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Why do governments end up with debt ? Short-run effects matter

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Academic year: 2021

Partager "Why do governments end up with debt ? Short-run effects matter"

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0 5 10 15 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 percent assets 0 5 10 15 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 percent assets e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7 e8 e9 e10 e11 e12 e13 e14 E 4 1 5 8$ : 8$ : % D ! D 8 : 3 K ! # 8 : ! 8 : 8 : D L L ! 4(

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5 $ ! / K $ 7 # ! 7 # 8 : ! ! G 8$ : 0 G = - 7 # 8$ : 8$ : - ' - G $ $ =M > =M M =M > =M M N $ / E = ' E ! 3 5

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> 3 / ! 1 ! ! 2 D ! D ! 5

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! G / 5 ! D 7 # $ D 7 # $ G A A G $ $ 0 0 =M =M M G ! 5

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- ! 7 # ! 0 50 100 1.14 1.16 1.18 time Capital 0 50 100 0.04 0.045 0.05 0.055 Interest rate 0 50 100 0.3 0.32 0.34 0.36 time Aggregate hours 0 50 100 0.25 0.26 0.27 time Consumption 0 50 100 0.46 0.48 0.5 time GDP 0 50 100 1 1.05 1.1 time Wage 0 50 100 0.2 0.3 0.4 time tax rate time E -G ! E D ! ? / D 8 5 : ?N 8 : D 4B

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E D 7 # ! 8 : / ! 8 : 1 1 / 8 : 5 / 0 @ E A ! ! ; 8 : 8 : * * E 8 : D D I @N G

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8 D : ! D / 0 5 10 15 −0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 percent assets

Transition−adjusted welfare gains

0 5 10 15 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 percent assets

Steady state welfare gains

e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7 0 5 10 15 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 percent assets

Transition−adjusted welfare gains

e8 e9 e10 e11 e12 e13 e14 0 5 10 15 −0.5 0 0.5 percent assets

Steady state welfare gains

e8 e9 e10 e11 e12 e13 e14 e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7 E A 1 5 ! # ! 6 5 ! D 8 : 5 4'

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8 : ! 8 : D D ! 5 ! 8 8 :: / 5 ) D 5 1 8 : E E 1 8 : !

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0 50 100 1.16 1.18 time Capital baseline TR 0 50 100 0.044 0.046 0.048 0.05 0.052 time Interest rate baseline TR 0 50 100 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.35 time Aggregate hours baseline TR 0 50 100 0.26 0.27 time Consumption baseline TR 0 50 100 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.5 time GDP baseline TR 0 50 100 1 1.02 1.04 1.06 time Wage baseline TR E B E 1 ) 3 D ! G B 4@

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B G $ $ > & 0 0 ! 8 : > D ! E = ' 8 : G 8 : 8 : E J*J 5 ! / D ! E D / D ! D G D

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0 5 10 15 −1 0 1 2 C variation (%) assets Productivity 1 0 5 10 15 −1 0 1 2 C variation (%) assets Productivity 2 0 5 10 15 −0.5 0 0.5 1 C variation (%) assets −0.50 5 10 15 0 0.5 1 C variation (%) assets 0 5 10 15 −1 0 1 2 C variation (%) assets −10 5 10 15 0 1 2 C variation (%) assets 0 5 10 15 −1 0 1 2 C variation (%) assets baseline Tr baseline ss baseline Tr baseline ss baseline Tr baseline ss baseline Tr baseline ss baseline Tr baseline ss baseline Tr baseline ss baseline Tr baseline ss Productivity 3 Productivity 4 Productivity 5 Productivity 6 Productivity 7 E = 1 5 8 4 ?:

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0 5 10 15 −1 0 1 2 C variation (%) assets −0.50 5 10 15 0 0.5 1 C variation (%) assets 0 5 10 15 −0.5 0 0.5 1 C variation (%) assets −0.50 5 10 15 0 0.5 1 C variation (%) assets 0 5 10 15 −0.5 0 0.5 1 C variation (%) assets −0.50 5 10 15 0 0.5 1 C variation (%) assets 0 5 10 15 −1 0 1 2 C variation (%) assets Productivity 14 baseline Tr baseline ss baseline Tr baseline ss baseline Tr baseline ss baseline Tr baseline ss baseline Tr baseline ss baseline Tr baseline ss baseline Tr baseline ss Productivity 8 Productivity 10 Productivity 12 Productivity 9 Productivity 11 Productivity 13 E ' 1 5 8 @ 4B: = 7 # $ 7 # = / G / 5 G D 5 8 F*F : G 5 8 : 5 )

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O4P 0 2 499B * 4(9 '=9 '@B O-P 0 2 499B 3 4@ -B B( OAP 2 3 7 2 % 499@ 6 5 B- BB? B'9 OBP 0 2 3 0 $ 0 C C $ -((- 6 ! 44( 4--(Q4-=B O=P $ " & $ 49@? E # 1 * # O'P > 2 $ 49?9 6 @? 9B( 9?4 O?P 1 + + 1 & $ " # $ 499B 6 D 4(- '4?

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O4=P 2 49=4 E 0 #$ %

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