FAOÎLTT OF PHTVv t>4flr 'j'- J. 5/
B
30.6" ULM73
THSSÎS T ) TBS QCH yJL •# #RADQAT** or UVAL OmVEfôlTI TO OÎÜA» tksmront cr occrc# cr
mu r-nm
rm
ARïsvsffijA» wonr # cr
katou*
1. Hos s«wp«t -xîvun at Ml.
II. arts* tps» oetlonoe ut paaaia*o* iattarytar ,uant*» ad vuritatua tpalue «rtlflcti a Bynviarwl et eciontts morali.
II. purwtio net iraaanena eeeundm q od est virtue- liter transita*. ast ratio formalia a priori eadstwitiM Del in robua.
IV Son oognoaoantia iïdl tüàbeat niai, fursam soaa, MapaeanfelA mtaa posa nt haban» atlas forma» rai alteriua.
V. - : vo^îr-arluM ust 1» q Al bot operative a cientia, ut parocwdatitir modo eu.posito.
RWâCS
m ■ ook II of Uw tyetca, ârisVotld oeflaa* rature es rttbo principio and eeuae of wmsajQt and f met in that Va Wiioh it belong# primarily «4 la virtue of Itaulf » net in virtue of an awddentil attriiuto.* (1) Today many who read the Fftyalc* find this definition fatuous and inconsequential. w if Arletotle’» vary not n of neUtra war® miacmooiwd , suar-Itlng ndlctœnt»
of the philosophy «sod on tint notion would certainly be warranted. And this la praeleely the retrecentative jndgaent made by cm of the forenoat ccnUw^urary Aristotelian ecixdare, a, -îenaicn »
ewrt 'Mioee, he atenoLA* es.-, at a. nature appears evident to hi* Qyrlatetle ] . tint earn notion# drawn from emit ary oauerimnoe md lan gua;e be ground# enough to affirm tide tods tan as f !» not reeuuree to a rigorous desmxwtrs- t on in «T’dr ? The tmjlrite t*xm -t zociee ti#a Hiiiueti g to tide wdxmt end anwears without tweir«>t e» that it would be ridiculous even to wish to dazBonetretu timt nature cadets - what
la clear 1» not < amûtwt rated by «dut is ;ot
cluar — a a pareooding passage of tin* ftyaloa, he had argued ^^potiwticàûly againat the TuÜEÎôa that erw mat hold a# Ivon that all or at least sema naturel : singe ««re in movement} if oot, both natural pniloeophy and its Shject are da*- trenvd Tare he had recourse to «qwiaBce or Induction. and Me argmaat held. =ut Iwe hu goes too far md argue# to the existence of a
ri: «dpi* ranaocziuing experUmee. f octree.
all the ttovulp£*amt» of hi» theory of nature •ill participato in the fliminese of its be ginning and siisply will have aa its cels
«ly the succinct analysis of everyday urpa rieaca ftu f ordinary la%ua;e which we hm auiTtirlatidi but tide ea^orisnee, casprs*- aad n thi» lan'uage, laplia* an interpret- ti- a ,;olng beyond the facta (t).
Tide la «urtalnly duvaertatine arltidaa —» cue la surprised to f ind that hanatan can later salvare ae ush of the
me
nd Book of the Physics as he claim to.Tha position held anu explained hare, on the contrary, la that an understanding of certain things ;.,ruseppoawd by Aristo tle. but AhUti call fur explanation today, will obviate difficul ties such as the ma quoted above i or at the vury least will show why rictatis mldsnxi Ills not ed to be justified.
The «artier m jprupoae to folia* in our inwatigation la till» . first, m # AU eonslcar V oo« thing» presupposed by Aristotle » idti an* rulatod to is notion of nature, together with the tdffie.-ltitia arising tNav roni nest, we sIaU turn to the various W^osltl«ma of tiw word "nature and a?as the
iaper-(8) - au tsatln nnalOB* introdc-ti *i a la iç/sique /arieto- iwdti,*». *e &d.; üsfis, wfbi IT?#;, T/nmor.
3
-tance» ,af toe first imposition of naturu for the unduretanding of toe definition Ivon in toe ffcgmltt) finally, we shall malyae and attempt to j&etify toe definition givun in the hyale».
The tamretl roblam we aru faced with in this study are taro » toe prc&lea of Aristotle’» an called eo; fusing (and, if hi» eodem critics are right, confused) nee of eord»| and toe prcblsa of the plaie ma ourtltuda of internal «eporienea in too
:^lca, orwddsrtng the first problem* me find Aristotle com akn3y basing too scientific definition of a thing, for eaoasple, of "matter- or of foraf, un the way "the aatqr * the men in the street, use the
rmm
of that thing* a.aln, he has toe uxaspura- ting nmcttva uf wing a word to mean one thing in one sentence and a different thing la the wary next mantemms without die t in- gnlahlng these# wwaüngej and again, he ordinarily usee the none of a thing before he defines that thing for Instance to usee the word “natum* and natural*3 * * * * 8 thrsighout the first book of the Piyaios bat does rot jfine nature until the second *-<* ()).Inca internal experience la but vaguely roccyniBed by
(3) - ancien* op. dt , p. 105 » * Malgré 1« soin qu'il met à SSfïHr les tormse pîiHoaophâqaus importants* Ari*toto, an l*a reeormn souvent, corstima» d»w» faire un ucploâ fort libra et s’écarta wane. m divers paaaâge», du sens qu'il vient d établir quelque# 11 nue plus faut. C ost 3» cas pour le «et nature acme pour bien d'autres II
In Ma definition of nature.
it the treatment afforded these ; unoral ;W*tae# appears overlong and seams to lave but little to da with the proper sub ject of t di paper, -.ne should remuer that a Iroet ooacuotary on the text it Aristotle oust proeiççeae worç? other not lune a# wore evident (It). The amoral treatment of Aristotle'S use of words end of intimai «aperienw ia an attempt to sot down these
prusu positions ia w orderly fashion
n^apdll» eu avprwad ftpa^wmeeS, il uwt vrai, usas d'satme traités.» la définition dem&» au livra IX de la Ma n eqpvctse #» proud aou» sa pltw W fô^ÿïificati' ns qui, tout en étant propres a ne ,‘dlu*ûphle latorelie, # éoartunt .ans un» owr- tatns mmjKt du colle <#%'il lui assigne. <jeant il m traits ex professe. o osa aâjjdiieaUtna certaines ont o d'h'té' rolevéos dans due passa,es du premier livre us la iiwslque."
(W - **nrl > lehetlê ,™^uj«ald6r«Uaes sur quelques principes fwassmteux da le doctrine de spéculatif et de pra tique", aval lak&ogigsa et ftUesoÿMqwi, Vol I,
o. 1, T:s? ‘^ir^brte'0-las pria- eipuw vjonr«ui <te soi «quoad sapiunt*# pré#%^x*sent mm-mamm une «aqtiLleatkn prc^remmit dite que les an
«dans ont supposée et qu’il» cv naissaient parfaite mmt tans toujours nous la demur o um -,mn1ère très «exi-.-i-useo. f ast q,. 1» n'ont as toujnars tenu coep ta ds 1* taiblesee de lour poaturité v
5
teptor I
A isr^ms'# nsg or
"Thoru is an anclant saying that ♦herd is the knowledge of the good*. And the knar led;» of feme is * rest part of kncaQsd- 8».* (?lsto, ^stylus, >iJ*. >
1. - lord, iimoapt, IMng.
Ts fact that logical poeitlrlm so ;re-u«ptod the atudr of words and of language la general suggest» t at those Ulesiatls ‘iud with the cooclaaicaa reached t ight find rather
interesting a rucwisiiWratloR of Aristotle # doctrine of the nature of the word.
: think it mat be petesat to all that a p.dlo eopjbgr of iangua,;* such as that of the ,w **oai- tlvlsts which would eliminate whole areas of
-**m dlsseove as meaWnglaas and tm ntelHgl
ie hoe significant lapllcst s* for human cul ture. it rsduM conceivably bo a préluda to arave nw w rl In which the burna tpirlt, haw- in*; rid Itself of the ghosts of lato and Aris totle, and the inpo.ÜiwRte of the centuria», should enter into the full light of a wholly
Wntlflc# ore. It ml#t, on the otbor band, et» mâwûgr be a ayeptcm of a . ^ eying c lturo, and a j.raton» to a adontific barbariae and a cultural nihilism, n any easy, the issues
pro-Ariwtvtla ' • doctrine on the ward (as considered by the logician) Is found, in the surir. in the Ssrl)am#ni#a. St. Thoms#, in txxmiaeting on tbs text of Aristotlu, joints out that because man is naturally a social and political animal he finds It necessary to coBKMnicatti with others in uvur to «eiders the ends of social life (*)♦ In o man la poseesewd of into:lacteal kncsrletLe« Ida desim te oonuunicsate with others requires, for its satisfaction, something mors tiwi the simple grunts and groans proper to brute animals, which serve man only in Ms coassmiostim of tbs basic emotions, relative to these eisplc stands, the io$% m u of en
c nstltu*. s « highly complex system. n or:iur for cm man to tear munitete hie ideas ( «Usd, by analogy with the «pateo or written word, “mental words" (3)), be uses a uuùLusr w?JUis is st once both
sensible ami artificial.
(1) - Then, Ungua^a and aoUty, (Bsw lark * ISocsdUon end Co., X9$9)~p. 137 '’T.^orlvs W. yeeria, .miotic and
dltaagtar, (i vw otic, Titles all. WT pV 233 Tf: , ^«...iotlc offers a cWdw%;# to pidloeephyi it is indeed a «pewleisewm to any future philoatî by*, demanding that phileeopby moke clear the nature d it# eigne end the pur- poos of its discourse. Mlooophwrs of widely differing school# tousy rvc<.< .nise the need of mewtiry this challenge...
san» ^dioeceixOT regard philosophy «0 identical with 1 in it# grvaWst .enerolily.
(2) - h i ^wrilMrsansiaa, loot. 2. n 2.
(3) - f ttiE'i'tat*/"" ou. Ii art. 1 » 'spiia wrbua extarius, eum sit'e« siMléï est aegis netus nc,ds quam interius
ttosdnis Sxpositlunum, per «ries vocale dicitur vwbusi quo» vur.ua interius'.
T
-fhm asditsa of commtlcatlon, tbo spoken or written word, ls eenstbûUit it uan bo ijuardi or seau stk, as such Is atoms known to us that the mental word A» St. Ibcnae ««plains $
i i» i lain that m unvoiced cenewpticn of the .-vari est : tolinct ia elient? but tlat silence of tls i-i-art 1» dispelled when the Ida# la put into #valoal words, 1t«s, coetcrior words are
mare maifoot and leas siaple than the Interior eoacwptloRs of tl* heart (&).
fus a eee-.-nd point of vise, we can see the power at tbs sensible word to sen if «et the entai word. The cvnsible word la an artifact in the strictest sonae. The spoken word la to the human intellect whst the erecture la to the divine Intellect; both are the proci-ict# ef m oxtor i crisat «1 of an wee, tha one Is the divine Bind, the othur in tha eolleotive Hmm r.Ond. (5) Again, just as ArUrtotle usee analogic» taosn from lusen art to Manifest
<la> - Jn e IvLds .cttînihuc, da. loot. 1 $ *yenifeetum ost ".i Wc mSptlo ô-Rüs val kitsilleetua, absque voce est œe* silentio? sod per sensibiles voces illud silentium eerUt» emmclatar. lost sutae voces ..xturlcrus sunt nobis acJLe mw jf ustas et minus slspHoes qute interi crus eon~ o-ï’tus sordium, ita... * of. « illa, qu. 60, art. 6, o » « itdt sutum Att.uetinu» In U dTtwotr. < tsrlst.„ quod
'V4U inter heminas nM Imffimrff'firTifrtjTjfriSnil (prlfl nandi " j h< la irwti tdvurslmeds formari possunt ad sicnlflcardoa divisos sen, eptus mmtte, st propter hoc por vurba sagis distincta possums sw-jariswre quutl monte • .a\ctpims."
($) - la, t$u. 17, a 1, c. i -'epem-ynt sus sb inWUocto di vino ree neturtima, sicut ab intellectu -.uasno rm artifl eialar*.
rotae say that «e fora wards only because the object of knowlod.» is not tmaterial enough, or when the object is absent. This is true as far as it goes. But it is not the whole of the mat ter. Ke form words not coly because cf the is\*jrf©ctian of our in tellects, verbum o% indicentia, but also because of tbs perfection of the Intellect as such, "vurbum ex abundantia cordis" (si. Augus tine). The h man Intollect has a natural tendency to imitate, to the extent possible^ the eaaaetlvs knowledge of Qod, in which there is no real distinction between the speculative aid the practical modes.
It can imitate od's kr.owled.;e in the perfectly practical order where it is, in a sense, the cause of the essence and existence of a thing. It attempts to do the same thing in the speculative order in the fields of modern mathematics and logic, but even mere generally in naming things, in manifesting things to itself in a practical way by bringing tbs object from potency to act in naming it Consider the etymology of the “verb" manifest. Be manifest a thing first of all when we seise it by the hand (msnus-fondore), as when we seise a ttiief in his attempt to escape Xn "manifesting a thief we have, in a sen se, made a thief, since hfore we catch him he is not, for us at least, a thief, m somewhat the same sense ms make thu object we know in ma nifesting it through the process cf naming it} since before we know its name it is not for us, properly speaking an object of knowledge (7a).
(7a) - It is only In the leatifie vision where there is no proportion between the knowor and the object known - whore we cannot of ourselves so iso the object (for this we need the human glorias)
8
pries mat tar and au stantlnl form, so in much the same way dose man make use ■£ word# aa artifact* to m.lfost hia i. uaa.
' TV/, epyfcee word, ainoa it la e’jnifl =ant by eocrvam- ticn, hm am it: ;trln<dp&# tJTv* will» just ae otfcsr artifact* da.* (6) iha *rd la cut-atltait:d as a sign both the Will aa effi ciant eaxfcto and b; the irt«lloet| the natter, sounds signifying i «a#. la o.,itinrvnt| and the word ta » assured by sen'a practical intellect. * siya that am not nabral, but depend on the will» is found in the diwrsits of laogua;oa used y man to ex press ids anespts. Aa lahsan and a \<nei use the asm sys tem of logic, but the wort* they use to arguo scientifically will
(exoupt for wtr * ta^ua Aron a -oamcn or coined sntally similar) he- different
Xtrthar, since, the intellect la a faculty which not only uederstesn* tiin-je but mdfast# them, the intellect has an
(6) - ur , %... Jk, art, 1 ' vis* urn , relatu» «actorius, c. i ÜT r 1^3*1 nativue ad placitun, «jos prindpiim »at v-AVmtti», Bicut tit eestiron* artifit «torum.* "is ward es m artificial sign is the formal subject
of ,:wmr, am: is defined, as am all arttftets, as
an imitation.intrlnai© ordination to tho formation ei‘ tho word (7). It» leper tanoe of this poimt of Aristotle's doctrine can <o* be overuapha- si&yd -.on ws ofjBB to oonslder tb* oro-te -.me rarrespondenoe bet ween word end 1 ms, we shell see that a men cannot tww e dear laa of e tiling unless ha knows the artificial sign ai# Ifÿing thet tiring
lists, beoeiee of the interlority of the experience required to make a work of art, be cause tibe work of art la some thing of oureeltw, and because artistic creet can la an unparalle led expression of human liberty the work of art la better known to us time; what Is imitated.
tm ave wan that the wrapd la bo r nown than what it stands for, since It Is * sensible sign and an artifact. 1« near begin to see that the ward 1» me of the beet instruments of the intellect in its s march for what a tiring la. This instrumentality of the word merely indicated bexw, will be trusted in following chapter» where wu a mil sue hew the first iri-oeitlon of a word, end
(7) - of eint-Thomaw, ursus ti.oolujicua (ed. de 5 olesatae) p. 63, n. 1*2 ^jafeftswÿte eggs notura intellectua lis, e». 1st; vi intelligendl et aetlvitste in tota sua per fect, uno et modo considerata. petit Quod aliquid -rouodat ■afcr» ou quatenus non suium ©st via a,j, nesanslva, uod et iam fisnif«stativa et eapawesivs,.. ©c eois on uet im- P<rfostio in nater» intellective, quod i Sîdfœtativa et
roasiva ait rei intellectae; hoc enim pertinet mi fa çon. i tatam et pleni tuxilnao Intellectus, et ad latitudinem ©ordia, ut eructet wrbum bemn, M ont, ;^rfuetua.w
-lû-ln particular a$* the ward netur®", i» a necoeaary inetrvaaunt for tbti undarwtomxrlng of the edentifie dofloitix*) of a thing, an indi cation df the ext nt to which the word la « Instrununt of the In tellect wy be bow from the following exasple iwm by rt Ttxmee, where be hints that oosroet accidence my bo eat aoi.de to make way for the sore ^rioct irtdratanding of ti^at t Ida la amplified) cementing on the phreys "non ox aangutnibua” in the Gospel of t. 4ohn <ti ) hj wrlUa
The mterial cause of ewarat.on la blood and therefore be say» "not from bloods". Am althou(ii the ward "blood In Latin
[cue
fera, I/; ruek it ima such a form; tbere- are t:%â uraralator [ft. .uruaej d.i* not oheorew tho pragmatical rule In car- ur that tea : i<ht teach the perfect truth. Thus be did not say "Arm blood (accord ng to the latin) but "from bloods") for it is unuers- tood that smut .In; la owratad from blood, acting as matter for bodily gemrwtiw — the wed of the earn and the munatrual flow
(the ovum) of the woman.
laving oef»itA#red the need far language, we «hall now tondre into the precise relation betwuun word and Idea» w Aris totle «aplalned it With characteristic oonalaeasaa be writes t
v ) In twngalim gaamnia, chap 1, loot. S, e. S
-«rnWrialla ^13m causa gm&wati" mia eat aangulai et ideo dlcdt *bcn ex eanguii Ibua*. St licet hoc nomen ‘sanguis1 in latino nun habet plurale $ q la tanm in jtmoo habet, ideo translator n*; ûw jramatiow amrvara nun curavit, ut
poMsan word* are to» eigns «f t ow things resolved in the soul, end written words era the signs of spofeen words (9).
The intellect receives# en impression free am «% rent acting thrash the eonaec; sdnee the intellect 1» an Imeterial faculty, toe iscreswlen# of tJvizi,» remised in the soul are itamtorial. The Immaterial idem or the contai ward 1# » alga of the thine known, that la, the 1 ea ia that which mate a known, ee other than itewlf, to» object, yte-thermore, the spoken word la also a alga of the object imam; ib» raaaasi wtçr w u»v wards la to aoreunicat* 1» preeeiotia or lame out an object, noth the apt,«sen and the men tel word am eigne of the object but in diffament ways ■ toe mental word le .*» atural and isiodlate sign of the thing; toe
M
apo&m word a -yt,:. tfcw artificial and cwvwntlonal ftnxitate Sign of the $ kmtal word, and the artificial and conventional mediate sign <£ the tiling
v tiavu aoen in what some the apokwn word la artificial and, in general, bow It la eocnruntknel ww we mow from #x;ori£m x/ tint the spoken or written ward ‘ran or iocratee * 9
sesundan let nos, wed «ex sengu;, ibua'i q od Intolligl tur qulcqtild «.or sanguine generator, ouoaumms ut mate rise ad camalee ganerntAüaam aman viri elw vwnstrum wdiesia)*.
- 12 ~
relût es directly to what we know about race or about ' ocrâtes, aid not directly and naturally to the object as it 1» in itself, other wise everything said about an object weulu be perfectly intelligi blot and further, everything said about an object would be perfect ly true. That the entai word is a natural similitude of the object
(30 Is evident upon eomJLderation of tbs unity of men's ideas as expressed in roughly oquivala t landau an" is always defined
in ten» such as these ? featherless biped, rational animal, etc The
wry
fact that simple ideas can he translated from one l*n;,ua a to another testifies to the unity of mental words, of ideas.Having; inqirvd briefly into the relation between the spoken word and the ontal word, we &re near in a position to see certain of the unwelcome consequences attaching to such a relation, and further, to see the reason for the desire of many modern philo 10
(10) - Cf especially In II e Anima, ch. 11; la, qu. 13, a 2 » voces sunt signa IntoTEtiTlunm, et intellectus sunt re rum siîailit! dines. *
Macarius in la, qu. IJ, a. 1 $ "De vocibus, S. Thomas di cit esse intellectui ! signa.. De intellectibus affirmat osse si -jJitudinea ad notandum differentia» in significando (na turaliter et artificialiter) quam differentiam observat Aristoteles qui in 1 i ori. appellat notos, i.e. tigna; coo- cuptionee vero appellat * easionee in anlia — quia t&airua
auasntur a re ut a fuixiamnto wrltatis, et in intellecta recipiatur quae receptio passio quaedam eat S Thomas an tea conceptiones appellat intellectus quia eunt termini actus intelligendl *
liere la found the root of the reason why oral tradition la of such crest iaportmios to the maintenance of a constancy In the tradit on of a i articular school <f thought un if ont conventions In the use of wards roduiu the possibility of cteop and far-reaching errors In the inter, rotation of ouch a system. (Jf two men who differ widely in interpreting a particular system of thought, the om who has the closer contacts with tisoee who were themselves united by oral tradition with the originator of the system, csy with sttrx, and claim no departure, it is ha, other things being equal who will be the better interpreter of Marx, «id the one for whom the written words of Marx will moor the cost. Again those
trained in one system feel secure only within the terminology of that system, and tend to translate all else into the terms of that system Here, too la the root-reason of the desire professed by many modem philosophers to translate words into mathematical sym
bole f bo may verbal difficulties and problems are eliminated.
Is it any wonder timn that so t>any strive to reti nalise mathemati cally the relation between thing idea and word ? She purpose of tîil» paper, however is to show, through m examination of the notion of nature that though these attempts my be raiseworthy absolutely the disadvantages involved In using «are* as a media for the
discus-— tit discus-—
sion and solution of phlloecp leal problems are far outweighed by the adventacoa to be gained
Later In this paper an attempt will be wade to bring out in all it# force the full import as.' wiiat la but indicated here by the dictum Every word 1» defective (11).
"Be* I say that mm of the aforesaid name ['highest
good', ‘first being*, m referred to Ged] empress perfection and have no defect aa to that for the elg nifloaticn of which the ner» was imposed: but as to the mode of signification, «mtry name la daf ecEtvST
>3r by a name w# éapree» a thing am we conceive iT intellectually. Mt our intellect the origin of el lose kneeled# la tine eensoe, doee^ot by-paes that mode found in sensible thing#..." (12).
The ar^tront pertinent here is this i the measure of the word is the intellect; but wince the hr men intellect has an i^per feet mods of knewriag, the imerfecti a* found in our ideas will be reflected in the words we use. Corresp onding to the errors to which tî» intellect is liable are errors in the use of words, not to speak 11
(11) - Contra Juntas 1- eh 30 » " sue nomen cum defectu est." (12) - Jb'lH.y T^bllco mitem aliqua praedictorum nominum
perteo-tiortusi tftequu defectu Importare, quantum ad illud ad quod significandum nomon fuit impositum , quantum enim ad modum slgntfi andi oenenomen cum defectu est. warn nomine res exprime eo raoSo " t£uTIS€3H»ct*i c'(5ncip2ms. Intolluctus «item nostar, ex serai bu# cognoscendi Initium sumens, illum modum non transcendit q»i in rebus sensibilibus in venitur. ..."
of the difficulties involved in choosing the right word to express an ictos. Sis bates are possible at every stage of the process from tiling to idea to word, and inversely, for the listener, from word to idea to thing. There are errors arising from Insufficiency of observation rashness in judgment mistakes in reasoning. There are errors consequent upon the artificiality of words, changes in moaning, hoaojrapha homonyms, synonyms And finally, there are errors arising from ignorance, racking sure knowledge of a thing, we make use of two variables, the idea and the word — given two
variables to reach a constant a wathoaatlcian would throw up his hands in despair.
The presence of the ldoa or concept as medium between word and things adds to the radical imperfection of human words as a means of cotisurd cation St. Thomas writes t
words are signs of iduae, but it is ideas which are the likenesaes of things. For it is clear that the unity or diversity of significant sounds does not dupend on the unity or diversity of things signified; otherwise there would be no equivocal words; for thun if there were diffe rent things, they would have correspondingly
differunt names, and not the same name. Therefore the unity or diversity of a significant sound, be it uoaplox or Inco plex, depends on the uni ty or diversity either of the sound or of the idea, the sound being a sign only, whereas both idea and thing In addition to being signs, are signified by signs Therefore, a name can mm one thing now and another later, either because
of diversity of sounds only —« as in synonym», in wliidi tWru are differant eo n s but the very sura tiling yl15nifltid$ or also to different sounds can eon'oapond different ideas < either because of a diversity in things signified cr because of a diversity in the quality of the ideas — which letter takes place whan there is a diversity of connotations uoeeeqient open a diversity in the ways of un ere tending one and the case thing (lit). In this passage and in the one quoted above free the Contra Gentes, St. Thorns makes reference to what he calls the mode cr quality of signification Tn tha chapter on the first imposition of a ward we shall see pridsely what the quality of signification ne ans in terns of tW correspondence between tiw mod# of knowing and tint titxb to be found in sensible things
(Ut) - Quaestione» Quodlibotales, QuodUbetua It, a. 17 i
rr:. riam voces sunTsIgna intellectuum intellect*» au- tem sunt rerum similitudinos. Mailfestum est autem quod unitas vocis significativae vel diversitas non de- pen ut ux unitate vel diversitate rei significatae; allo- quln non esset aliuoti nomen aaqoivocums secundum hoc enim si sint diversae re», essent diversa numina, et non Idm nomon, "upendst >argo unitas vel diversitas vocis significativae, sive eosplexau si vu ineomp laxae, ex uni ta tu vel diversitate vocis vel intellectus; vjiorum unum, scilioet vox, est signum et non signatum tantum; Intel lectus nutum signum et signatum, sicut et res. Potest ergo nomen vel enuntiabile ussu aliud et aliud vel prop ter diversitatnza vocis tantum siout est in ejnonysd», in quibus est diversa vox, sed idem significatum camino i vul etiam cum diversitetu vocis potest eseu diversitas intellectum», sive propter diversitatem rei intellectae, sive proptor elvers itaU.su wo d iritulligundt; et hoc con tingit quandoqumque est di vere itas œnaignificaticml»; quae consequitur diversum nodum intelligendi una* et usn dem rem,..**
Thus, In eusaary, we haws saer> indie stud certain of the more salient proportio» and relations to which the human word is subject. In foilwring chapters we shall investigate the "common use of words and the or or of Imposition , so that we may get sow insight into the function of the word as a necessa ry principle of knowledge.
2 - The Cochon hto of a tvcrd
The aim of this chapter is to examine the distinctions betwxm the cocsaon um the etyiaoloo', the first Imposition, and the nominal end real definitions of a word. Those distinctions will aarw a two-fold purpose : first, they will be instrumental
in helping us to offer an answer to the question » of shot impor tance to the philosopher is the eonacn use of a word ? secondly, those general distinctions will later serve es the basis for dis tinctions In tha use of the word nature
Tn the Topics Aristotle says that in our use of words we .
m ould attend to tho moaning w icb is c^ven-tiem by "the many the uttn in thu-struct *
Things are to bo called by the saw names the aultitu ‘a use* but wtren wu ask obvut the quality of things , whether they be such or such, we no lon er attend to the multitude. For Instance,
that which is loductlvu of health is to be cal- ____ led salubrious; but whether a certain thing in X^VOT^X question bo productive of health is to be decided ^ ’"X -A by what the physician says, and not by what the, * /
V' \
multitude say.* (1) ( I *
--- X^/rÉ \S?
(1) - Topice II, oh. XX, text. 6.
also 1 Contra Juntos, I, e. 1 p De Ver., q. U, a, 2j in 1 Poet. Anal'.', leot.' & a. 6 * #.7T significatio eu fSKTSHBEBT"®cipicnda est ab eo, quod intendunt communi ter loquentfcS par illud nomen significare.**
Aristotle dLstiogtdaLti# tbs common signification of the wait'd and tbs laioislusge of the object to which the word refers. Tlkj Jt uiiaiiy (1) uüâtje of the word ao standorhifced by tbs lajcLao- grqplw is to lx- foil wad lor tne cotxuac naming; the expert, the «ut-iority In the field, Is to ou aide Mother such s ward with mdi u meaning ùsnoednate» aueq oataly an object unuer discussion. Loquendum con multle, ..^..tianduu cuu panels, runs the ancient ia». TI.us, for v*£63pla, the or.dawy - an ^torrlnos the moaning of the adjective ' dead j but it aalosigc to the biologist to determine wSm Jwr or not a parti oulsr plant Is at ;iresont dead or at ill
alive
in drawing the distinctions between the nominal and the real «.finitions of a thing (2), so must :.ot for0ct that the lack
(2) - uajofcsa, In m nte ct ascutia, Prooemium n. 8 (Marlettl) » "llirca haèic piÙ'iTciîïmloo€a quôd sicut quid rel eat qulddi- tae rel, Its quid nuiinis oat foidditas v.ocdnis. homm autem cum wesontialitur sit nota carm qusu east objective in anlaa paa&lonuw a £ ;ri.iur unda nca hatoet alias quid- xitatv.8 nisi hanc quad ostlEgimm aHeujua rel intellectae reu cogitstaj alscxao aoica, at ale, ivlativua est ad signatus. nuo cognoscere quid ncedrda nihil eat aliud qua® oognoeeore ad qu d tale nones uabet rolationem ut alg uum ad si^natua. Talla ctitoss cognitio potest acquiri per (1) - dot» that ’•ordinary lias at its root the word ** artier*.
a shall see that the or or in *,nation huru is a natural ardor.
20
-cf a reel definition tiaqpareeslns thu wr_at~lt-is (essence) of a thing does not aecaesarlly isply thy lark of a nominal tafinitloo of that thln^. i* cannot <Mins 'carrot exactly $ it may be difficult to dotxsr. ins * eyond all shad<m of .«ui-bt exactly what it 1» that makes a carrot a -arret and not v pare ip or a turnip. mt we can point to a carrot, wa can jive its apparently diet’ active qualities, we can approximately ilea.Tib-a Its color, its flrure, its aims; we taste the difference. All this may be included in the nominal definition of the carrot, as a matter of fact, the nominal definition of a thing offers a good critique of the real definition of that thirst the real definition laurt define what la pointed out or described by the nominal definition, to his eenaentary on the Posterior Analytics,
t. Thomas writos »
(2) - c .tinned
A-cli jatalia Ullus signati, per coaminia, par essentialia, per mitus rfc qW-ucvis aliir mcUs sicut a :.avoo quaerenti bus noble quid no&inia «ethrepos si digiio'“ôïter»iatar homo,T ,‘jrc^-Iro.-a"q./T:' - l. j ot .'a allia. ïhterro-ga'ttEua '.It, ; 'juToT reT * oportet assignare id <juod convenit rui significatae .to r'... > nodo peragitatis adaeratas. Et ha. c ust eshuntUlis differuntia inter q- lu' coadnlo et qx.id roi, h ciller t quod quid nam? nia est rolstlo nosainie ad ei^na tuna: quid roi waro oat reT reTa^radi; slgngfcaiao easentla
^.r'-nTïn'seoTrHtfir <•* ro* aïl** qr.aa dTcT'soîwnÇ, puts quod quid neminjn sit ton entium complexorum, per ac ei di u talia, pc-r coarsonia
par
uoct ranca; quid rei vero est w tiua toouoplexoras per propria ot essentialia - relatio feni... vo It: potest tor toari ad non ontla in .txmts "natura, et complexaret ÆctararJ - u cl .en'alia et hujusmodi r essen tia au tura rei non 7"T£Tpair
prcr>rïi ' essentialia hdbetur de entibus incoonsplexiaIho question fidous this exist T" precedes the quustion pwbat Is this t* tit it cannot be shewn whether a thing exists, xnlusa it be first understood what the name of the thing signifies * (3)
Further the incertitude which attaches to the nominal definition does not destroy the certitude of the real definition, once it has been reached t if we doubt whether every featburleea biped be a man, we do not by that fact doubt that man is a rational animal. Tills is because we are not givng a real definition of a word:
rather we define the object wliose nominal definition la ’'featherless biped1'.
The distinctions between the common use of a word its first imposition its etymology and the notion t a thing will be useful at this point, fatter we shall see tbs importance of these distinctions in the face of some of the criticises màa in took I of Aristotle ' e Metaphysics, which is, ss we shall see, something other than a dic tionary of philosophical terms chosen at random.
A# me nave already minted out, the common use of a word yields the meaning which the word has when used by the multitude. This use is, in general, characteristically «onerate and colorful.
(3) - in I Post. Anal., loot. 2 n. 5 • Untie quaestio, an eat pram Jolt quausEl-amsiB, quid est. sed n n potest ostunoBT*o» aliquo an sit, nisi prius IHÇoTligitur quid significatur per nomi,8
22
-then we aa>: for en exemple of something "substantial", the ordinary man will point to the heaviest, most solid thing In sight; end he would be inclined to deny that a body of water is as substantial as a mountain.
The notion of a thing is most often used as roughly wyno ctj&mm with the nominal definit n of a thing, with this difference, however, that the notion means rather the uneral idea or conception of a thing; whereas nominal definition refers more to the common- sense meaning of a word than to the idea of a thing. The nominal definition of 'natural'1 is given by pointing to a horse or to a tree. The notion of "natural" is given by an explanati on of one's general
utea of v *t "natural' implies- It is in this sense that the expree- sion "notion of nature" is used in the title of this paper.
The etymology and the first imposition of a word are dis tinguished from the cosmon use end the nominal definition cf a word inasmuch as the notions of neither etymology nor first ispoeitloo contain any necessary reference to an actual past or present usage, as do the notions both of common use and nominal definition of a word Ktymslsgy and first imposition are formally distinguished one from another by the fact that it -elengs to the grasmarian to study the derivation <£ a word by analysuag its parla, by seeking the root fren which it derives, or by referring it to on earlier form of the
present language i it belongs to the wise .an in his character as jud;a to tie termine the first Sepositi m of a word, i.e. significa tion which corree; code to visat is first known in the object
signified - aa will be explained inore fully in the following chapter. Further elynolo lue of words signifying the sees object may vary in different languages, but the first imposition, sines it is but tba vital ex rocs ion of the original sense kn<*le<fc# of an object, is coacion to all word-signs of the same object, no matter what the language (Is). ?jotu that the etymology of a wcrd n-wd have no direct *
(k) - Tills is not to imply, hcrnmar, that thuro is a one to-one coitus ontkunee between words of one language and the words of another. Words differ according to the experience and importance of certain objects in the lives of various peoples, - 238 II Ettn, lact. 8, n. 3l*l , "... est innced natus, quia rardlioc avcidit Kt multa similiter sunt in- sîoaÏÏKata, propter hoc, ijiod homines sa non advertunt commu niter, ut sic ipsis ncedna ponerent." - Cf. aleo ,
P. bel»», Wature and Man, (Princeton B. Press, 19UU) p. 61 t "After I hatlTIHoliKPEitis book, I cmm across the following by the brilliant denjarain Wharf (The Technology Review, vol. XLU, April 19l«0, p. 6) i ’ Hop! baa a noun that covers
everything or Win,; that flies, with the exception of birds, which class is denoted by a other noun, Tbs fermer noun may be said to denota the class — flying class minus bird.
The Hop! actually call insect, airplane, and aviatear all by the sanae word and feel no difficulty about it. The situa tion of course, deoiiue ay possible confusion among very disparate members of a broad linguistic class, such as this class. This .’lass seems to us too large and inclusive but so would'our cXase’^sncwf to m ' jsülmd1 Ko liavë tbs' 'same word for falling snow, snow on the ground, enow packed bard
like ice, slushy mow, wind-driven snow — whatever the si tuation may be. To an Eskimo, this all-inclusive word would be almost unthinkable; ’no would say the falling «nos, slushy «near, and so cm, art ansuouely and operationally different, different
things
to contend with he uses different words for them and for otiur kinds of snow The Astecs go even fartheretartiO ontianoo tu the or or of imposition as determined by the Bwtflçiiyslcian: near need the first imposition of a word correspond to any comm use of that word, it may be, for exaapla, that internal experience is tî» nain factor in determining the first imposition of a word, which word was used almost from the beginning to denardnata a sore general class of objects. The metaphysician, in carder to r anifeet further Impositions, my find it necessary to dotvrdm the first imposition, which may not, as in the case of word naturo".find confirmation in the original common use of that word. All this will become clearer one© we have determined the prin
ciples which govern the first imposition of • word, and have analysed the order of imposition of the name nature" as given in the Me tap hy ale a. Here we shall concern ours vivos primarily with the common use of words, in order to see what la its importance, if there be any, to the philosopher w o is seeking knowledge of the objects designated by those words- Toths extent that we recognise thla importance to
that extent will we have answered the difficulty of those who see in Aristotle -a use of the taras «naturo - and 'natural* an unwarranted word-play} he gives to them very ;@noral and ordinary meanings both before mu after he gives a strict definition of tbeee terms, which
than we in the opposite di ection with cold ice, and snow all represented by the esse basic word with different termi nations} lee is the nmn fera; cold, the adjectival fora aid fer sinar /ice mist*.1» — Of. » ..met Cassirer, Lang uage and Myth (New York « Harper and brothers, 19W) pp71> ST.
it is said, rusants a major obstacle to a scientific interpretation of tha
Finales-Wo have ouon in what way the artificiality and «visibility of words help to sake than bettor known to us than the concepts they signify, to the ardor of knavle<f;o the sensible is known first. As an artifact the word is «eas red by our intellect, and so is human creation
to brief, w have seen something of the topartanoe of words in manifesting i<*as. The probis» hero is : precisely why is the comon use of words ispwtant to the life of the intellect T why not abstract from the way to which words are oowecmly used and make a fresh atari t
The answer is given implicitly to Aristotle s words » The effect which lectures produce on s hearer upends on bis habits j for we jud.e to be i roper the language to which we are atcuetomed, and that which is different
roa this ouoas strange, somewhat unintelligible, and foreign bu causa of its unfam.il iarity. for it is the customary that is bettor known to us. 2nd how "gruat"
hakitual possoaanMfT'tha" liaw atake manifest J to which fabulous and puvrüa things have groator foaroe front usagtiTEyETilio ruSTvly'of uur~nwl.^ile ooncfl
(5) - Metaphysics, II (a) eb. 3, ^Ah32-995a6| cf, : to II «staph. 17 % no*. 331-333« t ïhewae explains the rufsrehce to laws % "Loquitur atten hie rftil sophus de legibus ab s «ominibus adin- wntis, qua& ad cunaorvatiurjea civile» «icut ad ultimo» fine»
26 —
This text si:are the relation between the intellect and that to rt'dch m are proportioned by 'nebit, by custom, what we beer repeatedly we are inclined to receive as true; these are the words
called voanon words. Aristotle, in explaining what he swans in
saying that the customary la recst readily accepted, give# the example of the man who will pay no bead to s scientific explanation unless it is .>resvmted in a oothenatlcal wsyj but «von more acceptable, because sacre customary is the coataon uae of words A difficulty romains, however, in seeing precisely why it is that we accept more readily what we are used to hearing. But since an adequate answer would require a paper quite as long as the w?>ole of the present one, we rust rest content with a itérai notion of the relation bet* en cus tom, intellect, and will as pertaining to words.
An example of the application of the common use of words to a philosophical robloa is found in the Physics (6). In searching for the intrinsic principles of absolute generation, Aristotle first makes uau of the words "matter" and form in their common meaning* ac referring: to the accidental : rinclplws of an artificial thing in
ordinantur• et ideo qiouaqpe Invunerunt cas, allqpa quibus hondnuo animi ro trahe rurvtur a calls ot provocarentur aid bona so cun dux diversitatem gentlun et nati nan in suis legibus tratii corun t- quavis ; imita eorum essent vana et frivola, quae homine» a pueritia audientes r»;is m: rbabant quam veritatis cognitionem. "
order to «hed li^ht ou the first pr ’Kdples of bo coming. Prtao matter Is anintolli^ibl» unlosa coo first ewa » at is meant by the matter of an artificial thing (7). Here, thee is an exssple in which the staple words "matter and for* In tiaair ceoewn meaning# are india- ponsable to a right unuorstanaiag of the Aristotelian doctrine of absolute charge
St. Thomas explains that Whits born of custom Incline in a nat cral way: what we are accustomed to becomes, ms it were, second nature. The corner domed.nator of both natural habit and of custom is a .. rop -rtlan to the object of nclination. Just as man by hie human nature a > report! nod to first principles; *id Just as man in virtuu of his habit of temporanee is proportioned to acting temperately; and just as tan in virtue of the articular disposition of his tasba
uds is prepartiomd to wist plumeoo ids taste at any particular uer.wntj so man, in virtus of custom, is proportl cned, by a habit simi lar to « natural habit, to accepting what he is accustomed to hearing. At the beginning of our intellectual life, m are unable to Judge what m hoar; our Intellects are » long ti a n the process of
in-fortaa-(7) - if. In I ply, loot 13 n. 9 ? "Quod igitur «io as habet ad ifaao*_6*abetantiM nat ralw, sicut ae habet aea ad statuam et ll;*num ad lectum at q odlibot materiale et informs ad fomens, hoc dicirau* assn atari#» prime».*
Ct also : m I H^-a., loot 35 n. 10 : "ad manifestandum m&torlea ,:rlioa c-pertrt utl «acarylo senslbilitua substantia rum.w
I
ê
If
(8). Ii la at this stag* of cur intellectual life that the play» an Important role. The will 1» a faculty which receive» which pleaeoe it But the will la pleased by that to which It la report! ned by custom Mow the will duairss the perfection of the whole men, end consequently desires the good of the intellect which is knowledge Since the intellect has as yet few standards ofits cam by which to jud;e (sinon it does not see), the will supplies far this properly intellectual function and orders the intellect to reuelvo what it commands, which oth in the j roaont and to a lessor extent, in the future acta as the measure of «hat is presented. The object aa obacure cannot move the intellect. But the object aa pleading the will cm mow the will The will then moves the intellect to accept what it offer#, not beemiao it la soma but because it is pleasing — "non quia visu» wed quia plaçons**.
Since the common use of words to the extant that it is com mon (9) is a prime example of what we accept because of custom, we may 8 9
(8) - Of. Contra Pantos I» o. 11. Of Gcmm. of Ferrara * "Praedic ta aûteü dpîhiu 'pro-, unit parti» qvI3S ex consuetudine qua ex prindpio assueti sunt nomen Dai audire at invocare. Consue tudo au tum, ut praecipue quae eat a puero, vim naturae obtinet ux quo contingit ut ea qaibue a pueritia animus imbuitur, ita firmiter teneat ac eT us*«vni haturaGTuiF ut' "per ad ndtaT" (9) - RSaforTc, iII,’ ch. E, (03'^dKnTl Affords' lÉedvOr "dT'ordinary
use, an3 in their original acceptations, mad matchers, are alone available iriu .restyle of pi*osa »" a proof (that thia la the fact, la) that those are the only words which all persons emp loy; for everybody carries on conversation by meana of taot^jh«ra, and words in their primary owse, and those of tWimny uau
say that the coactori use of words (becaueu of the influence of the will) is wU~toom to ce (10). mow one of the .jnsral methodological prin ciples of Intellectual pro roam is, briefly, that we begin with what we kxxm and proceed to #mt we do not now; «id among those things we
knew, what we knew best oust be our starting point. Applying this principle to our use of wards, wa may infer that in looking for the what~it~is of a thing ee must begin with what we know best about that thing, namely that which Is o-nwyad by its name. Mow since we see
that the name of a thing may nave various waniiys, we must take a# our starting point the moat common meaning of that name, consider, for example, the word "form", that is the "form" of s thing T For one who has sow acquaintance with Aristotelian terminology, it ia difficult to reel* the temptation to say that the "form" of a thing signifies first of all its substantial principle of actuality - its substantial form The common smarting of the "form of a thing is, hewtiwr, its shape, its figure. It ml^ht be shown. moreover, that an adequate mewled;* of what Aristotle muans by "substantial form* cam raver be rasped unless one is aware of the comaon meaning of 10
(10) - Gf. John of St. Thomas • m Ila-rise, qu. $7, a 6 (disp. IS, a Is, n. 11);
also Capstan • tit la-1 Lam, qu. 158, a 5 (n X); also ns 'irin., qTlTTT
30
•forte" (11). it# general problem of the importance of a knowledge of the cobboh meanings of a word to its later, more abstract Mean ings Is treated briefly in the next chapter on the first imposition of a word. Hera we tail investigate this relation only through a sign, an uxacple, and by analogy with the order of acquisition of the variais parts of philosophy.
A sign of the importance of the common use of a word is given by St. Thomas in a treatment of the word "fate" — can "fate" be used aa a synonym of Divine providence T St. Thomas answers »
Mt since me should not law even marnea in common with infidels, lest occasion of error arise from
sharing names with them; the name "fate" should not be used by the faithful lost wo seem to agree with those who had the wrong notion of fate", who sub jected all to a necessity in the stars. (12)
(11)
(12)
-Weiss, <$> dt , p 105 i "The meanings of most words are slowly wxEFÏvS in the course of history, occasionally, how ever. some powerful individual or group, some crisis in thought or fact, compels men to change the signification of the words they have bean a cue tamed to use. Plato turned the term "sophist* fToo aan of praise into one of contempt. Aristotle took the ordinary Greek words for timber and shape
askf -us u Xian ~~nto'"QiT'AHl'Tia^c~rmXGSF~mdToSn'wTth' iWlSErwi&r' aiïSïîncï.*
Contra hontes. III, ch. 93 s "Sed quia cum infidelibus nee -:c*aïna tbbeüïs iidbwrw communia,ne ex o nsortlo nominum pos ait sued erroris occa, iu; nomine fati non eat a fidelibus utendum, ne videamur illis at «entire qi male de fato sense runt, omnia neeeasitsti aiieru» sublidentes.”
Of. in I da A'iizaa, lwct 8 n 31)7 i ... plerumque quando ixjj-robaf ;,j :L i } * rTa Pletjmis con r^robat was quantum ad
latjaniB »uu quantum* &n»6n\m vurborum «jus. _ a ... .... ■ r.-—
intention#
Vtiry often to admit a name la to admit too much.
The neglect of the oonwgn ueu of words aa a principle of knowled.ee finds a parall#! in the neglect by philosophers of the inferior disciplines — grammar, poetice, end rhetoric. Heidegger has said that “what philosophy needs to. ay la lass metaphysics and more grammar." Though in the order of perfection metaphysics is the principle of the other sciences, it is the inferior sciences and disciplines which are principles of metaphysics in the order of ac quisition. Retired for the understanding of this zaost intelligible of inaasn sciences ia great tte termination or perfection of the in tellect Whence if not from the inferior disciplines and sciences can the intellect acquire this determination ? If certitude is the determination of the intellect to its object, and if the object treated by metaphysics is of such a degree of intelligibility that it is named '•wisdom , md if the Intellect is at its inception pure potency, than the certitude had by the subject — formal certitude
— is very poor, though it is true that the certitude of the matter
'lonia unia figurate dicit, et per symbola docet , in tondons aliud pur verba, qua* sonant ipsa verba; sicut quod^HHinP almam asio cixctûm*"."" ~ffc Tdub ne aliquis propter ipsa verba
incidat in errorum, Aristoteles disputat centra eu» quantum ad id qt od verba ejus sonant"
in metaphysics 1« the greatest possible in the natural order. To deny its tenuity in formal cert itude would be to l ontify what la best known by ua with what is, of itself, moat kncwable.
If the discipline* which perfect the intellect are neglected, philosophy la out off at its roots. We itaiwfc start with what we know, with what is first and moat proportioned to ua, to arrive at an underetandinc of what is least proportioned to ue.
ineo our Intellect# are the lowest possible in the hierarchy @f intellecta, we nuat recognise this inferiority and not proceed as though wu were possessed of Intellect# proper to separated substan ces.
Analogously, the neglect of the cow -on use of words means a neglect of what we know best in favor of what we know lees well. That a alighting of the ocaaaon use of a word mean# a slighting af what we know beat in a thing is evident from the fact that it la the multitudo who both determine wimt la beat known in a thing and oensu- qviently give such and eueh a meaning to it# name. #a follow the many in our uao of word# bo causa yet-ure inclines ua to this, aa St. Thomas explain# *
If thing» are two [in number] , we way "both" thing», mad w call two m& "both' man; but we do mot way "aU" thing» or "all" wm. wa use this word Gall] in referring to at least three things. And all oewmcnly uae tide manner of
•peaking, because nature inclines tie to this. For peculiarities in one's say of speaking cam
from conceptions peculiar to the individual) but shat all rswsnnly observe [in speaking]
warns to case frm a natural inclination (15).
A neglect in observing common usage is equivalent to intelleotusl- ietie tyranny) Just as in moral matters the laws of a tyrant follow not nature but the tyrant's cam will, so the will of the individual rather than that of the multitude become the principle of the
meaning of every word, this becomes arbitrary In a derogatory sense, being dependent on intellectual whims and fundee peculiar to an individual.
m this chapter we have attempted to see in shat sense the cora-on use of words is Justified and in shat sense necessary, be now see why Aristotle is Justified in using, and finds It necessary to use, the word "natural" in its ordinary meanings throughout the first hook of the I fry si ce; for it is in these common naming# that he finde help in determining the what-iV-is of nature as «Mined at the begin ning of the second book of the physic».
(15) - in 1 De oulo, ch. 1, le et. 2, n. 6 »$t didt quod etlam aoa&;tu#HUe vo abula rebus suoundm modum praedictum, quo scilicet perfectio coepe tit ternario, Si enim aliqua sunt duo, deisms quod sint seabo, et duos homines dicimus ambos , non autem de hi» dicimus assius, sed primo hoc vocabulo uti- ïaur circa tres. 1 Istum modum loquendi sequimur ccsauni- ter ames, propter Boc -fatlira lâflîoc liïos Inclinait.
a âïïSTwH* "curiiT * -rca »rîa Mï*juHa~ïn modo loquendi ,~vîden-tur provenire ex propriis conceptionibus uniuscujusque , sed id quod observatur oemmiter apud omnes, videtur ex naturali Inclinatione provenire".
3h
3. * The First ^position of « ■ ord.
“Any sort of ignorance of first or primitive namus involvas an ignorance of eocsmery words; for they can only be explained by the primary. Nearly then the professor of lan guages should be able to give a very lucid explanation of first naaus, or* let hist be assured be will only talk nonsense about the rest." (Plato, Cratylua, 126.)
•Tbs words of the teaebvr cause knowledge more directly than do sensible things outside the soul, insofar as yards are the signs of Intel- ligible things.” (St Thomas) (1)
In this chapter we 00m to the crucial point of our in vestigation of Aristotle's conception of the important of words in acquiring scientific isnowled ,0 of a thing. Having seen hoar
the ecraaon notion of a thi sg can be a principle of knowledge, we
row as$s how a knowlod.e of the order of imposition of a word can
be a principle of knowledge of tbs object signified. 6Order af
b position here tmam nothing mere than the ordered relation bet~
wsen two or mere meanings of a word. The purpose of this chapter is to show that such a relation exists- and tirât this relation is important.
(1) - v '■.or. q 21, a. 1, ad 11 1 "Verba doctoris propinquius
ieUSSont ad causandam scientiam quam sensibilia extra ani
mam, InquantUM sunt signa int-lHgibiliu» intentionem.'1
f. 8raet casairer,
Lmx<mi.v
and %th, op. ett., p. 61 1•Indeed, it is the Word) it is Torguage, that really re vertis to man that world which is closer to him than any world of natural objects and touches his weal or woe mre directly than physical nature."
The cdmoo moaning of s word telle us what all ago know about a tiling, and to disregard this moaniz® would be, in effect, to think in a vacuum shut off train reality — reality ae expressed by ordinary, evury-day language. To disregard the first imposition of a word when it Is necessary to sales a scientific study of the thing signified Is disastrous in yet another way , one cuts oneself off free what is first known about a thing.
The distinction between the first imposition and the common use of a word (a later imposition) 1» treated by st. Thomas In die- tia^uishing the word nseeing’* ,
WW# can speak of a word in two ways, either according to its first imposition, or accord ing to the use of the word This is cl oar in the word «seeing*, which is first imposed to Signify the act of the sense of si;ht
'ut because of the dignity and certitude of this sense, the word is extended in uao to all kncwledje of the othor seneas; for we say * see how it tastes, or hew it scella, or hear wans it la. "teeing' is applied even to Intellectual kn-cetiudja, as St. Matthew says j
'blessed are the dean of twart. for they shall see Tod'". (2a)
(2a) - " i<wkhsa quod de aliquo nomine dupliciter convenit lo~ «T?i 1 uno modo, secundum rrimso eius imposition» î alio
modo, secundum usum nominis, «icat patet in nomine vi si onie. quod primo impositum est ad significandum actam sansus visus t sed propter dignitatem et certitudinem huius eensus extensum est hoc txwm, secundum usum loquentlum, ad orexim cognitionem aliorum sensuum; died ima enim » vida quo- mode aapit, vel quomodo redolat, vel tyomodo eat calidum; et ultorius etiam ad cognitionem intellectus, secundum illud Mattfa. V8 $ 'mati mundo oords, quoniam ipsi uua vi- oebuÉt**. Ia, qu. 67, a. 1.
36
-It le inyoesibl», aa we eh#31 ses, to undarstand the defi nition of Büfcore giwn In the "byalcs mless one knows the first two l-sposltdone of the word naturo*’. Without this knowledge, coe cannot use ahat is better known to manifest what 1» lees known. le met now enter into a brief examination of the ardor of loarnicg, asking what it le m know first, then apply whet we learn to the corresponding Wdwr in naming things according to tiu principle "we name aa we tower’ (3)
The root of the «newer to oar inquiry into what is first known In on object end its relation to warning is given by ft, Thomas eœmarily when he considers how our aind proceoda towards a knowledge of the essences of things t
ur Intellect, which taken ocgnisance of the essence of a thi% as its proper object, ^elns knew&sdg* fTon sense, whoso prop a» objects are external aooi-
uontei iwice from external appearances wo cam to a knowledge of the assones of thirds and because wo name a thing as we imoer it sc from external pro parties name* are often impeaed to signify osaunnaa. ’"ucii name arc somtism taken strictly to denote the iseonce its»: if, the signification of which is tl» principal object* but sometimes, and less strict ly to denote ths properties from which they are ietwxwd. (h) 3
(3) - 32 a. 2 c. - *n Mnenue sleet cognoscimus11.
(W ” **» I'1- IB, a. ?, a. ; . l’nt'ÿJloctus noster, qui proprie «et coî^ncacitivus quii litatio roi "t proprii objecti, acci pit a ?on*u cuius propria objecta avant accidentia uxtoriora.
-Th» senses give us knowlad o only of the accident* of a thing t it# color, shape, email, etc. Thu# whet w first know about a thing is its ecci ontel properties It is iron these accidental properties (id a quo) that the name of a thing la first imposed on the substance of that thing (id ad quod). If the word be considered apart from its sensible imposition, ire depart from ewr peeper metis of knowing, in witlch there is always a resolutio ad sensum. The first Imposition of a word is an instrument in tide resolutio ad eensum, and being more manifest than a more abstract Imposition, to that extent does it refer more determinately to objective reality$ for thu certitude of intellectual knowledge depends more or loss remotely on the certitude of sense kneeled a (1*). If we neglect to
nimue ad cognoscendam essentiam rei. gt quia sic nominamus aliquid sicut cognoscimus illud, ut eae eupradictis patet, inde est quod plerumque s propria tat ibus exterioribus impo nuntur nomina ad significant as oseontlas rerum, ini» huius- modi nomina quandoque accipiantur proprio pro ipsis essen tiis rerum, ad quas significandas principaliter eunt impo sita ? aliquando sutum sununtur pro proprietatibus a quibus imponuntur, et hoc minus proprie."
(ti>) - De er,, qu. 12, a. 3 ad 2; Ibid., ad 3 »
, .7"Judicium non open et tiuTCaa a receptione speciei,
sud ex hoc quod ea de q dbu» judicatur, examinantur ad ali quod principium ce* jn itionis. sicut de conclusionibus Judica mus uas in principia resolvundo... >ed quia priiaum princi pium nostrae cojnitionis eat sensus, oportet ad sensum quo-
ua notio resolvuare omnia de quibus Judicamus | unde hiloso- piais dicit in III Caeli et until, quod oosplemmtum artis et natur au est res sensibilis visibilis, ex qua dobemus tie aliis Judicare; et similiter dicit in Vi ithic (cap. VIII in fin), quod sensus sunt extremi sicut intellectus principiorum;
eartnSa
à .pullans'OTa ‘in qumTTft resoluti?" 'JutiTcanCls." toro t. Theme is speaking of resolution in thu whole orderconsidar the first imposition of s ward as a principia in manifest ing shat is first known in a thing, we place ourselves in the posi tion of a uen who tries to put up the walls of » house before be lays its foundation. If our use of a word has no relation to the first (sensible) imposition, the word is no longer an instrument of the intellect and cannot but lead to confusion.
In summary, because cur knowledge is posterior to the things mv know whereas God ami the angels «now a thing in themselves (5), our propur aoue of knowing 1» an extrinsic one, that is, we learn from (id a yuo) the external appearances of things through the sen ses . It is for this reason that what we know first is the sensible appearance of a thing (6). We name as we know and we know first
of human knowing) when he says elsewhere (of. In D# Trin., qu. 6, a. 2, e.) that philosophy of nature resolves 'to "senae, mathematics to the Imagination, and metaphysics to the in tellect, ha is speaking only of a part of human knowledge — purely intellectual knowletfs, or science, which depends upon principles as related to matter, Keeoluticn to sense, however, is primary.
m tor., qu. 2, a. 5, c
assDSwr, op. dt., pp. 7ii~75 « "The spiritual depth and power of language is strikingly evinced in the fact that it is speech itself which prepares tbs way for that last stop wiAtraby it is itself transcended. Ibis most difficult and peculiar achievement is represented by two fundamental, linguistically groun^od concepts — the concept of "Being1’, and the concept of the loth appear to belong, In their coupletu significance, to a relatively late develop ment of IsneîUtt,;») both bIjow, in their grammatical forme, dear trace# of the difficulties which verbal expression en countered In face of these concepts, and could master only by slew degrees. In xvard to the concept of Being, a glance
throu gh tfcè «wfleew. hence, what we naira will not transcend the sæua found in sensible thing». At mu bet,inning of our intellec tual life the babb cells to wind the kind of concept which 1» only an Roproxinaticn of the what-it-is of » thing. When we do attain that which wakee a thing to be what it it, w oust keep our link with reality an it can first be Known through the first imposi tion of the word. Considar, fev exemple, the relation between the fera or finire of a thing arsd it® < ibstantlal foam. (It is by its fora or ratline that wu first ■jxw an elephant as distinct from a giraffe) it Is by Its substantial fora that an elephant is really distinct from a giraffe). To ask sememe 1,; nor ant of the first iw~ position of fora (finira) to explain substantial "fana , would be no more fr> Itful than asking him to explain substantial •xyw’*.
ow m cm see why it is that a later imposition need not fortiyo ttw wealth of istoodiacy given by the first imposition contra ry to what tassirar writes in ami yth t
nut although laifuSi'e and art both be coma jtnan- clpatod, in this fas him from their native so 1 to mythical thinking, the idaal, spiritual unity of the two 1» reassorted upon a higher 1*3vwl. if language is to .row into a vehicle
at the development on the original etyoelaglcal Meaning of the copula in most Isnjua, ojs shows how verbally oriented thinEuig arrival only vury gradually at a distinction between
' being* and ' buing~eof'. The “is1 of the copula almost un- failirij'ly joes been. to a eenauaSIy"oaicratForlgrIhMl'
Incj 'InStëjçf'oar cô?vvëÿlt\rliar^ uxStonou or a unefaTTRale
5T <^rrinsl%f denoted a partfcular kind and îbjrw'of
of thought, an expression of concepto and Jud;e- wasta. this evolution can be achieved only at the price of fWega&me 'Ibi' wJütK. and iSjESmagT' timediale experience. in £w what la left ?3HEETccnawEti sense anti feeling content it once possessed is little more tium a bare skeleton (7),
If cno neglects ti» first imposition, the real definition one as signs remains open to question: It is tm though someone found a bone which be claimed was the thigh-bone of a pra-hlatoric man, yet on bein; questioned, could not tell whuro and in shat stratus of the earth he had found it.
lbs questio» which now etwee to mind 1# t ie t How does cue establish which is the first imposition of a word ? (8)
hat general rules mad criteria can we lay down to a termine what it ia we first notice and denominate in a thing f (9) Shakespeare has till# to say t
(7) - vaasirer, m. oit.» p. 7U.
(8) - t belong* to'tTSTmtaphysicdaii to determine the firat impo sition of any particular word. Here will be given only asms gu.-tarsi notiem® conmeted with the first Imposition end the ur*.vr of impositioni we shall find these notions of value in considering the first imposition and the order of impo sition of the word "oaturu-.
(9) - caasinar, op. cit pp, 21* 2$ * »1tw formulation of a gaas-ial eonumprtpresuppoetis definite properties* only if there acv fixed cha acteristics *Hy~vErtue of v idi things say be roeo^ytiaad as similar or «issisdlar, coinciding tar not coin
ciding, is * possible to collect objecte which resemble each otitor in a class, ut — wo cannot help asking at this joint — how can such differentiae exist prior to language t
o we eel, rather, realise them only by aeons of language, through the vary ecC of them 7 And if the latter be
Th» present eyw praises the present object » Then marvel not» thou great and complete men, That all the (Breaks bejln to worship Ajax;
in ce things In motion sooner catch the eye wah \mvffr aiiH-gpr:---
---What we notice first «mat be sensible, since sensation pre cedes intellection (what is actually sensible is prior to what is only potentially intelligible)j and, being sensible, is accidental to the wtmt-lt-ie of a thing, now what is the sensible accident
which is most the actual for ua f la it not the movement of a thing f Though the most perfect actuality implies no real movement, never theless, for ue, what is most actual is the thing in movement. This is so because of the very nature of sense knowledge, "very act of sensation is the result of an entltatiw assimilation, a pfcy steal, material interaction taking place between the sense and the passive organ; the vividness of the sensation depends, within certain limita, on the movement, the striking force of the stimuli which impinge upon the organ. - is not a blow on the hand mere vividly sensed than a alight tap ? - and is it not easier to ass e thing in the distance when it is in motion ? (11) Again, somment la a cosmon sensible, and as such, can be known by all the senses. He other
seel-the case, seel-then by what rules and what criteria is this act carried out 7 ïtsût is it that leads or constrains lewyuag# to collect Just these ideas into a single whole and denote then by a word ?"~"lKat causes it to select, from the over flowing, over-uniform stream of impressions which strike our
senses or arise fma the autonomous processes of the mind, certain pre-eminent forms, to dmall on them and endow them with a particular »significance♦TH
(10) - Troilus and creaaida, Act. Ill, sc. ill.
(11) - 'T'laTq. £5, a. Ï; ibid,, q. 85. a. 2, ad 3; ibid., q. 87,
s. ), ed 3»
dont la as actual for us. °î
k aipAa9TCMB('i pre minant actuality can be fourni in the fact that for ua the most striking spocd.ua of opposition la that of contrariety, In which there is a rnammnt free one term to another say from black to white. lew though contradictory oppo sition is better known, it is less striking. Contradiction is per ceived by intellect alone, whereas soma contrarieties are the object of sense.
Confirmation of the pre-eminence of movement in actuality can be seen in a consideration of the very terms "act", "active", "actual", etc. he should not ordinarily eay that thinking was so much an ' act as naming) nor that a clerk was as active as an athlete. Why should this be if not that, to us, "act" and 'active* imply irst of all a sensible, physical movement, which is more proportioned to us, and thus more real and vivid than the acta of the intellect or any other act T
We can see now that the first imposition of a word refers us to sensible reality, and to that which is most striking in sensi ble reality namely movement. ones, w on we come to consider thu meaning* of the word «nature", we shall be able to sew why Aristotle tells us that “nature" in its first imposition has to do with move ment. Further it is new evident the* the objection made by aaeirar
lotie# neck of it# force if we keep In mind the relation between the first imposition ma the other meaning#. There 1# no need to lose the "wealth and fulness of immediate experience" in later use# of the word; if we use the first imposition of a word «id its common use as principles to manifest it# later, more abstract meanings, we lose nothing, m short, It is a dangerous thing, as
Cassirer points out, to allcar the concrete meaning of a word, to become entirely separated from a later, more abstract waning; but, a# we have seen, this is not necessary, nor will we find that Aris totle in hie treatment of the meninge of "nature" falls into this error.
it. - bnivursale In significando
Ont common cri titiem of Aristotelian language is that it la ward-poor, Aristotle, it is said, u« a few words do the work of a great many; as
a
consequence, the ease word mans one thing hero, and thon again something different in the wary next sentence. This, it would wen, la loose writing and not at all adapted to rigo rous exposition of philosophy.toe consider this problem here because Aristotle*s use of nature Is one instance which falls undor the eaae general criti ci *a — to give to cm word so many meanings la to leave the doer open to confusion and id. sunderstending. To resolve this difficulty we shall first consider briefly what is meant by, and than give scan» few examples of,"universal in signifying”.
The word is defined in relation to the mind, for it i# a sign and Instrumental cause of the intellect. Therefore, to ju<L* of the fittingness of a word is to judge it after its masure, the Intellect. From the vary beginning of the ^rihewaenelas, St. Thomas does subs tantially tide, tie argues from the intellect to the word t if it be thus for the intellect, it must be thus for the word. The exterior word met correspond to the interior word or concept, language suited
