Antitrust damages in EU law and policy

FOrEWOrD . . . 11

By Vice-President Joaquín almunia IntrODuctIOn . . . 15

By eric morgande riVery and Jacques derenne KEynOtE SpEEch . . . 19

By Vice-President Joaquín almunia

I

State of play of antItruSt damageS In the eu

and overvIew of the propoSed reform

By Barry rodger Section (I): The research methodology project . . . . 31

Section (II): Competition case-law across the EU . . . . 33

Section (III): Remedies in competition litigation . . . . 40

1 . May 2004 accession States and States with limited private Enforcement Experience . . . 42

2 . States with Developing private Enforcement Experience . . . 43

3 . States with considerable private Enforcement Experience . . . 45

Section (IV): Remedies and other data . . . . 52

Section (V): Success in competition case-law . . . . 55

part II: natIOnal cOurtS’ pErSpEctIVE – bInDInG EFFEct OF nca DEcISIOnS . . . . 61

By Jacqueline riffaut silk Section (I): Introduction . . . . 61

2 . the obligation of sincere cooperation between, on the one hand, national courts, and on the other, the commission and the

Eu courts . . . 62

3 . Effectiveness and efficiency . . . 63

Section (II): The need for convergence . . . . 64

1 . the scope of the proposal . . . 64

2 . the diversity of national rules applicable to damages actions throughout Europe . . . 66

Section (III): The binding effect rule and the legal elements of tort liability . . . . 68

1 . the fault . . . 68

1 .1 . the fault requirement: a decision . . . 68

1 .2 . the fault requirement: an addressee . . . 71

2 . the link of causation: effect and object . . . 73

3 . Existence of harm . . . 74

Section (IV): How to ensure the effective implementation of the new rule? . . . . 76

1 . access to decisions on public enforcement taken by ncas in the Eu . . 76

2 . Should an infringement to the binding effect rule be sanctioned? . . . 77

3 . Would the claimant have a choice? . . . 77

4 . Should control of the application of the binding effect rule be given to reviewing courts? . . . 78

II

InItIatIng a ClaIm

By rafael amaro Section (I): EU “legal tradition” and US experience . . . . 81

Section (II): Collective redress: Opt-in? Opt-out? Both? / Follow-on? Stand alone? Both? / Group actions? Representative actions? Both? . . . . 84

1 . Do opt-in systems work? . . . 84

2 . Should group actions be limited to follow-on litigation? . . . 89

Section (III): Consensual settlements: Business litigation? Consumer

litigation? Both? /Opt-in? Opt-out? Both? . . . . 94

1 . Is there a need to protect settling infringers sued in further courts’ litigation? . . . 94

2 . are consensual settlements adapted to mass consumer litigation? . . 96

3 . are opt-out consensual settlements the future of alternative dispute resolution? . . . 100

Section (IV): Incentive devices: Private funding? Public funding? Both? . . . . 102

1 . May group action systems work in E .u . Member States without punitive damages and contingency fees? . . . 102

2 . Is public funding a sustainable alternative to private funding? . . . 106

part II: cOllEctIVE rEDrESS: thE GrOup anD thE juDIcIal SupErVISIOn OF thE SEttlEMEnt . . . 111

By Vincent smith Section (I): Who is represented? . . . . 112

Section (II): Supervising the method of settlement distribution . . . . 114

1 . notice to the represented group . . . 114

2 . Ensuring that claimants fall within the class . . . 115

3 . unclaimed settlement proceeds . . . 116

III

determInIng lIabIlIty

By Pascale déchamPs Section (I): The new draft Directive from the European Commission and general approach to estimating damages . . . . 121

1 . Estimating damages within the context of European law . . . 121

2 . General approach to estimating damages . . . 122

3 . Estimating harm from cartels and exclusionary conducts . . . 123

Section (II): How to construct the benchmark . . . . 125

1 . classification of methods and models . . . 125

2 . cross-sectional analysis . . . 126

4 . Difference-in-differences analysis . . . 129 5 . Financial-analysis-based techniques . . . 131 6 . Market-structure-based analysis, using the example of Cardiff Bus 132 Section (III): What about the presumption of harm in cartel cases? . . . 134 1 . What presumption? . . . 134 2 . Is there any economic rationale for a presumption of X% overcharge

in cartel cases? . . . 136 Section (IV): How to go from the benchmark to calculating harm?

Applying interest . . . . 137 part II: crItIcal ObSErVatIOnS On thE prOpOSED

prESuMptIOn OF harM: a DIabOlIcal prESuMptIOn

OF platOnIc harM… . . . 141

By thomas rouhette

Section (I): The distortion of fundamental principles of civil liability

and procedure for a debatable purpose . . . . 142

Section (II): The first of its kind? . . . . 144 Section (III): The practical use of the presumption of harm? . . . . 145

part III: IMputabIlIty ISSuES In cOllEctIOn OF DaMaGES: jOInt lIabIlIty, parEnt-SubSIDIary

rElatIOnShIp, Etc . . . 147

By muriel chagny

Section (I): Imputability to the liable part(ies) and binding effect

of Competition authorities’ decisions . . . . 148

1 . Imputability on the basis of competition decisions . . . 149 1 .1 . possible imputability on the basis of decisions

other than findings of infringement . . . 149 1 .2 . the differentiated imputability on the basis of an infringement

decision . . . 150 2 . Imputability of an undertaking’s actions to legal persons . . . 155 2 .1 . Imputability to the parent company in pursuit of a foundation . 156 2 .2 . possible imputability to the subsidiary devoid of autonomy . . . . 159 Section (II): Imputability between co-infringers and solidarity rules . 160

1 . the principle: imputability shared among joint and several

co-infringers . . . 160 1 .1 . the scope to be specified of shared imputability . . . 161 1 .2 . the complex consequences of shared imputability . . . 162

2 . the exception: limited imputability in favor of the leniency

recipient . . . 165

2 .1 . a questionable measure of civil leniency . . . 166

2 .2 . back to the general rule for the benefit of injured parties . . . 168

Iv

ConCluSIon

Section (II): The aim(s) of the Directive . . . . 170

Section (III): The effect of national competition authorities decisions on national courts of other Member States . . . . 170

Section (IV): On determining liability . . . . 171

Section (V): Tort Law Public law in disguise . . . . 172

InDEX . . . 175

annEX . . . 177

the editors would like to thank jessica Walch, avocat, and alice Xavier,

student, for their contributions to compiling and harmonizing various

chapters of this book .