST PLACE THAT ETERNITY REALLY AND POSITIVELY IMPLIES DURATION AND NOT UNIFORMITY ALONE ABSTRACT ED FROM DURATION. Our first proof is from authority, for in Scripture eternity is explained by way of years and days, which could not hold without the concept of duration, as (Job 10: 5) : Are thy days as the
days of man, and are thy years as the times of men ? And (Ps. 101:25): Thy years are unto generation and generation; and (Mic. 5: 2) His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity. Whence Dionysius
(De divi. nom., X) says, "God is praised as the ancient of days because He is both aevum and time of all things, and before the days and before aevum and time." In explaining this St. Thomas says (De divi, nom., X, leet. 2), "God is said to be the ancient of days because He has in an
eminent way (praehabet) the duration of all days, and of aevum and of time.11 It is evident that He has this only because of His eternity; therefore eternity is duration. And St. Augustine explains eternity by duration when he says (Confess., XI, c. 14, n. 17) "But should the present be always present, and should it not pass into time past, time truly it could not be, but eternity.” How to be present signifies duration. Finally, St. Thomas (l, q. X, a. 2) explains from this that "God is His eternity, whereas no other thing is its cmn duration." And (I Sent., d. 19, q, 2, a. 1) he says we should note that, "the three aforesaid words, eternity, time and aevum, signify a certain duration. ”
10. The reason for the conclusion : eternity is to God what time is to temporal things, for the common notion of everyone is that eternity is contraposed to time, and that by the name eternity is designated that which is us is designated by time. But time is
intrinsically and essentially duration; therefore, eternity is also. The proof of the minor : we measure the durations of temporal things by time, for we say that something endures for an hour, or a month et
cetera. Therefore that by which such things are measured must be duration too, for nothing is measured by a proper and adequate measure except insofar as it is measured by something of the same genus. Whence different measures are distinguished according to different genera, and the most perfect or the most indivisible in one genus is the measure of others, because the more indivisible a thing is, the more certain it is;
if it is less certain something must be added to it or taken away. Thus what is more simple in a given genus serves for measure because it belongs
to measure to certify as to the thing measured.
11. And it cannot be said that duration belongs to time or eternity only materially but not formally and essentially, and that this very uniformity and regularity in movement constitute the measure of time, although that which is material in it is the duration itself of movement. On the contrary : St. Thomas says (I Sent., d. 19, q. 2, a, 1),
"Since to each thing corresponds a proper measure, it is necessary that the essential difference of the measure itself be received according to the condition of the act of the measured." Therefore, from the condition of the very thing measured is taken not only the material nature but the essential difference of measure. Therefore, since the thing measured is the thing itself as subjected to duration, it is necessary that the essential nature of such a measure have to do with duration. The reason for this is that uniformity or regularity alone, taken in the abstract, is commun to all measure, whether in quantity of movement and of duration, or in quantity of weight, or of number, etc. Therefore it is necessary that the nature of such a measure be determined essentially and intrin sically in that it is a uniformity of such and such quantity or genusj for we cannot measure by a measure of weight, by pounds, for example, that which is of duration, for example, days or years, or vice versa. Therefore it belongs to the essential nature of measure not only to have uniformity but also the uniformity of such or such a condition or genus,
by reason of which it would be an apt and fit measure for measuring such measured things. Therefore, since eternity is placed in God to designate uniformity and regularity in no other genus than that of duration, it is necessary that duration be included in its essential concept, so that it is understood that it is apt and fit for measuring duration rather than the virtual quantity of immensity, of wisdom, or of omnipotence, etc.
12. Lest you pursue the objection taken from Aureolus (1 Sent., d. 9, p. 2, a. 2), namely, that this does not prove that duration is formally in God, but virtually (just as in God there is virtual quantity) because duration designates a continuity or quantity, we reply that on the contrary duration, in virtue of its proper and precise formal notion, does not formally imply succession and quantity. Rather, formal succession diminishes the perfection of duration. A thing is said to endure as long as it remains in being; when it loses being it loses duration. Therefore the less being it loses the more perfectly it endures. Succession, however, implies a certain loss of being in so far as something does not persist in the same manner, and
it is not in act but passes from potency to act. Therefore, succession does not belong to the concept of duration, but rather diminishes the notion of duration and makes it less perfect.
13. IN THE SECOND PLACE I SAY THAT ETERNITY IS NOT FORMALLY CONSTITUTED BY A NEGATION OF MEASURE EVEN THOUGH IT INCLUDES THE NEGATION OF LIMITED MEASURE. This conclusion is contrary to
Vasques, quoted above, and in it is seen the equivocation under which this author labored; it is one thing to deny both intrinsic and extrinsic measure in G-od; it is another thing to deny limited measure or a depend ence on extrinsic measure. The latter cannot belong to God because since He is infinite and most perfect He can be neither measured nor equaled by any limited measure, nor can He be subjected to an extrinsic measure because there is nothing outside God more simple or more uniform than He.
14. Hence to understand this conclusion we must dis tinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic measure. Extrinsic measure is that which measures something outside itself, and hence it is said to measure by an application to or a containing of that which is measured, as the duration and movement of the heaven measures inferior movements as their extrinsic measure, and as the inch measures length, and the pound, weight. Hence such measure terminates the real relation of its measured
thing. Intrinsic measure is that which is in the measured thing, and thus it does not measure by application but by information. Hence it has the perfection of measure although it does not have the real relation and imperfection of dependence by which the measured thing depends on measure; just as time, which, although it is extrinsic measure in regard to us, nevertheless measures intrinsically the movement of the heaven, for it has no other superior time by which it is measured and in every genus the most perfect is the measure of itself and of others, intrinsic measure of itself, but extrinsic measure of others.
15. In the second place it must he noted that although measure of itself is ordered to making known the formal or virtual quantity of the measured, nevertheless it is not of the nature of measure that it make known to us the quantity of the measured in an
imperfect way, or according to the way by which our knowledge proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect; but it is necessary that from the very nature of measuring it make known to us the measured in a perfect way or by proceeding from the more perfect, or less known to us to the less perfect. Hence in order for eternity to be in the mode of measure it is enough that it explain in its concept the uniformity and regularity of divine duration which the other attributes do not explain. Thus it is said to make known by means of measure the quantity of divine duration, not as something more known to us as an effect leading us to the know ledge of God according to an imperfect mode of knowing, but as something explaining and distinguishing in its concept the formality of uniformity and of simplicity in that genus of duration. For it is in this manner that measure makes known, namely by way of what is more perfect, and more simple, because the most perfect in every genus is the measure of the other things in that genus. Hence measure must make known by way of perfection and not by way of generation (or a passing from the imperfect to the perfect.).
16. From these considerations we prove the conclusion we have stated, for the nature of measure (all imperfections removed) is not unbefitting to God. How eternity has the conditions of measure
in regard to that which is perfect in measure; therefore measure must not be denied to it but only the limitation and imperfection a measure may have. The major is obvious because measure denotes perfection since we always take as the measure that which is the most perfect in every genus. And it is not necessary that it make known the thing measured as implying imperfect knowledge but by way of something more simple and more perfect by which the thing measured is reduced to greater unity and uniformity. Therefore in this respect the nature of measure is not unbefitting to God. Nor is it unbefitting in that it would suppose the thing measured to be imperfect, as depending on, and reducible to, the uniformity of the measure which consequently would seem to suppose that the measured has some imperfection and less
uniformity in regard to its measure. For contrary to this is that such an imperfection is not of the nature of measure or of the measured except when it is extrinsic measure and distinct from the measured. But in this way we do not attribute measure to eternity with respect to the duration of divine being, but it is by way of measure which is intrinsic and not distinct from its measured, but rather it establishes it as having the nature of what is measured, yet having in itself the uniformity of the measure. We shall determine immediately here below in what manner the notion of measure and the notion of the measured are distinguished according to our own concepts.
uniformity of the simplest duration, such as the divine, and thus it corresponds to time in mutable and temporal things. For just as time has the conditions and the nature of measure, so too eternity (which implies uniformity and regularity of duration much more than time does) will have the conditions of measure, but with all imperfections removed. A confirmation of this argument is that although in God the act of under
standing and the primary object are not distinct, nevertheless we find in God both the nature of the object and the nature of the act. Never theless, the object has the nature of measure in regard to the act since it is the object by way of what specifies the act although found in God removed from all imperfections. Hence, in like manner, the nature of measure will not be unbefitting to eternity provided its imperfections be removed. And thus it has the perfection of measure rather than its relation or its denomination which supposes that the measure is distinct from the thing measured and more perfect than it.
18. IN THE THIRD PLACE I SAY THAT ETERNITY REALLY AND POSITIVELY INCLUDES THE PERFECTION OF MEASURE ACCORDING TO THE UNIFORM ITY OF DURATION; AND THIS PERFECTION OF MEASURE DOES NOT REQUIRE
FORMALLY, AS TO ITS CONSTITUTION OR COMPLEMENT, ANYTHING OF REASON, EVEN THOUGH IT MIGHT SUPPOSE SOMETHING OF REASON OR SOMETHING
MIGHT FOLLOW IT.
In this conclusion we follow Cajetan against àllveste$ Ferrara (Contra Gentes I, c. 15) who believed that eternity, like time,
is completed through the operation of the intellect in the nature of measure. It is also against Scotus and Suarez, cited above, whose opinion is rejected as too feeble because it explains the nature of eternity only by the negations of dependence, of succession, etc.
18b. In the explanation of this conclusion, however, note that what is necessary for the perfection of measure is one thing, what is necessary in its relation to the measured, or of the measured
to it is another. In fact, that the measured and the measure might have a real relation a real distinction between them is necessary. Moreover, the measured must be more imperfect than its measure and be reducible to its uniformity. None of this is found in God. Therefore we do not say that there is really the relation of measure in Him but the perfection of measure. Moreover, in the very perfection of measure we must note that there are some measures which in their constitution and perfection require something of reason as a condition and complement, as for example, time; and because it measures according to a before and after and this before and after are not simultaneous in the thing (since it is successive), it is necessary in order for it to adequate the
measured that the before and after be taken as one. This cannot be done except by reason because in the thing several.parts of time cannot be taken as one and simultaneous, which is nevertheless required in order that it measure a determined and given movement. And similarly an ell cannot measure any large quantity except by enumeration and replication which take place successively and not simultaneously. And so to equalize
the measured whole some unification and enumeration must be done by the intellect. And in the same way Silvester of Ferrara believed that the nature of measure in eternity is completed by something of reason,
as in time. On the contrary we say that eternity is simultaneously- whole without anything of reason and has all the perfection and cons titution of measure. Nevertheless, with respect to God, it is not extrinsic, but intrinsic measure. And hence it cannot measure its measured by application or replication but by identity or information.
19. Therefore, we prove the conclusion we have stated, first from St. Thomas, who (I, q. 10, art. 4j and 1 Sent., d. 19, q. 2, a. 1) says, "The essential diversity between eternity and created durations is not understood according to a negation of beginning and end because even if time never began and never ended, still time would I/ not be eternity, and even if the angels had alqays been, still the aevum
would differ from eternity.11 But he adds, "Just as the before and after of time according as they are understood as numbered, complete the nature of time, so the permanence of act as it is understood according to the formality of the one that has the nature of measure completes the notion of aevum and of eternity. "
Therefore, according to St. Thomas, the essential and proper difference between eternity and time is that time measures according to a mode of enumeration, that is, according to a before end after as numbered, which enumeration is done by the intellect. But eternity measures, not by enumeration which is done by the intellect,
has the nature of measure, not as it has the nature of negations. Thus he excludes the opinion both of Ferrara and of Suarez, - that of Ferrara in so far as St. Thomas says that eternity is permanence by way of unity, but time by way of enumeration. Hence eternity need not be completed through something of reason as does time, since this permanence by way of unity does not depend on the intellect in order that it be one and simultaneously-whole, as parts of time depend on the intellect in order that they be numbered and taken under a certain formality of simul taneous unity. The opinion of Suarez, however, is thereby excluded because that permanence by way of unity does not have the nature of
eternity merely from those negations, unless the perfection of measure is added by way of the most simple and most uniform duration.
20. And now the conclusion may be proved by its proper reason because the complete nature of the perfection of measure is found in the divine eternity before any work of the intellect, although not a real relation of the measured to the measure since this implies dependence of the measured on the measure, and of subjection to the measure as to what is more perfect and more uniform. Therefore : -
(See N. 18). The antecedent is proved in that the perfection of measure consists in uniformity and simplicity by which something is of itself capable of making known a certain quantity, for this is essential to the
nature of measure on the part of its perfection, because the most perfect in every genus is the measure of all others in that genus. Likewise a certain condition required for measuring is that measure adequate its measured and be simultaneous with it. This is not achieved in time (and in other measures which measure by numbering) except with the intervention of reason, because the parts of measure
cannot be joined and numbered except by an act of the intellect.
In eternity, however, this is not required because it does not measure by enumeration and by succession, but by possession and by permanent indivisibility by which it is wholly simultaneous. Therefore the whole perfection of measure is found really in eternity, but the limitation and imperfection of the measured (which are due to
its dependence on, and distinction from, the measure) are not found. Rather the great perfection of this measure shines forth in this that the measured is not only adequated to the measure but is even identical with it.
21. You might object that by this explanation the nature of measure is destroyed, first, because it is not distinguished from the measured, and thus the whole which is here will have the perfection of uniformity but not the force and the nature of measure; for just as there cannot be father except as relative to son, so, if father is iden tified with son the nature of father is destroyed. Thus if in measure the nature of the measured is destroyed, then the very nature of measure which is intrinsically relative is destroyed. Second, because although
there is in God the perfection of uniformity, nevertheless there is not quantity reducible to measure and rendered knowable by it. Hence we will find measure only in the mode of perfection and not in the mode
of quantity.
Finally, to be the measured intrinsically implies im perfection since the measured as such must be something inferior and less than the measure. Otherwise, if it is equal to the measure, there will be no more reason that it be the measured than the measure,
22. To the first we reply that when measure is most perfect and intrinsic it so has the perfection of measure that it is identified with the measured, rendering it perfect not by an application to it, by means of which the measure (as something more perfect) might make known the measured, but by an identification with it, or information
of it, by which it renders it perfectly joined to itself and consequent ly perfectly measured. Hence -the operation of the intellect is required not for the constitution or complement of eternity but only for exercising its relation to the measured, which does not pertain to the nature and intrinsic complement of measure but only to its exercise, as to the relation which it founds. Thus formally, measure is not relation but the foundation of relation, for some relations are founded in measure
(as is said in V Meta.) just as others are founded in action and passion. And just as act is not constituted formally nor completively by relation, so neither is measure although it is the basis for it.
But the difference is that in regard to the very nature of action, even antecedently to relation, there is a distinction from its produced term so that the same thing cannot act and produce itself. Therefore, if father be identified with son it takes away the nature of father not only as to the relation but even as to the action which is its foundation. But measure, in fact, antecedently to the relation does not imply any emissive and productive action of the measured, but only implies two things; first, that it be the most perfect and most uniform in its genus; second, that it can be applied and joined, or identified, to the measured, equalling it. Thence follows the relation founded on the part of the thing measured to the measure when it is inferior and dependent on the measured.
And the first, namely, to be the most perfect and uniform is absolutely required for every measure. The second, however, namely the application and joining of the measure to the thing measured is not found in the same way in all measures. For some measure by enumeration and succession, others by the highest unity and permanence; some by extrinsic application, others by intrinsic information. And the more perfect the measure, the more perfectly it will be joined to the measured and the more will it draw it to itself in so far as it is possible. And thus since eternity is the most perfect measure, it is joined to its own measureLso completely that it has identity with it.
There is no difficulty, however, in the fact that there is intrinsic measure in regard to the subject in which measure is. For in creatures, just as time is not only the measure of
inferior movements, but even of the primum mobile in which it is, and the aevum is the measure of the duration of the supreme angel in which it is and of others outside it, so too in God, who, therefore, is said to be impeccable because He is the rule of His operations. Creatures, however, can sin and fail because they are not the rule. Therefore, the operation of the intellect is required only for exercising the relation of measure to the measured, which follows on measure as on a foundation. It is not required, however, for fundamentally constituting or completing the nature and perfection of measure, although this is required in time because it is constituted by a before and after in succession.
23. To the second objection we reply that in God there is not formal, but virtual quantity. For in God there is the permanence of duration, lacking beginning and end, and this is a duration infinite in permanence. Finite, however, and infinite, are a passion of quantity. Now this quantity of duration is measurable by its own uniformity. And although the uniformity of duration is not distinguished from its quantity, nevertheless duration insofar as it explains the precise (l) concept of
quantity, as to the permanence or perseverance of duration without end, explains the nature of the measurable; but as it expresses the uniformity by which this permanence and perseverance endures, it
explains the proper formality of that which measures. And thus it makes known the very nature of duration, as to its quantity and
extension by its uniformity. And each one (i.e., extension which is measurable, and the uniformity, in which consists the proper formality
of the measure), is explained in the definition of Boethius, when he says, the perfect possession of interminable life for interminable means the quantity of duration and thus is measurable ;while perfect possession expresses the greatest uniformity without succession and so it is that which measures. Hence it is evident how the same duration according to different formalities and concepts is that which measures and that which is measured; as it explains the quantity or extension by which it is maintained in duration, it is that which is measured; as it explains the uniformity it is the measure, although in reality the two are identical.
24. To the third objection we reply that the measured is imperfect when it is subjected to, and dependent upon, measure, and when it is distinct from it and subordinate to it. When, however, it
is identified with the measure, then it does not include imperfection but in itself has the perfection of measure. Yet it is not to be conceived as perfectible by the measure. And so it is not repugnant in
God that one formality be considered as perfective of another (1), not because one is perfectible and in potency but because one is the perfection of the other, (just as the will is understood to be regulated by the intellect, and wisdom or providence to direct and regulate om nipotence in its act of execution, and as the intelligible object is the perfection of the intellect, not because these perfect something imperfect or potential in God, but because they explain by their concept a certain perfection which others do not explain,) So likewise duration as it explains quantity or extension of duration is measurable. However as it explains uniformity, it expresses the perfection of measure ident ified with it, and therefore that quantity is not imperfect because it is identified with that perfection and it is not without it, for the uniformity is its perfection.
25. That the nature of eternity is not sufficiently explained by these negations (by which Scotus and Suarez explained,it ^
is evident from the fact that these negations of dependence, of succession, and of cessation can belong to other attributes for it
has the negation of dependence formally, not from the nature of eternity but because it has being of itself. And likewise the negation of
succession belongs to immutability which also lacks mutability and
succession. Therefore, something more must be added to the notion of eternity through which these negations might constitute a distinct attribute of eternity. Hence because no attribute is constituted by mere negations but by something positive, and this is not explained by that opinion, (especially since in the definition of Boethius besides the negation interminability there is also placed the positive notion of uniformity and measure, in the words, simultaneously-whole and perfect possession,) therefore, that which belongs formally to the nature of measure and of positive uniformity in eternity is not explained through those negations alone. 3$or does that opinion explain it.
26. And it cannot be said that uniformity is also found in other attributes, such as uniformity in being, in immutability, in the will, etc., for we do not posit uniformity alone, taken as it were abstractly, for the formal nature of eternity, as Banes seems to have done, but we speak of the uniformity of duration which is explained by the perfect and simultaneously-whole possession. The quantity and the extension of its duration which are explained by the interminability of life (which comprises life in being and in operation) are in the mode of what is measurable, and thus the measure and the measured are distinguished only virtually in eternity. The relation between them
cannot be real but one of reason, because it does not suppose a distinction except one made by reason. Nevertheless this relation, as already said, does not constitute the nature of measure but follows or is founded on it.
And so that which is of reason does not constitute nor complete the nature of measure in eternity, but is consequent on it, just as in other measures the relation is not the measure itself but is founded on it.
SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS :
27. In the first place it is objected that St. Thomas (I, q. X, a. l) says, ”... the nature of eternity consists in the apprehension of the uniformity of what is absolutely beyond movement, just as the nature of time consists in the numbering of before and after in movement." Therefore, according to St. Thomas, something of reason is necessary to eternity! The consequence is evident, for the apprehension of uniformity is not uniformity only as it is in the thing, but as it is apprehended and consequently as it is affected by something achieved by reason. And furthermore, because the nature of time is completed by something of reason, as is gathered from these words of St. Thomas, so eternity is too because he speaks of eternity in the same way that he speaks of time. This is confirmed; for the divine ideas in
their complement depend on reason regarding them, without which their plurality and distinction could not be understood, as St. Thomas teaches below (I, q. 15, a. 2)j therefore, similarly, eternity for its complement exacts the operation of reason, that it have the nature of measure, and be distinguished from its measured.
28. We reply that St. Thomas is talking about real uniformity which, as object, can be apprehended by us, as Cajetan
explains in the present (l, q. 10, a. 1). Thus "in the apprehension" is the same as in the formality of uniformity or in its notion. For when Thomas in this first article explained the mode by which we know
eternity by analogy with time, he aptly said that eternity consists in the apprehension or knowledge of uniformity, that is, it is under stood or is apprehended by us to consist, and it consists in this notion or apprehension of uniformity. Saint Thomas did not mean that
eternity consisted in the apprehension, that is in something of reason, thus speaking absolutely since he, above all, agrees that eternity is a real attribute unable to consist of anything of reason. And to the other instance we reply that from these words of St. Thomas we deduce that eternity and time are disparate notions. For he says that time consists in the enumeration of before and after. How before and after cannot be joined and constitute one measure unless its parts are joined by enumeration; this enumeration is done by the intellect. But eternity is not integrated by a before or after since it consists in the appre hension or notion of uniformity, and since uniformity is entirely whole. Consequently this formality of measure is not constituted nor completed in eternity by anything of reason, as is the integration of time in the ' nature of measure.
29. To the confirmation we reply that ideas, inasmuch as they are multiplied are not attributes, for thus they are exemplars
known rather than that by which He knows. Eternity, however, even as measuring uniformly is a divine attribute, and therefore as to the perfection and constitution of measure it is not completed by anything of reason, as is the plurality of ideas. Whence St. Thomas (de Ver., q. 3, a. 2, ad 2) says, "nothing belongs to the essential attributes as to their principal meaning besides the essence of the Creator, but the idea as to its principal meaning lias something besides the essence in which the notion of idea is formally completed, by reason of which ideas are said to be many. " This doctrine is a strong argument in our favor, for if many ideas are not many attributes in God because they are completed through some respect of reason which is outside the divine essence, so then, if eternity were completed by something of reason it would not formally be an essential attribute.
29^. In the second place it is argued in support of the opinion of Vasquez that for the nature of measure two conditions are required which eternity lacks. Eternity, therefore does, not consist in the notion of measure. The antecedent is proved from St. Thomas (I Sent., d. 19, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4) where he says, "Divine magnitude is in no way measurable or measured either by another or by itself, first, because measurement places a limit and divine magnitude has no limit, within or without. Second, because commensuration is not of one quantity
to itself but of two, and no other magnitude is equal to the divine magnitude." This is how St. Thomas seems to convey the very foundation
for Vasquez1 opinion, namely that eternity is not a measure because all measure implies a termination of finiteness. Likewise nothing is measure with respect to itself but with respect to something other than itself, but between eternity and the divine being measured by it, there is only a distinction of reason; therefore, without the work of the intellect it lacks the nature and constitution of measure in regard to the measured.
30. And this is furthermore confirmed and strengthened because the quantity inhering in a subject cannot be the measure of that in which it inheres, therefore neither can eternity with respect to God. Proof of the antecedent: in the first place because the quantity inhering in a substance, since it belongs to another genus cannot make known substance, and consequently cannot be its measure since measure makes known the measured. Secondly, because measure is either homogen eous or excessive, but quantity is not homogeneous with substance since it is an accident of another genus; much less is it excessive since an accident is inferior to substance. The same argument is advanced about eternity, because it neither makes known to us the divine substance
(because in our way of knowing we do not use eternity in knowing or
measuring God nor in knowing created durations) nor does God use eternity as a means of making His substance known to Homself, but He knows Himself through Himself. Therefore, eternity is not measure.
measure of perfection is one thing, the measure of quantity another. By the former we know the perfection of other things, whereas the measure of quantity is a more uniform quantity by which another quantity is measured, as the Philosopher teaches (Meta.,%,c.2 and3). Eternity, therefore, said Vasquez, although it is the measure of per fection in regard to creatures, nevertheless is not the measure of quantity, because it is not like unity or number by which the intellect measures the quantities of the duration of temporal things. lïocne,
indeed, uses eternity to measure in this way, for eternity is indivi sible and unknown to us for measuring divisible things. To God, more over, all things are known per se and not by means of eternity. And finally God does not fall under any measure since He is the first being. Therefore eternity is not like a measure of Him but is entirely identified with Him.
32. We reply by denying the antecedent, and to the proof taken from St. Thomas we reply that he denies that God or divine magnitude is measurable by an extrinsic measure or by an applied measure, because as we said, that which is measured by anything extrinsic is inferior to it and less uniform and perfect in so far as it is measured. However that which has its measure identified with itself is not more imperfect than the measure and consequently is not repugnant to divine magnitude. Whence (I Sent., d. 19, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4) St. Thomas said, "Nothing
when he denies measure to God he is speaking of measure which is diverse or distinct and consequently extrinsic to the measured. There fore he denied it to God. To the first confirmation we reply that quantity inhering in a substance, if it is the most perfect and most regular in its genus of quantity makes both itself and others known. It does not make substance known in the formality of substance but in as much as it is corporeal and the root of quantity, and capable of being ordained by the dimension in its parts. It is like light and color which make known to the visual power the substance of the stone not absolutely as it is substance in itself, but as visible and the subject of color. And when he says that quantity is a thing of another genus than substance, we reply that although entitatively it belongs to another genus, nevertheless proportionally quantity and substance convene, in so far as substance is in potency to be ordained through quantity. And thus in as much as it is ordainable, it can be made known by the very order of quantity. And thus it is said to be its homogeneous measure in the formality of the corporeal thing, not by reason of its substantial entity but as the root of dimension and as it is quantifiable. As to what is said of divine eternity we say that it has really all the perfection of measure although it does not have relation but it renders God measured in constituting God eternal in as much as it renders Him entirely uniform to His duration; not by the application of any extrinsic measure but by the identification of uni formity with such duration. And in this way it is manifestive of His
divine duration, not indeed denominatively and by application of an extrinsic thing which makes known, but formally and. intrinsically in so far as it explains in its concept the most perfect uniformity of duration which duration itself does not explain according to the notion of quantity and extension by which it endures. But it is true that if we wish to use this measure in distinguishing between the measure and
the measured and by constituting a relation between them, this is done only through our inadequate concepts and according to a distinction of reason. And thus God does not use eternity as manifestive of His duration as an extrinsic measure applicable to Himself, but He uses eternity as formally constituting the uniformity of duration and thus manifesting God Himself as formally eternal. In regard to creatures He uses it as a supreme and excessive measure.
34. To the second confirmation we reply that eternity is not only measure through a mode of exemplar and according to perfection but. through a mode of quantity. Nevertheless it is not a homogeneous measure, but one wholly excessive which measures through a mode of unity and indivisibility, not by replication and multiplication through a succession of mensuration, but in an immutable and indivisible way by coexisting with all things. And eternity does not serve our imperfect cognition for it is not a homogeneous and inferior measure, but one wholly excessive; and therefore it serves a wholly exceeding knowledge
known; not as we have already said as an extrinsic thing that makes known and extrinsically applied, or as providing a light or species for knowing, but as an intrinsic thing which makes known in so far as it formally renders the divine duration uniform, and thus conformly knowable.
And in reply to the argument that infinity cannot be measured we say that it cannot be measured by a finite measure because this does not adequate eternity, and it cannot be measured by a more uniform and more perfect extrinsic measure, because in respect to God nothing can be more perfect. It can be measured however, through
measure which is intrinsic and not less infinite than God Himself, just as it is said that God understands Himself through His infinite know ledge.
35. In the third place it is argued from Suarez (Metaph., d. 50, sect. 4, n. 3): that eternity is not an active or measuring
measure either with respect to creatures or with respect to God. Hot with respect to creatures because it has no proportion to them since
it is infinite and lacks all quantity. Nor with respect to God because what is measured in God cannot be indicated, unless it is the duration
or continuation in being. Eternity, however, is this duration itself. Therefore the measure is not distinguished from the measured, not even by reason. This is confirmed : because through eternity it is not so much through measure that we know how much God endures, but rather
through the form by which He is constituted, enduring, since it is the formal duration itself of God. And in eternity there is not perceived greater regularity than in the divine being. Therefore, it does not have the mode of measure with respect to divine being, unless we take the form for measure, which is contrary to the common way of thinking. But rather, on account of this, divine being is called the measure of eternity because from the perfection of divine being the perfection of eternity is deduced.
36. We reply that eternity is measure with respect to creatures as well as to God. With respect to creatures it is indeed not proportionate but wholy excessive, and thus it is infinite. And although it lacks all formal and successive quantity, nevertheless it does not lack virtual and eminent (quantity) with respect to created duration, with which the following article will deal. With respect to God duration itself according to different concepts has the formality of the measured and of measure, as we have already said; of the measured in so far as it expresses quantity or virtual infinite extension because it endures always; the formality of measure in so far as it explains the highest uniformity and immutability in enduring. And there is nothing repugant in its being its own measure according to different concepts, just as time is a measure by which we measure the movement of the primum mobile as through an intrinsic measure which in informing also measures, because there is no other time by which it is measured;
but with respect to the other inferior movements it is as extrinsic measure, measuring through its application.
37. To the confirmation we reply that when measure is intrinsic the same thing that is measure is also form; otherwise it would not be intrinsic measure, i.e. measuring through information;
since, it is necessary to posit some intrinsic measures, because that which is measure ought to be in some subject and not measured through anything extrinsic, otherwise we should ask what in turn measures that which measures. Thus either there would be a processus ad infinitum
or we come to some measure which with respect to its subject is form and measure, but with respect to others outside itself is measure only. Nevertheless it is not form and measure under the same formality, but
it is form as it constitutes formally; it is measure as it regards a certain virtual or formal quantity, uniformly affected and thus measured. And when it is said that there is not more regularity in eternity than
in the divine being we reply that the regularity is not greater but that eternity and divine being are identical. Formally, however, by eternity is explained the regularity of duration which is not explained by other attributes, or by being itself as such, but rather there is explained the virtual quantity of enduring, which is the measured; through the uniformity of duration, however, the very formality of measure is explained.
Article two
WHETHER ETERNITY IS THE MEASURE OF CREATED THINGS
In the preceding article, because of the absolute identity between God anlHis eternity, there was difficulty in under standing how eternity is the measure of God Himself. Now, in this article, because of the very great distance and distinction between eternity and created things, there arises the difficulty as to how it can be their measure, especially when we see that created things are mutable, and some of them successive and not always existing. But eternity is immutable and ought to measure in an immutable way and by way of possession (which possession is simultaneously-whole), and not by way of succession or of enumeration. The difficulty is not
whether eternity has measure through a mode of perfection and of exemplar, but whether it has measure through a mode of more uniform quantity, the sphere of which extends even-to creatures. For, through the mode of perfection and of exemplar all attributes are measures with respect to the perfections which are received by creatures from participation in these attributes, just as divine wisdom is the measure of all created wisdom and divine justice the measure of all created justice, and so on. And so also, eternity is the principle of the participation of all
created duration. Therefore the question is, are created durations not only by participation from divine duration or eternity but are the quantity of created duration and its permanence or continuation in being
subjected by way of measure to the supremely regular uniformity of divine eternity ?
2. There are three opinions on this matter. First is that of Aureolus (I Sent., d. 9, q. 2, a. 2, after 2nd proposition; d. 36, q. 1, a. 1, prop. 1, 2) who, speaking absolutely, affirms that God does not coexist with any created thing according to duration and con sequently does not measure it. His reason is that eternity is so elevated above all created duration that it cannot coexist with it,
especially with temporal things, because eternity is entirely indivisible while temporal things endure through succession. The second opinion
teaches that eternity has coexistence with created things, not however, with the formality of measure, but only materially, as the duration of the angel (which is indivisible ) coexists with our time but does not measure it. This opinion is attributed to Silvester (in Conflato, q.
14, a. 16). The third opinion admits that eternity coexists with created things and measures them. It does not always measure them however, buib only when they exist, because as a necessary condition that one thing coexist with another and be measured by it, it is required that the thing exist in itself. Therefore, created things when they are in God are measured by eternity, because they are not distinguished from God Himself. If however, they are considered in their own being outside of God, they cannot be measured unless they first exist in themselves. Hor does there follow from this any intrinsic mutability in the men suration of eternity, but only extrinsic, from the fact that the thing
measured changes in itself as God begins anew to be the Creator or Lord of the creature through the change of the creature itself. This position is held by Suarez (Absoluta Scientia, bk. I, c. 7); Vasques
(I, disp. 64, c. 3); Valentia (ibid., q. 14, point 5); Gillius (de
Aeternitate Dei, bk. 2, tract 10); and by many others; among the ancients, Scotus (I, Sent., d. 39); Durandus (I, Sent., d. 38, q. 3); Gabriel
I Sent., d. 38, q. un.; Gregorius (q. 2, a. 2) : This opinion agrees with that of St. Thomas and the Thomists in that it admits absolutely that eternity is the measure of created duration, although it differs from them as to the mode of measuring. The following article treats of this.
3. We must say therefore, that eternity truly and properly is the measure of created durations, nevertheless, it is a measure which is not proportionate but excessive. This excessiveness
is found in two things : first, as to extension, because it includes without beginning and end all durations, and it is not limited to any
one genus of these durations; second, as to the mode of measuring, because it measures in an immutable mode, not by enumeration but by a supreme unity and indivisibility. Following St. Thomas (I, q. 14, a. 13) his disciples commonly held this position : Cajetan (ibi); Barez; Navarrets
(controv. 52); Zumel (disp, l); Hazarius (controv. 102); Gonzalez (disp. 43, sect. 3, cone. 4); Silvester of Ferrara (I Contra Gentes, c. 66); Capreolus (i Sent., d. 36, q, unica, a. 2); Cath&rinus (de Praescientia et Providentia Dei, c. 14); Molina (i, q. 14, a. 13, d. 13); and
especially Abulensis (Testatus)(on Josue, from q. 20 to q. 54, but principally the first three and the last three questions).
4. How that this is truly the mond of St. Thomas can be clearly gathered from several passages in his works. For especially in the Contra Gentes, I, c. 66, n. 6, he says, "... the proportion of eternity to the whole duration of time is as the proportion of the indivisible to the continuous, not indeed of the indivisible that is the term of the continuous, and is not present to each part of the continuous, for such is likened to an instant of time - but of the indivisible that is outside the continuous, and yet synchronizes with each part of the continuous, or with each designated point of the continuous; because, since time does not exceed movement, eternity, being utterly outside movement, is altogether outside time. Again, since the being of the eternal never fails, eternity synchronizes with every time, or instant of time." Whence he concludes : "...accordingly whatever exists in any part of time is coexistent with the eternal as
though present to it, although in relation to another part of time it is present or future." Likewise, he says: (Quodlib., 5, a. 7) "Because that which is predicated essentially is always the measure of that which is predicated by participation, it can be said that the first measure of all eviternities is God’s own eternity." Therefore, St. Thomas joins in the eternity of God both the formality of first or supreme measure and the formality of coexistence with all measured things. So it has whatever is required that it may contain them through the mode of measurement
5. Next it is evident from St. Thomas that he proves that God sees intuitively all things which are done in time or- in other created durations because they are present in eternity; but a presence physically and really measured by eternity is necessary for this; there fore, eternity, according to St. Thomas, is a true and proper measure.
The minor is proved immediately from the very nature of intuitive vision, which regards the thing seen as really and physically present in itself. Therefore, if St. Thomas proves that things are seen intuitively by God, not because they are present in their proper measure, but because they are present in eternity, and the presence which is required in the thing intuitively seen is real and physical presence and contained under some measure of duration, then, in the opinion of St. Thomas, it cannot be accepted that eternity is not the measure of created things in the way in which it is required for the presence of the thing seen by intuition.
The major, in fact, follows clearly in St. Thomas as can be seen in the de Ver., q. 2, a. 12, and q. 12, a. 6, where he says,
"From this it belongs to God to know with certitude the future as present because His intuition is measured by eternity, which is siraultaneously- whole: whence all times and the things which are done in them lie under His sight." In other passages which we shall consider in the following article, we shall show that St. Thomas cannot be understood as saying that things are present in eternity only objectively and cognitively, but physically and really, granted that in eternity itself He reaches
